Producing Change in an Adversary

Public opinion polls indicate that “distrust of the Russians among the American people is about as universal as any feeling could be.” Our newspapers repeatedly refer to the “Red menace,” “Soviet intransigence,” “Communist trickery and deceit.” Leading Americans warn of the “Soviet threat to the American way of life” and castigate Communist China as an “outlaw among nations.” Many American scholars specializing in the study of Communism hold the view that the Communists are out to impose their system on the rest of the world and will succeed unless we are prepared to face up to a life-and-death competition with them.\(^2\)

I shall, for the purpose of this paper, accept the widely held assumption that the Communists have evil designs on us—(that they are out to do us in

\(^2\)The views expressed in this paper do not represent, nor are they necessarily similar to, the views of any organization with which the author is affiliated.

\(^3\)In my opinion, this is a partial truth. It is no doubt true that the Communist leaders are hostile to the United States and would be delighted to see our national power and international influence eliminated or reduced. But our views and theirs, in these respects, are mirror images. Americans would not grieve over the demise of Communism. Each side is correct in seeing the other side as hostile and as being willing to indulge in lawless conduct (i.e., “whatever serves the national interest”) to defeat the other. Each side is also notably imperceptive with regard to how its own actions foster and maintain a hostile reaction from the other.

Moreover, as a result of the mutual hostility, each side’s view of itself and of the other tends to become rigid and determined by the need to be opposed to the other side. As a result, each side loses its historical perspective and becomes imperceptive of the reality that ideas, men, and societies change; that Adam Smith would not recognize the American “free enterprise” system as his intellectual offspring; and that Karl Marx would not be able to identify Soviet or Chinese “Communism” as his descendant.
by whatever means they can, fair or foul. According to this view, the Communists are seeking to dominate the world and to undermine the United States and other potential obstacles to their goal of world supremacy. Moreover, since this is their objective, one cannot trust them because they will unscrupulously exploit any opportunity to harm us and advantage themselves.

ARE THE COMMUNISTS INCORRIGIBLE OR CORRIGIBLE?

If the Communists are, in fact, an unprincipled adversary out to do us in, what then? One possibility is to consider that the Communists are this way and that they are incorrigible or unchangeable. The conception of the Communists as incorrigibly malevolent leads only to the following policy alternatives:

(1) waging a preventive war to destroy them before, presumably, they destroy us;
(2) submitting to the Communists to induce them not to destroy us;
(3) withdrawing into isolation and disengaging ourselves from the complex problems of international relations;
(4) “buying time” through a military policy of stable deterrence and waiting uneasily for doomsday;
(5) attempting to achieve such a clear-cut military superiority over the Communists that they would be rationally compelled to refrain from the use of force to attain their objectives.

The last alternative is sometimes broadened to state that we could use a clear-cut military superiority to prevent the Communists from attaining victories of any sort, military or nonmilitary, while we attempt to weaken them by economic warfare, propaganda, and/or subversion.

I suggest that none of the first four alternatives is tolerable and that each for a different reason is likely to result in a nuclear catastrophe. It is now evident that even a surprise attack on the Soviet Union would leave Russia with a sufficient number of multi-megaton weapons to retaliate with a devastating blow. Submission to the Communists would not be psychologically possible for the American people unless we had been hopelessly defeated in a nuclear war. Withdrawal into isolation in the face of an unprincipled adversary is tantamount to surrender; it can only strengthen the adversary and enhance our own sense of desperation.

Psychologists would probably agree that, for most people, it is easier to perceive something by which they feel threatened and which they oppose as intrinsically rather than as conditionally evil. The perception of intrinsic evil is black and white, it requires less differentiation and integration of experience, it involves less emotional restraint, and it permits unequivocal and uniform moral judgment. Psychologists would also probably agree that quick moral judgment, a black-white picture, an unconditional view of personality and behavior, make it difficult to understand either the determinants of behavior or the conditions for its change.

With regard to the policy peace will not endure; misurose del of desperation during of nuclear weapons. The use an all-out thermonuclear w stability in the “stable” de doubtless true that the exa makes war less likely for an we “buy time,” we must use in our adversary before the military deterrence is not c policy which assumes that only uneasily await doomsday.

The Policy of Military Supe

The fifth alternative—war by many influential groups si ability. The plausibility, I bel Westerns military inferiority military superiority. This p the attempt to attain a dl Obviously, if the Communi military inferiority, our at lead to a continuing intensi costly to the Soviet Union as domestic economic develop the Soviet system under th to keep up in an arms race d fixed arms race will not disto tions of the United States without turning ourselves into for the effort necessary to d would do better in an arms: numerical and technological able to do enough damage to military force. We may get but, even if they can kill us.

