Public opinion polls indicate that "distrust of the Russians among the American people is about as universal as any feeling could be." Our newspapers repeatedly refer to the "red menace," "Soviet intransigence," "Communist trickery and deceit." Leading American public figures warn of the "Soviet threat to the American way of life" and castigate Communist China as an "outlaw among the nations." Many American scholars specializing in the study of Communism hold the view that the Communists are out to impose their system on the rest of the world and will succeed unless we are prepared to fact up to a life and death competition with them."

I shall, for the purpose of this paper, accept the widely-held assumption that the Communists have evil designs on us;*** that they are out to do us in by whatever means they can -- fair or foul. According to this view, the Communists

---

*The views expressed in this paper do not represent, nor are they necessarily similar to, the views of any organization with which the author is affiliated.

**A quote from an unpublished paper, "Internal Divisions on Disarmament in the U.S.," by Samuel Lubell, the well-known public opinion expert.


****In my opinion, this is a partial truth. It is no doubt true that the Communist leaders are hostile to the United States and would be delighted to see our national power and international influence eliminated or reduced. But our views and theirs, in these respects, are mirror images. Americans would not grieve over the demise of Communism. Each side is correct in seeing the other side as hostile and as being willing to indulge in lawless conduct (i.e., "whatever serves the national interest") to defeat the other. Each side is also notably imperceptive with regard to how its own actions foster and maintain a hostile reaction from the other.

Moreover, as a result of the mutual hostility, each side's view of itself and of the other tends to become rigid and determined by the need to be opposed to the other side. As a result each side loses its historical perspective and becomes imperceptive of the reality that ideas, men, and societies change: that Adam Smith would not recognize the American "free enterprise" system as his intellectual offspring nor would Karl Marx be able to identify Soviet or Chinese "Communism" as his descendent.
are seeking to dominate the world and to undermine the United States and other potential obstacles to its world supremacy. Moreover, since this is their objective, one cannot trust them because they will unscrupulously exploit any opportunity to harm us and advantage themselves.

**Shall we assume that the Communists are Incorrigible or Corrigible?**

If the Communists are, in fact, an unprincipled adversary out to do us in, what then? One possibility is to consider that the Communists are this way and that they are incorrigible or unchangeable.* The conception of the Communists as incorrigibly malevolent leads only to the following policy alternatives: (1) a preventive war to destroy them before, presumably, they would destroy us; (2) submitting to the Communists to induce them not to destroy us; (3) withdrawal into isolation and disengaging ourselves from the complex problems of international relations; (4) "buying time" through a military policy of stable deterrence, waiting uneasily for doomsday; or (5) attempt to achieve such a clear-cut military superiority over the Communists that they would be rationally compelled to refrain from the use of force to attain their objectives. The last alternative is sometimes broadened to state that we could use a clear-cut military superiority to prevent the Communists from attaining victories of any sort, military or nonmilitary, while we attempt to weaken them be economic warfare, propaganda, and/or subversion.

I suggest that none of the first four alternatives is tolerable and that each for a different reason is likely to result in a nuclear catastrophe. It is evident that even a surprise attack on the Soviet Union is likely to leave Russia with a sufficient number of multi-megaton weapons to retaliate with a devastating blow. Submission to the Communists is not psychologically possible for the Americans.

---

*Psychologists would probably agree that, for most people, it is easier to perceive something which they feel threatened by and which they oppose as intrinsically rather than as conditionally evil. The perception of intrinsic evil is black and white, it requires less differentiation and integration of experience, it involves less emotional restraint, and it permits unconditional and uniform moral judgments. Psychologists would also probably agree that quick moral judgment, a black-and-white picture, an unconditional view of personality and behavior, make it difficult to understand either the determinants of behavior or the conditions for its change.
can people unless we had been hopelessly defeated in a nuclear war. Withdrawal into isolation in the face of an unprincipled adversary is tantamount to surrender; it can only strengthen the adversary and enhance our own sense of desperation. With regard to the policy of military deterrence, I suggest that a hostile peace will not endure; misunderstanding, insanity, local irresponsibility, or a sense of desperation during a non-nuclear war will ultimately lead to the use of nuclear weapons. The use of nuclear weapons in a war will, in turn, make an all-out thermonuclear war more probable. In effect, there is not enough stability in the "stable" deterrent in a hostile world. However, it is no doubt true that the existence of relatively invulnerable nuclear weapons makes war less likely for any specified period of time: it "buys time." But if we "buy time" we must use the time constructively to bring about a change in our adversary before the time runs out. In other words, the policy of military deterrence is not enough in itself; it must be supplemented by a policy which assumes that our adversary is corrigible. Otherwise, we can only uneasily await doomsday.

