Awakening The Sense of Injustice*

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This paper is concerned with the sense of injustice of the victim and the victimizer. In it, I shall consider the conditions necessary for awakening the sense of injustice in these different participants in an unjust relationship. My discussion will focus on race relations in the United States, one of the major sources of injustice in North America, for illustrative purposes. Before turning to the major theme of the paper, it is relevant to consider the meaning of injustice.

The Meaning of Injustice

The concepts of "justice" and "injustice" have preoccupied moral philosophers, legal scholars, and social commentators throughout the ages. Although in preparation of this paper, I have examined some of the writings of the major philosophical and legal scholars in this area, I shall not attempt to review them here. Instead, I shall directly present my own views with the realization that they are heavily indebted to many who have thought more deeply about these issues than I.

In its essence, the concept of justice is concerned with the distribution of the conditions and goods which affect individual well-being. I use "well-being" broadly to include its psychological, physiological, economic, and social aspects. The sense of injustice with regard to the distribution of "benefits" and "harms", "rewards and costs", or other things which affect individual well-being may be directed at: (1) the values underlying the rules governing the distribution (injustice of values); (2) the rules which are employed to represent the values (injustice of rules); (3) the ways that the rules are implemented (injustice of implementation); or (4) the way decisions are made about any of the foregoing (injustice of decision-making procedures).

**Injustice of values.** Let us consider, for illustrative purposes, a teacher who has to distribute grades among the students in her classroom. There are various values she could use as a basis for her grading procedure: assign grades according to the final performance level of the student, according to the improvement in the student's performance during the year, according to the student's effort, according to the student's underlying aptitude, according to the needs of the students for good grades, and so on. Suppose she decides to assign grades based upon the principle that students should be rewarded in accordance with their effort. This value, itself, may become the focus of perceived injustice - not only by the students who are disadvantaged by it but also by others who prefer grades to be assigned according to different values.
Injustice of rules. Even if, by rare circumstance, the students and teacher completely agree on the principles to be employed in assigning grades (we shall later consider the conditions under which this is likely to occur), there may be lack of agreement on how these principles should be implemented. Thus, suppose "effort" is to be the basis for grading, shall it be judged by the number of pages in his term paper, the number of references he has employed, or the amount of weight he has lost in preparing his paper, or what? A student who has written a short paper but has done a lot of reading in preparing it may feel aggrieved if a student who has written a long paper based on little preparation gets a higher grade.

Injustice of implementation. Thirdly, the sense of injustice may be aroused by the implementation of the accepted rules. This might occur for example, with a teacher who says she is going to grade according to effort, but, in fact, grades so as to give preference to students whose parents have helped them with their school work.

Injustice of decision-making procedures. Finally, even if a student feels that substantially he has been benefitted by the teacher's grading procedure (he has gotten a good grade), he may feel an injustice in the procedures by which the values, rules, or specific grades were determined. He may, for example, believe that the students rather than the teacher should select the principles and rules for assigning grades and should also make the assignment of grades. For him, the injustice lies in the methods by which the decisions are made rather than in the substance of the decisions.
There is much social psychological research which would suggest that this last-mentioned type of injustice is the most fundamental. The research to which I am referring indicates that people are more apt to accept decisions and their consequences if they have participated in making them. Although participation in the decisions which affect one's well-being helps to legitimize such decisions, particularly in a society with democratic values, this is by no means the only source of legitimacy for the decision-making procedures involved in the distribution of benefits and harms. Legitimacy can also be derived from such factors as tradition, authority, or respect for the decision-maker's expertness or power. However, whenever it is perceived that the decision-making procedures are themselves not legitimately based, then the values, rules and specific practices in distributing rewards and costs will all come into question. Whether a student receives a high or low grade, it will be difficult for him to accept it if it is given by someone who he considers to have no right to grade him.

The values involved in "justice". In the scholarly discussions of the substantive values which underlie distributive justice, a number of key values have been repeatedly identified. Justice has been viewed as consisting in the treatment of all people:

1. as equals
2. so that they have equal opportunity to compete without external favoritism or discrimination
3. according to their ability
4. according to their efforts
5. according to their accomplishments
6. according to their needs
7. according to the supply and demand of the market place
8. according to the requirements of the common good
9. according to the principle of reciprocity
It is evident that these different values may conflict with one another: the most needy may not be the most able, those who work the hardest may not accomplish the most, equal opportunity may not lead to equal reward, treating everyone as equals may not maximize the common good.

Among the many conflicting values for defining "justice" are there any that have a claim for an inherent or natural priority? Is there anything in the nature of man in society that connects justice to one rather than another set of values so that men will always react with a sense of injustice until the social order exemplifies these values of natural justice? Such questions as these have preoccupied scholars, throughout history, and so far no completely satisfying answer has been given. I do not have one to offer either.

The natural values of justice. However, as a social psychologist concerned with both individuals and groups, let me suggest that there is usually a positive, circular relation between the well-being of the individuals in a group (or society) and the well-functioning of that group: the more satisfied the individuals are, the better their group functions and vice versa. There are exceptions, of course; and my generalization is: re true for groups that don't have to deal with radically changing environments. Nevertheless, this proposition suggests that justice is intrinsically concerned with the individual well-being and societal functioning. The "natural values of justice" are, thus, the values which foster effective social cooperation and promote individual well-being. Here, I am using the term "cooperation" broadly to include working out ways of not interfering with or
bothering each other and also developing accepted procedures for engaging in conflict and competition.

It is evident that the specific ways of interrelating so as to foster social cooperation most effectively to promote individual well-being (and, in my view, a "just world" will do this) depends upon the external circumstances confronting the group and upon the specific characteristics of the individuals composing it. Thus, the distributive values operative in a "just world" will and should depend upon circumstances: under some conditions distributing rewards according to individual need will be more "just" and, under other conditions, allocating in terms of individual productivity will be more so. Similarly, the use of "group quotes" may be viewed as an unjust practice when it is used to exclude and thus to discriminate against members of disadvantaged groups but considered a desirable practice when used to include and to prevent continued discrimination against a group that has been previously subjected to bias.