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With regard to the policy of military deterrence, I suggest that a hostile
peace will not endure; misunderstanding, insanity, local irresponsibility, or a
sense of desperation during a non-nuclear war will ultimately lead to the use
of nuclear weapons. The use of nuclear weapons in a war will, in turn, make
an all-out thermonuclear war more probable. In effect, there is not enough
stability in the "stable" deterrent in a hostile world. However, it is un-
doubtedly true that the existence of relatively invulnerable nuclear weapons
makes war less likely for any specified period of time: it "buys time." But if
we "buy time," we must use the time constructively to bring about a change
in our adversary before the time runs out. In other words, the policy of
military deterrence is not enough in itself; it must be supplemented by a
policy which assumes that our adversary is corrigeble. Otherwise, we can
only uneasily await doomsday.

The Policy of Military Superiority

The fifth alternative—working toward military superiority—is advocated
by many influential groups in the United States and it has a surface plausi-
bility. The plausibility, I believe, arises from the reasonable proposition that
Western military inferiority might tempt the Communists to exploit their
military superiority. This proposition, however, does not necessarily imply
that the attempt to attain a clear-cut Western military superiority is desirable.4
Obviously, if the Communists were unwilling to settle for a position of
military inferiority, our attempt to achieve military supremacy would only
lead to a continuing intensification of the arms race. While an arms race is
costly to the Soviet Union and undoubtedly interferes with and distorts their
domestic economic development, there is no evidence to indicate either that
the Soviet system under threat cannot marshal its population and resources
to keep up in an arms race despite the resulting privations or that an intensi-
ified arms race will not distort the economy and weaken the democratic insti-
tutions of the United States. Thus, there is no reasonable assurance that
without turning ourselves into a garrison state (and hence losing our rationale
for the effort necessary to defend our no-longer-existing "way of life"), we
would do better in an arms race. Moreover, even if we were able to achieve
numerical and technological military superiority, the Russians might still be
able to do enough damage to prevent us from intimidating them by superior
military force. We may get into the position where we can "overkill" them
but, even if they can kill us only once, how much of an advantage is this?

4 The balancing of military power is admittedly a very complex problem since
military power includes such diverse elements as geography, weaponry, national will,
the state of research, and economic development. In terms of conventional forces, we
wish to have clear military superiority to the Soviet Union in Detroit just as they wish
to have clear superiority in Magnetogorsk. When I indicate the desirability of equality
with regard to military power, I refer to the desirability of both sides being equally
capable of preventing the other side from changing the political status quo by the
threat or use of military power.
The policy of attempted military superiority also rests upon the assumption that the Communists will rationally accept their inferiority and not do anything that might unleash our military might. If, in fact, we can assume that they will behave rationally in terms of their self-interest when under the threat of our military superiority, can we not assume that they are also rational enough to know that their self-interest would be better served by a peaceful world in which neither side can profit from the use of military force? Evidence and common sense suggest that one acts less judiciously rather than more so when an opponent is perceived as trying to attain an intimidating superior force. Would our reaction be one of “rational” acceptance if we believed the Soviet Union were attempting this? Consider only our reaction to the military build-up of Cuba. Would the Soviet Union be more rational than we? Are we to assume that they perceive themselves as villains and perceive us as innocent victims and will then accept as just that they should be humbled by us?

To argue against the reasonableness of the policy of military supremacy does not imply that we should accept a position of military inferiority. As I shall indicate more fully below, we should neither tempt nor encourage Communist aggressiveness by military (or any other kind of) weakness. On the other hand, we do not wish to stimulate the arms race or provoke fears of our aggressiveness (and thus support the most intransigent, militaristic elements in the Communist bloc) by seeking the elusive and possibly non-existent goal of military superiority.

The conception of the Communists as incorrigibly evil, even if it were true, is useless; it does not lead to any reasonable course of action. One loses nothing by assuming that the Communists are incorrigible. Such a premise does not imply that we must weaken ourselves in order to influence them to cooperate in building a peaceful world. To the contrary, my discussion later in this paper suggests that we will be more likely to influence them if our own society is strong and thriving and if we are resolute in overcoming our own economic and racial problems. From the assumption of incorrigibility, it follows that positive inducement to change, and not merely threats, are appropriate in the attempt to influence the Communists. The shift from a primary reliance on threats may have a salutary effect not only on our adversary but also on ourselves and the uncommitted nations.

_Essay a Nation Change?_

The conception of the Communists as incorrigible is not only useless; it also runs counter to the basic intellectual traditions of science which place stress on understanding the conditions which give rise to and which alter phenomena. The scientific the Communists) must be over again; it has been & phenomena which are vie understanding. Moreover, reform.

Americans often forget and arrogant by the most seized the Fiederk from adventurer’s war against Oregon Territory by the forget that American expensively from their leads in time, we were stridently peoples to win national in and military dominance in American slave traders ran to do the menial, backside States has obviously chang not necessarily unbearable.

If the Communists are to change, we must ask: Has the experience led them to develop world emerge? What gave nations did their developing our own behavior had to the assumptions underlying our attitude toward them to answer these questions. He has led me to the following.

