and may, indeed, have incompatible implications. Youths are apt to be better educated than their parents. They are more likely to challenge some of the assumptions that were unquestioned by their parents—in such fundamental areas as sexual behavior, the relation of men and women, economic achievement and aspirations, patriotism, and race relations. The challenges from youth arising from social change and the responses to them by those in authority can rejuvenate a social order or produce tragedies such as those that have occurred at the Kent State and Jackson State massacres.

INTERNAL PROPERTIES OF GROUPS AND INTERGROUP CONFLICT

Groups differ in countless ways. Among the many different internal characteristics that distinguish groups from one another, three have been mentioned most frequently in the literature on intergroup relations. They are cohesiveness, structure, and power. Each is discussed below.

Group Cohesiveness

In everyday usage, "cohesiveness" refers to the tendency to stick together; its usage in social psychology is much the same. It refers to the strength and types of linkages that bind the members of a group together. Since group cohesiveness is central to the existence of groups, it is natural that its determinants and also its consequences have been studied extensively (for summaries see Hare 1962; Collins and Guetzkow 1964; McGrath and Altman 1966; Cartwright and Zander 1968). Research findings, in general, indicate that cohesiveness (as measured by interpersonal congeniality, the desire to remain a member of the group, positive attitudes toward the group's functioning, or similar measures) is associated with greater communication between group members, greater readiness of group members to be influenced by the group, greater consensus among members on attitudes and beliefs that relate to group functioning, more sense of responsibility toward each other among group members, and so forth. Also, task effectiveness is generally positively correlated with cohesiveness if high accomplishment of the task is valued by the group (some groups restrict performance to achieve their objectives) and if the task is such

that its perturbing environment, in his 1951 book, has been a true partner to the individuals in the group, sacrificing their own within, warlike groups which were facing the same situation. The writer characterizes the situation as a "tug of war" sense of its members against outgroups. Solidarity and ethnic identity between ingroups.

Rosenblatt (1972) have argued that the literature dealing with group cohesion is heavily indebted to the issues involved in intergroup relations. That Sumner's distinction between ingroup solidarity and outgroup solidarity is that the association of group members may be more, therefrom, that the association is that the association of group members is the opposite of the association of group members of the opposite group, even circulating.

Ingroup Cohesiveness

View emphasis on the processes involved in maintaining and perpetuating group cohesion is that many different centers around tasks and situations. In addition, attention onto other participants of the intergroup may develop.
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that its performance is likely to be enhanced by increased group effort. It should be noted that the causal arrow is bidirectional: group cohesiveness not only increases intragroup communication and group success, but group success and intragroup communication increase group cohesiveness.

The connection between ingroup cohesion and outgroup relations has been a topic of considerable interest to social scientists since Sumner, in his Folkways of 1906, asserted that "the relationship of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and war towards other-groups are correlative to each other. . . . Loyalty to the group, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, warlikeness without—all grow together, common products of the same situation." Sumner coined the term ethnocentrism to characterize the syndrome of pride in one's own group combined with a sense of its superiority over other groups and an antipathy toward outgroups. Some writers (e.g., Rosenblatt 1964) indicate that nationalism and ethnocentrism overlap in that each stresses the association between ingroup loyalty and antipathy toward outgroups.

Rosenblatt (1964), Campbell (1965), and LeVine and Campbell (1972) have prepared extensive summaries of the social science literature dealing with ethnocentrism. In the comments that follow, I am heavily indebted to their summaries, even though my analysis of the issues involved departs from theirs. Most social scientists would agree that Sumner was correct in noting the pervasive association between ingroup solidarity and outgroup hostility; some, however, contend that the association, while pervasive, is far from universal. Furthermore, there are disagreements about the conclusions to be drawn from this association. Some assert that the causal arrow points from ingroup cohesion to outgroup hostility, others say the arrow points in the opposite direction, while still others stress the bidirectionality or even circularity of the causal process involved.

Ingroup cohesion as the cause of outgroup hostility. One point of view emphasizes that outgroup hostility is a consequence of the processes involved in maintaining or increasing ingroup cohesion. There are many different versions of this viewpoint. One prominent version centers around the concept of displacement: ingroup cohesion is fostered or preserved by displacing internal conflict and internal frustration onto other groups, thus reducing internal dissension. Group leaders may deliberately foster antipathy to another group as a ploy to
maintain or increase ingroup loyalty to their leadership. Also, antipathy may be employed to discredit internal opposition by identifying the opponents with the hated outgroup. The reader will have no difficulty suppling illustrations of these methods if he brings to mind relations between the United States and the Communist nations during the Cold War or current relations between Israel and the Arab countries.

As the psychoanalytic origin of the term suggests, displacement may reflect unconscious rather than deliberate processes. In its extreme and most pessimistic form, as articulated by Freud in his *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930), the displacement theory posits that outgroup hostility is an inevitable consequence of the restraints and inhibitions inherent in civilized group life. Group cohesion and survival require obedience to authority, restraint on covetousness, willingness to delay immediate gratification for future gains, and inhibition of aggressiveness toward the perceived sources of the frustration. However, due to the protracted helplessness of the human infant and the strong mutual dependence of adult group members, it is dangerous to act upon or even harbor conscious ill feelings toward one’s own group or its leaders; doing so might lead to rejection and ostracism or to the disruption of the group upon whom one is dependent. Projection of one’s repressed urges (such as rebelliousness toward authority, unrestrained sexuality, covetousness, aggressiveness) onto an outgroup and, simultaneously, attack of the outgroup dissociate the group member from his feelings of alienation toward his own group and enable vicarious satisfaction of some of his repressed urges. According to this view, outgroup hostility is necessary to preserve ingroup cohesion and also to maintain the inner equilibrium of the inevitably frustrated participant in organized group life.

