Chapter 2

Interdependence
and Psychological
Orientation

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In this chapter, I shall examine the relations between types of psychological interdependence and psychological orientations. I shall employ the term psychological orientation to refer to a more or less consistent complex of cognitive, motivational, and moral orientations to a given situation that serve to guide one's behavior and responses in that situation. In brief, my theoretical analysis posits that distinctive psychological orientations are associated with the distinctive types of interdependence. I also assume that the causal arrow connecting psychological orientations and types of interdependence is bidirectional: A psychological orientation can induce or be induced by a given type of interdependence. Implicit in this view is the further assumption that each person has the capability to utilize the various psychological orientations and their associated cognitive, motivational, and moral orientations. Although individuals may differ in their readiness and ability to use the different orientations as a result of their cultural backgrounds, their personal histories, and their genetic endowments, people participate in diverse social relations in complex societies; and these varied

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social relations require and, hence, induce different psychological orientations. Thus, my basic assumption is an evolutionary one: Namely, to cope with the psychological requirements of assorted types of social relations, people have developed the capacity to utilize psychological orientations as they are necessary in different situations.

This chapter is structured into four sections: (a) a discussion of types of interdependence; (b) a characterization of psychological orientations; (c) a discussion of the relationship between types of interdependence and psychological orientations; and (d) a brief consideration of some relevant research. At the outset, I give notice to the reader that my chapter is not so ambitious as it may appear. I shall not attempt to discuss the full range of types of interdependence or psychological orientations. My aim is the more modest one of illustrating the potential fruitfulness of an idea that is still in the process of being formed in the hope that doing so will stimulate other investigators to contribute to its development.

Types of Interdependence

Several years ago, I collaborated with Wish and Kaplan (Wish, Deutsch, & Kaplan, 1976) in research that sought to identify the fundamental dimensions of interpersonal relations.\footnote{Although this research studied the perceptions of interpersonal relations, I see no reason to doubt that the identified dimensions are fundamental aspects of interpersonal relations.} Based on this research, as well as earlier research by Triandis (1972) and Marwell and Hage (1970) and later research by Wish and Kaplan (1977), it seems reasonable to assert that the fundamental dimensions of interpersonal relations include the following:

1. \textit{Cooperation–competition}. This dimension is referred to variously in the social psychological literature. I have characterized it as \textit{promotive versus contrient interdependence} (Deutsch, 1949a) or as a \textit{pro–con} dimension (Deutsch, 1962). Triandis (1972) referred to it as \textit{association–disassociation}; Kelley and Thibaut (1978) used the term \textit{correspondence–noncorrespondence}; and it has been labeled \textit{love–hate, evaluative, positive–negative interpersonal disposition, friendly–hostile}, etc. by other investigators. In the Wish, Deutsch, and Kaplan (1976) study, scales of the following sort were strongly weighted on this dimension: “Always harmonious versus always clashing,” “very cooperative versus very competitive,” “very friendly versus very hostile,” “have compatible versus incompatible goals and desires,” “very productive versus very destructive,” “find it easy versus difficult to resolve conflicts with each other,” “very altruistic versus very selfish,” “very fair versus very unfair.”

2. \textit{Power distribution (“equal” versus “unequal”)}. This dimension has been given various labels: Triandis (1972) characterized it as \textit{superordination–subordination}, Kelley (1979) described it in terms of \textit{mutuality of interdependence}, and others have used such terms as \textit{dominance–submission, potency, and autonomy–control}. Such scales as the following are strongly weighted on this dimension: “exactly equal versus extremely unequal power,” “very similar versus very different roles and behaviors,” and “very democratic versus very autocratic attitudes.” “Business partners,” “close friends,” and “business rivals” are at the “equal” end; “master and servant,” “teacher and pupil,” “parent and child,” and “guard and prisoner” are at the “unequal” end. The social psychological processes and consequences associated with this dimension are reviewed in Cartwright and Zander (1968).

3. \textit{Task-oriented versus social–emotional}. This dimension has been labeled \textit{intimacy} by Triandis (1972) and Marwell and Hage (1970) and \textit{personal} by Kelley (1979). Others have identified it as \textit{personal–impersonal, subjective versus objective, particularistic versus universalistic, or emotionally involved versus emotionally detached}. The two following scales are strongly weighted on this dimension: “pleasure-oriented versus work-oriented,” and “emotional versus intellectual.” Such interpersonal relations as “close friends,” “husband and wife,” “siblings” are at the social–emotional end of the dimension; “interviewer and job applicant,” “opposing negotiators,” “supervisors and employees,” and “business rivals” are at the task-oriented end. Bales’s (1958) distinction between social–emotional and task-oriented leaders of groups is relevant; the former focuses on the solidarity relations among group members, and the latter focuses on the external task and problem-solving activities of the group. Earlier, I made a similar distinction between \textit{task functions} and \textit{group maintenance functions} (Deutsch, 1949a, 1949b), which was elaborated in a paper by Benne and Sheats (1948). The sociological distinction between \textit{gemeinschaft} and \textit{gesellschaft} groups also reflects this basic dimension of social relations.

4. \textit{Formal versus informal}. Wish and Kaplan (1977) have shown that this dimension can be separated from the preceding one. It appears to be the same as the dimension of \textit{regulation} identified by Marwell and Hage (1970).
In an informal relationship the definition of the activities, times, and locations involved in the relationship are left largely to the participants; in a formal or regulated relationship, social rules and norms largely determine the interactions among those involved. Such scales as "very formal versus very informal" and "very flexible versus very rigid" reflect this dimension. Relations within a bureaucracy tend to be formal, whereas relations within a social club tend to be informal; also, relations between equals are more likely to be informal than relations between unequals. Formal, bureaucratic relationships have been the subject of extensive discussions by such sociological theorists as Weber (1957) and Merton (1957).

