I have learned much from reading the many fine chapters in this book. However, it is not my intent to provide an integrative summary of them here. Rather, I shall present my views of the complex issues which are the focus of this book based upon my many years of relevant work (Deutsch, 1949, 1973, 1985, 1993, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c; Deutsch and Collins, 1952; Q. Wright, M.E. Evans, and M. Deutsch, 1962; Deutsch and Collins, 2000; Deutsch, Coleman, and Marcus, 2006) which has been informed by the writings of many scholars, including those who have contributed to this book.

This chapter is divided into five sections. In the first, I briefly discuss the distinctions among the types of relations between groups. In the second, I consider "constructive" and "destructive" processes involved in intergroup conflict. The third section is concerned with factors influencing the development of destructive, intractable conflict. In the fourth, I consider the processes that are involved in forgiveness and reconciliation after destructive conflict. And, in the concluding section, I offer some views about the implications of the preceding sections.

I. Types of Relations among Groups

The focus of this book, on reconciliation after destructive intergroup conflict, may lead the reader to the mistaken view that intergroup relations are primarily competitive or destructive. This is certainly not the case. Although I have not done any census of intergroup relations, a little reflection makes it evident that most groups have no relation with one another; they are independent of one another. Thus, I am a member of the Accabonac Tennis Club and a book club. These two groups have no relations apart from my membership in both. There are many more groups that are completely independent without even any common membership; e.g., a soccer team in Argentina and a kindergarten class in Germany.
Most groups have no relation to one another, apart from being human beings who exist on the same planet (and possibly in the same nation or locality). There are, of course, many groups who have, much more directly, interdependent or dependent relations with one another. The type of interdependency between groups varies along several dimensions, which include: cooperative-competitive; equal-unequal; importance of the relationship; duration of the relationship; substantive focus of the relationship. (For further discussion of dimensions of interdependence, see Deutsch, 1982, and Hofstede, 1980)

The focus in this book is on interdependent and important intergroup relations which have been competitive and destructive, of considerable duration, usually between groups of unequal power, involved in conflict about such issues of justice-injustice, control of land and other resources, political-economic power, identity, status, security and respect. The term “ingroup” refers to members of one’s own group and “outgroup” refers to members of other groups with whom one is competitively interdependent or who is used as a comparison group.

It is well to recognize that most interdependent group relations are not mainly competitive or destructive: assuming that they are leads to undue pessimism about intergroup relations. Most groups are part of larger systems – a university, an industrial organization, a hospital, an army, a nation. If these larger systems are to be effective enough to survive and thrive, the groups of which they are composed must be mainly cooperative even though some aspects of their relations are competitive. Usually, they are cooperative because of their common superordinate goal, survival of the larger system of which they are a component. In many of the chapters in this book, this is recognized by the emphasis on the importance of developing superordinate goals as part of the process of reconciliation between groups that have been engaged in a bitter destructive conflict.

I note that my discussion in the following sections of this chapter is meant to be quite general. I have sought to present my views about conflict so that they are applicable to conflict between groups of various sorts and sizes – between families, between groups within a community, between tribes, between ethnic groups and between nations as well as to interpersonal conflict. In doing so, I have ignored many of the
differences that exist when the conflict is between different types of groups. My emphasis is on the similarities across different types of groups, rather than the differences, so that the reader may have a general framework for thinking about intergroup conflict. This framework needs to be supplemented and enriched by specific particularities when considering any actual conflict.

II. Constructive and Destructive Processes Involved in Intergroup Conflict

In my book *The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes* (Deutsch, 1973), I presented a detailed characterization of the nature of such processes. The main point that I made was that a constructive process of resolving conflict is similar to a cooperative process of solving a mutual problem, the conflict being the mutual problem. In contrast, a destructive process is like a competitive struggle to win the conflict. Below, I summarize the main features of these two types of processes.

Cooperative relations (whether within or between groups), as compared with competitive ones, show more of the following positive characteristics:

1. Effective communication is exhibited. Ideas are communicated and members of the different groups are attentive to one another, accepting of the ideas of the others and influenced by them. They have fewer difficulties in communicating with or understanding others.

2. Friendliness, helpfulness, respect and less obstructiveness are expressed in their discussions. Members of the cooperating groups also are more satisfied with the relationship between the groups and their solutions as well as being favorably impressed by the contributions of the other group’s members. In addition, members of the cooperating groups rate themselves high in desire to win the respect of their colleagues and in a sense of obligation to the others.

