Abstract for "Preventing World War III: A Psychological Perspective"

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In this paper, the view is presented that the United States and the Soviet Union are involved in a malignant social process which is relentlessly driving them to engage in actions and reactions that are steadily increasing the chances of nuclear holocaust—an outcome no one wants. A number of key social psychological factors which contribute to the development and perpetuation of malignant social processes are described and illustrated in terms of relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. This includes a discussion of: their anachronistic competition for world leadership; the security dilemmas created for both superpowers by their competitive orientations and the lack of a strong world community; the cognitive rigidities arising from their archaic, oversimplified, black-white, mutually antagonistic ideologies; the misperceptions, unwitting commitments, self-fulfilling prophecies, and vicious escalating spirals which typically arise during the course of competitive conflict; the gamesmanship orientation to their security dilemmas which turns their conflicts away from what in real life is being won or lost into an abstract conflict over images of power in which nuclear missiles become the pawns for enacting the game of power; and the internal problems and conflicts within each of the superpowers that can be managed more easily because of the conflicts between them. The paper concludes with an extended discussion of what could be done to reduce the immediate dangers of their arms race and what could be done to reverse their malignant social process. In respect to the latter, the paper sketches the development of "fair rules for competition" and steps that might be taken to develop a sufficiently cooperative framework to permit fair rules to work.
I start with a Jewish proverb and a Jewish story. First, the proverb:

An insincere peace is better than a sincere war. The story is about a rabbi who was asked by a married couple to help resolve a dispute between them. The rabbi decided to see each spouse separately. First, he saw the wife and after listening to her for some time, he commented to her as she was leaving: "You are right." Then, he saw the husband and heard his side. As he was leaving, he told him: "You are right." The rabbi's wife who had secretly been listening in the next room to what was going on, confronted the rabbi and upbraided him: "How could you tell them both that they are right when they disagree so strongly?"

The rabbi shrugged and said to his wife: "You are right."

I believe that there is currently an insincere peace between the superpowers. For good reasons, they do not trust one another and they are justified in doubting the other's peaceful intentions. There may be a few morally righteous extremists who would prefer the simplicity and clarity of a sincere war to an insincere peace but most of us are prepared to accept the ambiguity and complexity of an insincere peace. We are aware that a sincere war involving the superpowers is likely to end up as a nuclear holocaust in which, as someone has put it, the survivors might well envy the dead.* But it seems unlikely that an

* Those who need to be convinced of the disastrous and horrifying consequences of nuclear war should read Jonathan Schell's The Fate of the Earth.

insincere, hostile peace will long endure: to put it bluntly, it seems to be
driving the governments of the superpowers "nuts": NUTS is an acronym used in
a paper by Keeny and Panofsky (1982, p. 289) "to characterize the various doc-
trines that seek to use nuclear weapons against specific targets in a complex
of nuclear war-fighting situations intended to be limited, as well as the manage-
ment over an extended period of a general nuclear war between the superpowers."
It is crazy for the U.S. and the USSR each to be spending hundreds of billions
of dollars on nuclear weapon systems in the illusion that it will be possible
to "prevail" over the other side in a nuclear war.

As the rabbi said to the married couple, so also with the superpowers it
can be said that each one is right: each one is right to think that the other
is hostile, provocative, and dangerous to peace. The relations between the
superpowers are pathological and the characteristics of such malignant relations
is that they enmesh the participants in a web of interactions and defensive
maneuvers which, instead of improving their situations, make them both feel
less secure, more vulnerable, and more burdened.

I believe it is important to recognize that the superpowers are involved in
a crazy social process which, given the existence of nuclear weapons, is too
dangerous to allow to continue. Perfectly sane and intelligent people, once
they are enmeshed in a crazy social process, may engage in actions which
seem to them completely rational and necessary but which a detached, objective
observer would readily identify as contributing to the perpetuation and in-
tensification of a vicious cycle of interactions. You have all seen this
happen in married couples that you know or in parent-adolescent

* NUTS = Nuclear Utilization Target Selection.
relations where the individual people involved seemed to be decent, intelligent, and rational. They trap themselves into a vicious social process which leads to outcomes—hostility, estrangement, violence—which no one really wants. So I believe this can happen with nations: same, decent, and intelligent people who are leaders of the superpowers have allowed their nations to become involved in a vicious, pathological social process which is relentlessly driving them to engage in actions and reactions that are steadily increasing the chances of a nuclear holocaust—an outcome no one wants. And as I have indicated earlier, in such a social process both sides are right in coming to believe that the other is hostile, malevolent, and intent on doing them in: the interactions and attitudes which develop in those involved in such a social process provide ample justification for such beliefs.

A social process which is increasingly dangerous and costly to the participants and from which the participants see no way of extricating themselves without leaving themselves vulnerable to an unacceptable loss in a value central to their self-identities or self-esteem, I term a "malignant social process". Here, I want to sketch out some of the general characteristics of such social processes, to indicate how the superpowers seem enmeshed in one, and to suggest some ideas for getting out of it.

The Characteristics of Malignant Social Processes

There are a number of key elements which contribute to the development and perpetuation of malignant social processes. They include: (1) being involved in an anarchic social situation; (2) a win-lose or competitive orientation to one another; (3) inner conflicts within each of the parties that express themselves
through their external conflict; (4) cognitive rigidity within the parties; (5) misperceptions; (6) unwitting commitments; (7) self-fulfilling prophecies; (8) vicious escalating spirals; and (9) a gamesmanship orientation which turns the conflict away from the issues of what in real life is being won or lost into an abstract conflict over images of power. Although my discussion in this paper centers on the malignant relations between the superpowers, my description of malignant social processes can, I believe, be applied to the Arab-Israeli conflict and many other protracted, destructive conflicts.

1. Being involved in anarchic social situations. There are lawless social situations which do not allow the possibility of "rational" behavior so long as the conditions for social order or mutual trust do not exist. I believe the current security dilemmas facing the superpowers partially result from their being in a situation of this sort. A characteristic symptom of such "nonrational situations" is that an attempt on the part of any individual or nation to increase its own welfare or security (without regard to the security or welfare of the others) is self-defeating. Thus, consider, for example, the United States' decision to develop and test the hydrogen bomb in the effort to maintain a military superiority over the USSR rather than to work for an agreement to ban the testing of the H-bomb and, thus, prevent a spiraling arms race involving this monstrous weapon (Bundy, 1982). This U.S. decision led the Soviet Union to attempt to catch-up. Soon both of the superpowers were stockpiling H-bombs in a nuclear arms race that still continues in different forms. U.S. leaders believed that if the Soviets had been the first to develop the H-bomb, they would have tested it and sought to reap the advantages from doing so; probably they were right. Both sides are aware of the temp-
tations that each side has to increase its security "by getting ahead". The fear of "falling behind" as well as the temptation to "get ahead" of the other lead to a pattern of interactions that increases insecurity of both sides. Such situations, which are captured by the Prisoners Dilemma Game, have been extensively studied by myself (Deutsch, 1958, 1973) and other social scientists (see Alker and Hurwitz, 1981, for a comprehensive discussion). When confronted with such social dilemmas, the only way that an individual or nation can avoid being trapped in mutually reinforcing, self-defeating cycles is to attempt to change the situation so that a basis of social order or mutual trust can be developed.