Communism in the Soviet repressive, autocratic, cruel development reflects the stress the problems of its parent formative environment was by Siberia by the United States Revolution, the long period League of Nations, and the... It is hardly surprising that us in (if, indeed, they have) this was what we were trying not agree or adhere to rule especially since we, and other on the principle that nations
0 rests upon the assumption of military inferiority and not do any-where we can assume that self-interest when under the assumption that they are also rational be better served by a policy of military supremacy to the use of military force acts less judiciously rather than accentuating an intimidating "rational" acceptance if we consider only our reaction the Union be more rational to themselves as villains and accept as just that they should policy of military supremacy of military inferiority. As I neither tempt nor encourage other kind of weakness. On arms race or provoke fears most intransigent, militaristic he elusive and possibly non-judicial evil, even if it were true; course of action. One loses irrigible. Such a premise does to influence them to contra-contrary, my discussion later to influence them if our better solution in overcoming our own assumption of irrigibility, it and not merely threats, are communists. The shift from a try effect not only on our admitted nations.

irrigible is not only useless; it ditions of science which place give rise to and which alter guilt about their hostility to the what this feeling by seeking evi- or military capability of the United

149 Producing Change in an Adversary phenomena. The scientific tradition insists that evil (if one accepts this view of the Communists) must be understood and not merely condemned. Over and over again, it has been demonstrated that the ability to control and change phenomena which are viewed as intractable depends on the development of understanding. Moreover, history suggests that even aggressor nations may reform.

Americans often forget that as a new nation we were considered bumptious and arrogant by the most established European countries. The United States seized the Floridas from Spain, conquered part of the Southwest after an adventurer's war against smaller and weaker Mexico, and obtained the Oregon Territory by threatening action against Britain. We also tend to forget that American expansion drove the Indian tribes ruthlessly and violently from their lands in a series of wars and broken treaties. During this time, we were stridently anticolonial, encouraging the Latin American peoples to win national independence as we established our own economic and military dominance in the resulting power vacuum. And for many years American slave traders raid the coasts of Africa to supply human chattels to do the menial, back-breaking work of American agriculture. The United States has obviously changed; aggressive, expansionist national policies are not necessarily unalterable.

If the Communists are unprincipled adversaries whose orientation we hope to change, we must ask: How did they get that way? What in their past experiences led them to develop as they did? How did their views of the outside world emerge? What gave rise to their conception of themselves? What functions did their developing internal structure serve? What relationship has our own behavior had to the particular way they have developed? What are the assumptions underlying their current behavior? How do they picture our attitude toward them and toward ourselves? I shall not attempt a detailed answer to these questions. However, a reading of many experts on Communism has led me to the following view.

Communism in the Soviet Union is a child of the West, nourished in the repressive, autocratic, cruel and secretive atmosphere of tsarist Russia. Its development reflects the stresses and strains of its formative environment and the problems of its parentage. I have no need to detail the fact that its formative environment was hostile—consider only the invasion of Russia and Siberia by the United States and other Western nations after the Bolshevik Revolution, the long period of nonrecognition, the initial exclusion from the League of Nations, and the savage destructiveness of the German invasions. It is hardly surprising that they should have developed the motivation to do this to us (if, indeed, they have) since their experience led them to believe that this was what we were trying to do to them. Nor is it surprising that they do not agree or adhere to rules of international conduct formulated by us—especially since we, and other nations, have consistently proclaimed and acted on the principle that national interests can never be subordinated to inter-
national interests. Is American intervention in Guatemala and Cuba less unprincipled than Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, except in minor degree? It is not surprising that they are unwilling to accept a double standard of international morality which is disadvantageous to them. Nor is it surprising that the Communists, having survived and even thrived in a hostile and unprincipled environment, should be confident of their ability to win a competitive struggle with us. They did well when they were weak. Shouldn't they do even better now that they are strong?

THE COMMUNIST ORIENTATION

To state that Russia's hostile, competitive orientation to the West has had realistic defensive functions in terms of past experiences does not, of course, minimize the problem in bringing about a change in this orientation. Let us examine some of its central features so that we may better understand the task confronting us.

1. It is a central Communist belief that Russia's enemies ("the West") strive not merely to contain Communism but to destroy it. Thus, whether the atmosphere of international relations is superficially harmonious or tense, the basic question remains, "Who will destroy whom?"

2. While the goal of Communism is victory over its enemies, the operational tactics of Communism must be flexible and must be rationally responsive to the opportunities and dangers characterizing specific situations—advantages are pushed to their limit, retreat is made when necessary, and adventurist or risky or emotionally-based actions are avoided.

3. The style of Communism is that of rude belligerence and its posture is one of unyielding resistance toward the West. By appearing brazen when they are deeply apprehensive, the Communists attempt to convince the enemy that they expect attacks and are prepared to meet them confidently. A defiant attitude not only hides their sense of inferiority from the enemy, but also protects them from their own fear of helplessness in the face of the enemy. Further, their belligerence and rigid resistance serve to remove any temptation to succumb to the enemy by helping to unmask the hostility which lurks beneath his occasional surface friendliness.