The foregoing is not meant to imply that "justice" is completely situational. There are undoubtedly some minimal conditions of individual well-being and human dignity which are necessary to sustain continued cooperative participation in a group's activities and vice versa. The standards for determining "minimality" are both absolute and relative: an individual can survive physically with a certain minimum of food and shelter but, perhaps, not psychologically if that minimum is below the socially defined level of "livability". Similarly, the minimum standard of human dignity and for the will to live competently are both absolute and relative. An individual can tolerate only a certain degree of inconsistency, rejection, isolation, abuse, or terror from his group before he no longer will be willing or competent to cooperate; his threshold of tolerance for such practices will undoubtedly decrease if he sees that others are not treated similarly.
Earlier, I proposed that "justice" requires effective social cooperation. There are undoubtedly some minimal conditions of social order and group integrity that are necessary to individual well-being and human dignity. Pain, drug addiction, thievery, civil disorder and violence, are often prevalent in societies that are characterized by lack of planning, ineffectual leadership, chaotic organization, poorly developed communication networks, insufficient allocation of resources to the development and utilization of its productive capabilities. Compare, as an example, the well-being and dignity of the average person in China today and a century ago. Just as one finds that emotional stress and disturbances are most prevalent in those areas of society which are the most neglected and most poorly organized — i.e., among the old, the poor, the victimized — so one would expect that physical disorder and emotional disturbance would be most prevalent in ineffectual, disorganized societies.

The scope of justice. My preceding discussion has limited the concept of justice so that it is applicable only to social relations or social systems in which there is perceived to be at least a minimal degree of actual, normatively expected or potential cooperation. Thus, unless one shares Albert Schweitzer's reverence for all living creatures, one would not feel it to be unjust if one killed an annoying mosquito or caught a fish to eat for dinner. Similarly, "justice" is not involved in relations with others — such as heathens, "inferior races", heretics, "perverts" — who are perceived to be outside and potential moral community or opposed to it. An implication of this line of reasoning is that the narrower one's conception of one's
community, the narrower will be the scope of situations in which one's action will be governed by considerations of justice. It has been reported that Eichmann, the mass murderer of the Jews in the Nazi era, was a good family man. Similarly, the New England captains of the ships that raided the African coasts for slaves and transported them to the Americas under the most brutal conditions were commonly leaders of their local churches.

On the other hand, if one takes all mankind as one's community, it is evident that the scope of applicability of one's concepts of justice will be wide: as wide as those advanced by the most moral philosophers who have written from a universalistic rather than parochial perspective. A still wider scope of applicability is inherent, as I have suggested above, in the Schweizerian "reverence for life". The widest scope is perhaps the one contained in the perspective which views all of nature as one community.

Cooperation and justice. Is it unduly limiting to restrict the concept of justice to situations in which there is at least a minimal degree of actual or potential cooperation? Cannot injustice occur even in bitter combat between deadly enemies? In my view, it can only occur in such a situation if the enemies exist within a community which has defined the rules and procedures for the conduct of the struggle, for example, in a duel of honor. The broader community may feel that the way the struggle is being conducted may threaten general well-being or undermine values which are important to the maintenance of the community.
To sum up, the concept of justice is concerned with the distribution of the conditions and goods which affect the well-being of the individual members of a group or community. The essential values of justice are those values which foster effective social cooperation to promote individual well-being. It is evident that particular socio-historical circumstances will play a role in determining the individual and social effectiveness of the many alternative, possible values which could be employed as a basis for the distribution of benefits and harms. Nevertheless, there are undoubtedly minimal conditions of individual well-being and dignity which are essential to effective social cooperation as well as minimal conditions of social order and coherence which are necessary to individual well-being. The sense of injustice can be aroused in relation to the values underlying the distribution of benefits and harms, the rules by which the values are operationalized, the implementation of the rules, or the procedures for determining which values, rules, or practices shall be employed. The scope of applicability of one’s concepts of justice, it was suggested, is determined by the scope of one’s perceived community.
The Differential Sensitivity To Injustice Of The Victim And The Victimizer

Bierce, in The Devil's Dictionary, has defined injustice as "a burden which of all those that we load upon others and carry ourselves is lightest in the hands and heaviest upon the back." Everyday language, similarly, in referring to injustice suggests that injustice is "suffered" by the victim, not the victimizer. Although it may be morally "better to be sinned against than to sin", it is generally accepted that the immediate pain is usually greater for the one who is sinned against than for the sinner.

In this section, I wish to consider briefly why there is this asymmetry in the sensitivity to injustice and also why of the circumstances in which the asymmetry is reversed: when the victim identifies with the victimizer and the victimizer identifies with the victim. The explanation for the asymmetry seems straightforward. The victims usually have relatively little power compared to the victimizers; the latter are more likely to set the terms of their relationship and, through their control of the State and other social institutions, to establish the legal and other reigning definitions of "justice".

Thus, the victimizers - in addition to their gains from their exploitative actions - commonly have the reassurance of the official definitions of justice and of the support of such major social institutions as the church, the press, and the schools to deaden their sensitivities to the injustices inherent in their relations with the victim. The victim, of course, be "taken in" by the official definitions and the indoctrination emanating from social institutions and, as a result, lose his...
sensitivity to his situation of injustice. However, the victim is less likely than the victimizer to lose his sensitivity to injustice because he is the one who is experiencing the negative consequences due to the injustice. He is also less likely to feel committed to the official definitions and indoctrinations because of his lack of participation in creating them.

The explanation of the differential sensitivity in terms of differential gains and differential power is not the complete story. There are, of course, relations in which the victimizer is not of superior power and yet, even so, he will not experience guilt for his actions. Consider a traffic accident in which a car hits a pedestrian. The driver of the car will usually perceive the accident so as to place responsibility for it upon the victim. Seeing the victim as responsible will enable the driver to maintain a positive image of himself. Projecting the blame on to the victim enables the victimizer to feel blameless.

If we accept that most people try to maintain a positive conception of themselves, we can expect a differential sensitivity to injustice in those who experience pain, harm, or misfortune and those who cause it. If I try to think well of myself, I shall minimize my responsibility for any injustice that is connected with me or minimize the amount of injustice which has occurred if I cannot minimize my responsibility. On the other hand, if I am the victim of pain or harm, to think well of myself, it is necessary for me to believe that it was not my due; it is not a just destiny for a person of my good character. Thus, the need to maintain positive self-esteem leads to opposite reactions in those who have caused an injustice and those who suffer from it.
Although the need to maintain a positive self-regard is common, it is not universal. The victim of injustice, if he views himself favorably, may be outraged by his experience and attempt to undo it; in the process of so doing, he may have to challenge the victimizer. If the victimizer is more powerful than he, and has the support of the legal and other institutions of the society, he will realize that it would be dangerous to act on his outrage or even to express it. Under such circumstances, in a process which Anna Freud (1937) labelled "identification with the aggressor", the victim may control his dangerous feelings of injustice and outrage by denying them and by internalizing the derogatory attitudes of the victimizer toward himself.

