The Psychological Consequences of Different Forms of Social Organization*

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Throughout recorded history, political and moral philosophers have discussed the question what values and psychological characteristics should a society try to foster? Should we be attempting to maximize the sense of self-reliance or of mutual interdependence, the drive toward superiority or equality, an orientation toward work or pleasure, spontaneity or conformity, an objective-abstract-analytic-comparative or an intuitive-concrete-holistic-qualitative mode of thought? In this paper I rephrase the question into one more appropriate for a psychologist to address: namely, what are the psychological consequences of different forms of social organization? Drawing upon social psychological theory and research, I seek to shed some light on this important topic.

My discussion centers on the distinctive psychological orientations associated with the different forms of social organization. I employ the term psychological orientation to refer to a more or less consistent complex of cognitive, motivational, and moral orientations to a given situation that serve to guide one's behavior and responses to that situation. I assume that typically the psychological orientation of the individual fits the situation and a lack of fit induces pressures from the situation and/or the self to reduce the misfit. A misfit produces problems for both the social organization and for the individual.

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I posit that the causal arrow linking social organization and psychological orientations goes primarily from type of social organization to psychological orientation: the former induces the latter. This is not to deny that individuals, if given the opportunity, may choose or create the types which best fit their psychological orientations nor is it to deny that when a significant number of individuals find that a social organization does not fit their psychological orientations social pressures may develop to change the nature of the organization rather than to alter their psychological orientations.

I make the further assumption that most people have the capacity to utilize a variety of psychological orientations. Although individuals may differ in their readiness and ability to use different orientations as a result of their cultural backgrounds, their personal histories, and their genetic endowments, most people participate in diverse social relations and social organizations in complex societies and these varied situations require and hence, induce different psychological orientations. For example, my psychological orientations are different when I am playing with my grandchildren as compared to when I am in a budget discussion with the Dean. My assumption here is an evolutionary one: namely, to cope with the psychological requirements of assorted types of situations, people have developed the capacity to utilize psychological orientations as they are necessary in different situations.

I do not mean to imply by the foregoing that there is no consistency in the psychological orientations that people employ in different organizational and institutional contexts. The social organizations and institutions in any society are interdependent and usually mutually supportive so that the psychological orientations appropriate to one social context also fit in others. Some institutions, such as the family, school, and religious
organizations help to develop the orientations that will be appropriate to one's roles in the adult world so that, frequently, there is consistency from childhood to adulthood in the psychological orientations that individuals employ.

I now turn to the body of my paper. In it, I shall characterize the nature of psychological orientations; second, I shall delineate some of the psychological dimensions of social organizations; third, I shall describe what psychological orientations are associated with the different dimensions of society; and fourth, I shall briefly mention some relevant research. Finally, I shall discuss some questions for research.

**Psychological Orientations**

A psychological orientation orients an individual to the situation confronting her. It is composed of three interrelated components: a cognitive, motivational, and moral orientation. In my view, the overemphasis in psychology in recent years on the cognitive and the neglect of the motivational and moral components of psychological orientations has led to a vastly oversimplified view of human beings and human interaction.

**Cognitive Orientations**

In recent years, scholars in a number of different disciplines -- cognitive psychology, social psychology, sociology, linguistics, anthropology, and artificial intelligence -- have utilized such terms as "schema," "script," and "frame" to refer to the "structures of expectations" that help orient the individual cognitively to the situation confronting him. I employ the term "cognitive orientation" as being essentially the same as these terms. If they lead us to inappropriate responses, then they are likely to be revised on the basis of our experiences; if the situation confronting us is sufficiently malleable, our responses to it may help shape its form.
Schemes, scripts, or frames may be very concrete and specific -- for example, how to work together with a particular person on a given task -- or they may be rather abstract and general -- for example, what is involved in a competitive as compared to a cooperative relation. In any society that provides a variety of situations in which different areas in the multidimensional space of social organizations are well-represented, it is likely that rather abstract schemas or cognitive orientations will develop to characterize the various types of organizations.