4. The Communists attempt to limit contact with the West and to maintain a sharp rather than fuzzy demarcation between themselves and their potential enemies. They do so because they believe their enemies will attempt to use "the smallest crack" for espionage and will use friendly contacts and false promises to subvert and seduce their populace, temporarily undergoing hardships. The limitation of contact and the emphasis on secrecy express their fear of being vulnerable to external enemies who are out to destroy them.

(5) The Communists regard their side as a worldwide society in which labor are freely available, objective as appealing confused and misled, and receive a fundamental support. The enemies of the Street clique") and are sent the existing balance.

There are several thing orientation to the West, struggle: Communists will produce. Their image of themselves. Second, there is the constantly be on their gun, the orientation make the retreating experience. Also, enemy, is likely to produce them feel that the image.

CHANGE

How can we change such that it is a difficult task and, no means certain. Nevertheless, therapeutic experience, in producing such a change.

First of all, there must be profound change. Communists derive from outweigh the anxieties and difficulties, they must be caused by co
The Communists believe that the tide of history is on their side and that their side has a noble, humanistic objective: the creation of a world-wide society in which no man exploits another, in which the fruits of man's labor are freely available to all according to their need. They see this objective as appealing to all but the exploiting classes and those who are confused and misled by the propaganda of the exploiters. Thus, they perceive a fundamental split between the people and the leaders of the enemy nations. The enemies of Communism are the leaders of the West (the "Wall Street clique") and not the people.

5) The enemies of Communism are viewed as being highly rational, intelligent, and effective, even though they are fighting a losing battle. Their power is never to be underestimated. Their continuing, basic hostility is always to be taken for granted and, in that sense, their hostility cannot be provoked; they believe the enemy unceasingly aims at the annihilation of Communism. The ruling group of the enemy camp derives its policies from sober calculations of the relationships of forces rather than from feelings or from considerations of prestige. It acts in terms of its own self-interest; agreements are made not to promote friendly feelings but simply to represent the existing balance of forces.

There are several things to be noted in this description of the Communist orientation to the West. First, it is based on an image of a life-and-death struggle: Communists will be annihilated unless they annihilate their opponents. Their image of the enemy is, in a sense, an evil version of themselves. Second, there is the pervasive sense of vulnerability so that they must constantly be on their guard against the enemy. Third, mechanisms built into the orientation make their image partially immune to counterevidence or refuting experience. Also, their behavior, determined by their image of the enemy, is likely to produce reactions from their opponents which will make them feel that the image is true.

CHANGING A HOSTILE ORIENTATION

How can we change such a self-perpetuating, hostile orientation? Obviously, it is a difficult task and, with our present level of knowledge, success is by no means certain. Nevertheless we must try. Drawing on analogies from psychotherapeutic experience, I suggest that there are four critical tasks involved in producing such a change.

First of all, there must be some motivation to change—the gains the Communists derive from a hostile orientation must not be so great as to outweigh the anxieties and difficulties engendered by the present situation.

Second, they must be made aware that the experienced anxieties and difficulties are causally connected with their competitive, hostile orientation.
MORTON DEUTSCH

Third, the current environment must not provide substantial justification and support for the continued maintenance of the defensive, hostile orientation appropriate in the past: new experiences, convincingly different from their past experiences, must indicate a genuine interest in their well-being.

Fourth, they must perceive that they will gain rather than suffer, have less anxiety rather than more, if they adopt a new orientation.

I do not list these tasks in order of importance or priority. They are all necessary and they must all be worked on if change is to occur.

The Motivation to Change

There is some evidence that progress on the first task—motivation to change—has been made. The leaders of both the Soviet Union and the United States are, I believe, deeply anxious about the present world situation; neither group believes that a competitive victory is possible through war. The new doctrine of peaceful coexistence consistently and repeatedly espoused by Khrushchev, despite bitter internal opposition, is a sign of this. Similar statements by Kennedy and Eisenhower, including their denunciations of right-wing extremists, can also be viewed as evidence that our leaders realize that nuclear weapons no longer permit victory through war. The existence of H-bombs is thus, in a perverse way, a force for change. Moreover, the economic burden of ever-increasing armaments, the increasing pressure from neutral nations who feel threatened by the arms race, and the increasing discontent with the arms race within the populations of the superpowers also work in the direction of change.

What are the gains from a competitive, hostile orientation? They are of two types—internal and external. Ample evidence suggests that a hostile, competitive orientation to the outside world fosters internal cohesiveness and permits Soviet leaders to justify and exert repressive controls to inhibit internal disdiance and challenge to their leadership. On the other hand, there is considerable reason to think that the present Soviet leaders believe that many internal stresses and strains are the indirect effects of the enormous costs of the arms race and that, without these costs, they could rapidly improve the lot of the Soviet people and could afford to lessen these repressive controls. Moreover, the process of de-Stalinization, initiated by the present leaders of the Soviet Union, indicates their realization that repressive controls have serious limitations as a means of motivating enthusiastic support for the goals set forth by the Communist party. In addition, the denunciation of Stalin and his paranoid despotism constitutes a repudiation of some aspects of the Soviet Union's past. In effect, the present leaders have attempted to dissociate themselves from the irrational suspiciousness and the brutal, homicidal acts connected with Stalin. In so doing, they have made it more difficult to reinstitute such despotic policies. Internally, almost all observers agree, the Soviet people have respon tyranny.

