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Editorial Introduction

Re-reading the Anamorphosis of Educational Fragility, Vulnerability, and Strength in Small States

Special Guest Editor

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The Raison d’être of Small States Research

Not so long ago, across many disciplines, the study of small states was seen as a futile project since “small states have been rendered synonymous to chronically vulnerable and problematic territories for which aid, assistance and especially favourable deals are legitimate” (Baldacchino, 2012, p. 237). Yet within the past eighteen months we have seen a popular resurgence of educational research on small states in comparative and international education (CIE) with at least two publications in 2011 (Education in Small States: Policies and Priorities by Michael Crossley, Mark Bray and Steve Packer, and Tertiary Education in Small States: Planning in the Context of Globalization edited by Michaela Martin and Mark Bray) and one in 2010 (Education in Small States: Global Imperatives, Regional Initiatives and Local Dilemmas edited by Peter Mayo). Before this wave of contemporary comparative analysis, the last comprehensive analysis in CIE of educational developments in small states appeared in the Special Issue in Comparative Education in 2008, Comparative and International Perspectives on Education in Small States guest edited by Peter Mayo.

This Special Issue of Current Issues in Comparative Education shows the raison d’être of small states research is more pertinent now than ever, and challenges doubts over whether small state studies is still noteworthy as a category of analysis (see Goetschel, 1998; Baehr, 1974; Christmas-Moller, 1983). The numerous submissions for this Special Issue corroborate the expanded interest in the topic, which beseeches the question: What is now ‘novel’ about small states that has drawn new attention from researchers? Perhaps an answer to this question rests in the economics of small states. Another – although not unrelated – answer could be the movement of small states from government to governance, driven by globalization and technology which call for innovation and inventiveness to partake in the knowledge economy. Indeed, globalization has changed the way small states are regulated since it creates both homogenization and new localisms as nation states are confined to particular spaces, topographies, and ecologies. Therefore, in a post-‘global financial crises’ era, this issue offers re-readings of the policies, performances, and practices of small states, and continues the resurgent discourse about what we can learn from them.

For some time now, small states research has been on an ‘empirical cliff,’ where there is emergent curiosity about why these states are successful, but diminishing empirical research about what constitutes success. Historically, the overall narrative on education in small states focused on analyzing individual states and searching for comparative patterns. Several prior studies have tried to address the educational challenges in small states, falling into two categories: single country studies or geo-strategic/geo-hemispherical studies (such as the Commonwealth, countries, the Caribbean Community [CARICOM], and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]). Within this issue, we have found new conceptualizations of small states that move away from “methodological nationalism” (Robertson & Dale, 2008) and provide unique
comparative perspectives on the strengths, vulnerabilities, and fragility that have come to define small states. The authors use existent literature on small political jurisdiction (see Baldacchino, 2012; Mayo, 2010) to reassess how distinctive small jurisdictions, such as the favelas in Brazil, which exist within a large urban metropolis, also face and respond to the same encounters that small states do (see in this issue Straubhaar). This new form of social learning forms a jurisdictions perspective that helps us to draw lessons from small states and apply them to big problems.

From a public administration viewpoint, small states are seen as having the four defining behavioral characteristics of ‘smallness’: “exaggerated personalism, limited resources, inadequate service delivery and donor dependence” (Sutton, 2006, p. 13). Further, Baldacchino (2012) argues that a “deficit discourse” exists around small states that are premised upon their inability to develop certain institutions and power. Despite this, size does matter when it comes to getting things done, as small states present advantages such as strategic flexibility (Baldacchino & Bertram, 2009) and economies which can outperform larger ones (Armstrong, de Kervenoael, Li, & Read, 1998). Thus, we should move towards seeing smallness as complimentary and not an exculpation for economic development. On the one hand, small states define themselves as such only when it is advantageous to them and on the other hand international, multilateral, transnational, supranational, trans-regional regimes entities, and institutions identify with this concept of smallness only when such organizations wish to offer advice and expertise as active specialists. However, recipient states and regional regimes gladly accept being labeled small, fragile, and vulnerable to bring donor funding to obscure and obfuscated projects while showing linkages and legitimacy with international mandates and targets. Moreover, in some instances we are now seeing greater collaboration between small states across different sectors give rise to a form of “new mutualism” defined by (i) creating a multi-sectoral approach, (ii) setting international targets, and (iii) establishing regional benchmarks (Jules, 2012). After all, as various articles in this issue (see in this issue the articles by Baldacchino; Crossley & Sprague) point out smallness has numerous advantages and gives rise to self-autonomous regions within larger states, redefining what it means to be a large state or a jurisdiction in a large state.

In numerous small states, education has become a target of the reform agenda as part of broader new public management (NPM) and neoliberal restructuring. Given the pervasiveness of educational reforms premised upon NPM in small states, we could come to the conclusion that the “global speak” (Steiner-Khamsi & Stolpe, 2006) influences national discourses and thus many small states are starting to align national aspirations with global and regional thinking (Jules, 2008). Yet it remains important to see who continues to challenge and propel simpler conceptions of smallness. In what follows, first I revisit the definitional tenets of what constitutes a small state (those who self-identify as such as well as those in which the arbitrary definition of smallness has been ascribed by the Commonwealth Secretariat and World Bank as well as the United Nations Small Island Developing States [SIDS] project). Next, I argue that being seen as small in today’s interconnected society is a survival characteristic within a post-bureaucratic society of vanishing scale, size, and space. Finally, I show how various chapters in this special edition make up the new mosaic of the raison d’être of small state research.