5. **Intensity or importance**. This dimension has to do with the intensity or superficiality of the relationship. Kelley (1979) suggests that it reflects the degree of interdependence (or dependence) in the relationship. Such scales as the following are strongly weighted on it: "very active versus very inactive," "have intense versus superficial interactions with each other," "have intense versus superficial feelings toward each other," and "important versus unimportant to the individuals involved." "Casual acquaintances," "second cousins," and "salesman and customer" are at the superficial end of this dimension; "parent and child," "husband and wife," "therapist and patient" are at the intense end.

Several other dimensions of interpersonal relations have been identified, including the enduring or temporary nature of the relationship; its voluntary or involuntary character; its public versus private nature; its licit or illicit quality; and the number of people involved in the relationship. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider these other dimensions.

Table 2.1 presents the first four dimensions in dichotomous form and provides illustrations of the types of interpersonal relations and types of interpersonal activities that could occur in each of the 16 regions of this four-dimensional space. (I have selected illustrations from the "more intense" rather than the "less intense" end of the intensity dimension.) It is, of course, an oversimplification to dichotomize each of the dimensions, but it is a reasonable place to start. If the reader were to blank out the illustrations in Table 2.1 and attempt to provide other examples, he or she would probably discover that the dimensions are correlated. It is easier to find illustrations for some of the 16 regions than others; some of the regions are undoubtedly more heavily populated than others.

Thus, social–emotional relations or activities are more likely to be informal than the task-oriented ones, especially if there are relatively more people involved in the task-oriented ones. Also, there appears to be a positive linkage between the informality of the relation or activity and its equality so that it is more difficult to find unequal, informal relations and activities

### Table 2.1

| Cooperative | 1 | Intimate Lover | Informal Social party | Task-Oriented | 8 | Problem-solving Colleagues Staff meeting |
| Cooperate Equal | 5 | Fraternal Club members | Formal Social party | | |
| Unequal | 2 | Caring Mother–child Nursing | Informal Protecting Police officer–child Helping | | 6 | Educational Professor-graduate student Working together informally on research project under professor's direction |
| Competitive | 3 | Antagonistic Personal enemies Fighting | | 7 | Rivalrous Divorced couple Custody suit | | 11 | Competitive Contestants in informal game Trying to score points against the other |
| Unequal | 4 | Sadomasochistic Bully–victim Tormenting | | 8 | Dominating Expert–novice Intimidating | | 12 | Power struggle Authority–rebel Guerrilla warfare |

**Note:** Each cell characterizes a type of social relation by labeling the relation (first entry), naming people who might be in such a relationship (second entry), and describing an activity that might occur in such a relationship (third entry).
than equal, informal ones. Moreover, there is evidently a positive association between the cooperativeness and informality of a relation or activity. Similarly, there appears to be a positive connection between the equality of an activity or relation and its cooperativeness. Additionally, there is likely to be a positive association between the social—emotional nature of a relation or activity and its cooperativeness. Further, one can expect that social—emotional relations and activities will more frequently be intense than task-oriented ones. And also that interpersonal relations or activities that are extremely competitive or cooperative rather than moderately so will be more intense.

The foregoing, hypothesized correlations among the dimensions suggest which regions of the interpersonal space will be heavily populated and which will not. (See Wish and Kaplan, 1977, for some support for the hypothesized correlations.) Thus, one would expect more interpersonal relations and activities (particularly, if they are stable and enduring) to be clustered in the cooperative, equal, informal, and social—emotional region (Cell 1 in Table 2.1), which I shall label the intimacy region, than in the competitive, equal, informal, and social-emotional region (Cell 3), which I shall label the antagonistic region. Intense competitive relations or activities are more likely to be stable and enduring if they are regulated or formal rather than unregulated. Thus, one would expect Cell 7 (“rivalry”) to be more populated than Cell 3 (“aggression”); similarly, for Cell 8 (“sadomasochism”) and for Cells 15 (“regulated competition”) and 16 (“regulated power struggle”) compared to their respective unregulated cells.

Intense, cooperative, task-oriented relations or activities are more apt to be equal and informal than otherwise unless there are clear status differences among the people involved (i.e., to be located in Cell 9 rather than in Cell 10, 13, or 14). However, the demands of large-scale cooperative tasks involving more than small numbers of people are apt to require a formal, hierarchical (i.e., unequal) organization for the tasks to be worked on effectively and efficiently. Thus, one could expect many hierarchically organized cooperative relations and activities to be found in Cell 14 (“hierarchical organization”). Yet the nature of such unequal relations as superordinate—subordinate ones in organizations, especially when they are not strongly legitimated for those in the subordinate position, is such as to produce conflict over the power differences. Hence, this type of relation is rarely free of strong competitive elements. It follows, then, that some superordinate—subordinate relations in hierarchically organized systems will

Psychological Orientations

In writing an earlier draft of this chapter, I entitled this section “Modes of Thought.” This earlier title did not seem to be a sufficiently inclusive label. It appeared to me evident that cognitive processes differ in different types of social relations, and I wanted to sketch out the nature of some of these differences. However, I also thought that the psychological differences among the different types of social relations were not confined to the cognitive processes: Different motivational and moral predispositions were also involved. It has been customary to consider these latter predispositions as more enduring characteristics of the individual and to label them “personality traits” or “character orientations.” Since my emphasis is on the situationally induced nature and, hence, temporariness of such predispositions, such labels also did not seem fitting for the material in this section. I have used the term psychological orientation to capture the basic theme of this section: People orient themselves differently to different types of social relations, and different orientations reflect and are reflected in different cognitive processes, motivational tendencies, and moral dispositions.

The Cyclical Relation between Psychological Orientations and Social Relations

Figure 2.1 depicts in schematic form my view of this association between psychological orientations and social relationships, as well as some other factors influencing both of them. It was stimulated by Neisser’s (1976) conception of the perceptual cycle but is a radical modification of it. My emphasis, like Neisser’s, is on the cyclical and active process involved in the connection among the elements. In characterizing this cyclical, active process one can start at any point in the cycle. In practice where one starts will usually be determined by what one manipulates as one’s independent variable. The nonmanipulated variables will be considered to be the dependent ones.