Comprehension of the basic nature of the situation we are in suggests that mutual security rather than national security should be our objective. The basic military axiom for both the East and West should be that military actions should only be taken which increase the military security of both sides; military actions which give a military superiority to one side or the other should be avoided. The military forces of both sides should be viewed as having the common primary aim of preventing either side (one's own or the other) from starting a deliberate or accidental war. Awareness of this common aim could be implemented by regular meetings of military leaders from East and West; the establishment of a continuing joint technical group of experts to work together to formulate disarmament and inspection plans; the establishment of mixed military units on each other's territory, etc. The key point we must recognize is that if military inferiority is dangerous, so is military "superiority"; it is dangerous for either side to feel tempted or frightened into military action. Neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. should want
its weapons or the other side's nuclear weapons to be vulnerable to a first strike. Similarly, neither side should want the other side to be in a situation where its command, control, and communication systems have become so ineffective that the decision to use nuclear weapons will be in the hands of individual, uncontrolled units.

2. Competitive orientation. A malignant social process usually begins with a conflict which leads the people or parties involved to perceive their differences as the kind which create a situation in which one side will win and the other will lose. If the participants in a conflict see it as a competitive situation, the resulting conflict process will tend to perpetuate and escalate the conflict. Some of the characteristics of a competitive conflict processes are (Deutsch, 1973):

1. Communication between the conflicting parties is unreliable and impoverished. The available communication channels and opportunities are not utilized, or they are used in an attempt to mislead or intimidate the other. Little confidence is placed in information that is obtained directly from the other; espionage and other circuitous means of obtaining information are relied upon. The poor communication enhances the possibility of error and misinformation of the sort that is likely to reinforce the preexisting orientations and expectations toward the other. Thus, the ability to notice and respond to the other's shifts away from a win-lose orientation becomes impaired.

2. It stimulates the view that the solution of the conflict can only be imposed by one side or the other by means of superior force, deception, or cleverness. The enhancement of one's own power and the complementary minimization of the other's power become objectives. The attempt by each of
the conflicting parties to create or maintain a power difference favorable to his own side tends to expand the scope of the conflict from a focus on the immediate issue in dispute to a conflict over the power to impose one's preference upon the other.

3. It leads to a suspicious, hostile attitude that increases the sensitivity to differences and threats while minimizing the awareness of similarities. This, in turn, makes the usually accepted norms of conduct and morality that govern one's behavior toward others who are similar to oneself less applicable. Hence, it permits behavior toward the other that would be considered outrageous if directed toward someone like oneself. Since neither side is likely to grant moral superiority to the other, the conflict is likely to escalate as one side or the other engages in behavior that is morally outrageous to the other.

I have written extensively (Deutsch, 1969, 1973, 1980, 1982) about the diverse conditions which lead people to define a situation which has a mixture of cooperative and competitive features as a win-lose or competitive situation rather than as a cooperative one. Much of this can be summarized by what I have termed Deutsch's crude law of social relations: the characteristic processes and effects elicited by any given type of social relation tend also to induce that type of social relation (if introduced into the social relation before its character has been strongly determined.) In relation to competition my crude hypothesis would indicate that competition induces and is induced by: the use of tactics of coercion, threat, or deception; attempts to enhance the power differences between oneself and the other; poor communication; minimization of the awareness of similarities in values and increased sensitivity to opposed inter-
ests; suspicious and hostile attitudes; the importance, rigidity, and size of
the issues in conflict; and so on. In contrast, cooperation induces and is
induced by: a perceived similarity in beliefs and attitudes; a readiness to be
helpful; openness in communication; trusting and friendly attitudes; sensitivity
to common interests and deemphasis of opposed interests; an orientation toward
enhancing mutual power rather than power differences; and so on.

What is the nature of the conflict between the superpowers: is it inherently
a cut-throat, win-lose struggle? Public statements of the leaders of the two
nations define the conflict as a confrontation of two mutually irreconcilable
ideologies; and it is apparent that basic ideological differences do exist.
On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that neither the United States nor
the USSR closely resemble its ideological "ideal type". Neither Karl Marx nor
Adam Smith would recognize his offspring.

Let us examine the central notions of each ideology. The key phrase of the
American ethos is "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." The American
vision is of the lone, self-reliant, enterprising individual who has escaped
from the restraints of an oppressive community so as to be free to pursue his or
her destiny in an environment which offers ever-expanding opportunity to those
who are fittest. The starting point of the Communist ethos is the view that the
human being is a social animal whose nature is determined by the way people are
related to one another in their productive activities in any given community.
The Communist vision is of social beings who are free to cooperate with one
another toward common objectives because they jointly own the means of production
and share the rewards of their collective labor.

There is not need to detail here how very far short of its ideal each system is,
nor need to describe the many similarities in values and in practices which char-
acterize these complex, modern industrialized societies. One might even suggest that many - but certainly not all - of the dissimilarities which strike the casual observer of these two societies are differences which are due to variations in affluence and in national character rather than ones caused by ideological distinctiveness. In fact, neither ideology is more than an emphasis, a partial view of the total picture. Each side looks at the elephant from a different vantage point and, of course, describes it as two different beasts. However, this much can be said about the beast - the relation of the individual to society, the relation between individual liberty and social justice - it is a complex animal that has different needs and different characteristics at different stages of its development and in different environments. It is a poorly understood beast and only careful, objective study from all vantage points will give us insight into its care and nurture. But, it is already evident that the beast needs both of its sides to function effectively. It needs individuals who are free to make their personal views and needs known, people who are neither conforming automati- toms nor slavish followers and it also needs a community which enables men to recognize their interrelatedness and to cooperate with one another in producing the social conditions which foster the development of creative, responsible people.

I suggest that neither the Marxist ideology nor the American ideology is consistent enough nor operational enough to be proved or disproved by empirical test. Nor is either specific enough to be a guide to action in the day-to-day decisions which shape the course of history.
I have stressed the fact that ideologies are vague. Vagueness permits diverse aspirations and changing practices to be accommodated under the same ideological umbrella. There are two important implications to be drawn. First, it is useless to try to refute an ideology. Moreover, since an ideology often serves important integrative functions, the attempt to refute it is likely to elicit defensiveness and hostility. Like old soldiers, ideologies never die, they are best left to fade away. Second, the vagueness of ideologies permits redefinitions of who is "friend" or "foe". There is ample room in the myth systems of both the United States and the Soviet Union (or China) to find a basis of amicable relations.

The resurgence of the Cold War has intensified our perception of ideological differences between "East" and West. Now, however, in light of internal conflicts within both "East and "West" (the Sino-Soviet break and the trade disagreements among the nations in the Western Alliance are only the more obvious cases)- we have an opportunity to revise our images of the nature of the so-called "struggle between Communism and freedom". We have more basis for recognizing that the ideological dispute is only the manifest rationalization of other less noble motives on both sides. As Freud pointed out the manifest life of the mind - what men know or pretend to know and say about the motives of their behavior - is often merely a socially acceptable rationalization of their unrecognized or latent motives. I suggest that the intensity of the ideological struggle has primarily reflected an anachronistic power struggle between two continental superpowers that have defined their prestige and security in terms of world leadership. The emergence of a power struggle between the U.S. and Russia was predicted by Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835 and by many others long before Russia adopted a communist ideology. It is much easier for Soviet leaders to rationalize an attempt to control and repress in Poland the popularly supported Solidarity movement by thinking of it and calling it a
tool of American imperialism than to admit a crude attempt to maintain Soviet domination. Similarly, it is much easier for the United States to rationalize its support for corrupt, dictatorial governments in Latin America, Africa, and Asia in terms of a defense against communism rather than to consider it an attempt to maintain our world power.

As Milburn, Stewart, and Hermann (1982, p.19) point out there are curious mirror image aspects in the views of leading Soviet and American analysts. Pipes (1976) and Conquest (1979), on the American side, have analogous positions to those of Suslov and Romanov, on the Soviet side: "All believe that the leadership of their major adversary is monolithic and that there are essentially no differences among members of the ruling class of their opponents...Those on the ideological right in both countries argue for the obstinate, stubborn, immutability of their imperialistic opposite number: you just cannot deal with these people; you cannot influence them or produce change in the way they think and act. Negotiation with them is likely to prove a waste of time and, besides, they cannot be trusted."