From an A Priori Definition to a Posteriori Conceptualization

Early scholars battled with defining the characteristics of small states, categorizing them as either having a positive or negative impact upon state centric relations. An a priori definition of small states materialized in the 1960s with the creation of numerous states in the post-colonial era. While there is no widely accepted unified definition of small states (Baldacchino, 2012; Cowards, 2002), its vocabulary often focuses on population size, ecology, vulnerability to external shocks,
limited human and natural resources, nature of their economies, cost per capita of services, and dependence on trade. Early definitions of small states also distinguished small societies from small territories and called attention to the fact that small societies may exist in large states (Benedict, 1967). Attention was given also to the political and economic systems of small states; however, scholars soon realized that smallness is relative (Martin & Bray, 2011). Regardless, over time numerous characteristics merged into a core definition meant to encompass the perceived challenges facing small states through “economics of size” (Demas, 1965) and to describe state vulnerability and fragility (Briguglio, 1995; Bune, 1987; Holmes, 1976). Thus, interchangeable concepts of “small states,” “micro-states,” “small open economies” and “small islands developing states” (Armstrong et al., 1998; Commonwealth Advisory Group, 1997; Commonwealth Consultative Group, 1985; Commonwealth Secretariat & World Bank Task Force, 2000; Read, 2004) entered the academic lexicon.

In this small state literature a number of themes emerge. First, the definition about what constitutes a small state references population size. Kuznets (1960) sets an upper population limit of 10 million for small states; by this gauge, today 134 countries could be considered small. The core definition now sets upper size limits for small states between 1.5 million to 5 million (Armstrong et al., 1998; Bacchus, 2008; Commonwealth Secretariat, 2009; World Bank, 2012). However by these measurements a few large countries (e.g., Botswana, Jamaica, Lesotho, Namibia, Papua New Guinea, and The Gambia) with population sizes above 1.5 million are also categorized as small since they share several of the same characteristics of smallness – including small GDPs (Bernal, 1998; Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank Task Force, 2000; see in this issue Crossley & Sprague). Once population size constraints had been taken into account, attention was turned to understanding what makes smallness unique. The joint Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank Task Force (2000) notes that small states share and are shaped by numerous characteristics that impede their development including: vulnerability to external events; natural disasters that create havoc on national incomes; limited capacity in the public and private sectors; and the uncertain and difficult economic transition to a changing world trade regime. Further, the report includes specific challenges of remoteness and isolation; openness; susceptibility to natural disasters and environmental change; limited diversification; poverty and limited capacity; and access to external capital.

From this perspective, extensive studies have examined specific characteristics that impede the development of small states by focusing on South-South migration (Bartlett, 2012), the politics of education in small states (Grant, 1993), the effect of indigenous knowledge and values upon the policy process (Holmes & Crossley, 2004), research capacity (Crossley, 2008), financial and human capital limitations (Jules, 1994), impact of donor aid on local decisions (Jules, 2006; Jules, 2010), adult education (Jules, 2006), higher education financing (Baldacchino & Farrugia, 2002; Nkumah-Young, Huisman, & Powell 2008), cooperation and collaboration (Jules, 2008; Jules 2012), post-socialist transformation (Jules, forthcoming; Jules, 2011), and the small scale syndrome (Baldacchino, 1997).

As these research foci show, a posteriori conceptualization should now focus on what it means to empirically study small states rather than what it means to be identified as a small state. This perspective involves looking at the small within the large and thus retuning to Benedict’s (1967) sociological characteristics of small states. This implies inquiring into the segmentation that exists within larger states that may embody the necessary elements of smallness and thus qualify for small states research. Finally, we are no longer restricted by geographic jurisdiction; emphasis has now moved to political jurisdiction instead (see Mayo, 2010; Baldacchino, 2012).
Moving Towards Small State Anamorphosis: A Paradigmatic Shift in Perspective

Anamorphosis suggests that the spectator needs to use a specific vantage point while observing a distorted projection of an image to perceive its true shape. If we apply the concept of anamorphosis to the raison d’être of small state research, not only do we see the research within the research (i.e. the empirical study of smallness), but we might view small state research as a gateway to understanding the challenges that larger states face. We would like to argue that this Special Issue represents an anamorphic perspective of re-reading the raison d’être of small state research. This perspective illuminates that small states are increasingly relying on networks (regional and sub-regional), which in turn allow them to constrain their efforts on the best possible solutions to policy challenges. No longer is isolationism premised upon ‘old regionalism’ or ‘closed regionalism’ seen as a creditable policy response, instead we are seeing the rise of ‘new regionalism’ or ‘open regionalism’ centered on open membership, regional and global trade liberalization, trade facilitation, and the inclusion of regional level into the global market (Bergsten 1997; Girvan 2001; Kuwayama 1999). Conceptually, several authors here point out, there is now a movement from incremental change towards fundamental change, including measures that act boldly on competition and innovation since everyone wants to be seen as being modern. Methodologically, we authors adhere to the call by Robertson and Dale (2008) to move away from methodological nationalism and begin to see that education is not primarily associated with the working of the nation-states, but is often formed through several collaborative governance structures (Dale, 2003; Dale & Robertson, 2002; Jules, 2012).

In this edition, Godfrey Baldacchino and Michael Crossley and Terra Sprague were invited to pinpoint the key conceptual issues that small states face. In arguing that academia has paid little attention to small states, Baldacchino reviews the cynicism of the analytical category of smallness by looking at its behavioral issues. In problematizing size and scale, he notes that while there is no agreed definition of the ecology of small states, current trends suggest evidence of a “small scale syndrome” based on a “package of behavioural issues” (p. 14). The main point of this article is that in defining small states, we get wedged at the conceptual phases and do not move beyond them. Michael Crossley and Terra Sprague draw on their recent research for the Commonwealth Secretariat to discuss the implication of the post-2015 international targets upon small states. In reviewing the existent literature to date on small states, they note that in a post-2015 era, small states would benefit tremendously from collaboration and use of the banner of smallness to access “nuanced and contextually sensitive attention” (p. 29). They remind us that larger states can learn much from smaller states, particularly in an era defined by the uncritical tendencies of international educational policy and practices transfer.