Externally, it is apparent that the development of economic influence in one of Western imperialism, in helping the peoples in a higher standard of living, prejudice, the Soviet Union. The revolution in Asia and which are being by Communism and carried over, there is already s for the West are not, in the newly emerged nations of.

In effect, the Soviet Union is something positive—some change, and so on being influence among the new nations has begun to find that it gains for the Communist

Another manifestation of course, been used to make view is that the Soviet countries whenever they can get away and economic imperialism of the Soviet leaders even in to their national security, a nonthreatening, in subservient if they could some evidence to support it. However, there is another issue. The Soviet Union has discommodified nations to obtain. There is a growing divisiv Communist group of nations: Albania diverge in different

Our military power vindicates which the Soviet Union can primarily in military terms be means, enabling the Communists they attempt to identify them progressive social change. It emphasis upon the need to it than upon military aid.
Soviet people have responded gratefully to the lessening of suspiciousness and tyranny.

Externally, it is apparent that the Soviet Union has made some gains by a competitive, hostile orientation to the West. It has gained political and economic influence in underdeveloped areas by being hostile to the remnants of Western imperialism. However, to the extent that we become more active in helping the peoples in these areas to achieve independence, freedom, and a higher standard of living, and to the extent that we free ourselves of racial prejudice, the Soviet Union will have little to gain from hostility per se to the West. The revolutionary changes which are sweeping through Africa and Asia and which are beginning to be felt in Latin America were not instigated by Communism and cannot be controlled by Soviet military power. Moreover, there is already some indication that the Soviet Union's criticisms of the West are not, in themselves, the Open Sesame to the affections of the newly emerged nations of Africa and Asia.

In effect, the Soviet Union is now being forced with the task of offering something positive—something more than the financial aid, technical assistance, and so on being offered by the West—if it wishes to compete for influence among the new nations. It has already entered this competition and has begun to find that it is an expensive competition with no easy and quick gains for the Communist bloc.

Another manifestation of change concerns Soviet military power which has, of course, been used to maintain control over Eastern Europe. A widely held view is that the Soviets will use their military power to gain political control whenever they can get away with it. This conception presupposes that political and economic imperialism would be viewed as a profitable course of action by the Soviet leaders even in a world where they perceived no military threats to their national security. Or, in other words, that the Soviet leaders would force a nonthreatening, non-Communist nation to become Communist and subservient if they could not convert it to their viewpoint. There is, of course, some evidence to support this view—consider only Czechoslovakia and Hungary. However, there is another side to this picture. Despite its military power, the Soviet Union has discovered that it cannot simply impose its will on other Communist nations to obtain unquestioning obedience to orders from Moscow. There is a growing diversity and independence of decision within the Communist group of nations. Yugoslavia, Poland, Rumania, China, and Albania diverge in different respects from Soviet doctrine.

Our military power vis-à-vis most of these areas is considerably greater than that which the Soviet Union can bring to bear. Our tendency to view the Communist threat primarily in military terms has led us to give arms to backward, unpopular governments, enabling the Communists to identify us with reactionary military cliques while they attempt to identify themselves with popular unrest and the groups advocating progressive social change. It is encouraging that the Alliance for Progress places emphasis upon the need to identify with popular aspirations for social reform rather than upon military aid.
The changes that have taken place within the Communist world reflect a growing relativism in the Communist ideology and may contribute to an erosion of the rigidity of the Bolshevik doctrine. The image of a utopian world Communism has been tarnished by the reality of conflict and diversity within the Communist bloc; the changing image may yet suggest that diversity among nations cannot be abolished by power or by superficial ideological similarity. This realization may weaken the readiness to run risks and to make sacrifices to establish a Communist domination over the world.

However, the erosion of the ideological base for militant Communist expansion has not yet proceeded far enough to warrant a lack of concern about the aggressive potentials of Soviet military power. The fact that Soviet military power has been used to establish and maintain unpopular Communist governments in Eastern Europe suggests that prudence requires the West to develop and maintain military forces sufficient to insure that the Soviet leaders fully understand that military aggression, or the threat of it, will be unrewarding to them. We have to prepare for agreements that would end the arms race, that would stabilize and reduce the military forces of both sides, and that would eliminate military elements from areas of intense international conflict (Central Europe, Southeast Asia, Middle East).\footnote{5}

Similarly, we must be prepared to deter subversion and indirect aggression against ourselves and other independent nations so that there courses of "unfair competition" become unrewarding to the Communists. We do not want to tempt them by indifference and lack of response to violations of civilized standards of international conduct. On the other hand, we do not wish to justify illegal behavior by emulating it. Nor can we reasonably assert the right to use military force (such as extensive military aid and the intervention of American troops) to support unpopular dictators who are threatened by internal revolutionary movements led by Communists. Since we cannot allow the Communists to claim the moral right to overthrow non-Communist nations, we cannot claim the moral right to preserve the status quo simply because it favors us.