Let us suppose, for example, that, as an experimenter, I lead a subject to have the psychological orientation toward another typical of a mutually promotive, interdependent relationship. This, in turn, will lead the subject to have some characteristic interactions with the other and these, in turn, will have some effects upon both the subject and the other that will provide evidence as to the type of relationship that exists between them.
subject was in, etc. Here the starting point is B and the cycle goes on to C, etc.

Several other features of Figure 2.1 merit comment. I assume that the two parts of each triangle can affect one another:

1. One’s psychological orientation to one’s present social relationship can be affected by and can also affect one’s desires with regard to that relationship. Thus, if one has a desire for a cooperative relationship but a contentious orientation to the other, one may change either one’s desire or one’s orientation, depending on which is less strongly rooted.

2. One’s present social relations with another can influence or be influenced by the potential one sees for the development of the relationship. If I experience the present relationship as a destructive one, I might not see it as having a future; on the other hand, if I see the potential of developing a warm, loving relationship, I might be more positive toward an initially difficult relationship than I might otherwise be.

3. The nature of one’s actions and reactions in a relationship can affect as well as be affected by the normative definitions that exist regarding interactions in a given social relationship. Although early in a relationship, culturally determined, normative definitions often govern the meanings of social interactions, relations tend to build up their own idiosyncratic normative definitions as a result of repeated interactions that may be peculiar to the particular relationship.

There is, of course, a tendency for the two parts of each triangle to be consistent with one another. When they are not, one can expect a more complex psychological structure than the one depicted in Figure 2.1. For example, if the present and future characteristics of the social relationship are perceived to be inconsistent with one another, the time perspective dimension of the relationship will be very prominent. If there is an inconsistency between the desired social relationship and the present psychological orientation, the reality dimension will be very prominent. It is beyond the scope of the present paper to consider these important psychological aspects of social relations; Lewin (1951) makes suggestive remarks about these dimensions of the life space in his writings.

Surrounding the triangles of Figure 2.1 is the “objective” world of the participants; this includes the characteristics of the individual participants, their immediate situations, and the environment within which their relationship is embedded. I have characterized this objective world as sending causal arrows to all of the elements involved in the psychological orientation-social relations cycle and also as receiving causal arrows from these elements. The nature of the participants and their immediate situations as
well as their environment affect their social relations, their psychological orientation, and their interactions; and these phenomena, in turn, affect the participants and the realities confronting them. In this larger cycle, it is the variables that one considers independent that one manipulates.

2. Interdependence and Psychological Orientation

The Nature of Psychological Orientations

COGNITIVE ORIENTATIONS

In recent years, scholars in a number of different disciplines—cognitive psychology, social psychology, sociology, linguistics, anthropology, and artificial intelligence—have utilized such terms as schema, script, and frame to refer to the structures of expectations that help orient the individual cognitively to the situation confronting him. I shall employ the term cognitive orientation as being essentially the same as these terms. In the view being presented here, the person's cognitive orientation to his situation is only one aspect of his psychological orientation to a social relationship. Other aspects include his motivational orientation and his moral orientation.

The term schema goes back to Bartlett (1932) who, much influenced by the work of the neurologist Sir Henry Head (1920), emphasized the constructive and organized features of memory as opposed to the notion of memory as passive storage. The term script derives from the work of Abelson (1975, 1976) and Schanck and Abelson (1977) who also stress that people have organized knowledge of a stereotypical form about most recurrent situations they encounter. Abelson (1975) defines a script as a "coherent sequence of events expected by the individual, involving him either as a participant or as an observer" (p. 33). He goes on to postulate that "cognitively mediated social behavior depends on the joint occurrence of two processes: (a) the selection of a particular script to represent the given social situation and (b) the taking of a participant role within that script" (pp. 42–43). The term frame was introduced by Bateson (1955) to explain how individuals exchange signals that allow them to agree on the level of abstraction at which any message is intended—for example, whether the message is intended as serious or playful. Goffman (1974) has generalized Bateson's discussion of frames in an extended analysis of how individuals, as they attend to any current situation, face the question, "What is it that's going on here?"

Underlying the concepts of schema, script, and frame is the shared view that people approach their social world actively, with structured expectations about themselves and their social environments that reflect their organized beliefs about different social situations and different people. Our structured expectations make it possible for us to interpret and respond quickly to what is going on in specific situations. If our expectations lead us to inappropriate interpretations and responses, then they are likely to be revised on the basis of our experiences in the situation. Or if the circumstance confronting us is sufficiently malleable, our interpretations and responses to it may help to shape its form.

Schemas, scripts, or frames may be very concrete and specific—for example, how to work together with a particular person on a given task—or they may be rather abstract and general—for example, what is involved in a competitive as compared to a cooperative relation. In any society that provides a variety of situations in which different areas in the multidimensional space of social relations (the space being composed from the dimensions that were described in the first major section of this chapter) are well-represented, it is likely that rather abstract schemas or scripts will develop to characterize the types of relations depicted in Table 2.1. Such scripts, or cognitive orientations, are a central component of what I am here terming psychological orientations.

It is important for the participants in a particular social relationship to know "what's going on here"—to know the actors, the roles they are to perform, the relations among the different roles, the props and settings, the scenes, and the themes of the social interaction. However, everyday social relations are rarely as completely specified by well-articulated scripts as is social interaction in a play in the traditional theatre; ordinary social interactions have more the qualities of improvisational theatre in which only the nature of the characters involved in the situation is well-specified and the characters are largely free to develop the details of the skeletonized script as they interact with one another.

The improvisational nature of most social relations—the fact that given types of social relations occur in widely different contexts and with many different kinds of actors—makes it likely that relatively abstract or generalized cognitive orientations, schemas, or scripts will develop for the different types of social relations. I assume that people are implicit social psychological theorists and, as a result of their experience, have developed cognitive schemas of the different types of social relations that, though usually not articulated, are similar to those articulated by theorists in social psychology and the other social sciences. Undoubtedly, at this early stage of the development of social science theory, the unarticulated conceptions of the average person are apt to be more sophisticated than the articulated ones of the social scientists.