The second part of this Special Issue pays attention to issues of fragility, and focuses on to the ways in which we have sought to conceptualize it. Rolf Straubhaar combines the literatures on fragility – a state-centric concept – (Mosselson, Wheaton, & Frisoli, 2009), small states and small jurisdictions to argue that a de facto jurisdiction such as the favelas in Brazil should be categorized as fragile small states. He cautions that although localized setting such as favelas, with their own semi-autonomous jurisdictions, lack institutional capacity and are not defined as fragile small states in the traditional sense, we should nevertheless combine the literatures of fragility and small states to reconceptualize the ways in which we study and comprehend smallness and favela life. Pigga Keskitalo, Satu Uusiautti and Kaarina Määttä, in looking at Sámi education and language, call attention to new distinctive features of small assemblages by showing how such a label can bring about educational transformation. In discussing assimilative language educational policies, they argue that national educational characteristics should acknowledge historical-cultural burdens and draw upon indigenous conceptualization of time, place, and knowledge. They further note
that given the small nature of the Sámi community, a distinctive Sámi pedagogy within such a small community would transform as well as improve inclusive education.

The third part pays attention to vulnerability, and focuses on the ways international agencies use it to their advantage during policy negotiations. Jerome De Lisle notes that donor relationships differ in situations and contexts based on the “strength of the recipient country’s economy” (p. 64). In reviewing educational change in Trinidad and Tobago (TT) De Lisle explores its vulnerability, smallness, and islandness by looking at externally funded secondary school reform projects to identify “facilitators and barriers” (p. 65) to change. De Lisle compares the impact of large-scale international assessments, such as IEA in 1991 and PISA in 2009, which occurred before and after the 1999 secondary reform, and concludes that after the reform was implemented, TT scores on international assessments had no significant changes. In contextualizing “barriers to change” and why system reforms fail, De Lisle identifies three factors: ambiguity, failure to connect, and resource constraints. He also identifies four drivers of changes: leadership, planning and support, involvement and commitment and collaboration and communication. Using the population benchmark of 10 million defined by Kuznets (1960), D. Brent Edwards Jr. makes the case that El Salvador is vulnerable and should be defined as small state. He reviews the role international agencies such as USAID have had in education reform, and highlights how institutional power manifests itself during the formal and informal policymaking stages as well as within the final national policy. His main point is that El Salvador can be observed as a small state since it lacks institutional capacity, which is a key characteristic of some small states.

The fourth part of this Special Issue provides a comparative perspective on education in various small states. Justin J.W. Powell looks at the extent to which higher education institutions reflect global norms as they seek to become global players, comparing higher education in the wealthy small countries of Luxembourg and Qatar. In looking at the role of national universities in building scientific capacity, Powell focuses on the influence of global league tables in a climate where numerous challenges exist in developing and strengthening world-class universities. Powell concludes by noting that in these hyper-diverse societies, universities “[emulate] global goals simultaneously with serving local needs” (p. 101) since they seek to become internationally competitive institutions focused on national skill formation. Richard O. Welsh compares the SIDS of Jamaica and Singapore beginning in the 1960s. He shares how Jamaica’s GDP was more than Singapore’s in that era, and by 2010 Singapore’s GDP was nearly seven times more than Jamaica. In seeking to understand this divergence in economic development and its link to quality education, Welsh posits that Singapore utilized a “positioning” educational strategy while Jamaica had an “adapting” strategy. He shows that the development trajectories of these states differed based on their role within the former British colonial setting as well as their connections with multilateral organizations. Valentyna Kushnarenko and Ludmila Cojocari use the post-socialist small state of Moldova to chronicle the internationalization of higher education reforms in state universities as demand for education access increased. In drawing upon interviews with university administrators and focusing on how “international collaborative networks” function (p. 134) the authors argue that the internationalization of higher education is seen by administrators as necessary to seek internationalized foreign partnership. Further, national collaboration helps shape the “Go Global” policy that promotes “greater respect for pluralism and multiculturalism” (p. 138) in higher education.

The final section presents several case studies that look cultural influences on educational developments in small states. Matthew J. Schuelka reviews inclusive education in the isolated small state of Bhutan as it shifted its educational policy from an elite monastic tradition to a secular
system. In reviewing the educational changes in Bhutan during the last fifty years, Schuelka explores the underlying assumptions between the characterization of Bhutan as a small state and its educational development to include the “policy problems” of access, cost and quality and set to the tone of “international audiences” (Steiner-Khamsi & Stope, 2006; Jules, 2008). Finally, Lindsay J. Burton looks at how the colonial history of the Solomon Islands, particularly among the Kahua people, continues to shape perspective of a community-based early childhood education program. This collaborative ethnography highlights the continued challenges facing small state and local efforts to deal with these challenges. From a local perspective, Burton examines the influences of international policy discourse upon the small jurisdictions (local level) and notes that local programs are based on “indigenous efforts...to counter the continuation of colonization” (p. 158).

In sum, we hope that the insights provided in this Special Issues will continue to inform both theory and practice as well as convey ways for policymakers, governments, and international agencies to re-conceptualize policymaking as they seek to undertake further waves of global reform. In education, reform is engendered through different ways and legitimated by institutions; we suggest that the researchers, students, practitioners and policymakers may want to move towards a global anamorphosis and identify the best vantage point to see the potential benefits of these reforms and their palpability. The *raison d’être* of small state research is one such anamorphic lens that may offer exemplar experiences to those in search of them.