As I have suggested earlier, both superpowers are right to think that the other side is attempting to increase its relative power and it is natural that those on each side who are most caught up in the competitive power struggle come to have views that are mirror images of one another: this is the inevitable result of a competitive power struggle.

Traditionally, the quest for world power has been closely bound to strivings for national security, economic dominance, and international prestige or influence. The quest for power has commonly taken the form of the attempt to establish military supremacy over one's major competitors. It is recognized increasingly that the drive for military dominance in the age of missiles and hydrogen bombs is
dangerously anacronistic. So too, crude economic imperialism—Western or Eastern style—no longer provides as much opportunity for economic gain as does a concentration upon scientific research and development. However, the quest for international power and influence is a resonable one for all societies. In a later section, I shall discuss the development of fair rules for competition for power and influence.

3. Inner conflict within the parties. Although competitive conflict is a necessary condition for malignant conflict, it is not a sufficient one. Malignant conflict is one that persists because the internal needs of the conflicting parties require the competitive process between the conflicting parties. The hostile relationship serves important functions within each of the parties. There are many different kinds of internal needs that a hostile relationship with another can be an outlet for: it may provide an acceptable excuse for internal problems (the problems are caused by the adversary or the need to defend oneself against the adversary); it may provide a distraction so that internal problems are made less salient; it can provide an opportunity to express pent-up hostility, arising from internal conflict, through combat with the external adversary; it may enable one to project disapproved aspects of oneself (which are not consciously recognized) onto the adversary and to attack them through attacking them in one's adversary; it may permit important parts of one's self—including attitudes, skills, and defenses developed during conflictual relations in one's formative stages—to be expressed and valued because the relations with the present adversary resembles earlier conflictual relations; and so on. When an external conflict serves internal needs it may be difficult to give it up until other means of satisfying these needs are developed.
There is little doubt that the conflict between the superpowers has served important internal functions for the ruling establishments in the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet establishment has been able to justify the continuation of its autocratic form of government, the Russian domination of the other nationalities in the Soviet Union, its control of the nations of Eastern Europe, and its subordination of communist parties in other countries in terms of its struggle against "the dark forces of imperialism." The U.S. establishment has been able to justify intervention in other countries, under the guise of support for anti-communism, to promote the interests of American business; it has helped to support the continuation and growth of the military-industrial complex; it has rationalized governmental secrecy so that many important governmental decisions are made without the possibility of informed public discussion of the issues; and it has inhibited the development of significant and sustained political opposition to the policies of the national security establishment.

It seems clear that an external enemy or devil has served many useful functions to those in power in both the Soviet Union and the United States. However, there is growing recognition by important elements within each superpower that the increasing dangers and costs of the arms race may begin to dwarf the gains from having a superpower as an external devil.

4. **Cognitive rigidity.** Malignant conflict is fostered by cognitive rigidity which leads one to be rigidly set in one's positions because one is unable to envisage other alternatives than the position that one has initially defined for oneself. An oversimplified black-white view of the issues involved in a dispute contributes to this rigidity. So does the high level of tension which may be generated by an intense conflict: the excessive tension leads to a constriction
of thought with the lessened capability to conceive of new alternatives and options. To the extent that parties in a conflict rigidly set themselves in their initial positions, they are unable to explore the range of potentially available solutions: among which might be one which satisfies the interests of both sides. In contrast, cognitive openness and flexibility facilitate a creative search for alternatives which might be mutually satisfying: the initial, opposed positions evaporating as new, concordant options emerge.

Although the views of knowledgeable American scholars of the Soviet Union may be sophisticated and the same may be true for Soviet scholars who specialize in American studies, there is little reason to think that this is true of the policy makers of the superpowers. They appear to have developed conceptions of the other which reflect the ideological indoctrinations they were exposed to in their earlier years. They have not travelled in the other superpower nor have they had informal contacts and conversations with their counterparts in the other nation. In other words, they have had little opportunity to learn that the other does not neatly fit the rigid stereotypes developed in their younger years. This is an important defect in the experience of the leaders of the superpowers which should be remedied through systematic attempts to cultivate such experiences.

5. Misjudgment and misperceptions. In our preceding discussion of the effects of competition, it was evident that impoverished communication, hostile attitudes, and oversensitivity to differences could lead to distorted views of the other that could intensify and perpetuate conflict. In addition to the
distortions that are natural to the competitive process, there are other distortions that commonly occur in the course of interaction. Elsewhere (Deutsch 1962, 1965), I have described some of the common sources of misperception in interactional situations. Many of these misperceptions function to transform a conflict into a competitive struggle—even if the conflict did not emerge from a competitive relationship.

Let me illustrate with the implications of a simple psychological principle: the perception of any act is determined both by our perception of the act itself and by our perception of the context within which the act occurs. The contexts of social acts are often not immediately given through perception, and often they are not obvious. When the context is not obvious, we tend to assume a familiar context—one that seems likely in terms of our own past experience. Since both the present situations and the past experiences of the actor and perceiver may be rather different, it is not surprising that the two individuals will interpret the same act quite differently. Misunderstandings of this sort are very likely, of course, when the actor and the perceiver come from different cultural backgrounds and are not fully informed about these differences. A period of rapid social change also makes such misunderstandings widespread as the gap between the past and the present widens.

Given the fact that the ability to place oneself in the other's shoes is notoriously underemployed and underdeveloped in most people, and also given that this ability is impaired by stress and inadequate information, it is to
be expected that certain typical biases will emerge in the perceptions of actions during conflict. Thus since most people are more strongly motivated to hold a positive view of themselves than they are to hold such a view of others, it is not surprising that there is a bias toward perceiving one's own behavior toward the other as being more benevolent and more legitimate than the other's behavior toward oneself. This is a simple restatement of a well-demonstrated psychological truth: namely that the evaluation of an act is affected by the evaluation of its source—and the source is part of the context of behavior. For example, research has shown that American students are likely to rate more favorably an action of the United States directed toward the Soviet Union than the same action directed by the Soviet Union toward the United States. We are likely to view American espionage activities in the Soviet Union as more benevolent than similar activities by Soviet agents in the United States.

If each side in a conflict tends to perceive its own motives and behavior as more benevolent and legitimate than those of the other side, it is evident that the conflict will spiral upward in intensity. If Acme perceives its actions as a benevolent and legitimate way of interfering with actions that Bolt has no right to engage in, Acme will be surprised by the intensity of Bolt's hostile response and will have to escalate its counteraction to negate Bolt's response. But how else is Bolt likely to act if he perceives his own actions as well-motivated? And how unlikely is he not to respond to Acme's escalation with counterescalation if he is capable of doing so? To the extent that there is a biased perception of benevolence and legitimacy, one could also expect that
there will be a parallel bias in what is considered to be an equitable agreement for resolving conflict: should not differential legitimacy be differentially rewarded? The biased perception of what is a fair compromise makes agreement more difficult and thus extends conflict. Another consequence of the biased perception of benevolence and legitimacy is reflected in the asymmetries between trust and suspicion and between cooperation and competition. Trust, when violated, is more likely to turn into suspicion than negated suspicion is to turn into trust. Similarly, it is easier to move from cooperation to competition than in the other direction.