Thus, he will become in Levin's terms (1935) a self-hater who attributes blame for his victimization upon himself or his group. If he attributes the blame to his group, he often will seek to dissociate himself from it and to ingratiate himself with the victimizers in order to curry favor and avoid blame. These reactions are defensive and, not uncommonly, the defenses are directly inculcated by parents in their children. As Grier and Cobbs (1968, p.172) point out: "Black mothers say as they punish rebellious sons: 'I'd rather kill him myself than let the white folks get him. He's got to learn.'" Such child-rearing practices among blacks - a residue from slavery when black children, in order to survive, had to be taught to view themselves as worthy only to be a slave. Child-rearing practices are slow to change. Nevertheless, training for masochistic submission and for identification with the oppressor seems less prevalent than it was earlier in this century. Blacks, Jews, women, and
other oppressed groups have begun to learn that they are not as powerless and weak as they thought and that their psychological situation is improved by teaching self-respect rather than self-abasement.

Just as the victim can identify with the oppressor, a member of the oppressing group can identify with the victim. There are political, social, and psychological factors which predispose to an "identification with the underdog." In a political struggle among different factions of a ruling group, one of the factions may seek to increase its political power by obtaining the allegiance of an oppressed group, by identifying with its interests, and by using the injustices perpetrated against it as a means of weakening the position of the ruling clique and displacing it. Examples of this are legion in domestic politics in the United States and elsewhere. Despite the political opportunism which may give rise to the "identification with the underdog," it can heighten the awareness of injustice among the oppressors by the increased political and intellectual attention paid to it: injustice fares poorly in the spotlight.
Some clues as to the social factors which predispose to a sympathetic attitude toward the underdog are revealed in White Attitudes Toward Black People (Campbell, 1971). Whites are more sympathetic to blacks if: they were born in the East or West rather than in the South or Midwest; they live in a city rather than on a farm or in a small town; their ancestors were Irish or Italian rather than Polish; they are not religious or Jewish rather than Catholic or Protestant; they have higher rather lower incomes; they went to college during the past twenty years rather than having not gone to college at all or having gone at an earlier period. Least favorable attitudes of whites toward blacks are found among whites who feel a threat to their status, economic position, or general welfare from the advancement of blacks.

Most favorable attitudes are found among those who have relatively secure socio-economic positions, have been exposed to the influence of the social sciences during their college days, and have had non-threatening equal status contacts with blacks.

Although the findings just cited are in relation to white attitudes toward black people, it seems to be more generally true that the willingness to question and challenge the ideologies and practices of ruling oppressive groups is more likely to rise from those: (1) whose social positions do not make them feel threatened; (2) whose ages and social positions are such that are not deeply ensnared in the existing organization of society; (3) whose backgrounds are such that they have been sensitized to the meaning of injustice by having been exposed to it as members of a minority group; and (4) whose education or social milieu has revealed to them new real
of thinking about society that appear to provide better ways of organizing society than those traditionally supported. As has been well-documented, the typical revolutionary of the past two centuries has been of middle-class origin, with better education than most, often in a marginal social-economic position which is not commensurate with his education, and frequently is a marginal ethnic group that has little reason to feel a commitment to the traditionalistic ideology and practices of the dominant groups in the society.

Personality, as well as political opportunism and social position, can predispose to identification with the underdog. Christian Bay (1967, p.90) after surveying the research literature on student activists and conformists came to the following conclusions:

The more secure and sheltered a person's infancy and childhood, and the more freedom that educational and other social processes has given him to develop according to his inner needs and potentialities, the more likely that a capacity for political rationality and independence will develop, simply because the likelihood of severe anxieties is relatively low. In addition, the better the individual has been able to resolve his own anxieties, the more likely that he will empathize with others less fortunate than himself. A sense of justice as well as a capacity for rationality is, according to this theory, a likely development in relatively secure individuals, whose politics, if any, will therefore tend toward the left - toward supporting the champions of the underdog, not the defenders of established, always unjust, institutions. And young people, with the proverbial impetuousness of youth, are likely to seek extremes of social justice, or militant means, simply because their emotions, and more particularly their sense of elementary morality and justice, have not yet been dulled by daily compromises and defeats to the extent that most older persons' emotions have been.

Sales (1970) describes a somewhat different personality type that is also characterized by identification with the underprivileged. This type is depicted as a somewhat passive, likeable individual who is concerned about the lack of emotional supportiveness and warmth in his environment. He blames this on an autocratic authority oriented toward power rather than nurturance. His own aggressive and power needs
are inhibited except as they are indirectly expressed in criticism and lack of trust of authority. His self-conception and his conscious wishes are on the positive altruistic side toward the underprivileged. In Bales' terms (1970, p.373) "He wants a bloodless revolution - a compassionate reform". His vulnerability is his innocence: his innocence of his own repressed aggressiveness toward authority and his innocence of the hostility among the underprivileged. In his "innocence" to foster greater egalitarianism in his society, he may join with leadership of the radical left and then be dismayed by its aggressive, militant, and often autocratic character. Bales characterizes this type of person as being relatively stable and mature, with relatively low sense of internal conflict.

Other, more pathological types of identification with the underdog, have been described by psychoanalytically oriented writers. One type is characterized by a pervasive sense of guilt and deeply-rooted masochistic tendencies (Fenichel, 1945). In its extreme form, this type of person feels guilty in relation to any injustice anywhere and in an attempt to undo his guilt he sacrifices himself by identifying with the victims of injustice. The self-defeating, pathological quality of this type is reflected in his need to have the victim remain in a state of being victimized so that he can continue to feel guilty and continue to sacrifice himself. Despite his outward sympathies, he is neurotically attached to the status-quo and social change would be threatening to him. Another type is the left-wing authoritarian personality (Adorno, et al, 1950). Like their right-wing counterparts, they perceive the world as made up of a glorified in-group and denounced out-groups, hierarchically arranged by power relationships. They constant
establish warm human relationships and adopt a moralistic condemnatory attitude toward those who differ from them. The right-wing authoritarian takes the "establishment" as its in-group while the left-wing authoritarian takes the anti-establishment as in-groups and reference-groups and these are often perceived to be the groups who are oppressed by the establishment. The left-wing authoritarian is opposed to social reforms that would lessen the degree of difference and opposition between the "haves" and "have-nots" since his psychological interest is not so much in a "just society" as it is in overthrowing those in power as an end in itself. On in doing this and also becoming part of the establishment in an authoritarian, hierarchically-organized society. The pathology lies in the continuous need to rebel and in the need to replace one form of authoritarianism with another; the needs of the oppressed group are subordinated to these inner compulsions.
Conditions That Awaken and Intensify The Sensitivity To Injustice

In this section we are concerned with understanding the conditions that awaken and intensify the sensitivity to injustice. In the social science literature, discussion of this topic has centered almost exclusively on the victim's sense of injustice. There has been a neglect of the victimizer: few attempts have been made to understand the conditions which make him feel his actions are unjust. I shall discuss both, with the realization that more is known about the former than the latter.