3. The members of each group expect to be treated fairly by the other and feel obligated to treat the other fairly. In their relations to one another, justice is an important value.

4. Coordination of effort, division of labor, orientation to task achievement, orderliness in discussion and high productivity are manifested in the cooperating groups.
(if the solution of the conflict requires effective communication, coordination of effort, division of labor or sharing of resources).

5. Feeling of agreement with the ideas of others and a sense of basic similarity in beliefs and values, as well as confidence in one’s own ideas and in the value that other members attach to those ideas, are obtained in the cooperating groups.

6. Recognizing and respecting the others by being responsive to the other’s needs.

7. Willingness to enhance the other’s power (for example, the knowledge, skills, resources and so on) to accomplish the other’s goals increases. As the other group’s capabilities are strengthened, you are strengthened; they are of value to you as well as to the other. Similarly, the other is enhanced from your enhancement and benefits from your growing capabilities and power.

8. Attempts to influence the other rely on persuasion and positive inducements.

9. Defining conflicting interests as a mutual problem to be solved by collaborative effort facilitates recognizing the legitimacy of each other’s interests and the necessity to search for a solution responsive to the needs of all. It tends to limit rather than expand the scope of conflicting interests.

In contrast, a competitive process has the opposite effects:

1. Communication is impaired as the conflicting parties seek to gain advantage by misleading the other through use of false promises, ingratiating tactics and disinformation. It is reduced and seen as futile as they recognize that they cannot trust one another’s communications to be honest or informative.

2. Obstructiveness and lack of helpfulness lead to mutual negative attitudes and suspicion of each other’s intentions. One’s perceptions of the other tend to focus on the other’s negative qualities and ignore the positive.

3. Fairness to the other is not valued. Each group is willing to exploit or harm the other to advantage themselves.

4. The parties to the process are unable to divide their work, duplicating one another’s efforts such that they become mirror images; if they do divide the work, they feel the need to check continuously what the other is doing.
5. The repeated experience of disagreement and critical rejection of ideas reduces confidence in oneself as well as the other.

6. Attempts to influence the other often involve threats, coercion or false promises.

7. The conflicting parties seek to enhance their own power and to reduce the power of the other. Any increase in the power of the other is seen as threatening to oneself and one's group.

8. The competitive process stimulates the view that the solution of a conflict can be imposed only by one side on the other, which in turn leads to using coercive tactics such as psychological as well as physical threats and violence. It tends to expand the scope of the issues in conflict as each side seeks superiority in power and legitimacy. The conflict becomes a power struggle or a matter of moral principle and is no longer confined to a specific issue at a given time and place. Escalating the conflict increases its motivational significance to the participants and may make a limited defeat less acceptable and more humiliating than a mutual disaster.

9. As the conflict escalates, it perpetuates itself by such processes as autistic hostility, self-fulfilling prophecies and unwitting commitments. Autistic hostility involves breaking off contact and communication with the other; the result is that the hostility is perpetuated because one has no opportunity to learn that it may be based on misunderstandings or misjudgments, nor to learn if the other has changed for the better.

Self-fulfilling prophecies are those wherein you engage in hostile behavior toward another because of a false assumption that the other has done or is preparing to do something harmful to you; your false assumption comes true when it leads you to engage in hostile behavior that then provokes the other to react in a manner hostile to you. The dynamics of an escalating, destructive conflict have the inherent quality of a folie à deux, in which the self-fulfilling prophecies of each side mutually reinforce one another. As a result, both sides are right to think that the other is provocative, untrustworthy and malevolent. Each side, however, tends to be blind to how it as well as the other have contributed to this malignant process.

In the case of unwitting commitments, during the course of escalating conflict, the parties not only overcommit to rigid positions, but also may unwittingly commit to
negative attitudes and perceptions, beliefs, stereotypes of the other, defenses against the other's expected attacks and investments involved in carrying out their conflictual activities. Thus, during an escalated conflict, a person (a group, a nation) may commit to the view that the other is an evil enemy, the belief that the other is out to take advantage of oneself (one's group, nation), the conviction that one has to be constantly vigilant and ready to defend against the danger the other poses to one's vital interests and also invest in the means of defending oneself as well as attacking the other. After a protracted conflict, it is hard to give up a grudge, to disarm without feeling vulnerable, as well as to give up the emotional charge associated with being mobilized and vigilant in relation to the conflict.