There are, of course, other types of processes leading to misperceptions and misjudgments (see Jervis, 1976, for an excellent discussion). In addition to the distortions arising from the pressures for self-consistency and dissonance reduction (which are discussed below) the intensification of conflict may induce stress and tension beyond a moderate optimal level and this overactivation, in turn, may lead to an impairment of perceptual and cognitive processes in several ways. It may reduce the range of perceived alternatives; it may reduce the time perspective in such a way as to cause a focus on the immediate rather than the overall consequences of the perceived alternatives; it may polarize thought so that percepts will tend to take on a simplistic cast of being black or white, for or against, good or evil; it may lead to stereotyped responses; it may increase the susceptibility to fear— or hope-inciting rumors; it may increase defensiveness; it may increase the pressures for social conformity. In effect, excessive tension reduces the intellectual resources available for discovering new ways of coping with a
problem or new ideas for resolving a conflict. Intensification of conflict is the likely result as simplistic thinking and the polarization of thought push the participants to view their alternatives as being limited to victory or defeat.

There are three basic ways to reduce the misjudgments and misperceptions which typically occur during the course of conflict; they are not mutually exclusive and if possible all should be used. One method entails making explicit the assumptions and evidence which underlie one's perceptions and judgments. Then, one would examine how likely these were to have been influenced by any of the common sources of misperception and misjudgment and how reliable and valid they would be considered to be by an objective outsider--e.g., as in a court of law. A second method entails bringing in friendly, objective outsiders--who are not enmeshed in the conflict--to see whether their judgments and perceptions of the situation are in agreement or disagreement with one's own. They may have different vantage points, different sources of information, and more objectivity which would enable them to recognize the errors of judgment and misperceptions that have developed from one's emmeshment in the conflict. The outsiders should have the independence to ensure that they are free to form their own views and the stature to be able to communicate them so that they will be heard. When the nature of the conflict is such that the employment of objective outsiders is unfeasible, the use of internal "devil's advocates" has been recommended (George, 1972; Janis, 1972) as a way of challenging the assumptions and evidence underlying one's perceptions and judgments. Here, too,
it is important that the devil’s advocates be sufficiently independent and prestigious to present hard challenges to conventional views in a way that cannot be ignored. Finally, there are agreements that can be made with one’s adversary to reduce the chances of malignant misjudgment and misperception of one another during conflict. Such agreements could promote continuing informal contacts among international affairs and military specialists on both sides. They could provide for regular feedback from the other of the other’s interpretations of one’s communications. They could enable each side to present its viewpoints on television and in the mass media of the other side on a regular basis. They could provide for "role reversal" enactments, where each side is required to state the position of the other side to the other side's complete satisfaction before either side advocates its own position. And so on.

None of the foregoing procedures would be certain to eliminate all misperceptions and misjudgments of the other during conflict. Yet, in combination, they might substantially reduce them and, in consequence, decrease the risks that conflict would escalate due to poor communication and misunderstandings. As the superpowers are increasingly placing themselves in the position where their leaders and strategic advisors may feel that they have to launch their nuclear-tipped missiles within minutes after being informed that the other side has initiated nuclear attack, the importance of not misinterpreting the other’s behaviors and intentions is increasingly urgent.

6. Unwitting Commitments. During the course of a malignant social process, the parties involved not only get overcommitted to their positions in a rigid way but they usually get committed, unwittingly, to the beliefs, to the defenses, and to the investments that are involved in carrying out their conflictual activities. As a consequence, the conflict is maintained and perpetuated by the commitments and investments that the malignant conflict process itself has given rise to.
Consider, for example, the belief by leaders of the American government that the Soviet Union would do us in militarily if it could. This belief leads to actions, such as intensifying our military build-up, and these decisions and actions in turn will produce an increased psychological commitment to the belief: after deciding to build the MX missile, doubts about the beliefs which support the decision will be reduced in a psychological process of dissonance reduction. Within limits, the more costly the actions you take based on your beliefs, the greater the need to reduce the prior-to-action doubts that you may have had about your beliefs (Festinger, 1957). Jervis (1976, p. 405) has an excellent, detailed discussion with many illustrations from international conflict of how the need to reduce cognitive dissonance will "introduce an unintended and unfortunate continuity in policy."

One of the characteristics of a pathological defense mechanism is that it is perpetuated by its failures, rather than successes, in protecting the security of the person employing it. An individual might, for example, attempt to defend himself from feeling like a failure by not really trying so that he can attribute his failure to his lack of effort rather than his lack of ability. The result is that he does not succeed and does not quell his anxieties and doubts about his ability to succeed. As a consequence, when again faced with a situation where he is anxious about failing, he will resort to the same defense of "not trying": it provides a temporary relief of his anxiety even as it perpetuates the need for the defense since the individual has cut himself off from the possibility of success. So too the defenses which emerge during the course of conflict can perpetuate themselves and the conflict. Thus, suppose the Soviet Union because it is suspicious of the U.S. and its intentions toward the Soviet bloc defends itself from the U.S. by limiting the amount of dissidence that can be expressed in Poland and other Eastern European nations. The
repression of dissidence does not permit grievances to be expressed and makes it less likely that the necessary socio-economic changes to reduce discontent will occur. As a consequence, discontent and dissidence may grow and there will be a need for the continued use of the defense of repression.

Parties to a conflict, frequently, get committed to perpetuating a conflict by the investments that they have made in conducting the conflict. Thus, for example, in explaining his opposition to an American proposal shortly before Pearl Harbor, Prime Minister Tojo said that the demand that Japan withdraw its troops from China was unacceptable: "We sent a large force of one million men [to China] and it has cost us well over 100,000 dead and wounded, [the grief of] their bereaved families, hardships for four years, and a national expenditure of several tens of billions of yen. We must by all means get satisfactory results from this." (As quoted in Jervis, 1976, p. 398). Similarly, there is considerable evidence to suggest that those who have acquired power, profit, prestige, jobs, knowledge, or skills during the course of conflict may feel threatened by the diminution or ending of conflict. The Soviet military-industrial complex as well as the one in the United States have both developed vested interests in the Cold War: it justifies large military budgets, it gives them positions of power and prestige, and it makes their skills and knowledge useful. They have good reason to be apprehensive about an "outbreak of peace" which would make them obsolete, deprive them of power and status, and make them lose financially; under such conditions, it is quite natural to accentuate those perspectives and aspects of reality which justify the continuation of an arms race. These understandable fears have to be dealt with constructively or else they may produce defensive adherence to the views which justify a hostile, armed war. I suggest that we must carefully plan to anticipate the psychological difficulties in the
transition to a peaceful world, otherwise the resistance to such a transition may be overwhelming. As a basic strategy to overcome some of these difficulties, I would recommend that we consider a policy of overcompensating those who otherwise might be adversely affected by the change: we want to change the nature of their psychological investment from an investment in military pursuits to one in peaceful pursuits.

7. **Self-fulfilling Prophecies.** Merton, in his classic paper on *The Self-fulfilling Prophecy* (1957), has pointed out that distortions are often perpetuated because they may evoke new behavior which makes the originally false conception come true. The specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of error. The prophet will cite the actual course of events as proof that he was right from the very beginning. The dynamics of the self-fulfilling prophecy help to explain individual pathology—e.g., the anxious student who, afraid he might fail, worries so much that he cannot study, with the consequence that he does fail. It also contributes to our understanding of social pathology—e.g., how prejudice and discrimination against Blacks keeps them in a position which seems to justify the prejudice and discrimination. So too in international relations. If the policy-makers of East and West believe that war is likely and either side attempts to increase its military security vis-a-vis the other, the other side's response will justify the initial move. The dynamics of an arms race has the inherent quality of a "folie à deux", wherein the self-fulfilling prophecies mutually reinforce one another.
8. **Vicious, escalating spirals.** In recent years, a number of social psychologists have concerned themselves with understanding the conditions under which people will become entrapped in a self-perpetuating cycle of escalating commitment (Teger, 1980; Rubin, 1981; Levi, 1981). Decision-makers sometimes face the problem of deciding whether to persist in a failing, costly course of action; they must choose between changing their course of action so as to cut their losses and continuing to invest in the hope of reaching their goal.