The sensitivity to injustice of the victim.

The major explanatory theme advanced by social scientists for the sensitivity to injustice among victims is that of deprivation. It is commonly assumed that it is relative rather than absolute deprivation that is critical in stimulating dissatisfaction. Research has indicated that people who are well-off by absolute standards may feel more discontent than those who are much worse off, if they feel relatively more deprived as a result of being surrounded by people who are even more well-off than they are.

Currently, there are two somewhat different usages of the term "relative deprivation". One usage, which is derived from Loevin's level of aspiration theory, (see Deutsch, 1957, for a summary) places its emphasis upon the discrepancy between the individual's aspirations and his attainments. The other usage, which is derived from the concept of reference groups developed by Hyman, Merton, and Stouffer, (see Deutsch and Krauss 1959, for a summary) focusses upon the discrepancy between the individual's
attainments and the attainments of others that he uses as references to compare himself with. These two usages are not contradictory and, in fact, in Lewinian discussions of factors determining the level of aspiration there is explicit mention of the standards of groups that an individual employs for comparison; these standards, it is asserted, are derived from the groups to which the individual belongs as well as other groups that he employs as models for establishing standards.

Consonant with the Lewinian tradition, I shall employ "relative deprivation" as the perceived discrepancy between what a person obtains and what he believes he is entitled to obtain in the distribution of the opportunities, conditions, and goods which affect his welfare.

It is useful to distinguish such separate value areas of relative deprivation as personal liberty, personal dignity, political participation, education, income, housing, police protection, community services, and social status. This listing is by no means all-inclusive. The total amount of relative deprivation would be the weighted sum of the relative deprivation in each of the separate areas; each area would be weighted by its importance to the individual and by its salience. "Importance" can be defined as the strength of the desire to get what one thinks one is entitled to in the given area. "Salience" is the prominence of the area in one's thinking. This is determined by the relevance of the value area to the immediate situation and how much greater the magnitude of relative deprivation in this area is than the average relative deprivation in all areas (each area being weighted by its importance).
One of the major determinants of the arousal of the sense of injustice is the total magnitude of relative deprivation: the greater the magnitude of relative deprivation the more likely and the more intense will be the arousal of the sense of injustice. The intensity of the sense of injustice is also undoubtedly influenced by the prior experience and future anticipations of relative deprivation. I suggest that it will be more intense the more sharply the relative deprivation has increased in the recent past and the more sharply it is expected to increase in the future; it will be less intense the more sharply it has decreased in the recent past and the more sharply it is expected to decrease in the future. Thus, I propose that the sense of injustice is determined by the perceived current magnitude of relative deprivation and the perception of how it is changing.

I turn now to a consideration of some of the conditions which affect these perceptions. The magnitude of total relative deprivation can be affected by influencing any of its value components in any of several ways. One can influence: (1) what the individual believes he is entitled to with respect to that value; (2) what he obtains of it; (3) its importance; and (4) its salience. It is evident that relative deprivation can be increased by either increasing what the individual perceives he has a right to or by decreasing what he gets. Similarly, the intensity of the sense of injustice can be decreased either by increasing what a person gets or by decreasing what he thinks he ought to receive. Also, by increasing the perceived importance and salience of the values in which the individual feels a discrepancy between what he is getting and what he is entitled to, one can heighten his sense of injustice. Due to space and time limitations, I shall only consider here a person’s conception of what he has a right to expect and obtain.
Conditions affecting the conception of what one is entitled to.

An individual's conception of what he is entitled to is determined by at least four major kinds of influence: (1) the ideologies and myths about justice that are dominant and officially supported in his society; (2) his amount of exposure to ideologies and myths which conflict with those that are officially supported and are supportive of larger claims for him; (3) experienced changes in his satisfaction -dissatisfactions; (4) his knowledge of what others who are viewed as comparable to him are getting; and (5) his bargaining power.

The influence of ideologies and myths. The official ideology and myths of any society help to define and justify the values which are distributed to the different positions within the society and, thus, to codify for the individual what a person in his position can legitimately expect. Examples are legion of how official ideology and myth limit or enhance one's views of what one is entitled to. The American poor offer an instance of the potency of myth in creating an identity which promotes docility in the face of deprivation (Edelman, 1971). Americans are taught by their schools, the mass media, and their political rhetoric that America is the land of equal opportunity. Given such a pervasive indoctrination, the poor are apt to attribute their condition to their own failings. This view of themselves as unworthy is further supported by cues from governmental practices toward them which place in question their morality, ambition, and competence. As a result, the poor in America have typically been meek and acquiescent, requiring less coercion and less in benefits than has been true in other developed countries. Analogously, the ideology and myth of white supremacy has led whites to expect that they
were entitled to deferential behavior from blacks and blacks to expect that they were not entitled to equal treatment from whites. Similarly, men and women under the influence of a sexist mythology and ideology defined gender entitlements that gave the woman supremacy in the narrow confines of the kitchen and the nursery while the men had supremacy in the broad world outside the home as well as in many areas within.