Motivational Orientations

A motivational orientation toward a given social reality orients one to the possibilities of gratification or frustration of certain types of needs in the given situation. To the cognitive characterization, the motivational orientation adds the personal, subjective features arising from one's situationally relevant motives or need-dispositions. It gives rise to the cathexis of certain regions of the cognitive landscape, making them positively or negatively valent, and highlights the pathways to and from valent regions. It gives the cognitive map a dynamic character. It predisposes one to certain kinds of fantasies (or nightmares) and to certain kinds of emotions. It orients one to such questions as "What is to be valued in this situation?" and "What do I want here and how do I get it?"

Moral Orientation

A moral orientation toward a given social reality orients one to the mutual obligations, rights, and entitlements of the people involved in the given situation. It adds an "ought to," "should," or obligatory quality to a psychological orientation. The moral orientation implies that one experiences one's situation not only from a personal perspective but also from a social perspective that includes the perspective of the others in the social situation. Experience of injustice becomes more than a personal
experience. Not only is one personally affected, so are the other participants in the social relationship, because its value underpinnings are being undermined. The various participants in a relationship have the mutual obligation to respect and protect the framework of social norms that define what is to be considered as fair or unfair in the interactions and outcomes of the participants. One can expect that the moral orientation, and hence what is considered fair, will differ in the different types of social organizations.

The Psychological Dimensions of Social Organizations

Four fundamental dimensions of interpersonal relations (Deutsch, 1965), "cooperation-competition," "power distribution," "task-oriented versus social-emotional," and "formal versus informal," have their social system analogs and can be used to characterize organizations and societies. They are not sufficient to describe the internal features of larger social units but they do provide a useful framework for thinking about the psychologically relevant properties of different forms of social organization. Other dimensions such as size, complexity, stability, openness, and affluence are undoubtedly of considerable psychological relevance also. Here, I discuss only the four dimensions mentioned above.

1. Cooperation-competition. At the organizational and societal level, cooperative systems are ones in which the individuals (or units) composing them have positively interdependent goals, shared communitarian values, an emphasis on positive interrelatedness among its members, a sense of accountability to the group, and a shared responsibility for one another and for maintenance of the cooperative system. In competitive systems, the individuals (or units) composing them have negatively linked goals, a common scale on which each individual's success is compared in relation to one another, an emphasis on individuals struggling against one another to determine who will be winners and losers, and a responsibility for and
accountability only to oneself. Worker-owned cooperatives, the Kibbutzim, "cooperative learning" classrooms, and Zuni society, are examples of systems with a cooperative emphasis. Examples of systems with a competitive emphasis are to be found in many traditionally organized classrooms in the United States, among firms competing for a share of the market, among employees within traditional firms who are competing for status, and in the Kwakiutl society.

2. **Power distribution ("equal versus unequal")**. At the organizational and societal level, the distinction is between systems which are "egalitarian" or "hierarchical" in their power structure. In an "ideal" egalitarian system, power is equally shared among the individuals (or units) composing it; each person has equal access to relevant education and information; each has equal opportunity to influence decisions; each has equal rights and an equal vote; each has equal access to economic resources and consumer goods. In contrast, in a hierarchical system, power is distributed unequally, with greater power going to those who are higher in the hierarchy. There is a correlation, far from perfect, between the cooperative-competitive and the power dimensions: cooperative systems tend to be egalitarian; competitive ones, hierarchical in power structure. Also, as the size of the system increases, it is more likely to have a hierarchical structure.

3. **Task-oriented versus social-emotional**.

The distinction between *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft* groups reflects this basic dimension of social relations; the former focuses on the solidarity relations among group members, and the latter focuses on the external task and problem-solving activities of the group. Production-oriented, economic-oriented organizations are primarily task-oriented; families, friendship groups, and fraternal organizations are mainly social-emotional in their orientation.
4. Formal versus informal. In an informal relationship the definition of the activities, times, and locations involved in the relationship are left largely to the participants; in a formal or regulated relationship, social rules and norms largely determine the interactions among those involved. Relations within a bureaucracy tend to be formal (Weber, 1957; Merton, 1957), whereas relations within a social club tend to be informal; also, relations between equals are more likely to be informal than relations between unequals.

Research (Wish and Kaplan, 1977) suggests that the four dimensions described above are correlated. Competition, hierarchy, formality, and task orientation tend to be clustered together while cooperation, equality, informality, and social-emotional orientation are apt to be clustered. Thus, it is likely that were we to plot naturally-recurring groups, social organizations, or societies in the four-dimensional space composed by the dimensions we have selected for emphasis, certain regions of the space would be more heavily populated than others.