Ariel Levi (1981) has developed a model of the factors affecting decision-making when such a dilemma has to be faced. The model implies that the tendency to escalate commitments after failure should be greatest when: (1) the decision-maker evaluates his or her losses so far as very negative; (2) the decision-maker considers that further losses will not make his or her position much worse than the losses already suffered; and (3) the decision-maker believes that the previous failures do not reduce the chances of success of an increased commitment of resources.

From Levi's model, it can be predicted that decision-makers who see themselves as highly accountable to others for their decisions should be cautious before losses have occurred but increasingly ready to take risks as losses increase. Also, since gains or losses are evaluated from a reference point, the greater the losses are perceived to be from this reference point, the greater will be the decision-maker's tendency to escalate his or her commitment. In addition, if the decision-maker attributes his previous losses to changeable factors, escalation of commitments is likely.

Levi's model is based, in part, upon Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) Prospect Theory which seeks to account for why decision-makers systematically violate the
basic tenets of rational, economic decision-making. One of their basic assumptions is that people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty. This "certainty effect" means that a gambler facing the prospect of a sure loss of a smaller amount if he stops now and an uncertain loss of a larger amount if he continues to gamble is apt to choose to take the risk of increasing his losses.

As this is being written, Argentina and Great Britain appear to be trapped in a vicious spiral of escalating commitments over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. For them to stop the war now and to work out an agreement which does not imply the complete capitulation of one side or the other implies that the sizable losses that each side has already suffered makes the respective decisions to go to war seem utterly indefensible. Having gone to war, each side is suffering significant losses and the losses which they incur in the course of combat are, at least in the short run, escalating the determination of each side not to be the loser. The escalation of the losses suffered by each side makes it clear that all sides—the British, the Argentinians, the people on the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands—will be worse off than if war had been averted. (Except, of course, that the people in each nation might not have been distracted from their discontent with their governments). The only possible value to come out of this absurd war, that could have easily been averted, is that it might give "war" a bad reputation.

The superpowers appear to be trapped in an escalating commitment to an

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arms race that is rapidly increasing the risk of an accidental nuclear war.

As Arthur M. Cox has pointed out (NY Times, May 27, 1982):

Most of the new nuclear weapons will have a capability for a first strike because they can reach their targets with such speed, accuracy and power. When they are deployed, both sides will be on hair-trigger alert, especially at times of political crisis. These weapons will be able to destroy nuclear command, control and communications systems, both human and mechanical. Those systems are vulnerable and subject to error. The United States in 1979 and 1980 had three nuclear-war alerts caused by false alarms from computer error.

Fortunately, for this planet, we could survive such false alarms because there was time to ascertain the error before a command to launch was given. In the future there will not be time.

In June, 1980, Fred C. Ikle, the present Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, wrote an article in The Washington Post titled "The Growing Risk of War By Accident". He said: "The more we rely on launch on warnings (or, for that matter, the more the Soviets do) the greater the risk of accidental nuclear war....The crux of the matter is that the more important it becomes to launch on warning, the more dangerous it will be. The tightening noose around our neck is the requirement for speed. The more certain one wants to be that our missile forces (or Soviet missile forces) could be launched within minutes and under all circumstances, the more one has to practice the system and to loosen the safeguards."

We are progressively tightening the noose around our necks, out of the increasing fears that each side is creating by its development of nuclear weapons that have a first-strike capability. The notion that each side must be prepared to "launch on warning" is the culmination of the escalating, competitive "game of strategy" being played by the superpowers in which each side has initiated moves to improve its strategic position without adequate recognition of how
the other would be forced to respond and without positive, concern for what would happen to the strategic position of the other.

9. Gamesmanship. What is so psychologically seductive about nuclear weapons and the various hypothetical scenarios of nuclear war that the strategists and decision-makers in both of the superpowers are drawn to them like a moth to a flame? There are so many dimensions of power—economic, political, cultural, scientific, sports, educational, etc.—in which the power struggle between the superpowers could be played out. What is the special fascination to playing the international power game with nuclear weapons?

I speculate that there are two key psychological reatures that make the power game with nuclear toys a supergame: it has a tremendous emotional kick for those with strong power-drives, and the game is a very tidy, abstract one. It has a tremendous emotional kick for several reasons: the stakes are high (the fate of the earth is at risk), decisions have to be made quickly (there is no time for indecisiveness), and the use of nuclear weapons is inherently an aggressive action. For those with strong power-drives, being in a position of nuclear superiority can be seen as a sure way to dominate and control others, while being in a position of nuclear inferiority can be seen as a sure way to be dominated and humiliated by others. In the eyes of those driven by power, nuclear weapons are the purest and most concentrated form of power that exist. As Barnett (1972) has pointed out, the national security managers and our governing class are educated and selected in a way that ensures that many will have strong power drives and a conception of human life that leads them to believe that unless one controls and dominates, one will be controlled and dominated.
One must be "steel-like" and unflinching in one's resolve not to allow the other to prevail no matter how catastrophic the consequences in order to be a competent participant in nuclear war games. As Maccoby (1976) has suggested, the "gamesman" differs from the "jungle fighter". The latter's lust for power is passionate and open and the domination he seeks is personal and concrete. In contrast, the gamesman's power drive is more depersonalized. His game of power is played coolly, analytically, and with emotional detachment. As Maccoby (1976, p. 100) has indicated: "...he is energized to compete not because he wants to build an empire, not for riches, but rather for fame, glory, the exhilaration of running his team and of gaining victories. His main goal is to be known as a winner, and his deepest fear is to be labeled a loser."

Maccoby (1976, pp. 108-109) further describes gamesmen in these terms:

"................. imaginative gamesmen tend to create a new reality, less limiting than normal, everyday reality. Like many adolescents, they seem to crave a more romantic, fast-paced, semifantasy life, and this need puts them in danger of losing touch with reality and of unconsciously lying. The most successful gamesmen keep this need under control and are able to distinguish between the game and reality, but even so, in boring meetings they sometimes imagine that they are really somewhere else-- at a briefing for an air-bombing mission, or in a hideout where the detested manager who is speaking is really a Mafia chieftain whom the gamesman will someday rub out....At their worst moments gamesmen are unrealistic, manipulative, and compulsive workaholics. Their hyped-up activity hides doubt about who they are and where they are going. Their ability to escape allows them to avoid unpleasant realities. When they let down, they are faced with feelings that make them feel powerless. The most compulsive players must be "turned on," energized by competitive pressures. Deprived of challenge at work, they are bored and slightly depressed. Life is meaningless outside the game, and they tend to sit around watching TV or drinking too much. But once the game is on, once they feel they are in the Super Bowl or one-on-one against another star, they come to life, think hard, and are cool.

The abstract character of nuclear war scenarios appeals to the talented, imaginative gamesmen who are the leading strategic analysts in the national security
establishments of the U.S. and the USSR. It is an exciting, competitive game calling for the use of inventive thought, cool, analytic ability, and emotional toughness. It has little of the messiness of war games involving real soldiers, battlefield commanders, rain, mud, and pestilence. It is basically an abstract, impersonal, computerized game involving nuclear weapons with strategists on each side trying to outsmart the other.