MOTIVATIONAL ORIENTATIONS

Just as different cognitive orientations are associated with the different types of social relations, so also are different motivational orientations. A
motivational orientation toward a given social relationship orient one to the possibilities of gratification or frustration of certain types of needs in the given relationship. To the cognitive characterization of the relationship, the motivational orientation adds the personal, subjective features arising from one's situationally relevant motives or need-dispositions.

The motivational orientation gives rise to the cathexis of certain regions of the cognitive landscape, making them positively or negatively valent, and highlights the pathways to and from valent regions. It gives the cognitive map a dynamic character. It predisposes one to certain kinds of fantasies (or nightmares) and to certain kinds of emotions. It orients one to such questions as “What is to be valued in this relationship?” and “What do I want here and how do I get it?”

It is evident that different types of social relations offer different possibilities of need gratification. It would be unreasonable, for example, to expect one's need for affection to be gratified in a business transaction and inappropriate to expect one's financial needs to be fulfilled in an intimate relationship. In the third section of the chapter I shall attempt to characterize briefly the motivational orientations associated with the polar ends of the different dimensions of interpersonal relations.

MORAL ORIENTATIONS

A moral orientation toward a given social relationship orient one to the mutual obligations, rights, and entitlements of the people involved in the given relationship. It adds an “ought to,” “should,” or obligatory quality to a psychological orientation. The moral orientation implies that one experiences one's relationship not only from a personal perspective but also from a social perspective that includes the perspective of the others in the relationship. A moral orientation makes the experience of injustice more than a personal experience. Not only is one personally affected; so are the other participants in the relationship, because its value underpinnings are being undermined. The various participants in a relationship have the mutual obligation to respect and protect the framework of social norms that define what is to be considered as fair or unfair in the interactions and outcomes of the participants. One can expect that the moral orientation, and hence what is considered fair, will differ in the different types of social relations.

The Relationship between Types of Interdependence and Psychological Orientations

In this section, I shall characterize the psychological orientations that are associated with the dimensions of cooperation-competition, power, task-oriented versus social-emotional, and formal versus informal. For each of the four dimensions depicted in Table 2.1, I shall describe the cognitive, motivational, and moral orientations that typify the dimension.

Cooperation–Competition

COGNITIVE ORIENTATION

The cooperative-competitive dimension seems so fundamental to social life that one would assume a well-developed innate predisposition to develop abstract cognitive orientations to help an individual define quickly whether “what's going on here?” is “good” for him or “bad” for him. With additional experience and further psychological differentiation and integration, the basic cognitive schema of cooperation-competition should emerge: We are “for” one another or “against” one another; we are linked together so that we both gain or lose together or we are linked together so that if one gains, the other loses. This basic schema has many implications (see Deutsch 1949a, 1949b, 1962, 1973, 1979 for an elaboration of these implications). It leads an individual holding it to expect that in a cooperative relation, the other will be pleased by the individual's effective actions and ready to help him or her achieve success; the individual will expect the opposite to be true in a competitive relationship. If one believes one is in a cooperative relationship and the other is displeased by one's effective actions, one will wonder, “What is going on here?” “Am I in the kind of relation that I think I am in?” “What can I do to find out what is going on here?”

MOTIVATIONAL ORIENTATION

In a cooperative relation, one is predisposed to cathexis the other positively; to have a trusting and benevolent attitude toward the other; to be psychologically open to the other; to be giving as well as receptive to the other; to have a sense of responsibility toward the other and toward the mutual process of cooperation; to see the other as similar to oneself; etc. One is also predisposed to expect the other to have a similar orientation toward oneself. Murray's (1938, pp. 175–177) description of the need for affiliation captures much of the essence of this motivational orientation. It is clear that the specific quality of this orientation will be very much influenced by what type of cooperative relation is involved: social-emotional or task-oriented, equal or unequal, formal or informal, intense or superficial.

In a competitive relation, one is predisposed to cathexis the other negatively; to have a suspicious and hostile, exploitative attitude toward the other; to be psychologically closed to the other; to be aggressive and defensive toward the other; to seek advantage and superiority for the self and disadvantage and inferiority for the other; to see the other as opposed to oneself.
and basically different; etc. One is also predisposed to expect the other to have the same orientation. Murray’s (1938) description of the need for aggression (pp. 159–161) and “need for defence” (pp. 194–195) as well as the associated needs for “infavorance” (pp. 192–193) and “counteraction” (pp. 195–197) seem to characterize many of the basic features of this motivational orientation. The specific quality of this motivational orientation will be determined by the type of competitive situation: task-oriented or social—emotional, equal or unequal, formal or informal, intense or superficial. In addition, it will be colored by one’s conception of one’s chances of winning or losing.

MORAL ORIENTATION

Although the specific character of the moral orientations associated with cooperation and competition will also depend on other features of the social relationship, it seems evident that cooperation and competition elicit different types of moral orientations. The moral orientation linked with cooperation is a tendency toward egalitarianism. This tendency underlies a general conception of justice that Rawls (1972) has expressed as follows: “All social values—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect—are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage [p. 62].” The moral orientation connected with cooperation fosters mutual respect and self-respect and favors equality as a guiding value to be breached only when inequality brings greater benefits and advantages to those less fortunate than they would otherwise have been if all were treated equally. Given this moral orientation, as Rawls (1972) points out, “Injustice, then, is simply inequalities that are not to the benefit of all [p. 62].”

In contrast, the moral orientation linked with competition sanctions inequality and legitimates a win-lose struggle to determine who will have superior and who will have inferior outcomes in a competitive relationship. Depending on other features of the relationship, the struggle may be regulated so that the competition takes place under fair rules (as in a duel of honor) and one’s moral orientation will include an obligation to obey the rules, or the struggle may be a “no-holds-barred” one in which any means to defeat the other can be employed. An active state of competition implies that the competitors do not mutually perceive and accept a superior—inferior relationship between them: If they do, and they continue to wage competition, then they are violating the moral imperatives of competitive justice. Thus, it is part of the moral orientation of competition for a victor to accept the defeat of someone who acknowledges being vanquished without continuing to beat the defeated one.