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Editorial Introduction


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Editorial Introduction


Invited Article

Meeting the Tests of Time: Small States in the 21st Century

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The analytic category of ‘small states’ remains problematic in the 21st century. Its legitimacy as a rigorous conceptual category continues to be debated; even as small states assume a strident visibility on the world stage because of climate change negotiations. This paper reviews the scepticism that hovers around the small state concept, and invites a largely social constructivist discussion that looks at a syndrome of behavioural issues which are more likely to occur with decreasing polity size. Education remains a key policy battleground for small states, as the latter balance human resource needs with the trans-territorial aspirations of their brightest and ablest (and often wealthiest). In spite of spectacular advances in information and communication technologies, the personality of the small state has not essentially changed; and this remains characterised by rootedness and mobility.

Introduction: Does Size Really Matter Anyway?

Ask civil or mechanical engineers about whether size is a significant variable in their work. Most are likely to agree: large animals are not merely scaled up versions of smaller ones; large and heavy land-based mammals, for instance, need to distribute their considerable weight on four legs, rather than just two. There is also a whole sub-field of technical inquiry that explores the possibilities proffered by very small size: nanotechnology.

Ask biologists whether size and scale have a bearing on environmental survivability. Most are likely to agree: smaller fauna have a larger surface area with respect to their body mass, and so their bodies lose heat much quicker; this makes them more susceptible to hypothermia.

Ask physicians whether there are any special concerns with the diagnosis and treatment of small patients. For most, this is a no-brainer. Why else would there be a long-standing specialization in paediatrics?

When it comes to matters social, economic or political, however, the self-evident nature of the case disappears. There is no general agreement that small states (however defined) have any particular ‘ecology’ of their own (e.g. Commonwealth Secretariat, 1985, p. 6); even though, as is argued further below, there is considerable evidence that a ‘small scale syndrome’ does exist.

Purpose

This paper is deliberately polemic; it reviews the scepticism and fuzziness that hovers around the small state concept, but also invites a social constructivist discussion that looks at a package of behavioural issues which are more likely to occur with decreasing polity size. In this context, and in spite of the recent revolutionary changes in information and communication technologies, education remains a key policy battleground for small states, as the latter seek to balance local human resource needs with the trans-territorial aspirations of their brightest and ablest (and often wealthiest) citizens.

It is only an enlightened few who – occasionally in the course of their work – single out small states as a ‘special case’ for and worth studying. Even those who would profess a serious interest in, and
belief in the validity of, that category, must do so while competing with so many other claims to their time, resources and energies. “Academia has paid little attention to small states” (The Round Table, 2012, p. 202). This widespread reticence and incredulity is the result of a confluence of various factors, and a review of the literature suggests that the following four explanations stand out:

First, small states are above all _states_, and this is how they wish to see and project themselves. They have nothing less, or more, than other states in terms of the notional equity imparted by the community of nations. Small states (but see the second explanation, below) may be the least likely candidates for welcoming such a typology. There is some resentment, if not revulsion, of the appellation because it smacks of neo-colonialism: here is yet one other way in which the hegemonic powers of the day continue to drum up pseudo-scientific arguments justifying their role as guides, mentors, consultants, advisors, and in whichever other guise to continue to engrain their ‘natural’ superiority. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is reported to have quipped thus about the inhabitants of the Marshall Islands: “There are only 90,000 people out there. Who gives a damn?” (Vine, 2009, p. 183). In sharp contrast, small states that see themselves as successful present themselves as having done so by virtue of the nimbleness, social corporatism, canny opportunism and policy flexibility that their size provides and permits (Katzenstein, 1985). And indeed, today, the freest, wealthiest and happiest residents in the world are, as a rule, small state citizens (Hannan, 2007).

Second, and in sharp contrast to the first explanation above, some small states – particularly the 38 grouped under the United Nations SIDS (small island developing states) umbrella – have tended to brandish their smallness as a bargaining chip, arguing that their size renders them especially vulnerable (to financial, trade, economic and environmental shocks, above all else), in spite of sometimes quite impressive quality of life indicators, and as a result they claim that they are deservedly in need of international assistance and/or special arrangements (Charles, Jacovides, & Mata’afa, 1997; UN, 2012). For scholars searching for plausible definitions, what characterizes a small state is “a shortage or lack of certain ‘normal’ attributes of state power, autonomy and international standing” (Bailes, 2010, p. 2). What is of particular interest, we are told, is “how the small nation state [sic] can develop and manage...services and opportunities,” given that it is “severely constrained” to do so (Packer, 1991, pp. 517-9). This persistent “deficit discourse” (Baldacchino, 2012) is probably the best known representation of states as small in vogue on the international stage, taken up since the early 1980s by such international organizations as the Commonwealth and the United Nations Development Program (e.g. Commonwealth Secretariat, 2012a; UNDP, 2012), and also by the SIDS themselves: “[t]here are many disadvantages that derive from small size” (SIDS, 2012). International and regional agencies, banks, critics, politicians and other observers may have noted and acknowledged these arguments; however, they have not generally endorsed or tagged along with this line of reasoning. Is being a small state really such a handicap? Indeed, some scholars claim the very antithesis of these assertions of vulnerability: small states are only facing “small problems” (Easterly & Kraay, 2000); their smallness allows for a strategic flexibility that is often not acknowledged (Baldacchino & Bertram, 2009); their economies often perform better than those of larger states (Armstrong et al., 1998, p. 644).