The fifth alternative is advocated by many influential groups in the United States and it has a surface plausibility. The plausibility, I believe, arises from the reasonable proposition that Western military inferiority might tempt the Communists to exploit their military superiority. This proposition, however, does not necessarily imply that the attempt to attain a clear-cut Western military superiority is desirable.* Obviously, if the Communists were unwilling to settle for a position of military inferiority, our attempt to achieve military supremacy would only lead to a continuing intensification of the arms race. While an arms

---

*The balancing of military power is admittedly a very complex problem since military power includes such diverse elements as geography, weaponry, national will, the rate of research, and economic development. In terms of conventional forces, we wish to have clear military superiority to the Soviet Union in Detroit just as they wish to have clear superiority in Magnetogorsk. While I indicate the desirability of equality with regard to military power, I refer to the desirability of both sides being equally capable of preventing the other side from changing the political status quo by the threat or use of military power.
race is costly to the Soviet Union and undoubtedly interferes with and distorts their domestic economic development, there is no evidence to indicate that either: (a) the Soviet system under threat cannot marshal its population and resources so as to keep up in an arms race despite the resulting privations or (b) that an intensified arms race will not distort the economy and weaken the democratic institutions of the United States. Thus, there is no reasonable assurance that without turning ourselves into a garrison state (and hence losing our rationale for the effort necessary to defend our no-longer-existing "way of life") we would do better in an arms race. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that even if we were able to achieve numerical and technological military superiority they would not still be able to do enough damage to us to prevent us from intimidating them by superior military force. We may get into the position where we can "overkill" them but, even if they can kill us only once, how much of an advantage is this?

Also, the policy of attempted military superiority rests upon the assumption that the Communists will rationally accept their inferiority and not do anything rashly which might unleash our military might. If, in fact, we can assume that they will behave rationally in terms of their self-interest when they feel under the threat of our military superiority, can we not assume that they are also rational enough to know that their self-interest would be better served by a peaceful world in which neither side can profit from the use of military force than by a world in which each side pursues the dangerous and elusive goal of military superiority? Doesn't the evidence and common sense suggest that one acts less judiciously rather than more so when an opponent is perceived as trying to attain an intimidating superior force? Would our reaction be one of "rational" acceptance if we perceived the Soviet Union as attempting to do this to us? Consider only our reaction to the military build-up of Cuba. Would the Soviet Union be more rational than we? Are we to assume that they perceive themselves as villains and perceive...
us as innocent victims and will then accept as just what they should be humbled by us?*

To argue against the reasonableness of the policy of military supremacy does not imply that we should accept a position of military inferiority. As I shall indicate more fully below, we should neither tempt nor encourage Communist aggressiveness by military (or any other kind of) weakness. On the other hand, we do not wish to stimulate the arms race nor provoke fears of our aggressiveness (and thus support the most intransigent, militaristic elements in the Communist bloc) by seeking the elusive and possibly nonexistent goal of military superiority.

The conception of the Communists as incorrigibly evil, even if it were true, is useless; it does not lead to any reasonable course of action. One loses nothing by assuming that the Communists are corrigible. Such a premise does not imply that we must weaken ourselves in order to influence them to cooperate in building a peaceful world. To the contrary, my discussion later in the paper will suggest that we will be more likely to influence them if our own society is strong and thriving and if we are resolute in overcoming our own economic and racial problems. From the assumption of corrigibility, it follows that positive inducement to change, and not merely threats, are appropriate in the attempt to influence the Communists. The shift from a primary reliance on threats may not only have a salutary effect on our adversary but also upon ourselves and upon the uncommitted nations. We too often forget that we, ourselves, and our views of the world are molded by, as well mold, our behavior: a threatening posture distorts the internal economy and political process and makes our adversary appear and be more hostile. Further, it distorts our relations with the uncommitted nations and does little to persuade them of our peaceful aspirations.

*If, in fact, the Soviet leaders have an underlying guilt about their hostility to the West, they would attempt to defend themselves against this feeling by seeking evidence to justify their hostility: a threatening, superior military capability of the United States would provide ample justification.
The conception of the Communists as incorrigible is not only useless, it also runs counter to the basic intellectual traditions of science which place stress on understanding the conditions which give rise to and which alter phenomena. The scientific tradition insists that evil (if one accepts this view of the Communists) must be understood and not merely condemned. Over and over again, it has been demonstrated that the ability to control and change phenomena which are viewed as intractable depends on the development of understanding. Moreover, history suggests that even aggressor nations may reform.

Americans often forget that as a new nation we were considered to be bumptious and arrogant by the more established European countries. The United States seized the Floridas from Spain, conquered the southwestern part of our present territory after an adventurer's war against smaller and weaker Mexico, and obtained the Oregon Territory by threatening action against Britain. We also tend to forget that American expansion drove the Indian tribes ruthlessly and violently from their lands in a series of wars and broken treaties. During this time, we were stridently anti-colonial, encouraging the Latin-American peoples to win national independence, as we established our own economic and military dominance in the resulting power vacuum. And for many years American slave traders raided the coasts of Africa to supply human chattels to do the menial, backbreaking work of American agriculture. The United States has obviously changed; aggressive, expansionist national policies are not necessarily unalterable.