The Psychological Orientations Associated With The Different Psychological Dimensions of Society

In this section, I shall characterize the psychological orientations that are associated with the four dimensions just described. For each I shall depict the cognitive, motivational, and moral orientations that typify the dimension. In my discussion, I make the assumption that organizations which differ on where they are located on the dimensions will differ in a similar way in the nature of the social relations to be found among the members within each of the differing organizations. That is, a truly cooperative-egalitarian organization typically will be characterized by cooperative-egalitarian relations among its members while the members of
a competitive-hierarchical one will have competitive-hierarchical relations. The description is of "ideal types." In reality, the psychological orientation associated with any given organizational dimension is inevitably colored by the current societal context in which that dimension is embedded as well as by its prior historical context.

Cooperation-Competition

Cognitive Orientation

The cooperative-competitive dimension seems so fundamental to social life that one would assume a well-developed innate predisposition to develop abstract cognitive orientations to help an individual define quickly whether "what's going on here?" is "good" or "bad" for her. With additional experience and further psychological differentiation and integration, the basic cognitive schema of cooperation-competition should emerge: We are "for" or "against" one another; we are linked together so that we both gain or lose together or so that if one gains, the other loses. This basic schema (see Deutsch, 1949a, 1962, 1973, for an elaboration) leads an individual holding it to expect, in a cooperative relation, that the other will have similar basic values and will be pleased by the individual's effective actions and ready to help him or her achieve success; the individual will expect the opposite to be true in a competitive relationship.

Motivational Orientation

In a cooperative relation, one is predisposed to cajole the other positively; to have a trusting and benevolent attitude; to be psychologically open; to be giving as well as receptive; to have a sense of responsibility toward the other and toward the mutual process of cooperation; etc. One is also predisposed to expect the other to have a similar orientation toward oneself. Henry Murray's (1938) description of the need for affiliation captures much of the essence of this motivational orientation.
In a competitive relation, one is predisposed to categorize the other negatively; to have a suspicious and hostile, exploitative attitude; to be psychologically closed; to be aggressive and defensive; to seek advantage and superiority for the self and disadvantage and inferiority for the other; to see the other as opposed to oneself and basically different; etc. One is also predisposed to expect the other to have the same orientation. Murray's (1938) description of the needs for aggression, defensiveness, infatuation, and counteraction seem to characterize many of the basic features of this motivational orientation. The specific quality of this motivational orientation will be colored by one's conception of one's chances of winning or losing.

Moral Orientation

Although the specific character of the moral orientations associated with cooperation and competition will depend on other features of the social relationship, cooperation and competition elicit different types of moral orientations. The moral orientation linked with cooperation is a tendency toward egalitarianism.

In contrast, the moral orientation linked with competition sanctions inequality and legitimizes a win-lose struggle to determine who will have superior and who will have inferior outcomes in a competitive relationship. Depending on other features of the relationship, the struggle may be regulated so that competition takes place under fair rules (as in a duel of honor) and one's moral orientation will include an obligation to obey the rules, or the struggle may be a "no holds barred" one in which any means to defeat the other can be employed. An active state of competition implies that the competitors do not mutually perceive and accept a superior-inferior relationship between them: If they do, and they continue to wage competition, then they are violating the moral imperatives of competitive justice.
Power ("Equality" versus "Inequality")
Cognitive Orientation

The basic schema of "relationship power" (Deutsch, 1973) has to do with the relative power of the participants in a relationship to benefit or harm or persuade one another and, hence, their relative power to influence one another. In a relationship of unequal power, it is expected that the more powerful member will be advantaged whenever their interests are opposed. The competitive branch of the unequal power schema highlights the roles of "victor" and "vanquished;" the equal power schema orients more to continuing struggle. In both competitive branches, the use of tactics of coercion, intimidation, and power bluffs are made salient. Even in a situation where the more and less powerful members have congruent interests, the less powerful member is expected to be more dependent on the other and, hence, more likely to engage in ingratiating behavior. The cooperative branch of the unequal power schema emphasizes the orientation toward responsibility in the high power position and of respectful compliance from the low power position; the equal power schema orients more toward mutual responsibility and respect. Both cooperative branches make salient the use of the more positive forms of power: persuasion rather than coercion, benefits rather than harms, legitimate rather than illegitimate power, etc.