Third, 20th century social science scholarship has mostly shied away from considerations of scale in relation to statehood. Development economics and political science have presented tried and tested theories of economic growth, democracy, administration and good governance that were expected to be copied and adopted by many decolonizing jurisdictions, irrespective of culture, history or size (e.g. Huntington, 1968; Porter, 1990). If these templates did not work, or did not
work as expected, it was those trying to adopt the models, who were invariably to blame; the plausibility of the model itself was not questioned. There were various attempts to oblige the smallest colonies – particularly in relation to the post-1945 dismantling of the British Empire – to gain independence only as part of something larger than themselves: the West Indies Federation; Malaysia-Singapore; Gilbert and Ellice Islands; St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla...but nationalism made short shrift of most of these. Nowadays, it is the regionalization initiatives of independent states that somehow seek to achieve economies of scale and unity of voice and purpose while maintaining the autonomy, privileges and powers associated with being small polities. The best – and quite successful – example of this is probably the nine-member Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS, 2012).

Fourth and lastly, most mainstream geography and social science generally have rushed to embrace the appeals of post-structuralism in the context of a digitized, borderless world (Ohmae, 1990): “the digital planet will look and feel like the head of a pin” (Negroponte, 1995, p. 6). Everything and everyone is now connected, engaged in a global village, where places and spaces are at best social constructions, at worst mere illusions carried over from a now defunct pre-IT age. The hubris of post-modernity makes any reference to size, scale and even location appear spurious, irrational and passé. Deleuze (2004) argues that space “is imaginary and not actual; mythological and not geographical” (p. 12); the same dismissal would apply to size.

This means that, as long as we feel obliged to define our subject, we will remain stuck at the conceptualization phase; endlessly contesting whether there is, first of all, such a thing as a small state; and, if there is, how do we recognize it.

Moreover, it is not only when one observes small state dynamics – whatever they are – in play, but also when one expects them to pan out, and behaves accordingly, that the small scale syndrome also operates. If people operate in accordance to perceptions, their consequences will be real, irrespective of whether those perceptions were crafted out of impressions, myths or assessments of praxis (Thomas, 1966). Moreover, purposive individuals, community groups, corporations, and governments behave in terms of the institutional constraints and horizons of possibility within which they operate (Brinton & Nee, 2002). From such social constructivist and neo-institutionalist lenses, a small state is a state that either believes it is small, and/or else is seen to be one, and is expected to behave accordingly; also because of its historical unfolding and resource availability. “[Q]uite convincingly, it can be argued that a state is ‘small’ when it feels and acts small – implying that it could become smaller or less small at different points in its history” (Bailes, 2010, p. 2). Some interesting international relations episodes – such as the ‘cod wars’ between Britain and Iceland – have occurred when actions have flown dramatically in the face of such expectations (Baldacchino, 2009; Ingimundarson, 2003).

The paradox is that, while a general refusal to acknowledge any idiosyncrasies associated with smallness (as explained above) persists – there is still “no widely accepted definition of a small state” (Crowards, 2002, p. 143) – most of the world’s states tend towards the small. After all, out of 267 jurisdictions (of which 195 countries and 72 subnational territories) listed in the US Central Intelligence Agency’s latest edition of the World Factbook (CIA, 2012), only 23 have populations of over 50 million; and 160 have populations of less than 10 million (of which 43 have a population of not more than 100,000). Lay out jurisdictions in order by population size, from the People’s Republic of China to Pitcairn, and the median spot would be taken by Kyrgyzstan, with a population of just 5.5 million. Alternatively, lay out jurisdictions in order by land area, from Russia to the Vatican City, and the median country size turns out to be occupied by Latvia, with
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64,000 square kilometers. Clearly, the so-called small state is the typical state size (as it has also been for most of recorded history). In contrast, the large state is the quirk and the anomaly: notice how hard it can be for large states to control diverse nations and other nationalist aspirations within their borders: think China and Tibet; India and Telengana; Indonesia and Aceh; Irian Jaya and Timor; Russia and Chechnya; Canada and Quebec; and Sudan and South Sudan. Perhaps we should establish ‘large states’ as a field of inquiry and ask ourselves: is a large state a state of the wrong size (e.g. Lewis, 1991)? And, meanwhile, why is normalcy too hard to bear and acknowledge?

Moreover, and as already observed (Baehr, 1975, p. 466) and in spite of some quantitative attempts (Crowards, 2002), there is, and can be, no sharp dichotomy between ‘small’ and ‘large’ states. The choice of boundary is arbitrary, subjective and purely instrumental. The Commonwealth has defined small states as “countries with a population of 1.5 million or less”; but the larger member countries of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Trinidad & Tobago, Jamaica and even Papua New Guinea (with over 5 million population) are included “because they share many of the same characteristics of small states” (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2012b). So much for a rigorous upper limit (Hindmarsh, 1996). Nevertheless, this grouping is even less discretionary than the UN’s listing of SIDS, which includes members that are not small (Cuba), are not islands (Belize, Guinea-Bissau, and Guyana) and are not developing (Singapore). This leads one to think that the listing is perhaps one of convenience, driven by political opportunism. Meanwhile, within the 27-member European Union (EU) bloc, all members states except the ‘big six’ – France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland and the United Kingdom – are considered small (Panke, 2010; Thorallsson, 2000); the largest of what are notionally ‘small states’ within the EU would be the Netherlands, with a population of almost 17 million. It is worth considering whether the reference to “smaller states” is preferable to “small” in most (though not necessarily all) instances, resurrecting a formerly preferred usage (Benedict, 1966; 1967; Berreman, 1978; reviewed in Baldacchino, 2011a).