III. The Development of Destructive Conflicts

Several of the preceding chapters in this book have referred to "Deutsch's Crude Law of Social Relations": The characteristic processes and effects elicited by a given type of social relationship also tend to elicit that type of social relationship.

Thus, cooperation induces and is induced by perceived similarity in beliefs and attitudes, readiness to be helpful, openness in communication, trusting and friendly attitudes, sensitivity to common interests and deemphasis of opposed interests, orientation toward enhancing each other's mutual power rather than power differences and so on. Similarly, competition induces and is induced by use of tactics of coercion, threat or deception; attempts to enhance the power differences between oneself and the other; poor communication; minimization of the awareness of similarities in values and increased sensitivity to opposed interests; suspicious and hostile attitudes; the importance, rigidity and size of issues in conflict; and so on.

In other words, if one has systematic knowledge of the effects of cooperative and competitive processes, one has systematic knowledge of the conditions that typically give rise to such processes and by extension to the conditions that affect whether a conflict takes a constructive or destructive course. My early theory of cooperation and competition is a theory of the effects of cooperative and competitive processes. Hence, from the Crude Law of Social Relations, it follows that this theory brings insight into the conditions that give rise to cooperative and competitive processes. The crude law further
suggests that enhancement of any correlate of cooperation (e.g., trusting and friendly attitudes) would enhance its other correlates (e.g., an orientation to enhancing one another's power). Similarly for competition, as any of its correlates are enhanced, this would lead to the enhancement of its other correlates.

My "crude law" would suggest that a competitive, destructive conflict would develop and endure, becoming an intractable conflict (See Coleman, 2003, 2004, 2006, and Coleman, et al., in press, for a comprehensive discussion of intractable conflicts), if the issues in conflict are or become of central importance to the parties involved and if such a conflict does not occur in a context of strong cooperative relations between the parties in conflict. There is evidence from research on primates and children (Roseth, 2006) as well as from observations of marital conflict that a flare-up of destructive conflict is often followed by reconciliation if the relationship is otherwise cooperative.

My crude law suggests that a destructive conflict can be initiated by many different causes:

1. Poor communication, which leads one to believe, mistakenly, that the other is preparing to take harmful, unjust actions or has initiated such actions, which threaten one's security, power, wellbeing, resources, reputation or identity. A past history of destructive intergroup conflict with the other predisposes one to such misunderstandings when there is little or poor communication between the groups.

2. Of course, accurate perceptions of the other's preparations for harmful, unjust actions is likely to lead to destructive conflict unless there are respected and powerful third parties who can successfully intervene to prevent, limit or mediate such conflicts.

3. The feeling of being treated unjustly, of being exploited and humiliated by the other (more powerful group) often create humiliation (Lindner, 2006), rage and a desire for revenge (in members of the less powerful group), which may lead to acts of violence against the perceived oppressor and humiliator. This, in turn, can stimulate fear and indignation in members of the more powerful group and lead to strong actions of counter-violence by them to intimidate and deter the rebellious and violent actions of the oppressed group.
4. Competition for superior rights to land, resources (e.g., oil, water, food, precious metals), power, status or achievement which cannot be shared equitably is often the instigation of destructive conflict. This is especially the case when the claim to superiority is central to one’s identity and esteem.

5. Negative stereotypes and attitudes as well as distrust of the other can be the initiators as well as the effects of destructive conflict. The history of past destructive conflicts and injustices is kept salient by the way history is taught in schools, by family legends, by the songs, stories and art in one’s group. The negative attitudes generated by frequent exposure to this history can magnify a minor incident so that it comes to be symbolically central to one’s identity and, hence, an instigator to major, destructive conflict.

Most protracted, intractable conflicts – no matter how they are initiated – come to have all of the characteristics described in the above points.

IV. Forgiveness and Reconciliation

After protracted, violent conflicts in which the conflicting parties have inflicted grievous harm (humiliation, destruction of property, torture, assault, rape, murder) on one another, the conflicting parties may still have to live and work together in the same communities. This is often the case in civil wars, ethnic and religious conflicts, gang wars and even family disputes that have taken a destructive course. Consider the slaughter that has taken place between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi (Staub, this volume); between blacks and whites in South Africa; between the “Bloods” and “Crips” of Los Angeles; the Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland; and among Serbs, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia. Is it possible for forgiveness and reconciliation to occur? If so, what fosters these processes?