More recent and less fatalistic versions of what LeVine and Campbell term the *frustration-aggression-displacement* theory offer several new emphases. Thus while group life may be acknowledged to be frustrating, groups differ in how much frustration they impose upon their members, and different segments, positions, and individuals within a group can vary in how much frustration they experience. A group that is experiencing considerable deprivation and difficulty has more need for outgroup hostility; similarly, members of a group who are frustrated, marginal, or under considerable pressure are more likely to be ethnocentric and nationalistic. Moreover, groups, sub-
leadership. Also, antiposition by identifying reader will have no difficulty if he brings to mind re- of the repressive nations during israel and the Arab coun- suggests, displacement and processes. In its ex- by Freud in his Civili- ement theory posits that ce of the restraints and groups cohesion and sur- on covetousness; will- uture gains, and inhi- urces of the frustration. f the human infant and members, it is danger- s towards one's own sections and ostracism or is dependent. Project- ness towards authority, ness) onto an outgroup - dissociate the group his own group and en- essed urges. According preserving ingroup cohe- of the inevitably frus- that LeVine and Cam- er theory offer several - acknowledged to be members of a group who of pressure are more - ever, groups, sub-

groups, and individuals differ in how they manage frustration. In many instances, frustration is not likely to lead to aggressiveness; hence the need for its repression and displacement out onto groups becomes less compelling. Finally, there is an increasing awareness that displacement of repressed hostility onto an outgroup is not a simple, automatic process. For such a displacement onto a particular outgroup to occur in a unified manner, there must be a socially institutionalized mechanism for identifying an appropriate target and for channeling the displaced hostility in a socially coordinated fashion. In effect, outgroup hostility as a displacement mechanism becomes less likely when it is difficult to achieve internal consensus about the appropriateness and safety of engaging in particular expressions of hostility toward specified outgroups.

Although the frustration-aggression-displacement theory is the most widely discussed explanation for the assumed causal sequence that posits that outgroup hostility is an effect of the processes involved in attempting to achieve ingroup unity, there are other possible explanations for such a causal sequence. Thus one might suppose that ingroup loyalty would be enhanced if members conceive their group to be unique and superior to the other groups available and relevant for purposes of comparison. However, a sense of superiority implies a derogation of other groups, and to the extent that the derogated outgroup does not acquiesce in the judgment of its inferiority, one may also expect hostility toward the outgroup. Another ingroup process that might result in outgroup hostility could be described as follows: intragroup communication leads to familiarity, a sense of similarity, and convergence in beliefs and values among group members. This, in turn, leads to a preference for and a discrimination in favor of ingroup members; the necessity to maintain and justify the ingroup favoritism produces the sense of one’s own superiority and a derogation of the outgroup.

**Intergroup conflict as the cause of ingroup cohesiveness.** Many social science theorists reject the view that intergroup conflict is an inevitable product of the intragroup process. Instead, they postulate (see Campbell 1965) that real conflicts of group interests cause intergroup conflict and pose a real threat which is correctly perceived. The perception of threat from an outgroup, whether the threat is real or not, is hypothesized to have a number of consequences: it causes hostility toward the outgroup; it increases ingroup solidarity; it magnifies in-
group virtues and exaggerates outgroup vices; it increases the tightness of group boundaries; and it increases the punishment and rejection of deviants. A further hypothesis suggests that when external threat is reduced or nonexistent, a group will become less unified, member loyalty will diminish, and the group will tend to break up into smaller units.

There is much evidence from history and from the research laboratory (Deutsch 1949; Blake and Mouton 1962; Fiedler 1967) illustrating the views that intergroup competition enhances ingroup cohesiveness and ethnocentrism and that the diminution of external threat reduces group unity. Thus conflict with the colonial powers allowed many emerging African nations to overcome tribal rivalries and achieve a temporary unity; with the withdrawal of the colonial powers, retiralization has occurred in several of these new nations. The retiralization has often led to considerable internal conflict and a loss in national cohesion (Mazrui 1969).

Although war often leads to an upsurge of nationalism and patriotism, it frequently also has divisive effects. Consider the internal disension in the United States associated with the war in Vietnam and recall the internal effects of Russia’s involvement in World War I. In fact, many writers on revolution suggest that war may lead to conditions that are particularly conducive to revolutions (Laqueur 1968). The conditions under which real conflict between groups has divisive rather than cohesive effects are not yet definitively established. However, it seems likely that external conflict will be internally disruptive rather than unifying when its costs are clearly perceived to outweigh its potential gains, when the costs are viewed as being borne unjustly and disproportionately by only certain segments of the group, when important segments of the ingroup have strong ties with the conflicting outgroup, when the conflict persists over an extended period of time, or when the conflict violates traditional beliefs and values of the ingroup.

Ingroup cohesion and outgroup hostility as factors influencing one another. It seems evident that intergroup conflict can promote ingroup cohesion and, also, that the need to increase ingroup cohesion can stimulate ethnocentrism and outgroup hostility; the causal arrow is bidirectional. After all, the knowledge is widespread that external threat can increase ingroup loyalty. So it is not surprising that group leaders often resort to the tactic of attempting to increase the sense of
Intergroup Conflict

external danger as a means of inhibiting internal dissension. However, not every outgroup can be “used” in this manner. One can state as a general principle that the more unresolved opposition in values and interests there has been between an ingroup and an outgroup in the recent past, the more useful will the outgroup be as a target. In other words, the tactic of whipping up hostility to an outgroup is most likely to work when there is an existing active predisposition to perceive the outgroup in terms of well-established hostile or fearful stereotypes. Intergroup conflict and differences give rise to outgroup stereotypes, and these, in turn, can be used to promote or activate intergroup conflict.