Power (“Equality” versus “Inequality”)

COGNITIVE ORIENTATION

The basic schema of “relationship power” (Deutsch, 1973) has to do with the relative power of the participants in a relationship to benefit or harm or persuade one another and, hence, their relative power to influence one another. In a relationship of unequal power, it is expected that the more powerful member will be advantaged and the less powerful one will be disadvantaged whenever their interests are opposed. Hence, it is considered better to be in the more—rather than the less-powerful position in a competitive relationship. The competitive branch of the unequal power schema highlights the roles of “victor” and “vanquished”; the equal power schema orients more to continuing struggle. In both competitive branches, the use of tactics of coercion, intimidation, and power bluffs are made salient. Even in a situation where the more- and less-powerful members have congruent interests, the less-powerful member is expected to be more dependent on the other and, hence, more likely to engage in ingratiating behavior. The cooperative branch of the unequal power schema emphasizes the orientation toward responsibility in the high power position and of respectful compliance from the low power position; the equal power schema orients more toward mutual responsibility and respect. Both cooperative branches make salient the use of the more positive forms of power: persuasion rather than coercion, benefits rather than harms, legitimate rather than illegitimate power, etc.

MOTIVATIONAL ORIENTATION

In an equality relation, one is predisposed to consider that the other is entitled to the same esteem and respect as oneself. The equality of power is likely to signify that the different participants in a relationship have the same value. Respect and esteem are more valuable if they are received from those whom one respects; equal status relations represent the optimum distribution for the mutual support of self-esteem. The need-dispositions related to self-esteem and self-respect seem to underlie this motivational orientation. The need for self-esteem involves the need to have a sense of the worthiness of one’s goals and a sense of confidence in one’s ability to fulfill one’s intentions; the need for self-respect involves the need to have a sense of one’s moral worth, of one’s equal right to justice and fair treatment. It underlines one’s sense of belonging to a moral community to be treated more fairly or less fairly than others and this, in turn, weakens the foundations of self-respect. Hence, one’s self-respect is more firmly grounded in relationships where one can feel the others are also entitled to respect.
Similarly, the confidence in oneself that is connected with a secure self-esteem is fostered by association and comparison with people who are similar in status rather than with those who are higher or lower.

In an unequal relationship, one is predisposed either to take a more dominant or a more subordinate role or to resist the inequality. Murray (1938) has characterized the different aspects of the need for dominance. It is manifest in the desire to control, influence, direct, command, induce, dictate, supervise, instruct, or lead. In a competitive situation, the need for dominance will often be fused with the need for aggression and will lead to attempts to coerce and force the other to comply with one's desires. In a cooperative situation, it will often be fused with the need for nurturance and will lead to a protective, guiding, and caring orientation toward the other. Different needs are associated with the submissive role, depending on whether it occurs in a cooperative or competitive context. In a cooperative context, Murray's (1938, pp. 154–156) description of the need for deference seems appropriate. It involves a readiness to follow, to comply, to emulate, to conform, to obey, to defer, to admire, to revere, to be suggestible, to heed advice, and otherwise to accept the superior authority of the other. In a competitive relationship, the need-disposition associated with the acceptance of the inferior role is well characterized in Murray's (1936, pp. 161–164) description of the need for abasement. This disposition is reflected in the tendency to submit passively, to accept blame, to surrender, to seek punishment or pain, to be servile, to be resigned, to acquiesce, to be timorous, to give in, and to allow oneself to be bullied. It is evident that the subordinate role in an unequal relationship may be difficult to accept and may be resisted. The resistance to an unequal relationship will be evidenced in aspects of what Murray has termed the need for autonomy (pp. 156–159) and the need for rejection (pp. 177–180). The need for autonomy is characterized by the tendency to resist coercion and restraint, to be defiant and rebellious in relation to arbitrary authority, to be independent of social ties, and to be a nonconformist. The need for rejection is reflected in the tendency to separate oneself from a negatively cathexed other; to reject a disliked superior other; to out-snub a snob; to exclude, abandon, expel or remain indifferent to an inferior other.

**MORAL ORIENTATION**

As the preceding discussion of motivational orientations would suggest, there are a number of different moral orientations connected with equality and inequality: Other features of the relationship, in addition to the distribution of power within it, will determine the nature of the moral orientation that will be elicited. Thus, in a cooperative, equal relationship one would expect the kind of egalitarian relationship described in the section on the moral orientation associated with cooperation—competition. In a cooperative, unequal relationship, the moral orientation obligates the more powerful person to employ his power in such a way as to benefit the less powerful one, not merely himself. In such a relationship, the less powerful one has the obligation to show appreciation, to defer to, and honor the more powerful person. These obligations may be rather specific and limited if the relationship is task-oriented or they may be diffuse and general if the relationship is a social–emotional one.

In an equal, competitive relationship, one's moral orientation is toward the value of initial equality among the competitors and the subsequent striving to achieve superiority over the others. This orientation favors "equal opportunity" but not "equal outcomes": The competitors start the contest with equal chances to win, but some win and some lose. In an unequal, competitive relationship the moral orientations of the strong and the weak support an exploitative relationship. The strong are likely to adopt the view that the rich and powerful are biologically and, hence, morally superior; they have achieved their superior positions as a result of natural selection; it would be against nature to interfere with the inequality and suffering of the poor and weak; and it is the manifest destiny of superior people to lead inferior peoples. The beatitude of those in powerful positions who exploit those in weaker positions appears to be, "Blessed are the strong, for they shall prey upon the weak" (Banton, 1967, p. 43). In an unequal, competitive relationship, the weak are apt to identify with the aggressor (A. Freud, 1937) and adopt the moral orientation of the more powerful and to feel that their inferior outcomes are deserved. Or, they may feel victimized. If so, they may either develop a revolutionary moral orientation directed toward changing the nature of the existing relationship or they may develop the moral orientation of being a victim. The latter orientation seeks to obtain secondary gratification from being morally superior to the victimizer: "It's better to be sinned against than to sin"; "the meek shall inherit the earth."