There are many meanings of forgiveness in the extensive and growing literature concerned with this topic. I shall use the term to mean giving up the rage, the desire for vengeance and a grudge toward those who have inflicted grievous harm on you, your loved ones or the groups with whom you identify. It also implies willingness to accept the other into one’s moral community so that he or she is entitled to care and justice. As Borris (2003) has pointed out, it does not mean you have to forget the evil that has been
done, condone it or abolish punishment for it. However, it implies that the punishment should conform to the canons of justice and be directed toward the goal of reforming the harmdoer so that he or she can become a moral participant in the community.

There has been rich discussion in the psychological and religious literature of the importance of forgiveness to psychological and spiritual healing as well as to reconciliation (see Minow, 1998, and Shriver, 1995). Forgiveness is, of course, not to be expected in the immediate aftermath of torture, rape or assault. It is unlikely, as well as psychologically harmful, until one is able to be in touch with the rage, fear, guilt, humiliation, hurt and pain that has been stored inside. But nursing hate as well as "competition for victimhood" between the conflicting parties, keeps the injury alive and active in the present instead of permitting it to take its proper place in the past. Doing so consumes psychological resources and energy that are more appropriately directed to the present and future. Although forgiveness of the other may not be necessary for self-healing, it seems to be very helpful, as well as an important ingredient in the process of reconciliation.

A well-developed psychological and psychiatric literature deals with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Treatment of PTSD (Ochberg, 1988; Basoglu, 1992; Foa, Keane and Friedman, 2000) essentially (1) gives the stressed individuals a supportive, safe and secure environment (2) in which they can be helped to reexperience, in a modulated fashion, the vulnerability, helplessness, fear, rage, humiliation, guilt and other emotions associated with the grievous harm (medication may be useful in limiting the intensity of the emotions being relived), thus (3) helping him identify the past circumstances and contexts in which the harm occurred and distinguish current realities from past realities; (4) helping him understand the reasons for his emotional reactions to the traumatic events and the appropriateness of his reactions; (5) helping him acquire the skills, attitudes, knowledge and social support that make him less vulnerable and powerless; and (6) helping him develop an everyday life characterized by meaningful, enjoyable and supportive relations in his family, work and community.

The PTSD treatment just described is very appropriate for individuals suffering from this disorder. However, when many members of a group have developed this disorder as a result of destructive intergroup conflict, it requires considerable
supplementation. This entails work with the relations that exist among the members of the ingroups and the relations between the groups that were involved in the destructive conflict. As Kantowitz (2006, p. 1), has stated: “Current models of trauma, because they individualize, pathologize and decontextualize this phenomenon.” I do not have the space here to more than suggest what needs to be done. At the communal level, the chaos, the displacement and physical destruction, the poverty, unemployment, the continued social focusing on victimhood are some of the issues that must be addressed. At the intergroup level, constructive dialogue between representatives of the two groups, which enables both sides of a destructive conflict to come to an understanding of the conflict and its dynamics as well as its history and to learn that similar conflicts have occurred elsewhere (as Staub, this volume, has pointed out). Their dialogue must deal not only with the past, but also with issues relating to their present and future. (The chapters by Kelman and Staub are most relevant to the foregoing)

Forgiveness and reconciliation may be difficult to achieve at more than a superficial level unless the posttraumatic stress is substantially relieved. Even so, it is well to recognize that the processes involved in forgiveness and reconciliation may also play an important role in relieving PTSD. The causal arrow is multidirectional; progress in “forgiveness” or “reconciliation” or posttraumatic stress reduction facilitates progress in the other two.

There are two distinct but interrelated approaches to developing forgiveness. One centers on the victims, and the other on the relationship between the victims and the harmdoers. The focus on the victim, in addition to providing some relief from PTSD, seeks to help the victim recognize the human qualities common to victim and victimizer. In effect, various methods and exercises are employed to enable the victim to recognize the bad as well as good aspects of herself and her group, that she has “sinful” as well as “divine” capabilities and tendencies. In other words, one helps the victim become aware of herself as a total person – with no need to deny her own fallibility and imperfections – whose lifelong experiences in her family, schools, communities, ethnic and religious groups and workplaces have played a key role in determining her own personality and behavior. As the victim comes to accept her own moral fallibility, she is likely to accept
the fallibility of the harmdoer as well, and to perceive both the good and the bad in the other.

Both victims and harmdoers are often quite moral toward those they include in their own moral community, but grossly immoral to those excluded. Thus, Adolf Eichmann, who efficiently organized the mass murder of Jews for the Nazis, was considered a good family man. The New England captains of the slave ships, who transported African slaves to the Americas under the most abominable conditions, were often deacons of their local churches. The white settlers of the United States, who took possession of land occupied by native Americans and killed those who resisted, were viewed as courageous and moral within their own communities.