It is difficult not to accept the official myths and ideology of one's society even if they are to one's disadvantage unless: (1) There is a breakdown of consensual norms and the inability or unwillingness of the ruling elite to act in such a way as to restore these norms. This is likely to occur during a period of rapid social change or intra-societal conflict, either of which could bring into question the legitimacy of traditional myths and values. (2) There is a failure of the society to deliver the entitlements that it has defined as legitimate for one's position so that the magnitude of one's relative deprivation is increased. This could be due to natural or social disasters which worsen the conditions of daily life. Or, (3) there is exposure to new ideologies and new examples that are accepted as legitimate by many people, which stimulate consciousness of new and better possibilities for oneself. This could happen as the result of increased communication due to new technological developments such as books, newspapers, radio and television, or it may reflect an increased urbanization and the resulting exposure to more diversity of people, ideas, and experience. Obviously, one would expect that the receptivity to new ideologies and examples would be heightened by the breakdown of legitimacy of the existing ideology and by the worsening of one's own living conditions.
Experienced changes in satisfactions-dissatisfactions. Modifications in the conception of what one is entitled to derive not only from alterations in the ideology and myths that one accepts but also from changes in one's experiences of satisfactions. A period of gain creates expectations about further improvement. As De Tocqueville in L'Ancien Régime (1747, p.186) has commented: "Only a great genius can save a prince who undertakes to relieve his subjects after a long oppression. The evil, which was suffered patiently as inevitable, seems unendurable as soon as the idea of escaping from it is conceived. All the abuses then removed seem to throw into greater relief those which remain, so that their feeling is more painful."

Many social scientists, before and after De Tocqueville, have written insightfully about the "revolution of rising expectations" to explain the paradox that social discontent and even revolutionary activity is more likely to occur after social conditions have improved, when there is rising hope not bleak despair. The explanation is generally along two major lines. First, improvement of social conditions increases aspirations by increasing what is perceived to be possible to attain. Demand may increase at a faster rate than the actual gains received, with a resulting increase in relative deprivation and in the sense of injustice. The increased discontent is most likely to occur if the gains are discontinued or reversed after the initial gains have heightened future expectations (Davies, 1962). Pettigrew (1964, 1967), as well as many others, has suggested that the Negro protests for change in the United States in the 1960's reflected this dynamic. A rapid betterment of the social situation of the Negroes during and after World War II resulted in a sharp rise in
expectations which led to increasing discontent and protest as these expectations were frustrated by a slow-down and even reversal of relative social and economic gains in the 1960's.

The second explanation of the effects of gains is similar to that advanced by de Tocqueville. Namely, the increase is not uniform in all areas in which the victimized are disadvantaged. Improvement in one area, such as education, only makes one more sensitive to the injustice one is experiencing in other areas such as employment, police protection, and housing. Many social scientists have advanced the proposition that status-disequilibrium (such that there are differences in one's relative statuses in income, education, social prestige, and the like) is a source of tension and discontent. Thus, for this reason as well as for others advanced above in the discussion of exposure to new experience, a very effective way of enhancing the sense of injustice of the victimized is to increase their education and little else.

Comparing oneself to others.

Alterations in the conception of what one is entitled to result not only from changes in the level of satisfaction but also from modifications in one's views either about how comparable others are being treated or about who should be considered as comparable. There is considerable research evidence that one's emotions are very much influenced by one's perceptions of these attributes in others who are used for comparison purposes. (see Pettigrew, 1967, for a summary). Thus, it is not surprising that one's views of what one is entitled to will be affected by what happens to comparable others. If the firemen in New York City get a salary increase, the policemen will
certainly feel that they are entitled to one also. Although the evidence is by no means conclusive, it has been suggested by Festinger (1954), Gurr (1970), and others that comparison tends to be primarily with similar others and Gurr further suggests that the comparison will be with the similar other whose gains are most rapid. Thus, if someone else who is perceived to be similar is already better off then one will feel it is unjust and if, in addition, he has a rapid advance in status, salary, or the like one would experience a substantial increase in relative deprivation unless one had a comparable increase. This proposition implies that a person selects among similar others for comparison so as to justify a maximum increase in one's own entitlements. This is most likely to occur when one's perceived bargaining power is high or when one's alienation is high so that one wishes to maximize the sense of injustice. In any case, a potent way of arousing the sense of injustice is to make the victim more aware that comparable others are being treated better or to increase his feeling that it is appropriate to compare himself with others that he previously considered to be incomparable to himself.

**Increasing the victim's bargaining power.**

One's perceived bargaining power is undoubtedly a factor determining what one is entitled to and with whom one compares oneself to establish one's entitlements. If a victim or victimized group is dealing with an unresponsive exploitative group, it is faced either with the possibility of resigning into apathy and depression or attempting to increase its bargaining power sufficiently to compel the other to negotiate. Bargaining power is increased by either of two means:
increasing one's own power or decreasing the other's power. Attempts to change power can be directed at altering the resources which underlie power (such as wealth, physical strength, organization, knowledge, skill, trust, respect, and affection) or it can be directed toward modifying the effectiveness with which the resources of power are employed. Potential power may not be converted into effective power because those who possess such power may not be aware of their power, or they may not be motivated to use it, or they may use their power inefficiently and unskillfully so that much potential power is wasted. Thus, effective power depends upon the following key elements: (1) the control or possession of resources to generate power; (2) the awareness of the resources one possesses or controls; (3) the motivation to employ these resources to influence others; (4) skill in converting the resources into usable power; and (5) good judgment in employing this power so that its use is appropriate in type and magnitude to the situation in which it is used.

By operating on one or more of the key elements listed above a victimized, low power group can work to increase its own power or to decrease the power of the high power group opposing it. There are, of course, endless ways in which each of the key elements can be affected; which of the ways are suitable to employ at any given time will be determined by particular circumstances. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that victimized groups generally lack control over the resources such as money, guns and official position which are immediately related to economic, military, and political power. Their primary resources are discontented people and having "justice" on their side.

The utility of people as a resource of power is a function of their number, their personal qualities (such as their knowledge, skill, dedication, and discipline) their social cohesion (as reflected in mutual trust, mutual liking, mutual values and mutual goals), and their social
Organization (as expressed in effective coordination and communication, division of labor and specialization of function, planning and evaluation). Numbers of people are obviously important but undoubtedly not as important as their personal qualities, social cohesion, and social organization. A large, inchoate mass of undisciplined ineffectual people are at the mercy of a small, dedicated, disciplined, well-organized, cohesive group. Most large groups are controlled by less than 10 percent of their membership.

If one examines such low power minority groups as the Jews, Chinese, and Japanese that have done disproportionately well in the United States and in other countries to which they have migrated, it is apparent that these groups have been characterized by high social cohesion and effective social organization combined with an emphasis upon the development of such personal qualities as skill, dedication, and discipline. Similarly, the effectiveness of such guerrilla forces as the Vietcong has been, in part, due to their cohesion, social organization, and personal dedication. Clearly, the development of these characteristics is of prime importance as a means of increasing the power of one's group.