Motivation Orientation

In a cooperative equality relation, one is predisposed to consider that the other is entitled to the same esteem and respect as oneself. The equality of power here is likely to signify that the different participants in a relationship have the same value. Respect and esteem are more valuable if they are received from those whom one respects; equal status relations represent the optimum distribution for the mutual support of self-esteem. The need-dispositions related to self-esteem and self-respect seem to underlie this motivational orientation. The need for self-esteem involves
the need to have a sense of the worthiness of one's goals and a sense of confidence in one's ability to fulfill one's intentions; the need for self-respect involves the need to have a sense of one's moral worth, of one's equal right to justice and fair treatment. It undermines one's sense of belonging to a moral community to be treated more fairly or less fairly than others and this, in turn, weakens the foundations of self-respect. Hence, one's self-respect is more firmly grounded in relationships where one can feel the others are also entitled to respect. Similarly, the confidence in oneself that is connected with a secure self-esteem is fostered by association and comparison with people who are similar in status rather than with those who are higher or lower.

In a competitive situation, the equality relation is inherently unstable. One is seeking to advance one's relative power or to prevent others from reducing it. This leads to an insecurity about one's self and an unstable self-esteem and self-respect. Defensiveness and anxiety as well as exaggerated but securely-based claims for self are characteristic in such situations. In an unequal relationship, one is predisposed either to take a more dominant or a more subordinate role or to resist the inequality. Murray (1938) has characterized the different aspects of the need for dominance. In a competitive situation, it will be fused with the need for aggression and will lead to attempts to coerce and force the other to comply with one's desires. In a cooperative situation, it will be fused with the need for nurturance and will lead to a protective, guiding, and caring orientation toward the other.

Similarly, different needs are associated with the subordinate role, and the need for submission, depending on whether the context is cooperative or competitive. In a cooperative situation, Murray's (1938) description of the need for deference seems apropos. It involves a readiness to follow, to
comply, to emulate, to conform, to obey, to defer, to admire, to revere, to be suggestible, to heed advice, and otherwise to accept the superior authority of the other. In a competitive relationship, the need for abasement is associated with the acceptance of the inferior role (Murray, 1938). It is reflected in the tendency to submit passively, to accept blame, to surrender, to seek punishment or pain, to be servile, to be resigned, to acquiesce, to be timorous, to give in, and to allow oneself to be bullied. It is evident that the subordinate role in an unequal relationship may be difficult to accept and may be resisted.

The resistance to an unequal relationship will be evidenced in aspects of what Murray has termed the need for autonomy and the need for rejection. The former is characterized by the tendency to resist coercion and restraint, to be defiant and rebellious in relation to arbitrary authority, to be independent of social ties, and to be a nonconformist. The latter is reflected in the tendency to separate oneself from a negatively catalyzed other; to reject a disliked superior other; to out-snub a snob; to exclude, abandon, expel or remain indifferent to an inferior other.

Moral Orientation

As the preceding discussion would suggest, there are a number of different moral orientations connected with equality and inequality. Thus, in a cooperative, equal relationship one would expect the kind of egalitarian relationship described earlier. In a cooperative, unequal relationship, the moral orientation obligates the more powerful person to employ his or her power in such a way as to benefit the less powerful one, not merely himself. In such a relationship, the less powerful one has the obligation to show appreciation, to defer to, and honor the more powerful person. These obligations may be rather specific and limited if the relationship is task-oriented or they may be diffuse and general if the relationship is a social-emotional one.
In an equal, competitive relationship, one's moral orientation is toward the value of initial equality among the competitors and the subsequent striving to achieve superiority over the others. This orientation favors "equal opportunity" but not "equal outcomes." In an unequal, competitive relationship the moral orientations of the strong and the weak support an exploitative relationship. The strong are likely to adopt the view that the rich and powerful are biologically and, hence, morally superior; they have achieved their superior positions as a result of natural selection; it would be against nature to interfere with the inequality and suffering of the poor and weak; and it is the manifest destiny of superior people to lead inferior peoples. The weak are apt to identify with the aggressor (A. Freud, 1937) and adopt the moral orientation of the more powerful and to feel that their inferior outcomes are deserved. Or, they may feel victimized. If so, they may either develop a revolutionary moral orientation directed toward changing the nature of the existing relationship or they may develop the moral orientation of being a victim. The latter orientation seeks to obtain secondary gratification from being morally superior to the victimizer: "It is better to be sinned against than to sin;" "The meek shall inherit the earth."