If the Communists are unprincipled adversaries and we hope to change this orientation, we must ask how did they get that way? What in their past experiences led them to develop the way they did? How did their views of the outside world emerge, what gave rise to their conceptions of themselves? What functions did their developing internal structure serve? What relationship has our own behavior had to the particular way they have developed? What are the assumptions
underlying their current behavior, how do they picture our attitude toward them and toward ourselves, etc., etc.?

I shall not attempt a detailed answer to these questions. However, let me indicate that a reading of many experts on Communism has led me to the following view: Communism is a child of the West, nourished in the repressive, autocratic, cruel and secretive atmosphere of Tsarist Russia. Its development has reflected the stresses and strains of its formative environment and the problems of its parentage. I have no need to detail the fact that its formative environment was hostile -- consider only the invasion of Russia and Siberia by the U. S. and other Western nations after the Bolshevik Revolution, the long period of nonrecognition, the initial exclusion from the League of Nations, the savage destructiveness of the German invasion. It is hardly surprising that they should have developed the motivation to do us in since their experience led them to believe that this was what we were trying to do to them. Nor is it surprising that they would not agree to and not adhere to rules of international conduct formulated by us; especially since we, and other nations, have consistently proclaimed and acted upon the principle that national interests could never be subordinated to international interests. Is American intervention in Guatemala and Cuba less unprincipled than Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia and Hungary except in minor degree? It is not surprising that they are unwilling to accept a double standard of international morality which is disadvantageous to them. Nor is it surprising that the Communists, having survived, and even thrived, in a hostile and unprincipled environment, should be confident of their ability to win a competitive struggle with us; they did well when they were weak, shouldn't they do even better now that they are strong?

The Communist Orientation

To state that their hostile, competitive orientation has had realistic defensive functions in terms of their past experiences does not, of course, minimize
the problems in bringing about a change in this orientation. Let me detail some of the central features of the Communist orientation to the West so that we may better understand the task confronting us.*

1. It is a central Communist belief that its enemies (i.e., "the West") strive not merely to contain Communism but to destroy it. Thus, whether the atmosphere of international relations is superficially harmonious or tense, the basic question remains "who will destroy whom?"

2. While the goal of Communism is victory over its enemies, the operational tactics of Communism must be flexible and must be rationally responsive to the opportunities and dangers characterizing specific situations so that advantages are pushed to their limit, retreat is made when necessary, and adventurist or risky or emotionally-based actions are avoided.

3. The style of Communism is that of rude belligerence and their posture is that of unyielding resistance toward the West. By appearing brazen when they are deeply apprehensive, the Communists attempt to convince the enemy that they expect attacks and are prepared to meet them confidently; a defiant attitude not only hides their sense of inferiority from the enemy but also protects them from their own fear of being helpless in the face of the enemy. Further, their belligerence and posture of rigid resistance serve to remove any temptation to succumb to the enemy by helping to unmask the hostility of the enemy which lurks beneath the occasional surface friendliness of the adversary.

---

*I draw the following description largely from N. Leites's A Study of Bolshevism, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1953. Leites's description is, I believe, an excellent depiction of the official American view of the Soviet orientation; it may not be an accurate view of the actual orientation of the leaders of post-Stalin Russia. My own view is that the characterization of the interaction between the two parties, tends to be misleading. It is somewhat like knowing that a wife condemns her husband to neighbors, opens his mail, takes money from his wallet, and does other nasty things. Knowing this about the wife may be misleading unless one also knows whether the husband is a habitual drunkard and adulterer or a generous and reasonable man.
1. The Communists attempt to limit contact with the West and to maintain a sharp rather than fuzzy demarcation between themselves and their potential enemies. They do so because they believe their enemies will attempt to use "the smallest crack" for espionage and will use friendly contacts and false promises to subvert and seduce their populace who are temporarily undergoing hardships. The limitation of contact and the emphasis on secrecy express their fear of being vulnerable to external enemies who are out to destroy them.

5. The Communists believe that the tide of history is on their side and that their side has a noble, humanistic objective: the creation of a world-wide society in which no man exploits another, in which the fruits of man's labor are freely available to all according to their need. They see this objective as appealing to all but the exploiting classes and those who are confused and misled by the propaganda of the exploiters. Thus, they see a fundamental split between the people and the leaders of the enemy nations. The enemies of Communism are the leaders of the West (i.e., the "Wall Street clique") and not the people.

6. The enemies of Communism are viewed as being highly rational, intelligent, and effective even though they are fighting a losing battle. Their power is never to be underestimated. Their continuing, basic hostility is always to be taken for granted and, in that sense, their hostility cannot be provoked: the enemy ceaselessly aims at the annihilation of Communism. The ruling group of the enemy camp derives its policies from sober calculations of the relationships of forces rather than from feelings or from considerations of prestige. It acts in terms of its own self-interest; agreements are made not to promote friendly feelings but simply to represent the existing balance of forces.

