Becoming Anomolous: Thinking Curriculum at Far From Equilibrium States
Mutatis Mutandis
Science fiction has gone through a whole evolution taking it from animal, vegetable, and mineral becomings to becomings of bacteria, viruses, molecules, and things imperceptible.
As advances in scientific theory and technology have forwarded interpretations of life at increasingly complex 'plateaus' of vital self-organization, spontaneous quantum 'leaps', and non-linear growth, old models of biological development must be placed in doubt. Many of these outmoded models have constituted fictions no less 'real' as signifiers for the signified body. Similarly, while the implicate life of quantum processes and complexity theory have yet to materially emerge as depicted in such science fiction narratives as the 'X-Men,' and 'Heroes', what the mutant enables is a fiction no less 'real' in its affective relation to the bodies of its audience(s). Following Proust, it might be said that the anomalous or mutant body is 'real without being actual, ideal without being abstract' (Deleuze, 2000). That is, the affective potential of the mutant body becomes less enjoined to a particular narrative or actuality than an extra-textual or non-narrative practice of virtual experimentation with what a body can do. As Powell (2005) notes apropos Shaviro, "the aesthetic experience can induce transformations of consciousness, as the agitated body…'desires its own extremity, its own transmutation'" (p. 65). This is not to simply introduce a new signifier or model for the bodily signified, but rather, to better understand the status of the signifier as a virtual potentiality.
The anomalous is a signification of the complex non-linear and non-additive conditions in which becoming occurs. Why non-additive? As biologist Stephen Jay Gould (1988) avers, fossil records detail sudden mutations over short periods of time, significantly interrupting the model of evolution as the effect of genetic accumulation. In a Deleuzeguattarian (1987) sense, this sudden evolutionary event marks the shift from an arborescent evolutionary model as the effect of genetic additives to that of the rhizome, which extends amoeba-like, capturing and extending in multiple directions. As Deleuze and Guattari (1987) develop, the rhizome is comprised of lines in which entry and exit points are always motile and open to further non-linear outgrowths. That is, evolutionary change is not the result of lineal accumulation, but rather, the sudden intensification of life through dissipative outgrowths. Such intensification cannot be explained as a simple drive to adapt. Systems theorist Erich Jantsch (1980) cogently notes that if evolution were simply about adaptation, then life would have ceased development with the perfectly adapted and adaptable bacterium. For Jantsch, there are other drives at work in evolution including the noted intensification, positive feedback, and propensity for unique creative singularities.
What is at stake in Jantsch's theory is pertinent to the conceptualization of curriculum. That is, teaching and learning continues to be overwhelmingly organized in the image of lineal progression and adaptation to representational models. The molar organization of the curriculum, that is, its conflation with normalizing or representational models of change and growth, map the course of a pedagogical life in advance. The molar coding of curriculum along linear and sequential images of change are reproduced in curriculum design, which functions to quarter off the anomalous, to jettison the invalid, and restrain sudden leaps out of field. In this vein, the reactive image of the curriculum organizes pedagogical life according to increasingly "equilibrated, homogenous, and probable states" (Bonta and Protevi, 2004, p. 116). It is in this image that the myriad desires of students and teachers are brought under control. The multiplicitous and hybridic character of the anomalous is subsumed and totalized in the convergent views of mainstream curriculum practice, resulting in a cutting off from the field of potentialities that inhere in difference.
At the Crossroads of Distribution: The Play of Molar and Molecular Forces
In the 'X-Men' serial, the radical genetic (molecular) differences of mutants have significant effects at molar levels of government and law enforcement. As Senator Kelly (Bruce Davison) argues in favor of a mutant registration program at the opening of X-Men (2000), "How can democracy survive when a man can moves cities with his mind?". Such forces of becoming-molecular pose problems at the molar level of institutions and in particular, those institutions predicated on homogeneous and dialectical modes of function. In X-Men, X-Men 2, and X-Men: The Last Stand, such molecular deterritorializations are constantly resisted, creating an essential tension that runs throughout the series. In a sense, the entire X-Men serial extends at such a crossroads of molecular and molar distributions, in effect becoming-molecular through subterranean perturbations and interpositions. What becomes apparent is that the risk of the mutant, mutant students, teachers and teaching is that of destabilizing all types of molar, representational, and identitarian boundaries.