Task-Oriented versus Social-Emotional

Cognitive Orientation

The basic schema here has to do with the focus of involvement. In a task-oriented relationship, one expects the attention and the activities of the participants to be directed toward something external to their relationship, whereas in a social-emotional relationship one expects much of the involvement to be centered on the relationship and the specific persons in the relationship. This difference leads one to expect a relationship that is primarily task-oriented to be impersonal and universalistic in the sense that the actual accomplishment of the task is more important than the identity of the persons involved in accomplishing it or the nature of their personal
relationship. In a task-oriented relationship, people who can perform equally well on the task are substitutable for one another; the personal identity and the unique individuality of the performer have little significance.

In contrast, a social-emotional relationship is particularistic: the personal qualities and identity of the individuals involved are of paramount importance. People are not readily substitutable for one another. In a task-oriented relation, people are oriented toward one another as complexes of performances -- that is, in terms of what each does; in a social-emotional relationship, people are oriented to each other as complexes of qualities -- that is, in terms of who each is.

In a task-oriented relationship one is oriented to making decisions about which means are most efficient in achieving given ends. This requires an abstract, analytic, quantifying, calculating, comparative mode of thought in which one is able to adopt an affectively neutral, external attitude toward different means in order to be able to make a precise appraisal of their comparative merit in achieving one's ends. One views other people as instruments or means and evaluates them in comparison or competition with other means. In contrast, in a social-emotional relationship one is oriented to the attitudes, feelings, and psychological states of the other as ends. This requires a more holistic, concrete, intuitive, qualitative, appreciative-aesthetic mode of thought in which one's own affective reactions help one to apprehend the other from the "inside." Other people are viewed as unique persons rather than as instruments in which aspects of the person are useful for particular purposes.

Motivational Orientation

A task-oriented relationship tends to evoke achievement-oriented motivations. Achievement motivation has been discussed extensively in the
psychological literature. Here I wish to stress that it consists not only of the egoistic motivations to achieve success and to avoid failure; motivations related to using one's capabilities in worthwhile activities may also be involved. Additionally, since achievement behavior is often oriented to serve an adaptive function in relation to an environment characterized by a scarcity of resources, it usually contains an element of motivation that is directed toward rational, efficient accomplishment of the task. Further, since task-oriented relationships are instrumental rather than consummatory in character, they require a motivational orientation that accepts delay-in-gratification and that obtains satisfaction from disciplined activity aimed at future gratification.

A number of different motivational orientations are likely to be elicited in social-emotional relationships: affiliation, affection, esteem, play, sentence, eroticism, and nurturance-succorance. The primary feature of these different need-dispositions is that they are focused on the nature of the person-to-person (or person-to-group) relationship. They are oriented toward giving and receiving conhences; toward the attitudes and emotions of the people involved in the relationship; toward the pleasures and frustrations arising from the interaction with the particular others in the given relationship.

Moral Orientation

The moral orientation in a task-oriented relationship is that of utilitarianism. Its root value is maximization: People should try to get the most out of situations. Good is viewed as essentially quantitative, as something that can be increased or decreased without limit (Diesing, 1962, p. 35). A related feature is the means-end schema, in which efficient allocation of means to achieve alternative ends becomes a salient value. Also involved is impartiality in the comparison of means, so that means can
be compared on the basis of their merit in achieving given ends rather than on the basis of considerations irrelevant to the means-end relationship. In Parsonian terms, the moral-orientation in task-oriented relations are characterized by the values of universalism, affective neutrality, and achievement. In contrast, the moral orientation of social-emotional relations are characterized by the values of particularism, affectivity, and ascription (Diesing, 1962, p. 90). Obligations to other people in a social-emotional relationship are based on their particular affective relationship to oneself rather than on general principles: They are strongest when relations are close and weakest when relations are distant.