There are several things to be noted in this description of the Communist orientation to the West. Firstly, it is based upon an image of a life and death struggle; they will be annihilated unless they annihilate their opponents. Their image of the enemy is, in a sense, an evil version of themselves. Secondly, there
is the pervasive sense of vulnerability so that they must constantly be on their
guard against the enemy. Thirdly, there are mechanisms built into the orientation
to make their image partially immune to counterevidence or refuting experience.
Also, their behavior as determined by their image of the enemy is likely to pro-
duce the reactions from their opponents which will make them feel that the image
is true.

**Changing a Hostile Orientation**

How to change such a self-perpetuating, hostile orientation? Obviously, it
is a difficult task and, with our present level of knowledge, success is by no means
certain. Nevertheless we must try. Drawing upon analogies from psychotherapeutic
experience, I suggest that there are four critical tasks involved in producing such
a change. First of all, there must be some motivation to change -- i.e., the gains
from such a hostile orientation must not be so great as to outweigh the anxieties
and difficulties associated with the present situation. Secondly, the experienced
anxieties and difficulties must be causally connected with the competitive, hostile
orientation. Thirdly, the current environment must not provide substantial justifi-
cation and support for the continued maintenance of the defensive hostile orienta-
tions which were appropriate in the past -- i.e., they must have new experiences,
that are convincingly different from their past experiences, which indicate a genu-
ine interest in their well-being. And, finally, they must perceive that they will
gain rather than suffer, have less anxiety rather than more, if they adopt a new
orientation.

I do not list these tasks in order of importance nor in order of priority.
They are all necessary and they must all be worked on, if change is to occur.

**The Motivation to Change**

There is some evidence that progress on the first task has been made. The
leaders of both the Soviet Union and the United States are, I believe deeply anxi-
ous about the present world situation and neither group believes that a competitive
victory is possible through war. The new doctrine of peaceful coexistence consist-
ently and repeatedly espoused by Khrushchev, despite bitter internal opposition (e.g., by Molotov), is a sign of this. Similar statements by Kennedy and Eisenhower, including their denunciations of right-wing extremists, can also be viewed as evidence that our leaders realize that nuclear weapons no longer permit victory through war. The existence of H-bombs is thus, in a perverse way, a force for change. Moreover, the economic burden of ever-increasing armaments, the increasing pressure from neutral nations who feel threatened by the arms race, and the increasing discontent with the arms race within the populations of the super-powers also work in the direction of change.

What about the gains from a competitive, hostile orientation? These are of two types, internal and external. There is ample evidence to suggest that a hostile, competitive orientation to the outside world fosters internal cohesiveness and permits Soviet leaders to justify and exert repressive controls to inhibit internal dissidence and challenge to their leadership. On the other hand, there is considerable reason to think that the present Soviet leaders believe that many internal stresses and strains are the indirect effects of the enormous costs of the arms race and that, without these costs, they could rapidly improve the lot of the Soviet people and could afford to lessen these repressive controls. Moreover, the process of de-Stalinization initiated by the present leaders of the Soviet Union indicates their realization that repressive controls have serious limitations as a means of motivating enthusiastic support for the goals set forth by the Communist party. In addition, the denunciation of Stalin and his paranoid despotism represents a repudiation of some aspects of the Soviet Union's past. In effect, the present leaders of the Soviet Union have attempted to dissociate themselves from the irrational suspiciousness and the brutal, homicidal acts which were connected with Stalin. In so doing, they have made it more difficult to reinstitute these despotic policies. Internally, almost all observers agree, the Soviet people responded gratefully to the lessening of the pervasive suspiciousness and tyranny.
Externally, it is apparent that the Soviet Union has made some gains by a competitive, hostile orientation to the West. Thus, they have gained political and economic influence in underdeveloped areas by being hostile to the remnants of Western imperialism. However, to the extent that we become more active in helping the peoples in these areas to achieve independence, freedom, and a higher standard of living and to the extent that we free ourselves of racial prejudice, the Soviet Union will have little to gain from hostility per se to the West. The revolutionary changes which are sweeping through Africa and Asia and which are beginning to be felt in Latin America were not instigated by Communism and cannot be controlled by Soviet military power. Moreover, there is already some indication that the Soviet Union's criticisms of the West are not, in themselves, carte blanche to the affections of the newly emerged nations of Africa and Asia.

In effect, the Soviet Union is now being faced with the task of offering something positive — something more than the financial aid, technical assistance, etc. being offered by the West, if it wishes to compete for influence among the new nations. It has already entered this competition and has begun to find that it is an expensive competition with no easy and quick gains for the Communist bloc.