Group Structure

Group structure refers to the ways in which the parts or elements of a group are interrelated. Since there are many different types of relations connecting the parts of a group, it would be more apt to use the term structures rather than structure. One could characterize the relations among the parts in terms of their physical proximity, the amount and types of communication that take place among them, the domain and scope of the power and authority each has over the other, their affective relations, their similarities in value orientation, their interconnectedness in relation to work, the flow of people between subgroups, their relative access to such advantages as prestige, education, and well-being.

For each of the ways in which the parts of a group may be interrelated, one could ask how variations in that type of relation within a group are likely to affect or be affected by the character of the group’s relations with other groups. Unfortunately, such questions have rarely been asked; as a consequence, there is little systematic information available with which to answer them. There has, however, been some suggestion that such structural characteristics as type of leadership and the degree of structural disequilibrium within the group might be relevant to intergroup relations. These characteristics are considered below.

Leadership. There are two widely held propositions about the relationship between ingroup leadership and intergroup relations. The first is that authoritarian leadership tends to produce internal frustration and hostility which is likely to be displaced onto outgroups. The second is that stress, whether it be the internal stress of ingroup frus-
tration or the external stress of intergroup conflict, creates a demand for authoritarian, highly structured leadership (see Korten 1962).

The first proposition implicitly rests on the frustration-aggression-displacement theory of ethnocentrism, which we have discussed in the section on group cohesion. Embedded in it is the assumption that authoritarian forms of leadership are intrinsically more frustrating than democratic forms. The most direct evidence in support of this assumption comes from a series of research studies comparing democratic and authoritarian leadership; these were stimulated by the pioneering investigation of Lewin, Lippitt, and White (1939). The studies (see Likert 1961 for a summary of many studies of leadership), in general, support the views that group members are less frustrated and more productive when they can participate in making the decisions that affect them and that leaders who exercise a participative rather than authoritarian leadership are more commonly liked by the group members.

Fiedler (1964), on the other hand, has shown that the effectiveness of different types of leaders is very closely related to the situation confronting the group. His findings indicate that controlling, authoritarian leaders tend to be more effective than democratic leaders in situations where the group and task conditions are either very favorable or very unfavorable. In the former, the leader-member relations are positive, the task is clear and well structured, the leader has well-defined authority and power; in unfavorable situations, the leader-member relations are not good, the task is unclear, the leader’s role is ill-defined. In the favorable situation, the leader can assume that the group will go along with his decisions willingly because what is required is self-evident, and little difference of opinion among the members is expected: discussion would be ritualistic and a waste of time. In the unfavorable situation, the leader can assume that the distrust and lack of clarity among the group members is so great that no consensus is likely and that the group will get bogged down in bickering and strife, to the detriment of the possibilities of effective action, if it were involved in the decision-making process.

Fiedler’s results would suggest that democratic leadership is less frustrating than authoritarian leadership only when the conditions are neither extremely favorable nor extremely unfavorable to obtaining a group consensus on the course of action to take. In the former instance, democratic leadership is not necessary, and in the latter, pre-
conflict, creates a demand for leadership (see Korten 1962). The frustration-aggression hypothesis we have discussed in the previous sections assumes that actual frustration is more frustrating than the potential for frustration. In support of this assumption, studies comparing democracies and dictatorships have shown that the effectiveness of democratic leaders is generally less satisfying for the population than that of authoritarian leaders. In making the decisions that arise in participative rather than dictatorial situations, the leader is less frustrated and more likely to be seen as a participant rather than as a controller.

The effectiveness of democracy is related to the situation in which it occurs. Authoritarian leaders in situations that are perceived as favorable or when the leader is well-liked by the population, the leader's role is ill-defined and can assume that the leader's role is ill-defined and can assume that the leader is more likely to be satisfied with the wants of the population. The degree of political stability, the extent of external aggression, and the like. Their data indicate a significant association between the effectiveness of the political regime and the amount of socioeconomic frustration within the country. Thus, sixteen out of twenty-two countries that are considered to have a high rate of satisfaction of the wants of their people have permissive regimes; none of the seventeen countries with a low rate of satisfaction has this type of government. Further, of the sixteen nations that have satisfied regimes and a satisfied populace, fifteen are considered to be highly stable; on the other hand, less than half of the countries that have both a socioeconomically satisfied population and a coercive regime exhibit a high degree of political stability.

Although it is impossible to state causal directions from such data as the Feierabends have presented, one may speculate that when the leadership is not as permissive as it should be, given the internal conditions within the group, there will be attempts to change the leadership. A parallel process seems to occur under conditions of high frustration of the wants of the population: a highly coercive regime induces more political stability than a moderately coercive regime. It should be noted, however, that the political equilibrium reached even by highly coercive regimes with frustrated populations is considerably less stable than that reached by permissive leaders dealing with satisfied populations. None of the former is rated as highly stable, but more than 90 percent of the latter are so considered. Thus, political equilibrium for a satisfied population is associated with a permissive leadership; relative political equilibrium for a highly frustrated popu-
lation is correlated with a highly coercive regime. Hence it seems reasonable to conclude that group tranquility is not simply a function of either the extent of internal frustration or the type of group leadership, permissive or coercive. Rather, internal stability results from the appropriate match between the two.