DeLanda (1997) documents the role that molar forces have played in homogenizing not only the human genome, but further, plant and livestock populations during the agrarian revolution. Over only a short period of time, the once genetically varied species of farmed corn "had been driven out and replaced by cloned genetic materials from only a few parental lines" (DeLanda, 1997, p. 167). Molar forces such as the selective breeding of larger cattle in Holland and superior wool producing sheep in Britain "made more precise genetic control, and the consequent (sometimes damaging) genetic homogenization possible" (p. 163). Throughout the past three decades, genetic homogenization in crop and livestock selection has reached new levels of intensity. No longer are genes being selected for their greatest heterogeneity or nutritional value, but rather, for their "adaptability to homogenous factory routines" (DeLanda, 1997, p. 177).
Many so-called rich and technologically advanced countries have become 'gene poor' through the impoverishment and nutritional depletion of genetic materials. At a cultural level, the desire for greater degrees of genetic control has resulted in the similar conceptual 'impoverishment' of evolutionary thought. The social Darwinian extension of genetic control expressed as "the survival of the fittest" connotes the idea of a "single, optimum [genetic] equilibrium" (DeLanda, 1997, p. 141). This dialectic elides the important role of co-evolution and 'survival via cooperation' as the significant research of biologists Lynn Margulis and Dorian Sagan (1986) have described. Further, such a drive toward homogeneity has significantly omitted the affective role of the mutant as an anomaly of both the binary code and the disjunctive synthesis by which biomass 'escapes' its genetic organ-ization. In this vein, the mutant body becomes a way of thinking positive desire and will in an age of cultural overdetermination and predestination. Yet, in a neoconservative atmosphere, radical difference is continually oppressed through practices of 'weeding out', in turn bringing all forms of anomaly under State control.
The notion of 'weeding' connotes the suppression of rhizomatic or molecular thinking. Webber and Reynolds (2004) write that institutional "disciplinary regimens…strike at the heart of [style], not merely…performance" (p. 205). That is, the homogenization of intellectual work in both the school and academy pertain not only to the control of their products, but the emergence of potential styles of thinking. In Deleuzian (2001) terms, style is intimate to way technique yields different ways of thinking and creation. For example, it is not that there is an a priori people or national identity that then represents it essential character through enunciation. Rather, it is through the enunciation of a cinematic, artistic, musical, philosophical, or theoretical style that a stable body or organization is constructed. Webber and Reynolds argue that education today is marked by the delimitation of enunciating forces. "The determination of what constitutes [the] legitimate curriculum…is a question of power operating to exclude and marginalize…[the] creative and imaginative struggle to think alternatively" (p. 5). As McKnight (2004) similarly accounts, the Latin curriculum vita (course of life) was narrowed in the 19th and 20th century to signify "discrete subjects and competencies to be mastered" (p. 109). In this vein, scholarly practice and potential variations in style are restricted to the orthodox question of what curriculum "IS or should BE" (p. 3).
In this definitive mode, the style of thinking that emerges is oriented to representational reactivity. Daignault (1992) writes, "the history of arts and…sciences are a struggle against the prejudices and clichés of an age, while it seems the history of education is an irreducible struggle to find the best prejudices and clichés" (p. 209). As the field of curriculum and instruction is enunciated through methodologies oriented to its ontological definition and teleological ideal, its identity and potential for thinking become transcendentally stabilized. In this reactive image of the curriculum, style is reduced to stable relations enslaved to majority thought. Yet, as Deleuze (2001) affirms, style is a local and not universal creation. This insight is significant to the field of curriculum and instruction, wherein myriad writers have challenged the canonical reading of the curriculum (Doll, 2000; Morris, Doll, & Pinar, 1999; Reynolds & Webber, 2004; Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery, & Taubman, 1995). Such a challenge is political, opening up a multiplicity of styles for thinking and practicing a curriculum. Against the orthodox demand for the molar definition of the curriculum, which in turn stabilizes its reactive image, molecular lines of becoming escape the rage for domestication, in turn revitalizing the question of what a body might do – and further, how a pedagogical life might be created.