Elsewhere (Deutsch, in preparation), I have considered some of the determinants of cohesion. Here I add that groups become cohesive by formulating and working together on issues that are specific, immediate, and realizable. They become effectively organized as they plan how to use their resources to achieve their purposes and as they evaluate their past effectiveness in the light of their experiences. It is apparent that the pursuit of vague, far-in-the-future, grandiose objectives will not long sustain a group's cohesiveness. Nor will the exclusive pursuit of a single issue be likely to sustain a long-endurin
group unless that issue proliferates into many subissues. Those intent upon developing social cohesion and social organization should initially seek out issues that permit significant victories quickly; they will set out on a protracted indeterminate struggle only after strongly cohesive and effective social organizations have been created.

So far, I have stressed "personal qualities", "social cohesion", and "social organization", as resources that can be developed by low power groups to enhance their power. Typically, such resources are vastly underdeveloped in victimized groups; however, they are necessary to the effective utilization of almost every other type of resource including money, votes, tools, force, and the like. Low power groups often have two other key assets which can be used to amplify their other resources: "discontent" and the "sense of injustice". If intense enough, these may provide the activating motivation and the continuing determination to change the status-quo. They are the energizers for individual and social action to bring about change. Moreover, to the extent that the basis for discontent and the nature of the injustice can be communicated to others so that they experience it, if only vicariously, then supporters and allies will be attracted to the side of the low power group. And increasing the number of one's supporters and allies is another important way of increasing one's power. Thus, in a circular way, "bargaining another power" and the "sense of injustice" mutually reinforce one; an increase in one increases the other.

Discontent and the sense of injustice may be latent rather than manifest in a subordinated group. Neither the consciousness of oneself as victimized or disadvantaged nor the consciousness of being a member of a class of disadvantaged may exist psychologically. If this be the case, "consciousness-raising" tactics are necessary precursors to the
developing of group cohesion and social organization. The diversity of "consciousness-raising" tactics have been illustrated by the variety of techniques employed in recent years by "women liberation" groups and "black power" groups. They range from quasi-therapeutic group discussion meetings, through mass meetings and demonstrations, to dramatic confrontations of those in the high power groups. It is likely that a positive consciousness of one's disadvantaged identity is most aroused when one sees someone, who is considered to be similar to oneself, explicitly attacked or disadvantaged and sees him resist successfully or overcome the attack: their resistance reveals simultaneously the wound and its cure.

By raising to consciousness the discontent and sense of injustice, a powerful and persisting energy for change is activated. If this energy can be harnessed through skilled and disciplined action by dedicated individuals in effectively organized, cohesive groups then a very powerful instrument for social change has been forged and the situation of the "low power" group has been radically altered. It is now in a position to offer significant positive or negative incentives to those in high power. The positive incentives are those deriving from enhanced cooperation, while the negative incentives are those of non-cooperation, harrassment, obstruction, or destruction.

Negative incentives are the losses that the high power group or "haves" expect to experience as a consequence of a power struggle with the low power group or "have-nots". As Alinsky (1971, p.152) has pointed out: "The basic tactic in warfare against the Haves is a mass political jujitsu: the Have-Not's do not rigidly oppose the Haves, but yield in such planned and skilled ways that the superior strength of the Haves become their own undoing." As in physical jujitsu, the inertia, momentum,
and imbalance of the adversary are used as weapons against him.

Thus, as Alinsky further suggests, "...since the Haves publicly
pose as the custodians of responsibility, morality, law and justice
(which are frequently strangers to each other), they can be constantly
pushed to live up to their own book of morality and regulations.
No organization, including organized religion can live up to the
letter of its new book." Alinsky (1972) cites many examples of tactics
in which bureaucratic systems were ensnared in their own red tape
by pressuring them to live up to their own formally stated rules and
procedures. Tactics of this sort may center upon demanding or using
a service that one is entitled to, a service which is not ordinarily
used so massively, and for which the institution is not prepared to
provide a large volume of service with excessive cost to itself. For
example, banks may be disrupted by a massive opening and closing of
accounts, department stores by massive return of purchases, airports
by a massive use of their toilets and urinals by visitors, and so
forth. Or the tactics may center upon disobedience to a rule or law
which can not be enforced in the face of massive noncompliance. Thus,
landlords can not afford to throw out all tenants who refuse to pay
rents in a cohesive rent-strike or schools to dismiss all students
who disobey an obnoxious regulation if the students are united in
their opposition.

Related to the tactics of clubbing the Haves with their own book
of rules and regulations is the tactic of goading them into errors
such as violating their own rules or regulations. If they can be
provoked into an obvious disruption of their own stated principles, then
segments of the high power group may become disaffected with the resil-
ient weakening of the Haves. In addition, previously neutral third-
parties may in response to the violations by those in power swing their sympathies and support to the Have-Nots.

In general, it is a mistake to think that a high power group is completely unified. Most groups have internal divisions and conflict among its most active members and, further, only a small proportion of its members are likely to be active supporters of current policy. The conflicts among those who are active in the high power groups and the distinction between active and passive members provide important points of leverage for the Have-Nots. The internal conflict can be exacerbated by fostering mutual suspicion and by playing one side against the other. The passive compliance of the inactive majority of the Haves may disappear as their leaders are provoked into errors and as they are subject to ridicule and embarrassment by their inability to cope effectively with the persisting harassments and nuisances caused by the Have-Nots.

The power of the Haves, as is true for any group, depends upon such tangibles as control over the instruments of force, an effective communication system, and an effective transportation system and upon such intangibles as prestige and the aura of invincibility. While a low power group may not be able to interfere seriously with the tangible bases of power of the Haves without engaging in illegal, destructive actions of sabotage, it has many legal means of tarnishing and weakening their intangible sources of power. Ridicule and techniques of embarrassment are most effective weapons for this purpose. Here, as elsewhere, inventiveness and imagination play an important role in devising effective tactics. Alinsky, a master at inventing such tactics, illustrates with the following hypothetical example (1971, p.141):

Imagine the scene in the U.S. Courtroom in Chicago's recent conspiracy trial of the seven if the defendants and counsel
had angrily trumpeted their contempt for Judge Hoffman.
and the system. What could Judge Hoffman, the bailiffs,
or anyone else do? Would the judge have found them in
contempt for farting? Here was a tactic for which there
was no legal precedent. The press reaction would have
stunk up the judge for the rest of time.