A Small Scale Syndrome
This is not to throw the proverbial baby out with the bathwater. At decreasing levels of size, certain parameters are likely to become more important, more prevalent, more difficult to ignore or resist. Smallness – often accompanied by the geographical delineations and remoteness afforded by islandness – is perhaps best seen as a dynamic interplay of three variables: monopoly (meaning that the natural number of most ‘things’ tends towards just one: one hospital, one university, one college, one area specialist, one internet service provider, one ferry service provider – impacting on the workings of the ‘free market’); totality (meaning that the state and its manifestations are ubiquitous and omnipresent, much like the workings of a total institution); and intimacy (meaning that the threshold of privacy is low, familiarity is excessive, information is power, who you are and who you know is important, and where role multiplicity and overlap are rife and unavoidable) (Puniani Austin, 2002). The signature of a small state is probably best rendered in the excessive personalization of decision making; the poverty of civil society; the power of information about, on and by people; the sheer impossibility of avoiding role conflict. Should one not particularly enjoy operating within this “small scale syndrome” (Baldacchino, 1997), there is really only one realistic option: pack up and leave.

Of course, we are aware of the real dangers of essentializing our subject matter. After all, such leitmotifs do not develop exclusively in a small state milieu: similar goings on may prevail in tight ethnic communities, total institutions, urban ghettos or other social enclaves. And yet, other things being equal, such and similar dynamics are perhaps more likely to occur in small state settings.
Today: Mobility and Immobility

A closer look at the presumed smallness of states, however, allows us to engage somewhat more critically with the subject at hand. Given the vantage point of the present, we can afford ourselves a critique of small state size, in a context of an era of inexorable space-time compression (Janelle, 1969, p. 359; Harvey, 1990), a creeping globalization of consumer tastes, a rapid dispersion of information and communication technologies: the world is now flat (Friedman, 2005). The “end” or “death of geography” concept is beguilingly simple and has become a fashionable narrative in many academic, business and marketing circles (e.g. Ohmae, 1990). Yet, perhaps this very drive towards sameness and fluidity is fuelling a slate of: place branding initiatives; bordering and security concerns; a renaissance in interest in local cultures and languages; and area studies (including border studies and island studies) in academe (e.g. Sidaway, 2012).

This is a contradictory time that we are living in: of interconnectivity and porosity, as much as of (state-led) excision and regulation. A poignant example of these dilemmas is presented by the predicament of the state of Kiribati, with 100,000 people perched on less than 900 square kilometers of fragmented land area, clearly a small state; but responsible for an immense swath of Pacific Ocean as its exclusive economic zone. This is an atoll archipelago with a significant number of its citizens working as ship crews on foreign flagged vessels, or else studying or working in places like Auckland, New Zealand and Sydney, Australia. This is a country threatened, certainly by no fault of its own, by global warming (which trumps borders) and concomitant sea level rise: its highest natural point above sea level is less than 3 metres. No amount of broadband, satellite phone access or internet connection speeds can change this. A country that may have to evacuate its total resident population, but is as yet unable to secure an alternative site over which to transfer its sovereign status, should matters come to a head (Byravan & Rajan, 2010). Mobility and immobility. Kiribati may be an extreme case; but various observers writing from/about small (and island) jurisdictions – think Joël Bonnemaison (1994), James Clifford (1997) and Karen Fog Olwig (1993) – have been keen to emphasize the rich yet messy co-presence of the values of roots/trees and routes/boats, of openness and closure (Villamil, 1977).

The exit option aligned to the small scale syndrome is a powerful reminder of how small states may appear small from a statist or juridical perspective; but can otherwise loom pretty large. Polynesian Epeli Hau‘ofa made such a point in a seminal essay: Western powers may have carved up his Oceania into small polities – Samoa, Tonga, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Niue – but the ocean, and their common ancestry, history and languages, unite them as one. Not only that, but the Polynesian reach has now extended to other settlements, especially in Canada, the USA, Australia and New Zealand (Hau‘ofa, 1993). Indeed, we have known for some time that, the smaller the state, the more likely is it that a considerable part of its population is either outside the country at any point in time, or even permanently resident elsewhere (Lowenthal, 1987, pp. 41-43; Ward, 1967, p. 95). We need to acknowledge “transnational corporations of kin” (Bertram & Watters, 1985), households and networks of relatives that straddle political borders, successively or simultaneously, maximizing revenue or career opportunities, and minimizing taxes, by a deliberate resort to “jurisdictional shopping,” made possible by protocols that permit brain/brawn circulation or rotation (Baldacchino, 2006), such as the acceptance of dual citizenship, now in place in almost 100 countries. Economically, the smaller the state, the more likely is it that it survives by virtue of its connectivities with other states (and their wealth); in fact, many small states do even better than their larger neighbours given the open nature of their economy and the sheer necessity of ex/importing or perishing (Armstrong & Read, 2002), providing a contrasting evaluation of what others have decried as “vulnerability” (Briguglio, 1995). Thus, even a mini-jurisdiction like Pitcairn – with a total current resident population of about 50 – can
survive, mainly thanks to its successful claims and overtures to British taxpayers, American stamp collectors and Filipino sailors: “the only cash economy of Pitcairn is the sale of stamps and the sale of handicrafts to passing ships” (Ridgell, 1995, p. 149). In the act of government, all states contemplate bold extra-territorial adventures, but particularly so for increasingly smaller states and territories. In an age where the principles of the Treaties of Westphalia (1648) that ushered in the modern state are increasingly challenged – think supranational integration, economic trade blocs, customs unions, bilateral trade agreements – the notion of a small state sounds increasingly like an oxymoron. Why indeed (and echoing Foucault, 1991) should one restrict any analysis to the territory over which a state exercises authority, when that same territory (and its residents) is also subject to competing laws and incentives forthcoming from elsewhere that still impact on the actions of the locals?