**Task-Oriented versus Social–Emotional**

**COGNITIVE ORIENTATION**

The basic schema here has to do with the focus of involvement. In a task-oriented relationship, one expects the attention and the activities of the participants to be directed toward something external to their relationship, whereas in a social–emotional relationship one expects much of the involvement to be centered on the relationship and the specific persons in the relationship. This difference in focus leads one to expect a relationship that...
is primarily task-oriented to be impersonal in the sense that the actual accomplishment of the task is more important than the identity of the persons involved in accomplishing it and the nature of their personal relationships. In a task-oriented relationship, people who can perform equally well on the task are substitutable for one another. The personal identity and the unique individuality of the performer have little significance in such a relationship.

In contrast, in a social–emotional relationship, the personal qualities and identity of the individuals involved are of paramount importance. People are not readily substitutable for one another. Using Parsons terminology, in a task-oriented relation people are oriented to one another as *complexes of performances*—that is, in terms of what each does; in a social–emotional relationship people are oriented to each other as *complexes of qualities*—that is, in terms of what each is. Also, in a task-oriented relationship, one’s orientation toward the other is universalistic—that is, one applies general standards that are independent of one’s particular relationship with the other; in a social–emotional relationship, one’s orientation is particularistic—that is, one’s responses to the other are determined by the particular relatedness that exists between oneself and the other.

In a task-oriented relationship one is oriented to making decisions about which means are most efficient in achieving given ends. This orientation requires an abstract, analytic, quantifying, calculating, comparative mode of thought in which one is able to adopt an affectively neutral, external attitude toward different means in order to be able to make a precise appraisal of their comparative merit in achieving one’s ends. One orient toward other people as instrumental means and evaluates them in comparison or competition with other means. In contrast, in a social–emotional relationship one is oriented to the attitudes, feelings, and psychological states of the other as ends. This orientation requires a more holistic, concrete, intuitive, qualitative, appreciative–esthetic mode of thought in which one’s own affective reactions help one to apprehend the other from the “inside.” Other people are oriented to as unique persons rather than as instruments in which aspects of the person are useful for particular purposes.

**MOTIVATIONAL ORIENTATION**

A task-oriented relationship tends to evoke achievement-oriented motivations. Achievement motivation has been discussed extensively by Murray (1938), McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, and Lowell (1953), Atkinson and Feather (1966), and Weiner (1974). Here I wish merely to indicate that it consists not only of the egoistic motivations to achieve success and to avoid failure: motivations related to using one’s capabilities in worthwhile activities may also be involved. Additionally, since achievement motivation is often instrumentally oriented to serve an adaptive function in relation to the external environment characterized by a scarcity rather than abundance of resources, it usually contains an element of motivation that is oriented toward rational, efficient accomplishment of the task. Further, since task-oriented relationships are primarily instrumental rather than consummatory in character, they require a motivational orientation that accepts delay-infraction and that obtains satisfaction from disciplined activity oriented toward future gratification.

A number of different motivational orientations are likely to be elicited in social–emotional relationships: affiliation, affection, esteem, play, sentence, eroticism, and nurturance–suckorance. The primary feature of these different need-dispositions as they are manifested in social–emotional relationships is that they are focused on the nature of the person-to-person (or person-to-group) relationship: They are oriented toward giving and receiving cathexes; toward the attitudes and emotions of the people involved in the relationship; toward the pleasures and frustrations arising from the interaction with the particular others in the given relationship. Although past experiences and future expectations may affect how one acts toward others and how one interprets the actions of others in a social–emotional relationship, such a relationship—if it is a genuine one—is not instrumental to other, future goals; it is an end in itself. In this sense, the need-dispositions in a social–emotional relationship are oriented toward current rather than delayed gratification.

**MORAL ORIENTATION**

The moral orientation in a task-oriented relationship is that of utilitarianism. Its root value is maximization: People should try to get the most out of situations. Good is viewed as essentially quantitative, as something that can be increased or decreased without limit (Duesing, 1962, p. 35). A second element in this moral orientation is the means–end schema, in which efficient allocation of means to achieve alternative ends becomes a salient value. A third element is impartiality in the comparison of means, so that means can be compared on the basis of their merit in achieving given ends rather than on the basis of considerations irrelevant to the means–end relationship. In Parsons terms, the moral-orientation in task-oriented relations are characterized by the values of universalism, affective neutrality, and achievement. In contrast, the moral orientation of social–emotional
relations are characterized by the values of particularism, affectivity, and ascription (Diesing, 1962, p. 90). Obligations to other people in a social–emotional relationship are based on their particular relationship to oneself rather than on general principles. They are strongest when relations are close and weakest when relations are distant. In a task-oriented relation, one strives to detach oneself from the objects of one's actions and to treat them all as equal, separate interchangeable entities; in a social–emotional relationship one is the focal point of myriad relationships that one strives to maintain and extend, since action takes place only within relationships (Diesing, 1962, p. 91). Ascription is the opposite of the achievement value: It means that one's actions and obligations toward people spring solely from their relationship to oneself rather than as a response to something they have done.

Formal versus Informal

Cognitive Orientation

The basic element in the schema related to this dimension has to do with whether one expects the people involved in the social situation to let their activities, forms of relationship, demeanor, and the like be determined and regulated largely by social rules and conventions or whether one expects such people to have the freedom to make and break their own rules as suit their individual and collective inclinations. In a formal relationship, one expects that the latitude for deviation from conventional forms of behavior is small and that when one violates the rules, others will react negatively and one will be embarrassed (if the violation is unwitting). Since the rules are usually well-known and well-articulated in a formal relationship, it is apt to be characterized by more predictability and less surprise than an informal one. Hostile rather than friendly relations, unequal rather than equal ones, and impersonal rather than formal ones are more likely to be regulated than informal.

Moral Orientation

In many respects, the moral orientations to task-oriented and formal relations are similar; this is also the case for social–emotional and informal relations. Formal relations go beyond the values of universalism and affective neutrality or impartiality to include a moral orientation to the rules and conventions that guide social relations. One has an obligation to respect and to conform to them. One's obligation is to the form of the relationship rather than to its spirit. In contrast, in an informal relationship one is morally oriented to the spirit rather than the form of the relationship. It is the relationship to which one is obligated rather than to the rules that are supposed to regulate it.