Their results for external aggression (which omit the data for the major powers) lead the Feierabends to suggest that the country that is sufficiently frustrated to be politically unstable has the strongest possibility of also being externally aggressive. While the satisfied country has the greatest probability of being both internally stable and externally nonaggressive, external aggression is more closely related to political instability than it is to internal frustration. Other investigators (e.g., Rummel 1969) have not found evidence of a significant relationship between domestic and external conflict such as obtained in the Feierabend study. This may be due to the fact, as Wilkenfeld (1969) has suggested, that the relationship between internal and external conflict may differ for different types of nations. Lumping all nations together for statistical analysis may obscure these underlying differences. However, even more importantly, most analyses of the relations between internal and external conflict make the obviously false assumption that the nature of a group's external environment can be disregarded. Consider Israel, a nation with much external conflict but one whose populace is relatively satisfied and whose government is relatively stable and permissive. Is it not apparent that attempts to characterize the relationship between a group's internal properties and its external conflict are bound to be incomplete and distorted unless its external environment is meaningfully delineated?

Structural disequilibrium. There is often a correspondence among the positions that an individual (or subgroup) holds in the different structures of a group. An individual who holds a central position in one structure (e.g., the communication structure) is likely to hold a central position in other structures (power, friendship, and prestige). The research of Galtung (1964) in Norway indicates that this is the case for Norwegian society: people who are more central on social variables (income, education, occupation, residence, age, and sex) are also more central in the communication and power structures. To explain the tendency for the different statuses of an individual to be congruent with one another, Benoit-Smulyan (1944), Lasswell and Kaplan (1950), Homans (1961), and many others (see Berger, Zel-
regime. Hence it seems reasonably not simply a function of the type of group leadership, but also the extent to which the country has a centralized and externally controlled political system. Other investigators (e.g., Flora and Zajonc 1965 a, b) have demonstrated that when an individual's performance rank improved, the group's performance improved, his performance improved.

However, status equilibrium is not always achieved. Research with air crews by Adams (1953) demonstrated that lack of congruence on such status dimensions as age, military rank, education, reputed ability, popularity, combat time, and position importance was related to poor morale, less friendliness, and lack of mutual confidence. Exline and Ziller (1959), working with experimentally created groups, found that groups constructed so as to have incongruent status hierarchies manifested more interpersonal conflict and less productivity than congruent groups.

Galtung (1964, pp. 95–119) has outlined a structural theory of aggression which is based on the hypothesis that "aggression is more likely to arise in social positions in rank-disequilibrium. In a system of individuals it may take the form of crime, in a system of groups the form of revolutions, and in a system of nations the form of war." He points out that the extreme forms of aggression are unlikely unless other methods of equilibration have been tried and failed and unless, in addition, the culture predisposes to violence. From Galtung's hypothesis, such interesting corollaries follow as: aggression is less likely from those who are the underdogs in all respects than from those who are the underdogs in some characteristics but not in others; social change that improves an underdog's position in some respects (education) but not in others (political influence, affluence) is likely to increase the amount of aggression; the smaller the number of dimensions on which social units are ranked and the smaller the number of social units being ranked, the more disruptive is any rank-disequilibrium to the system of units.

If one assumes that progress toward social equality of the races is uneven and that such progress initially increases the structural dis-
equilibrium, one will predict more open interracial conflict in the United States than in South Africa, and more in the North than in the South. Similarly, analysis of many revolutionary situations suggests (Davies 1962) that they often occur when there is an improvement of the underdog’s position in some respect (e.g., education) and a worsening in other respects (availability of suitable employment, etc.). Himmelstrand (1969), in a discussion of the relation between tribal conflict and rank-disequilibrium in the positions of the various tribes in Nigeria, indicates that the strains induced by the disequilibrium were conducive to the development of the intertribal conflict that led to their civil war. However, he suggests that other rank-equilibrating responses than intergroup aggression were possible, but he does not define the conditions that led to strife rather than to other types of equilibrating actions.

The hypothesis that aggression may arise from structural disequilibrium is intriguing. However, as Herses (1969) points out, it needs to be more precisely specified before it can be adequately tested. This is true not only with regard to the meaning and measurement of its key concepts but also with regard to the conditions under which aggression (rather than other actions) will occur as a response to rank-disequilibrium. Rank-disequilibrium is, obviously, neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the occurrence of aggression. It is probably more fruitful to conceive of structural disequilibrium as providing a motivation to produce an upward change in one’s disequilibrated statuses rather than as producing a motivation to aggress. Aggression may result as a reaction to the resistance of others to a change in one’s status, but it is unlikely without the experience of resistance and the resulting frustrations. But even resistance and frustration do not necessarily lead to aggression, except under rather specific conditions. Some of these have been touched upon in our prior discussion of the frustration-aggression-displacement theory of outgroup hostility.

Pyramidal-segmentary and cross-cutting structure. In most societies, people are members of more than one group. They are likely to be members of a kinship group, a political association, a recreation group, and many others. LeVine and Campbell (1972) point out that social anthropologists have characterized two basic types of social structures, the pyramidal-segmentary and the cross-cutting. In the pyramidal-segmentary type, each smaller unit that an individual belongs to is included as a se of. Thus in some folk lily group, in a small kinship group, which which is one compon as the name implies, t rather than nest in on included in his kinshi of people from man course, rarely exist in be mixtures, with on

There is considerable (see LeVine and Car pyramidal-segmentary tergroup strife within for this is easy to see. dal-segmentary struct in the society (e.g., at in the total society), groups that are nested recreation group, his l his ethnic group’s posi it more difficult to res the other hand, in a conflicting ethnic gro groups, common neigh memberships will ma about the ethnic confl dilemma of choosing to his other groups t memberships and loya in resolving any parti

Thoden van Velsen ple of fifty folk societi that intrasocietal viol compared to matriloci: change of residence fo nity in which he was to suppose that the di
Interracial conflict in the North than in the South in the Northern situations suggests there is an improvement of education and a worthwhile employment. However, the relation between tribal groups in the Southern states and the disequilibrium were the result of conflicts that led to the rank-equilibrating residual, but he does not deal with the other types of equilibria. 