**Formal versus Informal**

**Cognitive Orientation**

The basic schema here has to do with whether one expects the people involved in the social situation to let their activities, forms of relationship, demeanor, and the like be determined and regulated largely by societal rules and conventions or whether one expects such people to have the freedom to make and break their own rules as suit their individual and collective inclinations. In a formal relationship, the latitude for deviation from conventional forms of behavior is small and when one violates the rules, others will react negatively and one will be embarrassed (if the violation was unwitting). Since the rules are usually well-known and well-articulated in a formal relationship, it is apt to be characterized by more predictability and less surprise than in an informal one. Hostile rather than friendly relations, unequal rather than equal ones, and impersonal rather than formal ones are more likely to be regulated than informal.

**Motivational Orientation**

Formal social relations appear to be related to a cluster of psychological tendencies. Murray has described various elements of this cluster; the need
for order, subsuming conjunctivity, sameness, deliberateness, and placidity. Although Murray’s emphasis is on the enduring character of these psychological predispositions, it seems likely that the psychological tendencies underlying the bureaucratic personality (Merton, 1957) can be elicited by bureaucratic structures. These tendencies have been well described by Merton and are amply characterized in the literature on the obsessive-compulsive personality.

Informal relations tend to be more open, more particularistic, more frank, more flexible, more emotional, and more personal than formal ones. They have a more relaxed, improvisational character in which quickly formed, intuitive, and impressionistic reactions to the specific other in the particular situation largely determine one’s behavior. In an informal relation, one’s motivational orientation is more directed towards persons, whereas in a formal relation it is more directed towards rules and authority. Emotion and conflict are more apt to be openly expressed in informal relations and avoided in formal ones. The more enduring psychological predispositions that are characteristic of the so-called hysterical personality and the field dependent person, resemble the situationally induced motivational orientations to be found in informal relations.

Moral Orientation

In many respects, the moral orientations to task-oriented and formal relations are similar; this is also the case for social-emotional and informal relations. Formal relations go beyond the values of universalism and effective neutrality or impartially to include moral orientation to the rules and conventions that guide social relations. One has an obligation to respect them and to conform to them. One’s obligation is to the form of the relationship rather than to its spirit. In contrast, in an informal relationship one is morally oriented to the spirit rather than to the form of the
relationship. It is the relationship to which one is obligated rather than to the rules that are supposed to regulate it.

Relevant Research

The existing research which bears directly upon the theoretical ideas presented in the preceding sections is limited. It has mainly been concerned with the social psychological effects of cooperation and competition. There have also been a number of studies related to the effects of hierarchical differences in organizations. The results of the research in these two areas will be very briefly summarized below.

Research on the Psychological Consequences of Cooperation and Competition

Experimental Research. Since I have recently summarized much of the research on this topic (Deutsch, 1965) and David and Roger Johnson (1989) are about to publish a comprehensive review of the relevant literature, I shall make only a brief comment. It is evident that experimental research provides strong support for assuming that cooperatively structured systems as compared to competitive ones will be more productive, will lead to friendlier interpersonal relations, will promote more self-esteem and better mental health, and will evoke more positive attitudes toward one's group as well as toward the activities in which the group is engaged. What about the research in work settings, in collectives, in the kibbutzim: is it consistent with the results of small-scale experimental studies?

Research in Field Settings. Elsewhere (Deutsch, 1965), I have reviewed the diverse scholarly literature dealing with forms of worker compensation, ownership, participation, and control as well as the literature on worker
cooperatives and the kibbutzim. This review was oriented toward answering the question: Is there, inevitably, the trade-off between efficiency and equality that is so commonly assumed? The existing research is meager and not of high quality but its findings are concordant with the more carefully controlled experimental studies summarized above. The available research suggests that, when efficient work requires efficient cooperation, almost any movement toward a democratic, egalitarian, cooperative system and away from the more traditional, authoritarian, hierarchical, adversarial system of work improves productivity and lessens worker alienation. This is so whether the movement is from individual to group performance-based pay, or from nonparticipation to worker participation in decision-making and profit sharing, or from outside ownership to worker ownership, or from authoritarian control to democratic control of the workplace.

Margaret Mead (1937), in Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples, analyzed thirteen societies: three were classified as competitive, four as individualistic, and five as cooperative in their major emphasis. Her findings are consistent with the theoretical ideas advanced in this paper.