We should, of course, welcome Communist aid to underdeveloped nations. These nations need as much aid as they can get and Communist aid acts as a competitive spur to the West to continue and expand its assistance programs. Without the competition of the Communists, the West might neglect its responsibilities toward helping the poorer nations achieve a decent standard of living. The Communist aid programs should also be welcomed by the West because, indirectly, they may contribute

Our military power is a risk most of these areas is considerably greater than that the Soviet Union can bring to bear. Our tendency to view the Communist threat primarily in military terms has led us to give arms to backward, unpopular governments enabling the Communists to identify us with reactionary military cliques while they attempt to identify themselves with popular unrest and the groups advocating progressive social change. It is encouraging that the "Alliance for Progress" places emphasis upon the need to identify with popular aspirations for social reform rather than upon military aid.
to the erosion of the stereotyped view of the West fostered by isolation and rigid part doctrine. In other words, we should welcome the contacts of Soviet leaders and technicians with a reality which is rather different than they expected, a reality which cannot easily be fitted into their ideological preconceptions, a reality which forces them into association with people who have more modern and sophisticated knowledge of the West than they. It is undoubtedly healthy for leaders and people from both the East and West to be exposed to environments which demonstrate the irrelevance to much of the world of the Cold War and the ideological controversies connected with it.

Soviet military power has, of course, been used to maintain its control over Eastern Europe. A widely-held view is that the Soviets will use their military power to gain political control whenever they can get away with it. This conception presupposes that political and economic imperialism would be viewed as a profitable course of action by the Soviet leaders even in a world where they perceived no military threats to their national security. Or, in other words, that the Soviet leaders would force a non-threatening, non-Communist nation to become Communist and subservient if they could not convert it to their viewpoint. There is, of course, some evidence to support this view -- consider only Czechoslovakia Hungary. However, there is another side to this picture. Despite its military power, the Soviet Union has discovered that it cannot simply impose its will upon other Communist nations to obtain unquestioning obedience to orders from Moscow. There is a growing diversity and independence of decision within the Communist group of nations. Yugoslavia, Poland, China, and Albania diverge in different respects from Soviet doctrine. The changes that have taken place within the Communist world reflect a growing relativism in the Communist ideology and may contribute to an erosion of the rigidity of the Bolshevik doctrine: what works in Yugoslavia or Poland may, after all, have some useful implications for the Soviet Union. Even more basically, the Soviet experience with the difficulties of attempting to dominate completely a
relatively small bloc of Communist nations may suggest that their image of paradise (i.e., of a Communist world led by the Soviet Union) should be revised. Some of their ideologists may have begun to speculate about what the world would be like if the United States were to become Communist and were competing with the Soviet Union for leadership of the Communist world. They may have begun to realize that the world is too large to be controlled by any single power and that even a completely Communist world would not be free from conflicts of interests. In other words, the image of a utopian world Communism has been tarnished by the reality of conflict and diversity within the Communist bloc; the changing image may yet suggest that diversity among nations cannot be abolished by power or by superficial ideological similarity. This realization may weaken the readiness to run risks and to make sacrifices to establish a Communist domination over the world.

However, the erosion of the ideological base for a militant Communist expansionism has not yet proceeded far enough to warrant a lack of concern about the aggressive potentials of Soviet military power. The fact that Soviet military power has been used to establish and maintain unpopular Communist governments in Eastern Europe suggests that prudence requires the West to develop and maintain military forces sufficient to insure that the Soviet leaders fully understand that military aggression or the threat of it will be unrewarding to them. We do not want to tempt them to use force. Equally, however, we do not want to frighten or provoke them into military action by our own belligerence. They, after all, see our weapons the way we see theirs; as threats rather than as guarantors of the peace. The difficult question we face is: How can we convince the Soviet leaders (and ourselves) that we are dedicated to the view that the use of military force by either side would be unprofitable for both sides? It seems evident that attempts to maintain a clear military superiority, boasts of our military strength, attempts to acquire information which would make them less vulnerable to our surprise attack, etc., do little to convince the Soviets that we might not be out to destroy them. We have to press
for agreements that would end the arms race, that would stabilize and reduce the military forces of both sides, that would eliminate military elements from areas of intense international conflict (e.g., Central Europe, Southeast Asia, Middle East).*

Similarly, we must be prepared to deter subversion and indirect aggression against ourselves and other independent nations so that these courses of "unfair competition" become unrewarding to the Communists. We do not want to tempt them by indifference and lack of response to violations of civilized standards of international conduct. On the other hand, we don't wish to justify illegal behavior by emulating it. Nor can we reasonably assert the right to use military force (e.g., the use of extensive military aid and the intervention of American troops) to support unpopular dictators who are threatened by internal revolutionary movements which are led by Communists. Just as we cannot allow the Communists to claim the moral right to overthrow non-Communist nations we cannot claim the moral right to preserve the status quo simply because it favors us.