Education, Mobility and Policy Dilemmas

Education, especially higher education, helps to fuel these trans-territorial connectivities and lifelines of survival, providing portable, transnational skill-sets; and therein lies a key dilemma. In spite of significant attempts to indigenize educational provision the world over, education remains – amongst many other things – a vehicle for outmigration, especially for the smallest states which are most needy of talent. No wonder that significant resources have long been, and continue to be, directed at the provision and management of education in small states: capacity building programs, training workshops, and unpacking the dilemmas of multi-functional administrators (Bacchus & Brock, 1987; Farrugia & Attard, 1989; reviewed in Mayo, 2010). Meanwhile, small state policy makers waver between restricting and facilitating the movement of their brightest and ablest. Analysts debate whether a high level of outmigration – especially of highly educated personnel – is, in the longer term, a good or a bad thing. Are governments to be chastised and shamed for seeing so many graduates, many completing rigorous professional and vocational degree programs, pack up and leave? If policies privilege and speak to the choice of small state citizens to leave and migrate, should we not also privilege their choice, and right, to stay?

Nonetheless, trying to keep at home those who want to leave is probably not a good idea. Everywhere today, many young people in particular wish to embark on adventures that take them out of their home and country, especially if it is a small state (where living with monopoly, totality and intimacy can elicit behaviour reminiscent of cabin fever and claustrophobia). Any policies intended to restrict international movement by the upwardly mobile – mandatory domestic service after graduation is a common consideration – are soon going to run into significant objection and resistance by the well heeled and politically powerful elites; and are not likely to come into force, or stay in force for long, in most democratic polities. The circumstances point to an unravelling of the state-territory nexus, making it increasingly difficult for state regimes to impose their laws (and especially their tax codes), and more so on their more powerful and affluent (and mobile) citizenry; what Sheller and Urry (2006) call the “kinetic elite” (p. 219). If anything, the very opposite policies may be put in place: long-term emigration leave to tenured public servants; state-assisted passages to emigrants; and international scholarship offers to graduates.

Today, the key policy objective is not so much keeping human resources at home. Nationalist and nation-building rhetoric does not travel far with ambitious (and locally frustrated) college and university graduates. Moreover, there are economic benefits in having them leave: they reduce the local labour supply, easing unemployment; they nourish the overseas diaspora, maintaining the flow of significant amount of remittances; they accrue new experiences, contacts and knowledge, which can at some point be tapped by their country of origin (for which they develop some
nostalgia, which helps to maintain a sense of attachment and commitment). In the medium term, they can be enticed to return: if so, they would probably be better and smarter ‘glocal’ citizens than had they stayed, and not gone away at all; although this assertion cannot be proved. These returnees tend to invest in their local community, and set up local business ventures (e.g. Baldacchino, 2005). Circulatory migration may even help avoid discussions about whether to stay or to leave: you could leave and return, over and over again; there is no need for definitive or dramatic choices about such movements any more. Thanks to smartphones, electronic mail, Skype, Facebook, social media sites, blogging, texting, tweeting and the like, connectivity even when away is so much improved; and so, for example, small state diasporas are today more solidly, intimately and regularly involved in what is going on in their country (e.g. Forward Home, 2011).

It would be fair to say that the current key policy dilemma for small states and territories is precisely the consolidation of this access to the rest of the world, an umbilical cord on which their whole life, economy and society depends. The policy agenda of small states is driven by the need to secure, improve and widen the ability of their products, their services and their people to tap potential foreign markets, investors, workplaces, tourists and clients. This is precisely the main condition that prevents many potential small sovereign states from taking the plunge to political independence and full sovereign status (Baldacchino & Milne, 2008; Baldacchino & Hepburn, 2012). Back to Kiribati: had that archipelago not taken the decision to go independent in 1979, it might today have had the benefits and trans-territorial assurances accruing to such neighbouring jurisdictions as the Cooks, Niue and Tokelau – who have considerable local autonomy and no appetite for independence. Indeed, there are much larger populations of Cook islanders, Niueans and Tokelauans in New Zealand than there are resident in their own countries. Theirs is a ‘best practice’ in the use of regionalism to navigate seamlessly across national frontiers, while still reaping the benefits of the security and national identity that they also provide (Baldacchino, 2004).

Education will continue to serve as the key passport to development for small state citizens. These should continue to thrive – whether at home or abroad – by virtue of the transnational portability of their skill sets, their qualifications, their language proficiencies, and their recognized niches of expertise (remember the trained sailors from Kiribati). Access to privileged labour markets is likely to be tightened in the years to come; and, in such cases, higher qualifications are bound to emerge as the basic requirements for selection. That the local education system does not address the small scale syndrome is no big deal. The institution’s main objective is opening doors to wider and greener pastures beyond one’s ever-so-limited home turf. I believe this to be the key challenge for small states in the 21st century, just as it has been in the 20th. Should educational practice help to foster a deeper and more critical understanding of one’s own socio-economic and political predicament in a small state qua small state, then so be it. Such a dash of relevance would be a welcome bonus; but only a bonus.

Conclusion
This paper has acknowledged the limited interest in the small state qua small by those engaged in social science research and policy making; and paradoxically including most scholars from, or working in, small states. The concept is championed by a few obvious regional and international agencies, who do not appear troubled by a lack of definitional rigour. And perhaps, there should not be any such rigour at all: the social, political and economic circumstances that increasingly come into play with decreasing size are understood well enough that one may not really need to ring-fence them in/as a clear-cut category of analysis. A tight theoretical definition that re/
defines small states continues, unsurprisingly, to prove elusive.

Moreover, if trends in global academic practices are anything to go by, the signs of any concrete developments in ‘small state studies’ are not promising. There is still no scholarly peer-reviewed journal dedicated to the study of small states; and there is still no single professorial chair in any university that is dedicated to the study of small states. Even universities located in and for small states hesitate championing the concept of the small state within their curricula, perhaps fearful that any departure from internationally sanctioned curricula may dampen their claim to the portability of the certificates that they issue. At best, we have a handful of tertiary education institutes and centres dedicated to the study of small states (Martin & Bray, 2011; also Baldacchino, 2011b), as well as the occasional course, workshop, summer institute, conference (or even special journal issue, as we have here) that resurrects the notion and invites (at least a temporary) critical consideration of its ontological premises. But nothing mainstream yet.