Increasing Their Awareness of the Effects of Their Behavior

If my analysis is correct, the Soviet Union has made important internal and external gains from a competitive, hostile orientation to the West. But these gains have diminished considerably and are being overshadowed by the

\footnote{5} We should, of course, seek reasonable verification of compliance. However, since the Soviet leaders apparently view secrecy as necessary for their internal security, we should anticipate little immediate progress in obtaining agreements that require the Soviet Union to "open up" its society to external inspection. This is particularly likely to be the case when the agreement offers them no major economic saving. We may be more successful in obtaining disarmament agreements if we concentrate on agreements that do not require open access to Soviet territory by human inspectors—i.e., on agreements that can be monitored by nonhuman sensors or on agreements relating to areas outside of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. which are potential areas of military conflict.

\footnote{6} Thus, for example, if A liked as "We will bury you" outlive you," the misinterpretation seem more hostile than American capitalism would di would continue to flourish.
anxieties and difficulties associated with the arms race. However, I do not believe they are yet sufficiently aware that the arms race is partly stimulated by our reaction to their orientation toward us. They, of course, see the causal arrow pointed in the opposite direction—their attitude is determined by our hostile, threatening orientation to them. I doubt that the Soviet leaders are sensitive to how we react when they say, “We will outlive you” or “Your grandchildren will live under Communism.” I doubt that they are aware that their own actions and words lead us to react in such a way that their view of a hostile world is confirmed.

How we can help the Russians to become aware of the relationship between their actions and our reactions is a difficult problem for which I have no pat solution. Obviously, encouraging more and more of their leaders to visit the United States and to talk informally with congressmen, administration officials, businessmen, and others, may enable them to realize that many of our most influential citizens do, in fact, perceive our orientation as defensive and determined by their hostile, threatening orientation. We should encourage these visits whether or not they are willing to reciprocate. Philip Moseley has pointed out, “In comparing the 1931 level of [Soviet] knowledge about the West with the level of 1961, I have to say that the 1961 level is about two percent of the 1931 level.” We must change this horrifying situation by providing their leaders with as many opportunities as we can for informing themselves about us. (I place stress on “leaders” because one may suspect that their subordinates here in the United States tend, as do most subordinates, to frame their communications in ways which do not challenge the prejudices and stereotypes of their superiors.)

In addition to fostering frequent contacts among leaders, we should attempt to institutionalize a direct process of communicating accurate interpretations of the actions and utterances of each side. We should have some regularized way of holding up a mirror to the Soviet leaders so they can see how they look to us when they act in a certain way, and vice versa. Possibly, alternating every other month, the President might give a talk to and expose himself to questions from the Politburo, and the Soviet Premier might do the same for leading officials in our government. There is no doubt that the technical problems of arranging direct but restricted communication from nation to nation could be solved. I suggest that the communication be restricted to the leaders rather than made available to the public in order to reduce the temptation to propagandize. However, neither side is sufficiently disinterested and free of manipulative desires to be able to portray without bias their image of the other. It may well be that we each need a neutral mirror to interpret

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1 of compliance. However, since y for their internal security, we ng agreements that require the action. This is particularly likely for economic saving. We may be if we concentrate on agreements human inspectors—i.e., en-agreements relating to areas of military conflict.

2 Thus, for example, if American leaders interpret Khroushchev's statement headlined as "We will bury you" to mean "We will destroy you" rather than "We will outlive you," the misinterpretation may be a deliberate distortion to make the statement seem more hostile than it was. In Russian, Khroushchev's statement implied that American capitalism would die because of its comparative inefficiency while socialism would continue to flourish.
communications so that they are unlikely to be misinterpreted by either side. It would not, I imagine, be impossible to set up a group of competent statesmen and social scientists from neutral nations which might perform such a function. The record of each side in predicting the reactions of the other side is pitifully poor and suggests the need for some such procedure.

Providing New Experiences to Facilitate Change

While increased social and self-insight is helpful in bringing about change, the most important strategy in inducing it is to act and react in a way which is inconsistent with the other’s expectations. One should, of course, anticipate that when this is done the other will be disconcerted and will attempt, initially, to provoke reactions which will justify his original expectations. The great difficulty in executing this strategy is in resisting the trap of being provoked to actions which will confirm his expectations. Thus, if we wish to change a hostile orientation, we must see to it that the current environment does not provide justification and support for its continued maintenance. The Communists must have new experiences with us which are convincingly different from their past experiences—new experiences which, on the one hand, indicate that we have a genuine interest in their well-being and which, on the other hand, indicate self-respect and an unwillingness to be abused.