Becoming Anomalous
As DeLanda (1997) cogently points out, not all genetic or molecular lines are subject to impoverishment. Such domesticated animals as pigs, cattle, dogs, and horses have "escaped human genetic control and [have become] feral again, multiplying exponentially" (p. 154). Each of these animal species have not only 'lost' the domesticated qualities of their molar organization, but further, 'reacquired' the "repressed traits of their ancestors" (p. 154). This significant affective quality of escape from molar conditioning and organ-ization is conferred upon the body of the mutant. Particularly with the becoming-animal of such popular characters as Wolverine, Beast, X-23, and Sabertooth, the escape from homogenization and domestication is palpable. Each creates a 'face' foreign to the fascist tendencies of State thinking. This is similarly true of such elemental characters as Storm, Ice-Man, Sunfire, and Magneto, all of whom significantly deterritorialize the binary separation of self and environment, assembling with the primordial affective forces of the planet (Gaia) through which their potentials similarly undergo exponential multiplication. Against the Deleuzeguattarian (1983) claim that what most people secretly desire is a fascism, a ready-made identitarian order of control, the mutant body escapes by breaking with binaristic thinking and a priori representation.
This movement relates to DeLanda's analysis of the significance of the 'weed' as an inadvertent side-effect of conscious environmental exploitation. As DeLanda writes, the weed was able to propagate both without and in spite of human intervention. That is, even those plant organisms that had been domesticated via selection developed 'weedy' behaviors by which they were able to increase their ability to propagate. Like the Australian domesticated pig that became razorbacks and the Argentinean cattle that became feral, peach and orange trees too broke from domesticated molds, symbiotically (re)assembling their molecular and molar relations as new lines of creative evolutionary involution. Through deterritorialization, such organisms have broken with devitalizing modes of selection and homogeneity, additionally severing the conceit of control and mastery particular to anthropocentrism.
The Mutant as an Abject-Machine
The mutant body is the mis-en-scène of metamorphoses at the end of the twentieth-century, a time when many "have serious doubts about their capacity to cope, let alone survive" (Braidotti, 2000, p. 163). In an age of antibiotic immune 'super-bugs', turbulent environmental events, and the constant threat of various airborne diseases, polluted water and foods, the mutant body is "particularly reassuring … [to an] anxiety-ridden contemporary imagination" (p. 163). The mutant body survives in conditions wherein the human body would fail and become extinct. As a fictitious and imaginative body, the mutant is capable of surviving "the previously unspeakable fact that our culture is historically condemned to the contemplation of its extinction" (p. 158). Yet, while much analysis is focused on the image of the mutant as the unfolding of a monstrous internal other and site of jettisoned abject, the X-Men pose a unique case. Though the mutations of the various X-Men have been both welcomed and reviled, what might typically be seen as abject in the form of leaky bodies, repressed infantile beliefs, and jettisoned genetic materials are productively 'absorbed' and enfleshed by the mutant body. That is, the survival of the mutant as an analogy to the survival of post-nuclear society is that of merging with wastes, with abandoned potentials for thought, and the virtual memory of Teilhard De Chardin's (1964) noosphere. It is a body committed to survival through the very 'objects' that enable the distinction of the body as a (self)-enclosed organ-ism. Yet, when such abject 'objects' are incorporated, the binary distinction of self/other is deterritorialized, and the exact boundaries of a logocentric subject can no longer be unequivocally defined. It is in such an immanent process that the mutant body becomes-other by productively assembling the very forces that overwhelm, frighten and threaten the stability of Western culture.
The mutant is thus an imaginary site in which the body undergoes its most cataclysmic morphological transformations and becomes increasingly vital, self-sustainable, and unique as a result. It is not the site of a lack under which the subject mourns or censures its jettisoned abject, but rather, a virtuality which lacks nothing in its potential to assemble with all forms of abjected materials, beliefs, and capacities in creation of the Deleuzeguattarian body without organs (BWO). In Deleuzeguattarian (1987) terms, the BWO is the organism moved out of its equilibrated stability, that is, out of the hierarchical and patterned habits imposed upon the body. As a mirror on the mutation "that we are living through in these post-nuclear/industrial /modern/human days," the monsters that lurk in the pages of the X-Men serial are a testament to the "renewal of our imaginary repertoires…to help us to think through the maze of techno-teratological culture" (Braidotti, 2000, p. 169).