Other tactics of embarrassment and ridicule include picketing alun land-
lords, key stockholders and management personnel of recalcitrant firms, and
other such wielders of power in situations which are embarrassing to them -
e.g., at their homes, at their churches or synagogues, at their social clubs.
The advantage of such tactics as ridicule and embarrassment is that they are
often very enjoyable for those in low power and very difficult for those in
high power to cope with without further loss of face.

In the preceding several pages, I have discussed some of the strategies
and tactics available to low power victimized groups in their attempt to compel
a resistant high power group to agree to a change in their relations. My
discussion was meant to be suggestive rather than comprehensive. It was also
intended to indicate that apathetic resignation and destructiveness are not
the only responses available in the face of a contrary authority. It is possible
to increase the power of the Have-Not by developing their personal resources,
social cohesion, and social organization so that they have more influence.
And in jujitsu-fashion, it is possible for the Have-Not to employ some of
the characteristics of the Haves to throw them off-balance and to reduce
their effective opposition.
Let us sum up the discussion of activating the sense of injustice in the victim. I have suggested that the process basically entails: falsifying and delegitimitizing the officially-sanctioned ideologies and myths that "justify" the injustices; exposing the victim to new ideologies, new models and new reference groups which justify and give life to the possibilities of a change in his status; stimulating hope by successful efforts to improve his situation; and reducing fear by increasing his relative bargaining strength.

Conditions for awakening the sense of injustice in the victimizer.

Melvin J. Lerner (1971, manuscript), in a very interesting paper, has asked a key question: Given the weight of research evidence which demonstrates that considerations of justice and deserving play an important role in our lives, how then is it possible to explain why we tolerate injustice toward innocent victims in our community, society, and world? The research evidence to which he refers are a variety of ingenious experiments by social psychologists during the past decade which show in many different ways that people seek justice for others as well as themselves.

Adams (1963), for example, found that workers who were overpaid sought to restore the balance of justice by improving their work-quality if they were paid on a piece-rate basis or increasing their output if paid on an hourly basis. Berkowitz and Daniels (1963) demonstrated that subjects were willing to expend effort to help others get what they deserve. Students who unintentionally caused someone to have less than he deserved were more likely to do things to help others (Darlington and Macher, Carlsmith and Gross, 1959). However, if they were unable to act in some compensating manner and they were made to feel some responsibility for their victim's fate, they derogated the victim in an attempt to maintain their
own self-esteem (Berscheid and Walster, 1967; Davis and Jones, 1960; Dittes, 1959). Lerner and his colleagues have found that even where the subject is merely an observer, who is powerless to affect the victim's fate (Lerner and Simmons, 1966; Lerner, 1959), there may be a tendency to devalue the victim; for the world to be perceived as just, the victim must deserve his fate. (For summaries of much of this research see Macaulay and Berkowitz, 1970, and Krebs, 1970)

In response to his important question of why there is failure to act on the behalf of victims, Lerner proposed several answers: (1) The victimizer may find justification for thinking that the victim deserves his fate; (2) He may think that the victim's situation is improving and equity will soon be established; (3) He believes that he is doing all he can without making himself into a victim; and (4) He believes that he is doing as much as can be expected of him, equal to or more than others who should be doing at least as much as he.

Several additional answers can be suggested: (5) The victimizer is ignorant of the injustice experienced by the victim because of his lack of contact with victims; (6) He thinks that the situation is hopeless so that nothing adequate can be done to redress and alleviate the victim's situation; (7) He excludes the victim from his definition of the community in which his moral standards are applied; (8) He may fear that he may be humiliated or harmed by the victim or by other victimizers if he acts favorably toward the victim; and (9) He may feel that his personal interests and the interests of the victimized are directly opposed. The opposition may be in terms of external, material interests or it may reflect the victimizer's psychological needs, the need to feel superior or, to deny any evil in himself by projecting it onto the victim and attacking the victim.

In addition, of course, he may not believe in a just world, believing instead
that man is inherently amoral; those on top will always take advantage of those on the bottom; the victims would be victimizers if they had the chance.

The above list of reasons why victimizers may fail to act on the behalf of victims is, in effect, a catalogue of the obstacles and resistances to activating their sense of injustice. How can they be overcome? Basically, the process of activating the sense of injustice in the victimizer is similar to that of activating it in the victim. It entails: removing the victimizer's ignorance of the injustices experienced by the victim through education and contact with the victim; falsifying and delegitimizing the officially-sanctioned ideologies and myths that "justify" the injustices through education and governmental action; exposing the victimizers to new ideologies, new models, and new reference groups that support action to undo the disadvantages of the victims; stimulating his hope that he can act effectively to reduce injustice; reducing his fear that his new actions will have costly, harmful consequences for him at the same time that one enhances his prospect of material and psychic gains from a positive change in his relationship with the victim; and increasing his belief that continuation of his old relationship will no longer produce the material benefits or psychic gains he has experienced in the past from it and its continuation may have costly, harmful consequences for him.

It is apparent that those victimizers who are content with their superior roles and who have developed a vested interest in preserving the status-quo and appropriate rationales to justify it will have to have their interests challenged and their rationalizations exposed as false before their sense of justice will be activated. (My earlier discussion of increasing the bargaining power of the victim is relevant here.)
however, even if the victimizer understands how unjust the situation of the victim is and desires to remedy it, he is not likely to be activated to do something unless he sees the possibility of taking actions that will contribute significantly to correcting the injustice. Even then he is unlikely to act, if he thinks that by so doing he will place himself in economic or social jeopardy.

Lack of hope and fear are two central obstacles to activating the sense of injustice among even the well-disposed and well-informed victimizers. Once victimization has become deeply embedded in social institutions, individual action to overcome it is frequently seen to be futile and costly. Institutionalized racism persists in the United States despite the very substantial reduction of prejudice among individual whites in all segments of the U.S. population in recent years. The doctrine of white superiority has lost its appeal for the typical white. The pervasive victimization of blacks still occurs, because it is the natural consequence of a competitive ethos of everyman (or group) for himself under rules which assume that the competitors start more or less at the same initial point.