In the preceding pages, for brevity's sake, I have discussed the psychological orientations characterizing each of the four dimensions of interpersonal relations as though the dimensions existed in isolation from one another. Of course, in doing so, I have not adequately characterized the psychological orientations characterizing the different types of interpersonal relations: Each type reflects a combination of different dimensions. The psychological orientation associated, for example, with an intimate relation fuses the orientation connected with the particular positions on the cooperative, social–emotional, equal, informal, and intense dimensions. Here, the psychological orientations arising from the different dimensions of the relationship are all concordant with one another. A threat to an intimate relationship might arise from a discordance on any of the dimensions: for
example, from a competitive orientation rather than a cooperative one ("I am more giving than you are"); from a task-oriented rather than a social-emotional one ("You don't accomplish enough"); from a dependent rather than an equal one ("I need you to protect me and to take care of me"); or from a formal rather than informal one ("I get upset in a relationship unless I always know what is expected, unless it has no surprises, unless it is always orderly and predictable").

From our discussion of the correlations among the different dimensions in the first section of this chapter, it is evident that there is more or less discordance among the psychological orientations related to the different dimensions in the different types of social relations. Thus, the psychological orientation associated with cooperation is more concordant with the psychological orientations associated with equality, informality, and social-emotional activities than with the orientations associated with inequality, formality, and task-oriented activities. However, many cooperative relations are task-oriented and/or unequal and/or formal. Where there is discordance among the different dimensions characterizing a relationship, it seems likely that the relative weights or importance of the different dimensions in the given type of relationship will determine the relative weights of their associated psychological orientations. That is, if the task-oriented character of the relationship has stronger weight than the cooperative aspects, it will have more influence in determining the governing psychological orientation. It also seems likely that the more extreme is the location on a given dimension, the more apt is that dimension to have the key role in determining the nature of the psychological orientation: In a situation that is extremely formal and only slightly cooperative, the psychological orientation will be determined more by the situation's formality than by its cooperativeness.

Some Relevant Research

In the opening paragraph of this chapter, I stated that the causal arrow connecting psychological orientations and types of interdependence is bi-directional: A psychological orientation can induce or be induced by a given type of interdependence. Here, I would go further and indicate that the cognitive, motivational, and moral components of a psychological orientation can each induce one another—hence, they are likely to be found together—and each of the components can induce or be induced by a given type of interdependence. The foregoing assumptions proliferate into a great number of testable, specific hypotheses that I do not have the space to elaborate in this chapter. To illustrate, however, these hypotheses would predict a two-way causal arrow between specific modes of thought and specific types of social relations. Thus, a "bureaucratic" social situation will tend to induce "obsessive-compulsive" modes of thought and obsessive-compulsive modes of thought will tend to "bureaucratize" a social relationship. They would also predict that a competitive social relationship will tend to increase the psychological weight or importance of the differences in values between oneself and one's competitors, whereas a cooperative relationship will tend to increase the psychological importance of the similarities in values between oneself and one's fellow cooperators. We would also hypothesize that a tendency to accentuate the differences in values between oneself and others is apt to induce a competitive relationship, whereas a tendency to accentuate the similarities is likely to induce a cooperative relationship. Further, it can be predicted that different principles of distributive justice will be associated with different types of social relations: A fraternal relationship will be connected with the principle of equality; a caring relationship with the principle of need; a hierarchical organization with the principle of equity; a power struggle with the principle of "winner-take-all." Each of these different principles can induce different modes of thought and different types of social relations when experimentally introduced into an otherwise unstructured social situation. For all of the various hypotheses that entail two-way causal arrows, from an experimental point of view, the independent variables are the ones that are manipulated by the experimenter and the dependent variables are the ones that are affected by the manipulated variables.

Some of the hypotheses suggested by the theoretical ideas presented in this chapter have been tested in my laboratory (Deutsch, 1973) and by many other researchers working in a variety of areas in social psychology. However, many of these ideas have not yet been systematically investigated. Here, I wish to describe briefly two dissertation studies. One has recently been published (Judd, 1976); data for the other are now being analyzed. Both were conducted in our laboratory and reflect our interests in the relation between types of interdependence and modes of thought.

In the first of these studies, Judd (1978) argues that competitive processes in attitude conflicts are characterized by a tendency to accentuate the evaluative differences between one's own position and the position of the person one is arguing with. One of the ways in which this might be done is by emphasizing those conceptual dimensions along which there are larger differences. Hence, Judd hypothesized that in a competitive attitude conflict, the conflicting parties will come to see their positions as being relatively dissimilar and this will be accomplished by heightening the evaluative centrality of those conceptual dimensions that best distinguish between the positions.
For cooperative processes, he argued that parties have the mutual goal of learning more about the issue under dispute. An emphasis on conceptual dimensions along which positions differ significantly may well lead to a more competitive conflict; therefore, Judd hypothesized that a cooperative orientation will motivate individuals to de-emphasize those dimensions that best discriminate between the positions and to emphasize dimensions along which there is less of a difference. Thus, a cooperative orientation between conflicting parties will lead to the heightened perception of position similarity as a result of lowered evaluative centrality of the most discriminating dimensions and heightened evaluative centrality of less discriminating dimensions.

Judd came to the interesting conclusion that the perceptions of the similarity–dissimilarity of positions induced by one’s orientation (competitive or cooperative) to a conflict will be mediated by conceptual changes in the way we look at the issue under dispute. We will come to place more evaluative emphasis on some dimensions and less on others, and these changes may be relatively long-lasting.

Judd's research was designed to test this hypothesis. Pairs of subjects were assigned positions on how National Health Insurance should be organized, an issue about which they did not have strong opinions. These positions differed along three attribute dimensions, positions of pairs being highly distant on one dimension, less distant on a second, and identical on the third. Distance positions along dimensions and content of dimensions were varied independently so that Judd's hypothesis could be tested independently of dimension content. Subjects were asked to either discuss or debate the issue under either a cooperative or competitive orientation. Following this, judgments of similarity of positions were gathered and dimensional evaluative centrality was measured in order to test the hypothesis under investigation.