To play the game, each side has to make assumptions about how its own weapons (as well as how its command, control, and communication systems) will operate in various hypothetical future nuclear war scenarios as well as how the other side's will operate. There is, of course, very little basis in actual experience for making accurate, reliable, or valid assumptions about these matters since none of these weapons or systems have been tested or employed in circumstances even remotely resembling the situation of any imaginable nuclear war. However, for the nuclear game to be played and for scenarios to be developed, assumptions about these matters have to be made. Once these assumptions have been made and have, by consensus been accepted within one side's strategic group, they become psychologically "real" and are treated as "hard facts" no matter how dubious their grounding in actual realities. These "psychological realities" and dubious "hard facts" are then used as a basis for further decisions in the strategic game of preparing for the eventuality of nuclear war. These decisions may entail potential expenditures of hundreds of billions of dollars for new nuclear weapons--as, for instance, on the MX missile and the B-1 bomber--which will require the strategic gamesmen on the other side to respond (also based on their "psychological realities" and "dubious "hard facts") in a way which will prevent them from "losing" the nuclear war game.
This alluring, involving, imaginative game is played in an abstracted, unreal world in which the real costs of playing the game (in terms of the extravagant damage being done to the economic systems of the superpowers and the world) and the real horrors of a nuclear war are not faced. There is a continuing need to make these costs and horrors "psychologically real" to the people and decision-makers of the superpowers as well as a continuing necessity to challenge the dubious "hard facts" underlying the "psychological realities" of the strategic gamesmen on both sides.

Let me summarize my presentation so far. I believe the United States and the Soviet Union are entrapped in a malignant social process which gives rise to a web of interactions and defensive maneuvers which, instead of improving their situations, make them both feel less secure, more vulnerable, more burdened and a threat to one another and to the world-at-large. This malignant social process is fostered and maintained by: their anachronistic competition for world leadership; the security dilemmas created for both superpowers by their competitive orientations and the lack of a strong world community; the cognitive rigidities arising from their archaic, oversimplified, black-white, mutually antagonistic ideologies; the misperceptions, unwitting commitments, self-fulfilling prophecies, and vicious escalating spirals which typically arise during the course of competitive conflict; the gamesmanship orientation to
their security dilemmas which turns their conflicts away from what in real life is being won or lost into an abstract conflict over images of power in which nuclear missiles become the pawns for enacting the game of power; and by the internal problems and conflicts within each of the superpowers that can be managed more easily because of the conflicts between the superpowers.

What can be done to reverse this malignant social process and how can we begin to reduce the dangers resulting from the military gamesmanship and security dilemmas of the superpowers? Let me turn to the latter question first.

Reducing the danger

I shall outline a number of proposals, none of which are original. They are based upon what I consider to be common sense rather than specialized knowledge of military affairs or international relations: although I have informed myself as best I could in these areas. These matters are too important to be left only to consideration by specialists.

1. "The truly revolutionary nature of nuclear weapons as instruments of war" (Keeny and Panofsky, 1982, p. 287) suggests that the U.S. and USSR should quickly come to an agreement banning the first use of nuclear weapons and should, as part of this accord, jointly agree to punitive actions to deter any other nation's first use of nuclear weapons. Such an agreement between the superpowers should be presented to the United Nations for discussion and ratification.
However, the United States and the nations in Western Europe appear to be concerned that a "no first use" agreement would place their non-nuclear military forces at a disadvantage in case the military forces of the Soviet Bloc were to attack Western Europe (although there is considerable dispute among "experts" as to whether this is the case). Thus, the "no first use" agreement should be preceded by a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Bloc and NATO (including France) and should come into effect only after five years during which time unilateral or bilateral changes in military forces could be made to bring the opposing conventional military forces into balance.

Almost all experts appear to agree that a limited nuclear war involving the superpowers is very likely to turn into an all-out nuclear war (e.g., Bundy et al., 1982). Hence, it is imperative to place strong barriers against the use of any nuclear weapons by the superpowers. But the Western powers seem reluctant to agree on "no first use" because of the "superiority" of the conventional forces of the Soviet Bloc. A five year period to right the balance of conventional forces either by increasing the strength of the Western forces, decreasing the military forces of the Soviet bloc, or both should be sufficient, especially if it is buttressed by a non-agression pact. Western Europe has more material and population resources than the Soviet bloc: there is no reason why it should be in a position of feeling that it is not able to defend itself against a conventional attack. As a matter of the highest priority, we should not continue to dilly-dally about a "no first use" agreement. Such an agreement could not only deter the use of nuclear weapons by the nations in the "second" and "third" worlds but it could pave the way for a substantial reduction in the number of nuclear weapons deployed and stockpiled by the superpowers.

2. Immediately following the signing of a "no first use" agreement representatives from NATO and the Soviet bloc should meet continuously to seek verifiable
agreements which would:

(a) Eliminate all short-range and intermediate range nuclear missiles including all missiles in Western Europe and all missiles in the Soviet Bloc that could not reach the U.S.

(b) Reduce conventional armaments in the Soviet Bloc and NATO Bloc, particularly those weapons that have little value for defense, and reduce the possibility of surprise attack.

(c) Create a demilitarized zone in Central Europe which would separate the military forces of the Soviet Bloc and NATO by a militarily significant amount of space.

3. The United States and the USSR should each unilaterally and through agreement seek to increase the stability of nuclear deterrence by removing those nuclear weapons from their arsenals that are vulnerable to a first strike, by renouncing the use of "launch on warning", and by a verifiable freeze on further deployment, research, development, and testing of nuclear weapons. Once a "freeze" has occurred, a verifiable reduction to about 300 strategic weapons on each side should take place.

4. Since the Middle East is so volatile, the United States should seek to become independent of the oil supplied from the Middle East as rapidly as possible. The development of alternative sources of energy--shale oil, coal, solar power, geothermal, and so forth--should be fostered by governmental policy. The United States should not be in the position where it would have to intervene militarily in the Middle East in order to preserve the supply of energy for itself or its allies.

A bold and courageous leadership in the United States would take a risk for peace. It would announce its determination to end the crazy arms race. It would offer to agree on a package of "no first use of nuclear weapons", a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and a substantial reduction and equalization of the opposing conventional forces in Europe.
At the same time the United States would initiate a GRIT process: GRIT stands for "graduated reciprocation in tension reduction" (Osgood, 1959, 1963) We would state our determination to end the nuclear arms race and we would announce an across-the-board unilateral reduction of, for example, 10 percent of our existing nuclear weapons and would invite the USSR and other nations to verify that so many nuclear weapons in each category were being destroyed. We would request the USSR to reciprocate in a similar fashion. I believe that we have such a superfluity of nuclear weapons that we could afford to make several rounds of unilateral cuts in our nuclear weapons, even if the Soviets did not initially reciprocate, without losing our capacity to retaliate against any nuclear attack from the Soviet Union so that the destruction of the Soviet society would still be assured. Such repeated unilateral initiations, if sincere in their intent and execution, would place the Soviet Union under the strongest pressure to reciprocate. We could replace the arms race with a peace race. 

**Undoing the malignant social process**

Although some of the dangers of living in a MAD nuclear world can be controlled by arms control and disarmament agreements, the reality that we must face is that we cannot put the genie back into the bottle: the possibility of making hydrogen bombs, nuclear missiles, and other weapons of mass destruction will continue to exist—forever. This is why we must seek to remove the malignancy from the relations between the superpowers and to develop sufficiently cooperative relations among all of the major powers to make a major war unlikely. Great Britain and France both possess hydrogen bombs and missiles and we in the United States are not unduly disturbed by this reality because our relations with these countries are sufficiently cooperative. Also, there are many more nuclear missiles in the
Western part of the United States than in its Eastern part; nevertheless, as an Easterner I am not anxious about this disparity. We are part of one nation and the weapons are not controlled by the individual states but by a government representing all the states and there appears to be little likelihood of another Civil War.