In the paper “A Psychological Basis for Peace,” I have attempted to spell out some of the policies and actions we might adopt that might lead the Soviet Union to change its orientation. These policies include giving up the quest for military supremacy, establishing continuing joint military and technical groups to lessen the dangers of war and to work for disarmament, showing an active concern with what the Russians regard as important, accepting the viability and legitimacy of their system for them, conforming to the standards of international conduct we wish them to conform to, developing a genuine interest in their internal successes rather than failures, expressing in action and words our desire for a rapid improvement in their standard of living, recognizing and honoring their achievements, welcoming whatever assistance they may be able to give us, expanding mutual trade, fostering cultural and educational exchanges, establishing co-operative programs of research and advanced studies, and institutionalizing international competitive contests in diverse fields to encourage peaceful competition for international prestige.

Perceiving Gains from a New Orientation

In sum, I suggest that a policy which combines both firmness and friendliness, a policy of friendly strength. This is the surest way of helping the Russians to perceive the gains they can achieve by a change in orientation. We should attempt to establish an international atmosphere amicable enough to permit nations with diverse internal systems to engage in mutually rewarding, co-operative endeavors.

To create such an atmosphere of massive reconciliation to co-operate with the Communists we should not expect their spontaneous gratitude, or will be receptive so, we should persist in co-operation which will profit both sides confident so that we do not profit from the co-operative greater affluence, they may.

Obviously, the Communists stand to gain rather than lose, as a result of co-operation which will create positive interest in the obtained suspicion is such that of genuine co-operation, reasonable co-operation competitive struggle for interests.

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Roots of American Defensiveness

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To create such an atmosphere, we shall have to launch a sustained program of massive reconciliation in which we try to express and maintain a willingness to co-operate with the Soviet Union when it is to our mutual advantage. We should not expect that our offers of co-operation will be received with gratitude, or will be reciprocated fully, or will be frequently accepted. Even so, we should persist in offering to co-operate whenever we see opportunities which will profit both sides. Our underlying attitude must be sufficiently self-confident so that we do not feel threatened by the fact that they, as well as we, will profit from co-operation, or by the possibility that, because of our greater affluence, they may on occasion profit relatively more than we.

Obviously, the Communists will have no incentive to co-operate unless they stand to gain rather than to suffer, unless they become more secure rather than less, as a result of co-operation. It is, of course, these very gains from co-operation which will create a web of interdependencies that give each side a positive interest in the other's well-being. However, Russia's legacy of sustained suspicion is such that it will take continuing good will, sustained offers of genuine co-operation, and a persistent readiness to accept their offers of reasonable co-operation on our part, before their underlying image of a competitive struggle for survival is replaced by a sense of interlaced common interests.

CHANGING OURSELVES

Here, let me turn briefly to the question of how we can influence ourselves to sustain a policy of massive reconciliation. In other words, how can we change our own hostile orientation to the Soviet Union, especially since their actions often provide a justification for our orientation? This is an extraordinarily difficult question and most of us evade it. Many of those trying to change Russia's orientation do not face up to the social and political functions which it serves. The analysis I have sketched above might be politically disastrous unless there were a concurrent change in the American orientation.

Roots of American Defensiveness

In examining the question I have raised, I suggest that we must begin to understand the roots of our own defensiveness. I use the term "defensiveness" to indicate that our conception of the Communists is determined, not only by what they are actually like, but also by our own internally generated needs and anxieties. I would suggest that we must confront three major internal problems, three roots of our defensiveness, before we can lose our obsession with Communism.

First, historically, the United States has been able to have things pretty much its own way. Prior to World War I, our geographical isolation permitted this. After World War I, and especially right after World War II, we
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were the strongest power on earth. We were not able to remain isolated nor
are we likely to remain the supreme power. The future suggests that we will
have to accommodate ourselves to the fact that we will be a strong power
among other equally strong powers in a highly interdependent world. In a
sense, we have to adjust ourselves to a loss of unique power, to a loss of
unique status. Loss of status for a proud people is always difficult to accept.
We must investigate previous historical examples of such loss—for example,
England—to learn as much as we can about coping with this difficult national
situation.

A second root of defensiveness lies in the careers, skills, special privileges,
jobs, and financial interests which have been developed in relation to a hostile
world. These vested interests will naturally feel threatened by a change in our
orientation unless they are given the strongest assurance that they will not
lose by such a change. I suggest that the president urge Congress to adopt, as
a declaration of national policy, a statement to the effect that scientists,
the military, employers, industrialists, and investors will be compensated for
any losses they suffer as a result of the curtailment of defense activities. This
statement must, of course, be buttressed by the development of meaningful
and detailed plans, at the local as well as the national level, for enabling
the people and industries involved in defense to play a significant and profitable
role in a peaceful world.

A third root of defensiveness lies in a lack of confidence in ourselves—a
lack of confidence in our ability to maintain a thriving, prosperous, and
attractive society that can be morally and intellectually influential among
nations without a preponderance of military power. Obviously, we must work
to overcome our problems of racial prejudice, economic instability, and lack
of dedication to common purposes. To the extent that we have a thriving
society coping successfully with its own internal problems, we will have less
ground for the fears and less need for the hostilities that interfere with
international co-operation. Unless we can make democracy work in Missis-
sippi, what reason is there for believing that we can influence the under-
developed nations to adopt the social reforms and political practices necessary
to prevent international turmoil and strife?