Rise from structural disequilibrium (LeVine 1969) points out, it can be adequately tested. Theories and measurement of conditions under which occur as a response to obviously, neither a necessity of aggression. It is a disequilibrium as prerequisite in one’s disequilibrium to aggress. Assistance of others to a cut the experience of resistance and frustration under specific condition in our prior discussion. 

The conflict between the groups is included as a segment of each larger group that he is a member of. Thus in some folk societies, an individual may live in a small family group, in a small farming society, which is a part of a larger kinship group, which, in turn, is a segment of a larger ethnic group, which is one component of a larger society. In the cross-cutting type, as the name implies, the groups to which a member belongs cut across rather than nest in one another. His residence group is not necessarily included in his kinship group, and his work group may be composed of people from many different ethnic groups. These two types, of course, rarely exist in their pure forms. Most social structures tend to be mixtures, with one or the other predominating.

There is considerable evidence from the anthropological literature (see LeVine and Campbell for a summary of references) that the pyramidal-segmentary structure is more conducive to destructive intergroup strife within a society than the cross-cutting type. The reason for this is easy to see. If, for example, in a society which has a pyramidal-segmentary structure, a conflict arises between two ethnic groups in the society (e.g., about which group’s language shall be paramount in the total society), then the individual’s membership in all the groups that are nested within his ethnic group (his neighborhood, his recreation group, his kinship group, etc.) will strengthen his loyalty to his ethnic group’s position. But this will happen on both sides, making it more difficult to resolve the differences between the two groups. On the other hand, in a cross-cutting social structure, members of the conflicting ethnic groups are likely to be members of common work groups, common neighborhood groups, and so on. Their common memberships will make it difficult to polarize individual attitudes about the ethnic conflict. Doing so would place the individual in the dilemma of choosing between loyalty to his ethnic group and loyalty to his other groups that cut across ethnic lines. Thus cross-cutting memberships and loyalties tend to function as a moderating influence in resolving any particular intergroup conflict within a society.

Thoden van Velzen and van Wettering (1960), in a study of a sample of fifty folk societies, provide some relevant evidence. They found that intrasocietal violence was considerably higher in matrilocal as compared to matrilocal societies. Since matrilocal societies involve a change of residence for the male, so that he moves from the community in which he was born to a different community, it is reasonable to suppose that the difference in internal violence may be due to the
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person to his environment. Thus, the power of an actor in a given sit-
uation is determined by the characteristics of the situation as well as by his own characteristics. It follows that an actor has more power to satisfy his desires when his environment is "facilitative" rather than "resistive" to his goal achievement; that is, he has more power to overcome another when the other's resistance is weak. Also, he has more power when his wants are readily satisfied as, for example, when his aspirations are low or when, in Hindu or Zen fashion, he can exercise control over his own desires.

Many theorists who have been concerned with power have focused on it as an attribute solely of the actor. This neglects its relational as-
pects and implicitly assumes that it remains constant across situations, an assumption which is clearly false. However, it would be equally incorrect to assume that power is determined only by situational char-
acteristics. It is obvious that the resources of the actor play an important role in determining his power in a given situation. Such resources as wealth, physical strength, weapons, health, intelligence, knowledge, organizational skill, respect, and affection are ingredients of power in many situations, and they may be possessed, to a greater or a lesser degree, fairly constantly by a given actor. Thus it is possible to com-
pare individuals, groups, or nations with one another in terms of their possession of the ingredients of power, even though their relative rankings on situational power may vary from situation to situation. Moreover, doing so is more useful than might be anticipated from a situational perspective, because there is a tendency for rank-equilib-
rium with regard to access to different capabilities and resources and also across different situations. As Lasswell and Kaplan (1950, p. 57) have stated: "The rich tend also to be the healthy, respected, informed, and so on, and the poor to be the sickly, despised, and igno-
rant." Thus there is some meaning to the abstract statement that "A is more powerful than B," even though the statement is not qualified in terms of specific contexts.

There are three distinct meanings of power submerged in the state-
ment "A is more powerful than B": environmental power, or "A is usually more able to favorably influence his overall environment and/or to overcome its resistance than is B"; relationship power, or "A is usually more able to influence B favorably and/or to overcome B's resistance than B is able to do with A"; and personal power, or "A is usually more able to satisfy his desires than is B." Although these dif-
possibility that the change of residence encourages the growth of cross-cutting loyalties which, in turn, dampen the development of destructive conflict. More generally, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that population mobility, whether it be residential or social, would lead to the development of cross-cutting ties and would serve to prevent the polarization of intergroup conflict into a struggle between groups that feel they have no mutual interests.

Yet it would seem logical to assume that mobility would increase rank-disequilibrium and that, according to Galtung's hypothesis of structural aggression, this would give rise to social conflict. The contradictory predictions may both be correct, each for a different stage of the total process. Thus before there has been an erosion of the primary segmental loyalties (which are characteristic in the pyramidal-segmental type of social structure) and before the growth of cross-cutting loyalties, residential and social mobility might enhance social conflict. However, after mobility has led to the development of cross-cutting loyalties, the scope of intergroup conflict might be narrowed. Cross-cutting memberships might also be expected to individualize the social elements in the society and thus to increase their numbers, since fewer individuals might be expected to have parallel memberships in cross-cutting groups. As a consequence of the individualization and proliferation of the social units, rank-disequilibrium might be expected to have only minor consequences for intergroup relations. Nevertheless, insofar as rank-dis-equilibrium is individually frustrating, the frustration-aggression-displacement theory would predict that interpersonal tension and conflict would be enhanced.