"The [mutant] is a condensed image of both imagination and material reality, the two joined centers structuring any possibility of…transformation" (Haraway, 1999, p. 150). Such imaginary-real repertoires are involuted and a(mazing), yet necessary in a culture wherein the status of the modernist subject is uncertain at best. Yet, the contemporary elevated status of the mutant does not mark a solipsistic flight from the body. Rather, it is a way of thinking the body through the body, its potentials, and potential assemblages. Arguably, the most popular X-Man Wolverine is but one example of the irrepressibly embodied mutant and the affective force, speed, and duration of mutant flesh. Not only does Wolverine deterritorialize the politics of reproduction via a mutant healing factor through which he self-births a new body subsequent to egregious injury, his body is additionally the site of an unrivaled masochism that is (partially) destroyed each time his adamantium claws are deployed through the surface of his skin.1
Thinking a Mutant Ontology
Instrumental-rationalist movements in the field of curriculum theory are today urging the end of experimentation in lieu of a "call to order, a desire for unity, identity, security, popularity" (Webber and Reynolds, 2004, p. 3). Yet, discussion of what curriculum IS or should BE is to once again fall into the trap of binaristic, identitarian, and transcendent thinking. In its active expression, curriculum is neither this or that, but In Deleuzeguattarian terms, a 'stammering' and…and..and. Akin to the mutant, a curriculum's active force is a multiplicity, or series. It is not an object of definitive enunciation but an active power of connection, assemblage, and negotiation. Against the reification of truth via the continuous repetition of State practices, a curriculum's active expression stylistically opens lines of flight. In such a movement, a curriculum becomes morphological and analogous to the deterritorializing potentials of the mutant body. The conjunctive power of the mutant body disrupts identitarian thinking and the stable image of Being by traversing and assembling across heterogenic territories. Following, the privileged position of knowledge is deterritorialized. "To know is to put to death – to kill the lamb, deep in the woods, in order to eat it" (Serres, 1983, p. 28). A mutant or active curriculum disrupts the morbid emphasis on knowledge through morphology, throwing one back into thinking by interjecting the shifting character of reality. "To know is not the same as to think" (Hwu, 2004, p. 194). A curriculum "must go further…[making] encounters with relations penetrate and corrupt everything, undermine being, make it topple over" (Deleuze and Parnet,1977, p. 57).
"Now is the time to ask" Livingston (2004) writes, "if any of the curriculum theories…offer any insight into how we go about having a world…[w]hen…the anthropocentric idea that the self is the locus of identity, or that identities require original organic flesh, will not stand the test of critique from future generations" (p. 43). As much of curriculum theory continues to assert the fundamental nature of the individual, the problematic of the non-human 'dividual'2 becomes critical. In this vein, curriculum theory must begin to problematize the vaunted status of the individual, decentering the stable subject across a multitude of geographic, rather than genealogical lines. This shift marks a movement from the diachronic to the synchronic, the human to non-human conceptualization of the subject. Analogously, thinking curriculum as a wholly human enterprise is no longer sufficient in the posthuman era. Such a shift in thinking does not simply dispense with ontology, but alters ontological relations from discovery to creation, from essential to contingent characteristics, from identity to difference. The death of philosophy promulgated by ontology's failure to discover identifiable entities (structuralist identities) is for Deleuze the beginning of ontology. As May (2005) writes, "[w]e can engage in ontology, the only kind of ontology worth doing – ontology that responds to the question of how one might live – when we cease to see it as a project of identity" (p. 18). The X-Men serial is perhaps most cogently a way of thinking the complex issue of difference that pervades the contemporary imagination. The status of the "abnormal/ anomalous/ deviant" is particularly pertinent in today's post-industrial context, provoking a litany of responses and suggestions for (non)intervention.