To sum up, the research on the psychological consequences of cooperation—competition is supportive of the theoretical analysis presented in an earlier section: the experimental research in the laboratory and in the school classroom are strongly supportive; the research on worker cooperatives and the kibbutzim are consistent with the laboratory research as is the research on primitive societies. The research in industrial settings, however, suggests that an important moderating variable is whether or not the social organization is characterized by a traditional hierarchical structure of authority and control. Below, we turn to a discussion of some of the research related to the comparison of hierarchical and egalitarian systems.
Research on Hierarchical as Compared to Egalitarian Systems

The research in the laboratory as well as in the field support the view of striking differences between groups and organizations characterized by "authoritarian" or "democratic" leadership. In the laboratory, this is true from the pioneering studies by Lewin, Lippitt and White (1939) to more recent studies in my laboratory (Rinat, 1987); and in the field this is so for the many organizational studies done at the University of Michigan (e.g., Likert, 1961; Katz, Kahn, and Adams, 1980) as well as in Japan (e.g., Misumi, 1985).

In hierarchical authoritarian systems as compared to egalitarian-democratic ones, the rank-and-file member or worker is less apt to feel "equal," "motivated," "powerful," "cooperative," "trusting," and to have less favorable views of their leaders, managers, or supervisors. In hierarchical systems, positive reaction to and support for the system increases with hierarchical ascent (Tannenbaum, et. al., 1974, p. 179).

Kohn and Schooler (1983) have done extensive research on the effects of social stratification and occupation upon psychological functioning which is consistent with the ideas presented in this paper. They conclude (p. 81) that:

"A man's job affects his perceptions, values, and thinking processes primarily because it confronts him with demands he must try to meet. These demands, in turn, are to a great extent determined by the job's location in the larger structures of the economy and society. It is chiefly by shaping the everyday realities men must face that social structure exerts its psychological impact."

They further indicate (p. 152) that their longitudinal study leads them to conclude:

"Jobs that facilitate occupational self-direction increase men's ideational flexibility and promote a self-directed orientation to self and to society; jobs that limit occupational self-direction decrease men's ideational
flexibility and promote a conformist orientation to self and to society... Opportunities for exercising occupational self-direction - especially, for doing substantively complex work are to a substantial extent determined by the job's location in the organizational structure, with ownership and a high position in the supervisory hierarchy all facilitating the exercise of occupational self-direction... The longitudinal analysis also demonstrates that, over time, personality has important consequences for the individual's place in the job structure. Both ideational flexibility and self-directed orientation lead, in time, to more responsible jobs that allow greater latitude for occupation self-direction.

To sum up, the research on the psychological consequences of hierarchical as compared to egalitarian systems is consistent with our theoretical analysis. It is evident that the attitudes elicited by the two types of systems are different. It is also apparent that different positions in a hierarchical structure induce different psychological orientations as a function of the requirements and opportunities their positions provide.

Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I have advanced the view that the nature of the social organizations and institutions in which we participate, and our positions in them, not only influence what we think but also how we think; they affect our motivations, feelings, and attitudes towards ourselves and toward others; and they determine our moral perspectives. I have sketched out the characteristics of the cognitive, motivational, and moral orientations that I assume to be associated with some of the fundamental dimensions of social organizations, and I have summarized relevant research evidence bearing upon these assumptions. The existing evidence is consistent with my assumptions, yet it is obvious that the available research is fragmentary and insufficient.
I do not have the time to describe the many issues for research that can be generated by the ideas I have presented. Let me suggest, however, that it would be interesting and important to know, with confidence and in detail, how our thought processes, motivations, and moral perspectives differ as a function of whether we are in a cooperative or competitive, an egalitarian or hierarchical, an instrumental or solidarity-oriented social relation. It would also be important to know more about the conditions which foster the transfer of psychological orientations acquired in one social context to other contexts. If we alter schools so that they become more cooperative will students be able to transfer their school-acquired psychological orientations to their subsequent work settings? Or, are economic institutions so dominant an influence that they must change first? What are the processes by which a misfit between psychological orientations and social institutions lead to institutional rather than psychological change, and vice versa? These are but a few of the questions that cry out for systematic research.

I have indicated above that the existing research-based knowledge is not yet sufficient to make definitive statements about the psychological consequences of different forms of social organization. This is not to say that what we do know supports the status-quo, that it is consistent with the competitive-hierarchical organization of many of our social institutions. Research strongly suggests that the competitive-hierarchical atmosphere in many of our schools is not good for our children. If it is not good for our children, is it good for us?
REFERENCES