**Power**

As Dahl (1968) has pointed out, there is little consensus about this widely employed concept other than that it is a useful one in the analysis of behavior. I shall not attempt to summarize the many different conceptions of "power" but will, instead, offer some notions of my own which have been stimulated by the writings of many others (e.g., Lasswell and Kaplan 1950; Cartwright 1959).

An actor (a term used here to refer to either a group or an individual) has power in a given situation (situational power) to the degree that he can satisfy the purposes (goals, desires, or wants) that he is attempting to fulfill in that situation. Power is a relational concept; it does not reside in the individual but rather in the relationship of the person to situation is c by his own satisfy his "resistive" overcome more pown his aspirati c" contc

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ferent forms of power are usually positively correlated, this is not inevitably so.

Let us look at one of the possibilities. B has so little environmental power that he has little expectation of satisfying large wants, and thus he wants little. A, on the other hand, has high aspirations because of his high environmental power. As a result of A’s high aspirations and B’s low aspirations, A is more vulnerable to B’s threats of noncooperation or antagonistic behavior than B is to A’s. Thus despite A’s superior environmental power, he may be in an inferior bargaining position to that of B. Experienced bargainers know that the best way to get a merchant in a Turkish market to lower his price is to appear to have no interest in what he is offering to sell. And Karl Marx knew that workers could increase their power if they recognized that they had nothing to lose but their chains. More generally, by being devoid of wants and beyond “costs,” one can place himself in a powerful position to influence anyone who wants anything from him. A depressed child who does not want to eat or an apathetic adult who does not care whether he lives or dies, by emptying himself of desire, makes those who care about his well-being feel helpless and very responsive to any possibility of arousing the depressed person’s interest. Unfortunately, in establishing the credibility of his apathy and depression, the depressed person may lose touch with the wants that initially gave rise to this bargaining tactic.

The preceding discussion suggests that in a relationship between A and B, A does not necessarily have more influence over B when B is in a situation of low environmental power. It is also true that it is not always favorable to A’s environmental and personal power for him to be in a dominating rather than an equal relationship with B. In some instances, A may be even better off if he increases B’s power in the relation rather than his own. Thus a faculty that shares some of its resources and decision-making powers with students may find that the students are more responsible and cooperative in efforts to improve the educational quality of the university than they would be if these powers were not shared.

In many discussions, the concept of power is linked only to the ability to overcome resistance; in such discussions (e.g., Lasswell and Kaplan 1950, p. 98), “the exercise of power is simply the exercise of a high degree of coerciveness.” This seems too narrow a view. It overlooks the possibility that power can be facilitative as well as coercive, that it can help one to do, “against.” This arises from the fact that power is defined by its context and situation. I suggest that power as defined—power as one may influence or control another person’s behavior or emotions—be distinguished from power as defined—power as the power to imitate the behavior of another person.

It is useful to distinguish between power, which is the capacity to bring about a change in behavior or emotions, and power, which is the capacity to influence others’ behavior or emotions. In general, one is more likely to produce influence by the use of power (Etzioni 1961) than by the use of power (Etzioni 1961) except in situations where the expert and the nonexpert are not sufficiently differentiated to legitimize the use of power (Etzioni 1961).
Theoretical Essays

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that it can liberate as well as restrain, that it can be "for" as well as "against." The emphasis on the coercive aspects of power possibly arises from the attempt to distinguish "power" from "influence": power is defined by Lasswell and Kaplan as, in essence, being coercive influence. I suggest that it would be more appropriate to conceive of power as deliberate or purposive influence. Without intending to do so, one may influence another's values, beliefs, or behaviors. One may even be powerless to prevent another from being influenced by oneself — as is the case with many parents who do not want their children to imitate their bad habits. Power is purposive influence; it may be coercive but it need not be. Coercion is only one of several forms of power.

It is useful to distinguish six types of power to influence another (see French and Raven 1959; Cartwright and Zander 1968): coercive power, which uses negative incentives, such as threats to physical well-being, wealth, reputation, or social status, to influence the other; reward or exchange power, which employs positive incentives, such as promises of gain in well-being, wealth, and the like, in exchange for what is desired from the other; ecological power, which entails sufficient control over the other's social or physical environment to permit one to modify it so that the modified environment induces the desired behavior or prevents the undesired behavior (e.g., erecting a fence may stop rabbits from eating one's vegetable garden); normative power, which is based on the obligations that the other has to accept one's influence as a result of the social norms governing the relationship; referent power, which uses the other's desire to identify with or be similar to some person or group in order to alter his attitudes and values; and expert power, which is grounded in the other's acceptance of one's superior knowledge or skill.

It is reasonable to suppose that the different types of power are likely to produce more or less alienation in those subjected to the power (Etzioni 1968). The most alienation could be expected to result from the use of coercive power and the least from the employment of expert and referent power. The tendency to alienation is also undoubtedly affected by whether the power is perceived to be employed legitimately or illegitimately. If the power user is perceived to have no right to use the type of power, if he is perceived to be using it excessively, or if he is perceived to be using it inappropriately (e.g., at the wrong time or in the wrong manner), resistance to his influence and
alienation from his purposes are the probable consequences. In summary, illegitimate use of threat or reward that is inappropriate and excessive is most likely to elicit resistance and alienation. However, when the coercion or bribery is of sufficient magnitude to elicit overt compliance, inauthentic cooperation with covert resistance is the likely outcome.