Speaking to Both Audiences Simultaneously

My discussion has emphasized the fact that our own defensiveness may
make it difficult for us to adopt an orientation toward the Soviet bloc which
might lead to the end of the Cold War. Any change will require vigorous
political effort by the diverse groups who see the present state of international
relations as perilous. In addition, it may require pressure from friendly,
influential nations (for example, in Europe and in South America) who are
not as obsessed as we with the nightmare of Communism. However, not all
courses of constructive international action are likely to provoke equal
amounts of defensiveness. It may well be that our most important intellectual
task is to uncover communists and which will define programs of action
that will deal positively with constructive functions for whom is highly defensiv

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task is to uncover courses of action which will be reassuring to the Communists and which will challenge our own defenses least. The problem is to define programs of action sufficiently close to our own national identity which still deal positively with the Communist world. These actions must serve constructive functions for both the internal and external audiences, each of whom is highly defensive.

How do we convince both audiences that their fears are unwarranted? The answer to this dilemma lies, I believe, in the policy of friendly strength which I have described above. Both audiences must be persuaded that the military strength of either side cannot overcome the other and that the resort to military forces will be mutually destructive. Public statements of our own military capability should always be accompanied by clear recognition of Soviet military strength. Expression of our own determination to resist military aggression should be coupled with acknowledgment of the Soviet determination to do the same.

Explicit recognition of mutual military power (and, hence, of the importance of military power to resolve conflicts of interest) should be accompanied by open recognition that the internal achievements of the two societies will not affect the ultimate military balance of power. On the contrary, our public statements to both audiences should demonstrate an awareness that internal difficulties and failures make a nation with nuclear arms more rather than less dangerous. Neither we nor the Soviet Union have any reason to boast if internal problems or external loss of face strengthen the primitive, repressive, and belligerent elements in the other nation. We would do well to affirm repeatedly our real interest in a prosperous and thriving world, in which all nations (including those in the Communist bloc) are coping successfully with their internal economic, social, and political problems.

The promotion of the positive goal of a peaceful world, composed of thriving, independent, and cooperating nations, rather than the negative goal of containing Communism, provides a potential meeting ground for both audiences and a potential avenue for cooperation. Undoubtedly, the “meeting” will initially be on the safest grounds (for example, the adoption in the United States of ingenious Soviet-developed surgical staplers which join severed blood vessels and nerves, or the widespread use of American-developed polio vaccines in the Soviet Union). When there has been a successful encounter, however, it should be given the widest public recognition.

Even when the grounds for cooperation are least secure, when there is reason to believe that the other side is seeking to obtain a competitive advantage—for example, in attempting to use the vulnerabilities of underdeveloped nations to spread anti-American Communism—there is nothing to

1 There are, of course, more than two audiences. One has to consider one’s allies, the underprivileged nations, and so forth. However, if one can speak constructively to both the Soviet and American power-holders, it seems likely that the difficulties with other audiences can be surmounted.
be lost by proclaiming and pursuing a positive goal which is not oriented to, or determined by, the Cold War. On the contrary, a policy of aiding under-developed nations which is oriented to their need for prosperity and independence rather than our fear of Communism is more likely to produce attitudes favorable toward us. Such a policy is not only likely to be more effective in preventing the spread of anti-American Communism but, in addition, it leaves open the continuing possibility of co-operation with the Communists to achieve the mutually acceptable objectives of reducing poverty and instability among nations.

More generally, one can state that the reduction of international tension requires that the leaders of the United States and Soviet Union be constantly aware that their words and actions have implications for the two audiences. Neither audience is likely to attribute evil intentions to itself nor altruistic motives to the other, nor are they likely to accept a position of military inferiority. Statements or deeds which rest on the claim of moral superiority or of superior power can only incense the external audience, even though they may please the internal audience. On the other hand, the announcement and pursuit of positive goals which can contribute to the welfare of both sides, and to which both may contribute, enhance the possibility that co-operation will occur sooner or later.

For purposes of discussion, throughout this paper I have accepted the widely held assumption that the Soviet Union can be viewed as an unprincipled adversary. A Soviet reader, if he felt this were a more apt characterization of the United States, might apply the reasoning in this paper to the problem of changing the United States.

NOTES

3. I draw the following description largely from Nathan Leites, A Study of Bolshevikism (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953). Leites's description is, I believe, an excellent depiction of the official American view of the Soviet orientation; it may not be an accurate view of the actual orientation of the leaders of post-Stalin Russia. My own view is that the characterization of only one of the parties in a two-sided conflict, without characterization of the interaction between them, tends to be misleading. It is somewhat like knowing that a wife confines her husband to neighbors, opens his mail, takes money from his wallet, and does other nasty things. Knowing this about the wife may be misleading unless one also knows whether the husband is a habitual drunkard and adulterer or a generous and reasonable man.

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