It is evident that blacks, as a result of their legacy from slavery and a century of discrimination, are more likely to be poor, uneducated, ill, unstable, criminal, and otherwise "socially undesirable" in terms of middle-class standards than are whites. As a consequence, blacks are likely to be poorer "risks" as employees, tenants, borrowers, students, and law-abiding citizens. Employers, landlords, banks, stores, teachers, and the police - even if they are acting purely in terms of economic self-interest - are apt to discriminate against those they consider to be poor risks. Not to do so would place them at a competitive disadvantage or expose them to the possibility of danger or failure. Moreover, others
who are affected by the decisions of employers, landlords, bankers, etc., such as other employees, other tenants, share owners, etc. are likely to protest if the risks are taken since they are apt to feel they would be adversely affected. In addition, the American myth of equal opportunity provides a rationale for discriminating against those who are poor risks. In the land of equal opportunity, poverty must be due to the deficient character and motivation of those who are poor. Thus, self-interest, social pressure, and ideology combine to perpetuate the victimization of those who are poor risks.

Even if a victimizer, with a keen sense of injustice, were able to perceive the "self-fulfilling prophecy" in discriminating against poor risks, he might nevertheless consider it a futile, hopeless gesture to disregard the common belief about the greater riskiness of transactions with blacks. Doing so would not make a significant impact upon the situation of the blacks unless many other whites were also engaged in similar actions. Moreover, the possibility of failure - a housing development "tippering" so that it becomes all-black, non-payment of loans, etc. - would make his action demonstrate to others that nondiscrimination is unwise.

It has long been recognized that without governmental action to pass and enforce laws to prohibit racial discrimination, the unbiased landlord or employer would find it difficult to survive unless he conformed to the practices of his business rivals and also discriminated. More recently, it has also begun to be recognized that if discrimination is against the poor (as in the zoning regulations of many suburbs or the inadequately supported schools in poor districts) or against those who are poor risks (as in the case of inadequately prepared high school graduates seeking admission to college), then many blacks will remain disadvantaged despite
strict enforcement of laws prohibiting racial discrimination. Here too, governmental action is necessary to spread costs and risks equitably so that those who have an active sense of injustice are not themselves unduly disadvantaged by working to aid the disadvantaged.

From what I have stated above, it follows that the focus of attention and activity of the victimizer, who wishes to remove the injustices suffered by the victim, should be directed at other victimizers. He should be seeking to stimulate concerted action to ban racial discrimination and to enforce positive compliance with such bans. In addition, since elimination of racial discrimination will not eliminate discrimination against the poor or against "poor risks", he should be trying to develop collective programs of action to achieve these ends.

It has been a too common assumption of victimizers (even those of good-will), as well as of many social scientists, that the social pathology has been in the ghetto rather than in those who have built the walls to surround it, that the "disadvantaged" are the ones who need to be changed rather than the people and the institutions who have kept the disadvantaged in a submerged position. It is not that we should detach ourselves from "Headstart", "Vista", and various other useful training and remedial programs for the disadvantaged. Rather, we should have an appropriate perspective on such programs. It is more important that the educational institutions, the economic and political systems be changed so that they will permit those groups who are now largely excluded from important positions of decision-making to share power than to try to inculcate new attitudes and skills in those who are excluded. After all, would we not expect that the educational achievements of black children would be higher than they are now if school boards had more black members and schools had more black principals? Would we not also expect that the occupational attainment of blacks would be higher (and their unemployment rate lower) if General Motors
A.T. and T., and General Electric had black board members and company
presidents as well as white ones? Again, would we not expect more civil
obedience in the black community if Charles Evers rather than James
Eastland were chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and if the
House had barred corrupt white congressmen as well as Adam Clayton Powell?
Let us not lose sight of what and who has to be changed, let us recognize
where the social pathology really is!

Some Considerations in Instigating Social Change

I shall not elaborate here my views on social action necessary to
end racism. My views are hardly unique. In essence, I suggest that we
need vigorous enforcement of existing and (if necessary) new legislation
to obtain positive compliance with nondiscrimination policies in all areas
of community life. These legal actions should be supplemented by a contin-
uing educational effort in the schools and in the mass media, as well as
by government leaders, to support favorable attitudes toward positive
compliance. In addition, we need economic policies that will foster full
employment and substantially increase the share of the total national
income that is received by those in the bottom third of the income dis-
tribution. And lastly, we need policies to provide remedial and other help,
as well as a decent minimum income, for those who are unable to work.

It is evident that the attempt to effect such policies will stimulate
conflict and that such policies will only be adopted as the result of pro-
ductive social conflict. Some common-sense truisms about social conflict
have been supported by social science research and these are worth bearing
in mind.
Consider this well-established proposition: any attempt to introduce a change in the existing relationship between two parties is more likely to be accepted if each expects some net gain from the change than if either side expects that the other will gain at his expense.

One obvious implication is that a redistribution of income, so that there is an increase in the relative share received by blacks, is more likely to be accepted by whites if their absolute income also increases. In other words, when the total income pie is increasing, changing the relative shares is easier. This, of course, means that a policy of economic growth rather than the one of no-growth, advocated by some ecologists, is more favorable to the disadvantaged.

There are other implications of this proposition. Those whites who are not content or are only barely content with their share of the income pie are most likely to feel threatened by any relative gains by blacks. These are the poor whites and the blue-collar and other workers who feel that they are just about making it financially. If they can be led to recognize that the policies which will improve the situation of blacks will also improve their situation, they are more likely to be supporters than opponents of such policies. They are more likely to recognize this if the policies being advocated are cast in broad, populist terms rather than in terms of narrow, group interests. And, of course, if they see themselves as forming a coalition against a third-party ("the rich"), they are more apt to perceive the congruence of their interests.

Another implication of this proposition is that the employment of intimidating, coercive tactics in pursuit of one's objective is likely to suggest an opposition rather than a complementarity of interests and,
as a consequence, to provoke resistance. If concessions imply a loss of "face", a humiliation, a loss of legitimacy, a loss of self-respect they are not likely to be made. On the other hand, tactics which emphasize the gains to the other - even if these gains are primarily non-material (such as prestige, moral rectitude, respect, or the power to elicit authentic cooperation) - are more likely to lead to agreement.

The power of a victimized minority to compel social change by itself is limited. It can rarely afford to be without allies. To be effective, it must be for others as well as for itself. Being for oneself is the first responsibility of every person and every group; unless one is for oneself, others are not likely to be. However, one can define being for oneself so that one is either for or against others. As a permanent definition of self, the latter is inherently self-defeating for a group that needs allies.


Lerner, M.J. Deserving versus justice. in manuscript, 1971.