The preceding discussion suggests that the use of power may entail costs and that the costs may differ for different types of power and as a function of how the power is employed. Alienation is one type of cost; it reduces the powerholder's resources for the future employment of normative, referent, expert, and possibly also reward power by making the other less trusting of and less receptive to the powerholder. Without the other's trust as an asset, power is essentially limited to the coercive and ecological types, the types that require and consume most in the way of physical and economic resources. Moreover, it must be recognized that once the other has become alienated, untrusting, and unreceptive, a considerable expenditure of time and resources may be required to reestablish more favorable attitudes. In the short run, the use of coercive and ecological power may be more effective in producing compliance from the alienated than the attempt to develop the attitudinal resources that underlie the effective employment of noncoercive power. Nevertheless, because it seems likely that the costs of maintaining effective coercive and ecological power far outweigh the costs of maintaining the noncoercive forms, it is generally a short-lived economy to employ coercion as a substitute for the effort involved in developing a trusting relationship with the other.

It is a commonly held view about groups, as well as about men, that they tend to be shortsighted and that they value coercion as the primary form of power. Thus it is not surprising that the most widely accepted proposition about power is the one articulated by Michels, the political theorist (1911, p. 207): "Every human power seeks to enlarge its prerogatives. He who has acquired power will almost always endeavor to consolidate it and to extend it. . . ."

The assumption implicit in this proposition is that power relations are intrinsically coercive and competitive; the more power A has, the less power available for B. A corollary of this is that there is always a struggle for power. The struggle may be latent because both sides agree on its probable outcome or agree that the resulting changes would not be worth the costs; the struggle may be regulated and con-
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trolled so that it takes place under rules that limit its destructiveness, as in a boxing match; or the struggle may be unregulated and overt as in a no-holds-barred fight.

The earlier discussion of environmental power and personal power implies that power is not intrinsically competitive. While power is often gained at another's expense, in many situations it can only be enhanced cooperatively. And when the relations are cooperative, enhancement of the other's power also enhances one's own. Clearly it is possible for A's influence over B to increase at the same time as B's influence over A grows. This is what happens when two strangers, who have little influence over one another, become acquainted and fall in love. They develop great power over one another. This mutual increase in power to affect the other is a typical consequence in a cooperative relationship.

Why is it, then, that a competitive view of power is so widespread? This is probably a result of the fact that differential rankings of statuses, status hierarchies, are universal characteristics of human societies. As Barnard (1946) has suggested, status distinctions and associated distinctions of authority (the right to exercise influence in certain matters over certain statuses) are necessary for the effective functioning and survival of any group above a certain size. The competitive drive for superior rank and power, to the extent that it exists, probably derives from the existence of status hierarchies: the greater advantages usually associated with high as compared to low status provide the incentives to seek high relative power.

However, it would be unreasonable to assume there is an innately determined human tendency for everyone to want to be "top dog." Most people would rather not be President! While the striving for changes in power is usually upward rather than downward in direction, there are notable exceptions. The desire to avoid the responsibilities of high position and the fear of achieving competitive success are well-established phenomena. However, even when striving is upward, it is rarely directed to a rank beyond one's range of social comparison. Aspirations are generally determined by comparing oneself with others whose opinions or abilities are similar to one's own, rather than widely discrepant (Festinger 1954) and by comparing one's position with the other available opportunities (Thibaut and Kelley 1959). Thus it would be reasonable to assume that the power aspirations of most people are by no means unlimited.
It is well to note that the desire to increase power can be directed toward increasing the resources that underlie power (such as wealth, physical strength, organization, knowledge, skill, respect, and affection), or it can be directed toward increasing the effectiveness with which the resources of power are employed. Potential power may not get converted into effective power for two primary reasons. There may be little motivation to use the power; some potentially powerful groups and people prefer not to exercise it. Or, the conversion of power resources into effective power may be made inefficiently and unskillfully, so that much power potential is wasted. This may occur, for example, when power is used inappropriately or excessively. Thus effective power depends upon the following key elements: the control or possession of resources to generate power; the motivation to employ these resources to influence others; skill in converting the resources into usable power; and good judgment in employing this power so that its use is appropriate in type and magnitude to the situation in which it is used.

After this introduction on various aspects of power, we must turn to the question of how a group’s powers are likely to affect its relationship with other groups. By definition, the possession of great power increases a group’s chances of getting what it desires. Therefore, one would predict that the members of very powerful groups would be more satisfied with their groups and less personally discontent than members of low-power groups. Studies in industry (Porter and Lawler 1965) and of the people in various nations (Cantril 1965) provide strong support for this proposition. Second, one would expect more powerful groups to have a longer time perspective, to plan further into the future, and to have more freedom to initiate activities without consultation with others. Third, powerful groups are more likely to take actions that affect others and are more likely to influence the welfare of other groups than are less powerful groups.

Low-power groups face a situation that has many inherent disadvantages and potential frustrations. Their welfare is dependent upon the actions of others, they cannot plan far ahead, and there is likely to be discontent among their members. In such a situation, a low-power group has a limited number of alternative courses of action open to it. First, it may attempt to change the power relation itself by increasing its share of the resources at the base of power, by increasing its own resources and its effectiveness in using them, by finding allies, and/or by decreasing the power of the opposing group. Ceteris paribus, the power benevolence of given norms of equity, action and objectives so and less noti.

It is difficult for a group to see itself in the eyes of another group, unaffected by their influence. Also, one may be helpless and in a passive relationship, change that situation. The frustration may act as an instance of those in high roles in, what are a vested propriety ratio. These rational tenance (more greater initiative) than to those. Power, lack of people so defact they have failed to change the status. Conditions that resistance to comprehension as might succeed the condition that the one control of the mercy of those.
by decreasing the resources or increasing the costs of the more powerful group. Or it may seek to induce the high-power group to use its power benevolently through such techniques as ingratiation, the arousal of guilt, the appeal of helplessness, or the appeal to general norms of equity or justice. Finally, it may try to withdraw from interaction and insulate itself from the high-power group by changing its objectives so that it will be less dependent on the high-power group and less noticeable to it.