How do we undo the malignant social process in which the superpowers are enmeshed? The first step is to heighten everyone's consciousness of how crazy the process is and to make people aware not only of its very real dangers but also of its enormous economic costs. The people of the United States, of the Soviet Union, and of the rest of the world should be encouraged to recognize the craziness and to denounce it as unacceptably dangerous and costly to humanity. It is difficult to induce a therapeutic change in a pathological social or psychological process until the pathology is recognized as such and seen to be unacceptably harmful.

The second step in undoing a malignant social process is to focus on the underlying dynamics which foster and maintain the pathology. In my earlier description of the key features of a malignant social process, I sketched out in general terms the underlying dynamics of such processes. Here, I want to highlight two central dynamics in the pathological relations between the superpowers: the security dilemma, and their competitive orientations.

The security dilemma. The development of nuclear weapons has made the world a more uncertain, dangerous and anxious place and it has revolutionized the nature of war. It has outmoded the concepts of "military victory", "mili-
tary supremacy", and "nuclear superiority" as pertinent to the relations between the superpowers and it has made the anachronistic pursuit of such goals endangering to self as well as to others. The danger and the resulting anxiety push the policy-makers in the superpowers to use what has been a good defense against danger and anxiety in the past: increase their power vis-a-vis their adversary. This previously successful defense against insecurity now does the opposite: it increases insecurity. Overcoming this underlying pathological dynamic requires the recognition that the old defense is inappropriate to the new, revolutionary situation caused by nuclear weapons. As I have indicated earlier, the old notion of "national security" must be replaced by the new notion of "mutual security" if the superpowers are to break out of this malignant social process. It is difficult to give up old, well-established beliefs even when they have become dysfunctional until the new beliefs have been implemented and been seen to work.

We must begin to implement the idea of "mutual security" and give it a chance to work.

**Competitive orientation.** It is evident that the superpowers have a competitive orientation toward the conflicts between them and this makes it difficult for them to handle their security dilemma cooperatively and constructively. But must their conflicts for power and prestige be conducted as a "cut-throat" competition or can "fair rules for competition" be developed? Is it possible to develop a cooperative framework to support adherence to fair rules?
Fair Rules For Competition

Let me turn to a discussion of some fair rules. A contest is considered to be fair if the conditions and rules of the contest are such that no contestant is systematically advantaged or disadvantaged in relation to other contestants, the contestants have equal rights and opportunities, and the contestants are in the same category - i.e., they are more or less matched in characteristics relevant to the contest's outcome. Thus, it is manifestly unfair if the rules are such that the international contest permits non-Communist nations to become converted to Communism or to join an alliance with the Soviet Union but do not permit Communist nations or allies to be converted to the non-Communist side. Similarly, rules which would outlaw the establishment of a Communist nation in the Western hemisphere but not give a parallel right to the Soviet Union in its sphere of control hardly would be fair. Rules which put smaller, weaker nations-- Cuba or Hungary-- in a one-to-one contest with larger, powerful nations are not likely to lead to outcomes that are viewed as legitimate by the smaller nations.

The major international arena for rivalry between the big powers today is the underdeveloped countries of Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. The competition for these "prizes" is mixed with arms and military confrontations. The danger of continued armed sparring in such places as Cuba, South Vietnam, Angola, The Middle East, etc., is that misjudgment or despair may lead to an escalation of the armed conflict. We have lived through several close calls, it is time to rely on more than nerve and luck to avert disaster. I suggest that we take the initiative to propose fair rules for the competition of the unaligned countries. As Amitai Etzioni (1962) has pointed out, a set of rules would include such principles as the following:
1. No non-aligned country would be allowed to have military ties with other countries, particularly not with any of the major powers.

2. No foreign troops or foreign bases or foreign arms of any sort would be permitted to remain in or enter the non-aligned country. Foreign arms would be prohibited to rebels and to the governments of non-aligned countries alike.

3. A United Nations observer force consisting largely of personnel from non-aligned countries and equipped with the necessary scientific equipment and facilities (flashlights, infra-red instruments, helicopters, aerial photography, lie detectors, and the like) to check the borders, ports, airfields, roads, railroads, etc. would be deployed at the request of any of the major powers or by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Costs would be allocated so as to reduce the incentive to create repeated false alarms.

4. A United Nations research and development staff would be established to keep informed about the development of new observational techniques and equipment.

5. Violations of the arms embargo would - once they were certified as such by an appropriate U.N. Tribunal - set in motion a cease and desist order aimed at the sender of arms or troops and a disarm order aimed at the receiver. Obedience to these orders would be checked by the U.N. observer force. Lack of compliance with orders to desist and disarm would result in sanctions appropriate to the nature of the violation - e.g., a trade and communications embargo, a blockade, the sending of armed forces into the non-aligned country,
Suppose some such rules could, in fact, be established, what effects might be expected? Clearly, the revolutionary ferment in Asia, Africa, and Latin America would not disappear. Nor would it be unlikely that Communist governments would take power in some countries. These rules would not have prevented Castro from overthrowing Batista in Cuba. However, I suggest that the critical issue is not whether the local Communists or their sympathizers can achieve power in a given country without external military aid but rather whether after achieving power, they remain in power because of foreign military aid and whether they become a base for military aid to Communists in other countries.

Let us look at the issue of communism and the underdeveloped countries more directly. I suggest that a Communist government in an underdeveloped country presents no threat to us so long as it remains militarily unaligned. Such a government may be a tragedy to its people but we would be fulfilling our moral responsibility if we were to develop and enforce rules that could prevent outside military aid from foreclosing the possibility that the people will overthrow a government that is obnoxious to them. A Communist government that stays in power with the acquiescence of its people may be distasteful to us, and we may not want to aid it to stay in power, particularly if it is a terrorist government. But we can hardly claim the right to obliterate it. We do not intervene against such right wing terrorist governments as those in Haiti, Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic.

The underdeveloped countries face incredibly difficult problems. The "revolution of rising expectations" has created aspirations that can not be fulfilled in the foreseeable future without massive aid from the richer nations. Even with massive aid, it would be a long and slow process before most of the underdeveloped countries reach an economic, educational, and technological level that will put them in reach of the standards of living found in modern industrialized nations.
The Soviet Union cannot afford to give massive economic aid to many underdeveloped Communist nations. They cannot support many Cubas. Although we can afford to give much more aid than the Soviet Union and, in fact, to give much more than we do, our own capacities are not limitless. Both of our capacities could be considerably enhanced, as would the capacities of the recipients of such aid, if we could agree to keep arms and armed forces outside of the reach of the underdeveloped areas of the world. Too much of the assistance going to underdeveloped countries in the form of military aid and too much of the production of underdeveloped countries is being channeled into military expenditures.

How would the United States make out in a competition for the free "vote" of the underdeveloped countries of the world? Would we do better than the Soviet Union, better than Communist China, better than France? I do not know, but if we can do better in a free competition, perhaps we might consider the possibility that there is something wrong with us and had better revise many of our conceptions and ways of relating to other nations. We start off with many advantages. We have unsurpassed, and even unused resources to draw upon. We can turn out more food and more material goods than any other nation. We have a democratic tradition and the reputation of being the land of opportunity. The names of Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln and Roosevelt are revered almost universally.

We also start out with disadvantages. We have identified ourselves with the status quo, with governments that are unwilling to institute the economic and political reforms necessary to make them responsive to popular aspirations. Also, the populations of most of the underdeveloped countries are non-white, and unfortunately, we have not yet overcome the pervasive practices of racial discrimination and segregation in our country. We are making progress but the progress is slow:
It seems evident that unless we can achieve much more rapid and substantial progress in eliminating racism at home, these barriers will obstruct us abroad. It also seems apparent that if we are going to be effective in the underdeveloped countries our aid has to be directed toward those governments which are attempting to increase their national productivity and to improve the lot of their populations. Aid to governments that are ineffective or aid to tyrannical rulers will not help the position of the United States in the international competition for prestige and influence. Too often our aid has gone to just such countries. Wouldn't our position in Latin America be somewhat better than it is now if Trujillo's accomplices, Stroessner's henchmen, and Battista's militia had not been armed with guns supplied by us?