The results of the experiment strongly confirmed its underlying hypothesis: Competition led to decreased perceived similarity between the positions, and the dimension on which positions differed most was most evaluatively central; cooperation had opposite effects. In other words, the competitive orientation led the competitors to develop conceptual structures, related to the issue under dispute, that accentuated the differences between them and made these differences more attenually significant to them; in contrast, the cooperative orientation led the disputants to develop conceptual structures that emphasized the similarities in their positions and made the similarities more emotionally important to them.

An experiment by William A. Wenck, now in progress in our laboratory is also concerned with the relation between types of interdependence and modes of thought. In his study, Wenck is investigating the effects on modes of thought and types of social relations of three different distributive systems: (a) winner-take-all, where whoever contributes the most to the group receives the total outcome or reward received by the group; (b) equity, where the group's outcome is distributed to the individuals in proportion to their respective contributions to the group; and (c) equality, where the group's outcome is shared equally by all its members.

Wenck's investigation of the correlates of these three distributive systems derives from my (Deutsch, 1976) characterization of them:

1. The winner-take-all system is associated with a "macho," power-oriented mentality; it also is associated with a high risk-taking, gambling orientation. This mode of thought is much more prevalent in men than in women. It is common in social conditions of disorder, intense competition, widespread illegality, violence, or poverty. It is common in frontier societies, in societies lacking a middle class, in illegal organizations, in adolescent male gangs, in warring groups, etc. It can be elicited by challenge to basic values, by unregulated competition, by an atmosphere of violence and illegality, by anything that stimulates greed or desperation.

2. The equity system is associated with an economic mode of thought that is characterized by quantification, measurement, calculation, comparison, evaluation, impersonality, and conversion of unique values to a common currency. It is a cool, detached, future-oriented, analytic, tough-minded mode of thought that appeals to universalistic values, logical reasoning, and objective reality rather than particularistic values, intuition, emotion, and subjective considerations. It is more prevalent in men than women. It is common in societies characterized by a stable hierarchical order, regulated competition, a developed economy, technological advancement, and a large middle class who are neither poor nor rich. It is elicited by conditions that stress productivity, efficiency, objectivity, impersonality, detachment, individualism, and instrumentalism.

3. The equality system is associated with a particularistic, social–emotional orientation that is characterized by reliance on intuition, empathy, and personal feeling as a guide to reality. It is a holistic, involved, related, present-oriented "soft" mode of thought in which the reality of others is apprehended from their side rather than from the outside. Unlike the equity orientation, it is more prevalent in women than men. It is common in fraternal societies and in small cohesive groups that stress friendship, intimacy, loyalty, personal attachments, mutual respect, individual dignity, and cooperation. It is elicited by conditions that emphasize the bonds with others and the symmetrical–reciprocal character of these bonds.

Wenck's study employs a very involving, three-person task in which the group's outcome is determined by the activities of all three persons. The
group outcome is distributed to the individuals according to one of the three distributive principles described earlier. The task permits a variety of individual behaviors: The participants can work independently, they can help one another, they can harm one another. After working on the task for 30 minutes, the subjects are interrupted, and are administered a number of different instruments to obtain the dependent measures. Several questionnaires get at subjects' strategy in the task, their self-concepts as they worked on the task, their orientation toward other subjects, and their perception of others' orientation toward them as they all worked on the task. Adjective checklists elicit the motives and emotions that were activated during work on the task. In addition, projective techniques are employed to obtain the subjects' views of the group and of themselves as they worked in the group.

At this writing, the data have been collected and not yet completely analyzed. However, preliminary analyses show the following significant results: The "equality" groups were more productive than the "equity groups" who were in turn more productive than the "winner-take-all" groups; the "autobiographies" composed by the subjects for the roles they developed in the three experimental conditions differed from one another in unexpected ways: "winner-take-all" subjects characterized their thoughts and feelings as being more "aggressive", "risk-taking", "ruthless", "selfish", "ruthless", "unsharable," and "changeable" than did the subjects in the other two conditions; the subjects in the "equality" condition described themselves as more "nurturant," "affiliative" "cooperative," and "altruistic" than did those in the other two conditions; self-characterization of the subjects in the "equality" condition fell between the "winner-take-all" and "equality" conditions. It is apparent that the results which have been analyzed so far are in accord with the basic ideas underlying the experiment.

Concluding Comments

In this chapter, I have advanced several theses. First, different types of social relations can be characterized in terms of their positions on a number of basic dimensions of interpersonal relations. Second, each of the different types of social relations have associated with them distinctive psychological orientations. A psychological orientation is a complex consisting of interrelated cognitive, motivational, and moral orientations. Third, the causal arrow connecting psychological orientations and types of social relations is bidirectional: A psychological orientation can induce or be induced by a given type of social relationship. And, fourth, the various elements (cognitive, motivational, and moral) of a psychological orientation tend to be consistent with one another.

My argument is not that social relations determine psychological orientations without regard to the personalities of the individual participants nor is it that psychological orientations induce distinctive social relations without regard to the nature of the social situation confronting them. My thesis is rather that there is a tendency for consistency between psychological orientations and social relations that will lead to change in one or both until congruence between the two has been largely achieved. In some circumstances, it will be easier to change psychological orientations; in others, social relations can be more readily altered. I have not addressed the problem of what determines how a conflict between one's psychological orientation to a relationship and the nature of that relationship will be resolved. This is an important problem for future work.

One final comment: My discussion throughout this paper has been of "ideal types" of social relations. Actual social relations are inevitably more complex than my discussion would suggest. An intimate, love relationship, for example, is often characterized by considerable ambivalence: There are not only strong positive elements manifest in the relations but also intense anxieties latent within it; there are quarrels as well as embraces. In addition, it must be recognized that relationships develop and change. Apart from my brief discussion of Figure 2.1, I have not attempted to characterize the dynamics of relationships. This, too, is an important problem for future work.

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