It is difficult to predict which alternative will be taken by a low-power group. However, it is reasonable to assume that such a group is unlikely to attempt to change the power relations unless it is an effectively organized, cohesive group with a high level of frustrated aspiration, a significant degree of optimism about the possibilities of change, and considerable freedom from fear of the high-power group. Also, one might assume that if a low-power group considers itself helpless and powerless, it is likely to seek to ingratiate itself in a submissive relationship with the high-power group rather than attempt to change that group.

The frustrations inherent in the situation of the low-power group act as an instigator for change. The same is not true for the situation of those in high power. It is evident that those who are satisfied with their roles in, and the outcomes of, an interaction process often develop both a vested interest in preserving the existing arrangements and appropriate rationales to justify their position. For those in high power, these rationales generally take the form of attributing greater competence (more ability, knowledge, skill) and/or superior moral value (greater initiative, drive, sense of responsibility, self-control) to oneself than to those of lower status. From the point of view of those in power, lack of power and affluence is little enough punishment for people so deficient in morality, competence, and maturity that they have failed to make their own way in society. The rationales supporting the status quo are usually accompanied by corresponding sentiments that lead their possessors to react with disapproval and resistance to attempts to change the power relations and with apprehension and defensiveness to the possibility that these attempts might succeed. The apprehension is often a response to the expectation that the change will leave one in a powerless position under the control of those who are incompetent and irresponsible or at the mercy of those seeking revenge for past injuries.
Intergroup Conflict

and regulations if they participate in formulating and enforcing them; he may consider their increased commitment an important asset which more than compensates for the inconveniences of sharing power. Of course, if those in high power expect to be humiliated or frustrated in major ways by a redistribution of power, they will resist it and seek to defend or extend their superior position.

Class and Race Conflict

Although it is evident from everyday life as well as from research that intergroup conflict can arise between groups of equal power, the most pervasive form of social conflict is between dominant and subordinate groups, between the “haves” and the “have-nots.” Such conflict is latent in any social system, large or small, whenever there are differences in authority, power, or other forms of advantage associated with different social categories—e.g., employee-employer, black-white, students-faculty, women-men, homo-heterosexual, Catholic-Protestant, aged-young, disabled-nondisabled. We shall discuss class conflict and racial conflict to see what light such conflicts can throw upon the conditions affecting the course of conflict.

It is well to recognize that not all latent intergroup conflicts become actualized. Not, of course, do they inevitably become competitive struggles. The members of a disadvantaged social category may not feel actively frustrated by their relative lack of hope, or they may have accepted their inferior status as natural and legitimate, not having conceived of any other possible state of affairs. Neither beasts of burden nor their masters are likely to conceive the possibility that a conflict could exist between them. In the past, conflict between slaves and masters was sometimes latent rather than active because the slave, as well as the master, could not conceive that another type of relationship between them was natural or possible. Similarly, women in many traditional societies view their subordinate relationship to men as a natural one, and the idea of challenging it is unlikely to occur to them. To be actively disturbed with one’s social position requires more than unhappiness or dissatisfaction. There must also be a recognition that change is possible, and that such change would not be a violation of the natural order.

Even if there is a painful discrepancy between the aspirations of people in a particular social category and their reality, they may have
If such rationales, sentiments, and expectations have been developed, those in power are likely to employ one or more defense mechanisms in dealing with the conflict-inducing dissatisfactions of the subordinated group: avoidance, which seeks to minimize human contact with those in low status by establishing a social distance that permits contact only under conditions of clear status differences; denial, which is expressed by a blindness and insensitivity to the dissatisfactions and often results in an unexpected revolt; repression, which pushes the dissatisfactions underground and often eventuates in guerrilla-type war; aggression, which may lead to masochistic sham cooperation or escalated counteraggression; displacement which attempts to divert the responsibility for the dissatisfactions onto other groups and, if successful, averts the conflict temporarily; reaction-formation, which allows expressions of concern and guilt to serve as substitutes for action to relieve the dissatisfaction of the underprivileged and which, in doing so, may temporarily confuse and mislead those who are dissatisfied; tokenism, which attempts to appease the frustrated group by providing it with token benefits and gains; sublimation, which attempts to find substitute solutions—e.g., instead of increasing the decision-making power of Harlem residents over their schools, those in power provide more facilities for the Harlem schools.

Although defensiveness is a common reaction by those with high power to the efforts of low-power groups to decrease the power differences, it is well to recognize that other reactions can and do occur. Those in high power sometimes voluntarily give up or share their power; political leaders leave office, parents often reduce their power and increase the decision-making responsibilities of their children as they grow up, some administrators and faculties willingly share their powers with students. Little is known about the conditions under which a high-power group will be willing to share its power with those in low power rather than attempt to defend and maintain the status quo. However, it seems reasonable to assume that such a group is most likely to do so when it expects that this course will increase rather than decrease its environmental and personal power. Thus if the group members believe that there will be gains in their assets or decreases in their costs due to an increased cooperativeness of the other group, they may feel that the sharing of power will be beneficial rather than harmful to them. A dean of students may, for example, feel that students will be more committed to obeying dormitory rules and regulations if he may consider them more than the result of how much more than they are frustrated in major power. Of course, if it and seek to the

Intergroup Conflict

Although it is evident that the pervasive form of intergroup conflict, between groups, between individuals in social groups, the different social classes, the students-faculty, the young-old, the aged-young, differences in racial conflict to conditions affecting education.

It is well to recognize that the actualized. Nor is it likely to the groups' struggles. The motive may be to feel actively frustrate their conflicts have accepted the society, an organized, power. The conflict could exist between masters and slave, as well as in any relationship between men in many traditions. This often occurs to them. "The slave requires more than recognition that he be a violation of..."

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