**Increasing Their Awareness of the Effects of This Behavior**

If my analysis is correct, the Soviet Union has made important internal and external gains from a competitive, hostile orientation to the West, but these gains have diminished considerably and are being overshadowed by the anxieties and difficulties associated with the arms race. However, I do not believe they are yet sufficiently aware that the arms race is partly stimulated by our reaction to their orientation toward us. They, of course, see the causal arrow as being pointed in the opposite direction -- i.e., their attitude is determined by our hostile, threatening orientation to them. That is, I doubt that the Soviet leaders are sensitive

---

*We should, of course, seek reasonable verification of compliance. However, since the Soviet leaders apparently view secrecy as necessary for this internal security, we should anticipate little immediate progress in obtaining agreements that require the Soviet Union to "open up" its society to external inspection. This is particularly likely to be so when the agreement offers them no major economic saving. This suggests that we may be more successful in obtaining disarmament agreements if we concentrate on agreements that do not require open access to Soviet territory by human inspectors -- i.e., on agreements that can be monitored by non-human sensors or on agreements relating to areas outside of both the U.S. and U.S.R. which are potential areas of military conflict.*
to how we react when they say "we will outlive you" or "your grandchildren will live under communism." I doubt that they are aware of how their own actions and words lead us to react to them in such a way that their view of a hostile world is confirmed by a self-fulfilling prophecy. How can we help them become aware of the relationship between their actions and our reactions? This is a difficult problem and I have no good solutions to offer. Obviously, encouraging more and more of their leaders to visit the United States and to talk informally with Congressmen, administration officials, businessmen, etc., may enable them to realize that many of our most influential citizens do, in fact, perceive that our orientation to them is defensive and is determined by their hostile, threatening orientation. We should encourage these visits whether or not they are willing to reciprocate. Philip Moseley* has pointed out "In comparing the 1931 level of (Soviet) knowledge about the West with the level of 1961, I have to say that the 1961 level is about two percent of the 1931 level." That's a pretty horrifying situation and one which we must do everything to change by providing their leaders with as many opportunities for informing themselves about us as we can, even if they are too fearful to reciprocate. I place stress on "their leaders" because one may suspect that their subordinates who are here in the United States tend, as do most subordinates, to fashion their communications so that they do not challenge the prejudices and stereotypes of their superiors.

In addition to fostering frequent contacts among leaders, we should attempt to institutionalize some direct process of communicating to one another an accurate picture of how each side is interpreting the actions and communications of the other side. We should have some regularized way of holding a "mirror" up to the Soviet leaders so that they could see how they look to us when they act in a certain way and vice versa. Possibly, alternating every other month, Kennedy

* op. cit.
might give a talk to and expose himself to questions from the Politburo, and
Khrushchev might do the same for the leading officials in our government. There
is no doubt that the technical problems of arranging direct but restricted com-
munication from nation to nation could be solved. I suggest that the communi-
cation be restricted rather than available to the public so as to reduce the tempta-
tion to propagandize. However, neither side is sufficiently disinterested and
free of manipulative desires in relation to the other side to be able to portray
without bias their image of the other.* It may well be that we each need a
"neutral" mirror which would enable us to see how we look to the other side and
which would attempt to interpret communications so that they are unlikely to be
misinterpreted by the other side. It would not, I imagine, be impossible to set
up a group of competent statesmen and social scientists from neutral nations which
might perform such a function. The record that each side has of predicting the
reactions of the other side is pitifully bad and suggests the need for some such
procedure as I have just described.

Providing New Experiences to Facilitate Change

While increased self and social insight is helpful in bringing about a
change, the most important strategy in inducing change is to act and react in a
way which is inconsistent with the other's expectations. One should, of course,
anticipate that when this is done the other will be disconcerted and will attempt,
initially, to provoke reactions which will justify his original expectations. The
great difficulty in executing this strategy is in resisting the trap of being pro-
voked to actions which will confirm his expectations. The great difficulty in

*Thus, for example, if American leaders interpret Khrushchev's statement
which has been headlined as "we will bury you" to mean "we will destroy you" ra-
ther than "we will outlive you," the misinterpretation may be a deliberate dis-
tortion to make the statement seem more hostile than it was. In Russian, Khrush-
chev's statement implied that American capitalism would die because of its com-
parative inefficiency while socialism would continue to flourish.
executing this strategy is in resisting the trap of being provoked to actions which will confirm his expectations. Thus, if we wish to change a hostile orientation, we must see to it that the current environment does not provide justification and support for its continued maintenance. Thus, the Communists must have new experiences with us which are convincingly different from their past experiences with us which are convincingly different from their past experiences: experiences which, on the one hand, indicate that we have a genuine interest in their well-being and which, on the other hand, indicate self-respect and an unwillingness to be abused.

Elsewhere, in my paper "A Psychological Basis For Peace,"* I have attempted to spell out some of the policies and actions which we might adopt that might lead the Soviet Union to change their orientation. These policies include giving up the quest for military supremacy, establishing continuing joint military and technical groups to lessen the dangers of war and to work for disarmament, showing an active concern with what they regard as important, accepting the viability and legitimacy of their system for them, conforming to the standards of international conduct we wish them to conform to, developing a genuine interest in their internal successes rather than failures, expressing in action and words our desire for a rapid improvement in their standard of living, recognizing and honoring their achievements, welcoming whatever assistance they may be able to give us, expanding mutual trade, fostering cultural and educational exchanges, the establishment of cooperative programs of research and advanced studies, institutionalizing international competitive contests in diverse fields to encourage a peaceful competition for international prestige, etc.