Recognition of the good and bad potential in all humans, the self as well as the other, facilitates the victim's forgiveness of the harmdoer. But it may not be enough. Quite often, forgiveness also requires interaction between the victim and harmdoer to establish the conditions needed for forgiving. This interaction sometimes takes the form of negotiation between the victim and harmdoer. A third party representing the community (such as a mediator or judge) usually facilitates the negotiation and sets the terms if the harmdoer and victim cannot reach an agreement. It is interesting to note that in courts, such negotiations are, sometimes, required in criminal cases before the judge sentences the convicted criminal.

Obviously, the terms of an agreement for forgiveness vary as a function of the nature and severity of the harm as well as the relationship between the victim and harmdoer. The victim may seek full confession, sincere apology, contrition, restitution, compensation, self-abasement or self-reform from the harmdoer. (For an excellent discussion of apology and other related issues, see Lazare, 2004). The victim may also seek some form of punishment and incarceration for the harmdoer. Forgiveness is most likely if the harmdoer and the victim accept the conditions, whatever they may be.

Reconciliation goes beyond forgiveness in that it not only accepts the other into one's moral community, but also establishes or reestablishes a positive, cooperative relationship among the individuals and groups estranged by the harms they have inflicted on one another. Borris (2003) has indicated: “Reconciliation is the end of a process that
forgiveness begins.” (For excellent discussions of reconciliation processes, see the earlier chapters in this book, particularly chapters by).

Earlier, I discussed in detail some of the factors involved in initiating and maintaining cooperative relations; that discussion is relevant to the process of reconciliation. Here, I wish to consider briefly some of the special issues relating to establishing cooperative relations after a destructive conflict. Below, I outline a number of basic principles.

1. Mutual security. After a bitter conflict, each side tends to be concerned with its own security, without adequate recognition that neither side can attain security unless the other side also feels secure. Real security requires that both sides have as their goal mutual security. If weapons have been involved in the prior conflict, mutually verifiable disarmament and arms control are important components of mutual security.

After violent conflict, fear that the other will violate an agreement to cease hostilities and will engage in violence again is slow to disappear. The intervention of powerful and respected third parties is often necessary to create confidence that the cessation of violence will be observed by both of the conflicting parties.

2. Mutual respect. Just as true security from physical danger requires mutual cooperation, so does security from psychological harm and humiliation (Lindner, 2006). Each side must treat the other with the respect, courtesy, politeness and consideration normatively expected in civil society. Insult, humiliation and inconsiderateness by one side usually leads to reciprocation by the other and decreased physical and psychological security.

Mutual respect requires the belief that justice will be established in the relations between the conflicting parties. Doing so will involve the elimination of superiority-inferiority in rights and privileges, as well as exploitation in the relations between the conflicting groups.

3. Humanization of the other. During bitter conflict, each side tends to develop negative stereotypes of and dehumanize the other, which justifies images of the other as an evil enemy (Oppenheimer, 2006). There is much need for both sides to experience one another in everyday contexts as parents, homemakers, schoolchildren, teachers and merchants, which enables them to see one another as human beings who are
more like themselves than not. Problem-solving workshops and dialogue groups along
the lines described by Burton (1969, 1987) and Kelman (1972) are also valuable in
overcoming dehumanization of one another.

4. Economic security. Basic supplies of food, shelter and medical care are	en often seriously impaired during violent conflict. This lack of these basics must be
addressed expeditiously if reconciliation is to be possible.

5. Education and the media. During a protracted, bitter conflict, the
educational system as well as the media within each of the conflicting parties are often
warped so that the ingroup members are taught to view the outgroup as an evil enemy and
to consider its own heroes to be those who are most effective in destroying the enemy. A
lasting reconciliation will require transformations in the educational system and the
media within each group to achieve three objectives: (a) a non-partisan view of the
conflict and its history which is understood and essentially agreed upon by both parties
(see Staub, this volume); (b) providing knowledge and support for non-violent
constructive methods of conflict resolution; and (c) developing a positive image of the
peace-makers and of peaceable persons.

6. Fair rules for managing conflict. Even if a tentative reconciliation has
begun, new conflicts inevitably occur – over the distribution of scarce resources,
procedures and values as well as perceived non-adherence to the terms of prior
agreements. It is important to anticipate that such conflicts will occur and to develop
beforehand the fair rules or laws, experts (such as mediators, arbitrators, conflict
resolvers), institutions (such as courts) and other resources (such as neutral peace-
keepers) for managing such conflicts constructively and justly.