The very notion of radical difference virally infects the borderlines of molar or identitarian thought, eliciting the type of knee-jerk reaction that would require anomalous beings to be registered, branded, and catalogued, thus absorbing their differences into the State apparatus. In X-Men 2: X-Men United (2003), a similar scene is witnessed when it is revealed that Colonel William Stryker (Brian Cox) is using mutants as slaves to destroy the mutant species through sabotage and clandestine acts of terrorism aimed at inciting a war between homo sapiens and the mutant homo superior. When a captive Professor X (Patrick Stewart) derides, "For someone who hates mutants, you certainly keep some strange company", Stryker responds, "Oh, they serve their purpose. As long as they can be controlled". This tension effectively stages the degraded status of radical difference in contemporary society. As Braidotti comments, "we need to learn to think of the anomalous, the monstrously different not as a sign of pejoration but as the unfolding of virtual possibilities that point to positive alternatives for us all [and]… to the kind of becoming which our crisis-afflicted culture badly needs" (2000, p. 172). The mutant body is but one of a 'pack' of techno-teratological potentials upon which the body might be rethought. Yet, such rethinking must be cautious, as the X-Men serial is as much a caveat on conservatism and genetic/bodily control as it might be a corollary of designer capitalism, which territorializes difference by rendering it denumerable, or rather, by according it cash value. That is, designer capitalism requires some of the very decoded flows attributed herein to the productive power of the mutant. Yet, an important distinction must be made. While designer capitalism captures and reterritorializes difference along global circuits of exchange, the anomaly dehabitualizes desire from habitual consumption. Indeed, the anomaly is a "practical matter, something we must make or do" (Rajchman, 2000, p. 6). It is in this active sense that the mutant body is created by hacking territorial boundaries, by assembling with waste, by reordering the organs, by forming a "special" body, and by creating intensive assemblages too local and unrecognizable to be globally useful or economically exchangeable.
Certainly, these aspects of the mutant cannot be overlooked. Particularly those youth for whom the molar apparatuses of branding, categorization, and judgment have become intolerable, the ability to become an utterly unique singularity is a positive phantasmagoric possibility. Further, that the mutant body is able to survive in both spite of and in concert with such oppressive external forces marks for many fans an inspirational and productive practice of free will over the foreclosure of predestination. X-Men creators Stan Lee and Jack Kirby seemed to already have an implicit understanding of the angst of their target audience when they cast the original X-Men as teenagers. Yet, social conditions have significantly changed since the 1960's, and the era of post-industrialism has attracted an older, more diversified audience to the X-Men franchise. The X-Men themselves have undergone radical revisions over the past four and a half decades, grappling with the ongoing tensions of difference in a world that fears and hates the anomalous.
Mutant Pedagogies
Many fans have identified in the pedagogy of Professor Xavier, who as a parallel to Martin Luther King Jr., preaches a sermon of equality and civil rights for the dispossessed. Yet, there is another pedagogy at work within the X-Men serial that approaches difference amorally. While Xavier's utopian dream imagines positive relations between humans and mutants, Magneto's dystopic nightmare is marked by the ruin of the human species. Seen as an evolutionary 'dead-end,' homo sapiens are despised by The Brotherhood, a group of mutants unwilling and generally unable to blend into the 'crowd'. While the mass human populace in the X-Men serial fear and hate mutant difference, the Brotherhood loathe the demand of homogeneity dictated by human society. In response, Magneto preaches a pedagogy of pure heterogeneity in which the demand of normalized appearance and organ-ization is radically, perhaps violently extinguished. However, Magneto's pedagogy of heterogeneity is not simply an appeal to the aesthetics of designer capitalism. Rather, Magneto's dystopia includes the celebration of the ugly, the anomalous, and despised. It is the acknowledgement that the monster and the monstrous constitute a superior species capable of morphologies disavowed by the a priori organization of human sense. Unlike Xavier's utopia, Magneto's pedagogy insists that if you are not capable of becoming-mutant, you have already reached an evolutionary 'limit point'. Perhaps this pedagogy is most significant in our contemporary post-industrial, techno-teratological context in that it insists that today, we must all become mutants. As Braidotti (2006) questions, "[w]hat if these unprogrammed-for others [are] forms of subjectivity that have simply shrugged off the shadow of binary logic and negativity and have moved on?" (p. 205). Such becoming-mutant is not simply a linear case of evolutionary adaptation, but rather, the constitution of a radically creative condition for relating to and imagining a body in the between of binary codes – a body no less 'real' because it is virtual.
Notes:
1 In a reversal of reproductive heteronormativity, Uncanny X-Men Annual #11 illustrates the self-organization of Wolverine's body from only from only a single cell.2 In Deleuzeguattarian terms, the dividual is a multiplicitous collectivity irreducable to either an a priori representational model or transcendent meta-subject
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