In sum, I suggest that we embark on a policy which combines both firmness and friendliness, a policy of friendly strength. We should be firm in our resist-

---

ence to violations (by any nation) of decent and civilized standards of international conduct and strong enough to make effective contributions to the ability of other nations and our own, in concert, to resist and counteract such violations. However, our orientation should not merely be the negative one of the vigilant and well-armed guard; in addition, we should attempt to establish an international atmosphere which is amicable enough to permit nations of diverse internal systems to engage in mutually rewarding cooperation.

To create such an atmosphere, we shall have to engage in a sustained program of massive reconciliation in which we endeavor to express and maintain a willingness to cooperate with the Soviet Union when it is to our mutual advantage despite the inevitable provocations which will place a strain on the good will of both sides. We should not expect that our offers of cooperation will be received with gratitude, or will be reciprocated fully, or will be frequently accepted; even so, we should persist in offering to cooperate whenever we see opportunities which will profit both sides. Our underlying attitude must be sufficiently self-confident not to feel threatened by the fact that they, as well as we, will profit from cooperation or by the possibility that, because of our greater affluence, they may on occasion profit relatively more than we. Obviously, the Communists will have no incentive to cooperate unless they will gain rather than suffer, unless they become more rather than less secure as a result of cooperation. It is, of course, these very gains from cooperation which would create a web of interdependencies that would give each side a positive interest in the other side's well being, making it against one's own interest to harm the other. However, the legacy of sustained suspicion is such that it will take continuing good will and sustained offers of genuine cooperation and a persistent readiness to accept their offers of reasonable cooperation before their underlying image of a competitive struggle for survival is replaced by a sense of interlaced common interests.
Changing Ourselves

Here, let me briefly turn to the very difficult question of how we can influence ourselves to sustain a policy of massive reconciliation. Putting it another way, how can we ourselves change our hostile orientation to the Soviet Union, especially since their actions often provide a justification for our orientation? This is an extraordinarily difficult question to answer and most of us evade it. Many of those trying to change the policy do not face up to the social and political functions which it serves. It is evident that if our political leaders were to accept as valid the analysis I have sketched out above, it might be politically disastrous to act upon it unless there were a change in the American orientation. In orienting ourselves to the question I have raised, I suggest that we must begin to understand the roots of our own defensiveness. I use the term "defensiveness" to indicate that our conception of the Communists is determined not only by what they are actually like but also by our own internally generated needs and anxieties. Europeans (who, after all, are more precariously located in relation to the Soviet Union than we) have noted that Americans are obsessed with Communism, that Communism is the American nightmare, that the Communists are not viewed as being human opponents but are conceived to be devils. If in fact we are obsessed with the Communist "devil," what function does the devil serve for us?

Typically, an external devil serves several main functions for a group. It promotes internal unity by rallying the group against the external threat. This is the well-known sociological thesis: out-group hostility promotes in-group cohesiveness. Secondly, it serves to distract attention from internal weaknesses and difficulties by attributing the source of one's problems to the external devil. Thirdly, it provides a rationale and justification for those segments of the society whose prestige, skills, financial interests, and institutional existence are based upon the belief that there is a devil. And finally, it serves
to inhibit political criticism and social change by identifying the critics of the established order with the devil.

It seems evident that the external devil has served all of the above purposes for the United States. I would suggest that there are three major internal problems, three roots of our defensiveness, that we must confront before we in the United States will lose our need for our obsession with Communism.

First, historically, the United States has been able to have things pretty much its own way. Prior to World War I, our geographical isolation permitted this. After World War I, and especially right after World War II, we were the strongest power on earth. It is evident we were not able to remain isolated nor are we likely to be able to remain the supreme power. The future suggests that we will have to accommodate ourselves to the fact that we will be a strong power among other equally strong powers in a highly interdependent world. In a sense, we have to adjust ourselves to a loss of unique power, to a loss of unique status. Loss of status for a proud people is always difficult to accept. I suggest that we must investigate previous historical examples of such loss -- e.g., as with England -- to learn as much as we can about coping with this difficult national situation.

A second root of defensiveness lies in the careers, skills, special privileges, jobs, and financial interests which have been developed in relation to a hostile world. These vested interests would naturally feel threatened by a change in our orientation unless they are given the strongest evidence to indicate that they will not lose by such a change. I suggest that the President should urge Congress to adopt as a declaration of national policy a statement to the effect that scientists, the military, employers, industrialists, and investors will be compensated for any losses they suffer as a result of the curtailment of defense activities. This statement must, of course, be buttressed by the development of meaningful and detailed plans, at the local as well as national level, for enabling the people and industries involved in defense to play a significant and profitable role in a peaceful world.
A third root of defensiveness lies in a lack of confidence in ourselves; a lack of confidence in our ability to maintain a thriving, prosperous, and attractive society that can be morally and intellectually influential among nations without a preponderance of military power. Obviously, we must work to overcome our problems of racial prejudice, economic instability, and lack of dedication to common purposes. To the extent that we have a thriving society which is coping successfully with its own internal problems, we will have less ground for the fears and less need for the hostilities that interfere with international cooperation. Unless we can make democracy work in Mississippi, what reason is there for believing that we can influence the underdeveloped nations to adopt the social reforms and political practices necessary to prevent international turmoil and strife?