7. Curbing the extremists on both sides. During a protracted and bitter
conflict, each side tends to produce extremists committed to the processes of the
destructive conflict as well as to its continuation. Attaining some of their initial goals
may be less satisfying than continuing to inflict damage on the other. It is well to
recognize that extremists stimulate extremism on both sides; it is an unwitting
cooperation to keep the destructive conflict going by the extremists on each side. The
parties need to cooperate in curbing extremism on their own side and restraining actions
that stimulate and justify extremist elements on the other side. This is often difficult to
do. Extremists will seek to provoke the other to engage in a destructive counteraction in
the expectation that their counter-response will justify the negative view of the other as
an evil enemy with whom one cannot have peaceful, cooperative relations. In so doing,
they will also try to discredit the moderates in their group as weak appeasers who are
helping the enemy.

8. Gradual development of mutual trust and cooperation. It takes repeated
experience of successful, varied, mutually beneficial cooperation to develop a solid basis
for mutual trust between former enemies. In the early stages of reconciliation, when trust
is required for cooperation, the former enemies may be willing to trust a third party (who
agrees to serve as a monitor, inspector or guarantor of any cooperative arrangement), but
not yet willing to trust one another if there is a risk of the other failing to reciprocate
cooperation. Also in the early stages, it is especially important that cooperative
endeavors be successful. This requires careful selection of the opportunities and tasks for
cooperation so that they are clearly achievable as well as meaningful and significant. As
many chapters in this book have indicated, the development of superordinate goals (such
as building a bridge, a school or a hospital that would benefit both groups) is often an
excellent way to develop cooperation.

I also suggest that it would be particularly useful to create cross-cutting groups
whose members have common identities as well as the identities arising from their
memberships in the reconciling conflicting groups. Here, for example, I am referring to
such groups as health care workers, from both sides, working together to treat patients
and to prevent diseases; as construction workers, from both sides, working together to
repair roads and bridges, to build houses, etc.; as educators working to develop joint
curricula, etc.; and as law-makers working together to develop fair laws and institutions.
Many other types of cross-cutting, cooperative groups could be listed. In the initial stage
of the development of such groups, it would undoubtedly be helpful if such groups had
respected third party facilitators who could help with the development of the cooperative
process and with the substantive issues (e.g., health care) on which the group will be
working. Levine and Campbell (1972) documented that destructive intergroup conflict is
more conducive in pyramidal-segmentary social structures within a society than the
cross-cutting structures proposed here.
V. Concluding Thoughts

After bitter destructive conflict, it can be expected that reconciliation will be achieved, if at all, after a slow process with many setbacks as well as advances. The continuous and persistent help and encouragement of powerful and respected third parties is often necessary to keep the reconciliation process moving forward and to prevent its derailment by extremists, misunderstandings or harmful actions by either of the conflicting parties. The help and encouragement must be multifaceted. It must deal, justly, not only with the social psychological issues addressed so well in this volume, but also, justly, with such institutions as the economic, political, legal, educational, health care and security, whose effective functioning are necessary for a sustained reconciliation.

Unfortunately, currently there is limited availability and willingness of powerful and respected third parties to offer the help that is needed to achieve reconciliation after bitter civil or international strife. I suggest that there is much need to develop stronger and more effective institutions within the United Nations, as well as in regional organizations, that can intervene in violent conflicts to bring about a cessation of hostilities and to facilitate a process of reconciliation. Such institutions could also function to develop ways to prevent potential violent conflict by early intervention when signs of a potentially dangerous conflict appear. The intervention can take the forms suggested in many of the chapters in this book.

Efforts to further reconciliation after bitter, violent conflict are important, but even more important is the prevention of such conflicts. As is true for many diseases, the prevention of the "social disease" of destructive conflict is easier and more effective than its treatment and remediation. Peck (1993), in a chapter on preventive diplomacy, has described how new regional conflict resolution centers (established under the auspices and direction of the U.N.) could provide preventive educational, mediation and early warning signs that could deter the development of bitter, destructive conflict. And I (Deutsch, 1994) have articulated a somewhat utopian proposal for what the United Nations, as well as the various institutions of national societies, could do to prevent destructive conflicts. These papers are suggestive efforts related to prevention which
need considerably more work by many more scholars and practitioners in the field of conflict resolution.
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