The proposal I have made for the military neutralization of the underdeveloped countries has many technical problems which I have ignored - e.g., the nature and composition of observer forces, the composition and functioning of the Tribunal, the kinds of sanctions which might produce effective compliance. I assume that the major technical problems center about the need to reduce the likelihood that the rules can be violated in such a way as to give any side an insuperable advantage. Without going into this issue in detail, I think it can be seen that any given violation is not likely to have catastrophic consequences for the military security of any of the superpowers. And even if an underdeveloped country is subverted or taken over as a result of a series of violations, this is hardly likely to be catastrophic. Moreover, in such a case, the violations are hardly likely to be undetected. Thus, violations become evident before they become a substantial threat to one's security.

In other words, an agreement of fair rules for competition does not require a great deal of trust. However, it does require the governments that peddle arms to other countries to give up this lucrative form of trade. Currently, this trade
amounts to about $25 - $35 billion a year of which NATO countries originate somewhere over half the export volume, the Warsaw Pact countries about 40 percent (Sivard, 1981). It is a very profitable trade. So is dope peddling. The Western bloc and the Soviet bloc should agree to end the arms peddling business: it is an even more destructive form of trade than drug peddling.

Developing a Cooperative Framework

Acceptance of fair rules for competition means an abandonment of cut-throat competition. It implies a change in the conception of one's adversary: he becomes a contestant rather than purely an enemy. The conflict changes its character. The rules which limit the forms of conflict, bind the contestants together in terms of common interests. However, the common interest in the rules is not, by itself, likely to be adequate to resist the debilitating effects of the inevitable misunderstandings and disputes which are associated with any system of rules. The bind between the contestants must be strengthened by enhancing their community or cooperative interests.

How can this be done? The key to the development of cooperation can be stated very simply. It is the provision of repeated and varied opportunities for mutually beneficial interactions. In relation to the Soviet Union, we have done some of this. But obviously not enough.

Our reluctance to trade with the Soviet Union and our unsuccessful attempts to get our allies to limit their trade with them are indicators of an underlying view which hampers the attempt to strengthen cooperative bonds: the view that anything which helps them hurts us. Clearly, it helps them if their control over their nuclear missiles is such as to prevent accidental firings. But does this harm us? Clearly, it helps them if their children have available the Sabin polio vaccine. But does this harm us?
George F. Kennan, some time ago, stated something which seems just as pertinent today (especially with the prospective change in Soviet leadership): "It is not too much to say that the entire [Communist] bloc is caught today in a great crisis of indecision over the basic question of the proper attitude of a Communist country toward non-Communist ones. The question is whether to think of the world in terms of an irreconcilable and deadly struggle between all that calls itself Communist and all that does not, a struggle bound to end in the relatively near future with the total destruction of one or both, or to recognize that the world socialist cause can be advanced by more complicated, more gradual, less dramatic and less immediate forms, not necessitating any effort to destroy all that is not Communist within our time, and even permitting, in the meanwhile reasonably extensive and profitable and durable relations with individual non-Communist countries."

None of us will fail to note that a parallel question tortures public opinion and governments in the West. There can be little doubt that our answer to the question of whether Communist and non-Communist countries can exist together peacefully will be an important influence in determining how the Communists answer it. If we continue to maintain the quixotic notion that the Communist governments of Eastern Europe, Cuba, China, and for that matter, the Soviet Union are likely to disappear in some violent internal convulsion, will we influence them to choose the less belligerent answer? Or will they be better influenced by a policy which accepts the reality of the Communist governments and adopts the view that we are willing to participate in any and all forms of mutually beneficial interactions including normal diplomatic contacts, cultural and scientific exchanges, trade, and so forth. Which policy provides a more promising prospect of a relaxation of the severity of the Communist regimes and a weakening of the barriers that sepa-
rate their people from contact with the outside world? Which policy is more likely to promote the growing individualism and diversity among the Communist nations? The answers are obvious. Yet so many seem frightened by the idea of cooperation with the Communists; the very phrase sounds subversive.

For many, appeasement and cooperation are equated. They seem to feel that the only credible stance toward someone who might have hostile intentions is a self-righteous, belligerent counter-hostility. There is, of course, an alternative stance: one of firmness and friendliness. It is possible to communicate both a firm, unwavering resolve not to allow oneself to be abused, intimidated, or defenseless and a willingness to get along peacefully and to cooperate to mutual benefit. In other words, willingness to cooperate does not imply willingness to be abused.

"Firmness" in contrast to "belligerence" is not provocative and, thus, while aborting the development of vicious spirals does not abort the development of cooperation. It is, of course, difficult to resist the temptation to respond with belligerence to the belligerent provocations of some of the Communist nations. It requires a good deal of self-confidence to feel that one does not have to demonstrate that one is "man enough" to be tough nor that one isn't "chicken". It is just this kind of firm, non-belligerent, self-confident, friendly attitude which appears to be most effective in reforming aggressive delinquents, and which, our research (Deutsch, 1973) suggests is most effective in inducing cooperation.

Can we adopt such an attitude? Our defensiveness is rather high, suggesting that we don't feel confident of ourselves. Our defensiveness comes from two sources. First, we have too high a level of aspiration. Throughout most of our history, we have been in the uniquely fortunate position of having pretty much our own way in foreign affairs. Initially, this was due to our powerful isolated position in the Americas and since World War II we have been the leading world power.
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We face a loss of status. It seems evident that we can not remain in the unique status we have become used to. We can no longer be isolated from the physical danger of a major war nor can we remain the uniquely, powerful nation. We have to adjust our aspirations to the changing realities or suffer a constant frustration. A second root of our national defensiveness is a lack of confidence in our ability to maintain ourselves as a thriving, attractive society that can cope effectively with its own internal problems. The fact is that we have not been coping well with economic growth, unemployment, civil rights, the education of our children, the rebuilding of our cities, the care of our aged.

........ I have now come full circle. Conflict is more likely to take the form of lively controversy rather than deadly quarrel when the disputants respect themselves as well as the other. The process of reforming another, of inducing an opponent to adhere to fair rules of competition, often requires self-reform. The achievement of a sincere peace will require a sincere, sustained effort by both sides.
Abstract for "Preventing World War III: A Psychological Perspective"

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In this paper, the view is presented that the United States and the Soviet Union are involved in a malignant social process which is relentlessly driving them to engage in actions and reactions that are steadily increasing the chances of nuclear holocaust—an outcome no one wants. A number of key social psychological factors which contribute to the development and perpetuation of malignant social processes are described and illustrated in terms of relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. This includes a discussion of: their anachronistic competition for world leadership; the security dilemmas created for both superpowers by their competitive orientations and the lack of a strong world community; the cognitive rigidities arising from their archaic, oversimplified, black-white, mutually antagonistic ideologies; the misperceptions, unwitting commitments, self-fulfilling prophecies, and vicious escalating spirals which typically arise during the course of competitive conflict; the gamesmanship orientation to their security dilemmas which turns their conflicts away from what in real life is being won or lost into an abstract conflict over images of power in which nuclear missiles become the pawns for enacting the game of power; and the internal problems and conflicts within each of the superpowers that can be managed more easily because of the conflicts between them. The paper concludes with an extended discussion of what could be done to reduce the immediate dangers of their arms race and what could be done to reverse their malignant social process. In respect to the latter, the paper sketches the development of "fair rules for competition" and steps that might be taken to develop a sufficiently cooperative framework to permit fair rules to work.
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