Speaking to Both Audiences Simultaneously

My discussion in the last several pages has emphasized that our own defensiveness may make it difficult for us to adopt an orientation toward the Soviet bloc which might lead to the end of the Cold War. A change in our defensiveness will require vigorous political effort by the diverse groups who see the present state of international relations as perilous. In addition, it may require pressure from friendly, influential nations (e.g., in Europe and in South America) who are not so obsessed as we with the nightmare of Communism. However, not all courses of constructive international action are likely to provoke equal amounts of defensiveness. It may well be that our most important intellectual task is to uncover those courses of constructive action which will be reassuring to the Communists and yet which will challenge our own defenses least. The problem is to define courses of action which are sufficiently close to our own national identity and which still deal constructively with the Communist world. These actions must serve constructive functions for both the internal and external audiences, each of whom are highly defensive.
How do we convince both audiences that their fears are unwarranted? The answer to this dilemma lies, I believe, in the policy of friendly strength which I have described earlier in this paper. Both audiences must be persuaded that the military strength of either side cannot be overcome by the other and that the resort to military force by either side will be mutually destructive. Public statements of our own military capability must always be accompanied by clear recognition of Soviet military strength; expression of our determination to resist military aggression must be coupled with acknowledgment of the Soviet determination to do likewise.

Explicit recognition of mutual military power (and, hence, of the powerlessness of military power to resolve conflicts of interest) should be accompanied by open recognition that the internal achievements of the two societies will not affect the ultimate military balance of power. To the contrary, our public statements to both audiences should demonstrate an awareness that internal difficulties and failures make a nuclear power more rather than less dangerous. Neither we nor the Soviet Union have any reason to gloat if internal problems or external loss of face strengthen the primitive, repressive, and belligerent elements in the other nation. We would do well to affirm repeatedly our real interest in a prosperous and thriving world, in which all nations (including those in the Communist bloc) are coping successfully with their internal economic, social, and political problems.

The promotion of the positive goal of a peaceful world, composed of thriving, independent, and cooperating nations, rather than the negative goal of containing Communism provides a potential meeting ground for both audiences and a potential avenue for cooperation. Undoubtedly, the "meeting" will initially be on the safest grounds (e.g., the adoption in the United States of ingenious Soviet-developed surgical staplers which join severed blood vessels and nerves; the widespread use of American-developed polio vaccines in the Soviet Union) but when there has been a successful encounter it should be given the widest public recognition.
Even when the grounds for cooperation are least secure, when there is reason to believe that the other side is seeking to obtain a competitive advantage -- e.g., in attempting to use the vulnerabilities of underdeveloped nations to spread an anti-American Communism -- there is nothing to be lost by proclaiming and pursuing a positive goal which is not oriented to or determined by the Cold War. On the contrary, a policy of aiding underdeveloped nations which is oriented to their needs to become thriving and independent rather than to our hostility or fear of Communism is more likely to produce favorable attitudes toward us. Such a policy is not only likely to be more effective in preventing the spread of an anti-American Communism but, in addition, it leaves open the continuing possibility of cooperation with the Communists to achieve mutually acceptable objectives of reducing poverty and instability among nations.

More generally, one can state that the reduction of international tension requires that the leaders of the United States and Soviet Union be constantly aware that their words and actions have implications for the two audiences. Neither audience is likely to attribute evil intentions to itself nor altruistic motives to the other, nor are they likely to accept a position of military inferiority. Statements or deeds which rest on the claim of moral superiority (e.g., that an attempt to overthrow a government is legitimate if we do it but not if they do it, that boasts of missile strength are defensive when we do it but aggressive when they do it) or of superior power can only incense the external audience even though they may please the internal audience. On the other hand, the announcement and pursuit of positive goals which could contribute to the welfare of both sides, and to which both may contribute, enhance the possibility that cooperation will occur sooner or later.

In summary, in this paper I have raised the question of what one may do when faced with an unprincipled adversary who cannot be destroyed or avoided. My answer is that one must attempt to change him. To change him, I suggest, it is
necessary to understand why he is that way - how did he come to develop that way, what functions does this orientation serve for him, etc.? Then I considered some of the tasks involved in changing the hostile orientation of an adversary. For purposes of discussion, throughout this paper I have accepted the widely held assumption that the Soviet Union can be viewed as an unprincipled adversary. A Soviet reader, if he felt this were a more apt characterization of the United States, might apply the reasoning in this paper to the problem of changing the United States.

* * * *