And yet, ironically enough, the small scale syndrome is, meanwhile, alive and well. We do have a handy and general understanding – even if rudimentary and possibly still riddled with anecdotes – of a small state conceptual and analytic framework that could help develop a better understanding of why we may want to single out small states as a ‘special case’ meritorious of being studied for their own sake, and on their own terms. Our current information and communication technologies may have shifted and tweaked the dynamics and operations of the small state: cell phones exacerbate gossip; personality politics is accompanied by candidate blogs and websites; migrants are a free Skype video-audio conversation away. Small states – however defined, or even if left undefined – have assumed a new international visibility: note the ongoing diplomatic efforts of AOSIS with the “1.5 to stay alive” campaign in connection with sea level rise and international climate change negotiations, which are nothing short of commendable (AOSIS, 2012). Like Kiribati, small states may take pride in the fact that they continue to passionately argue the limitations and weaknesses resulting from their size (often compounded by insularity, archipelagicity and peripherality) on the global and regional stage. Watch this space.

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References


Baldacchino


Meeting the Tests of Time


Invited Article

Learning from Small States for Post-2015 Educational and International Development

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Drawing upon recent work for the Commonwealth Secretariat and our ongoing comparative research, this article focuses upon the nature, impact and implications of contemporary development challenges for education in small states. It is argued that the post-Jomtien era has been dominated by international goals and targets that have focussed predominantly upon basic education, an area of strength for many small states. During this era, many small states found themselves ahead of other nations in terms of access to basic education. They were, therefore, extending the boundaries and parameters of many international educational agendas, pressing ahead and often challenging the focus of international development trajectories. In this article we argue that, because of this, small states have much innovative and pioneering experience to share with those who are now considering the possible nature and direction of post-2015 global education agendas. This includes a rationale for the strengthening of educational research capacity within small states, and an acknowledgement of the fact that small states have much to share with each other, and to contribute to wider development discourse and educational policy deliberations worldwide.

Introduction
This article draws upon research recently completed for the Commonwealth Secretariat designed to identify educational policy priorities that are currently emerging within small states across, and beyond, the Commonwealth (Crossley, Bray, & Packer, 2011). In doing so, it draws upon consultations with Ministers of Education and Senior Officials from small states at the 17th Conference of Commonwealth Education Ministers (CCEM), held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in June 2009 (Crossley, Bray, & Packer, 2009) and participation at the 18th CCEM held in Mauritius during August 2012 (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2012b). This is combined with original and ongoing theoretical research, statistical material derived from a range of international databases, interviews and discussions with a wide range of personnel working within small states and related international development agencies, research being carried out by doctoral scholars from small states working with the authors, and contributions to a Special Issue of Comparative Education (Mayo, 2008), and to the 2009 UNESCO-IIEP Policy Forum and related activities that led to the publication of the book Tertiary Education in Small States Planning in the Context of Globalisation (Martin & Bray, 2011). Extensive research and consultancy work carried out in the small states of the Caribbean and the South Pacific – in collaboration with local research teams – underpins much of the analysis; and it is to this long-term collective experience, and our research partners, that we owe much gratitude.

The opening sections of the article revisit familiar literature on the nature of small states, and the origins and evolution of a distinctive body of work on education in such contexts. This is followed by an overview of the impact of the international Education for All (EFA) agenda, and education-related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), upon educational policy and practice in small states. The main body of the article focuses on the nature, impact and implications of contemporary development challenges upon education in small states around the world. In doing so, attention
Learning from Small States for Post-2015 Educational and International Development

is given to what the global community may learn from the experience of small states for the Post-2015 era of international development, particularly in the areas of the quality of teaching and learning, boys’ education and flexible/distance learning, and wider issues relating to the politics and future trajectories for international development cooperation, and the importance of contextual sensitivity in educational policy research, development and implementation.

Throughout the article, the analysis is grounded in theoretical and epistemological traditions and perspectives derived from socio-cultural and post-colonial approaches to comparative and international research in education, in particular the traditions inspired by the work of Sir Michael Sadler (see Higginson, 1979) and Isaac Kandel (1933), combined with more recent theoretical work by authors such as Loomba (1998), Tuhiwai-Smith (1999), and Tikly (2001). This intellectual position is articulated at greater length in an earlier article for CICE (Crossley, 2002) in the book Comparative and International Research in Education: Globalisation, Context and Difference (Crossley & Watson, 2003), and in a Special Issue of the journal Comparative Education on the theme of Postcolonialism (Crossley & Tikly, 2004). However, it is pertinent here to note how this draws attention to the importance of local voice and context sensitivity in both educational research and international development (Crossley, 2010).

Conceptualizing Small States

As discussed elsewhere in the current volume, conceptualisations and definitions of small states have varied widely over time and continue to be debated. Population size remains the favoured indicator in measuring state smallness. The Commonwealth, for example, which has long pioneered support for education in small states, recognises that 32 of its member countries fall into its broad definition of nations with less than 1.5 million people, in addition to six larger Commonwealth states that share similar characteristics: Botswana, The Gambia, Jamaica, Lesotho, Namibia and Papua New Guinea. Our own work with the Commonwealth aligns with this conceptualisation, but also recognises an increasingly accepted threshold of five million within some small states studies, and points out that:

Of the 80 sovereign countries with populations below five million, 32 (40%) are full members of the Commonwealth (Table 1). Twenty-three are island states, 15 of which are multi-island countries. When 1.5 million people are used as the benchmark, 25 fully independent Commonwealth countries comprise 53 per cent of the total of 47 small states globally. (Crossley et al., 2011, p. 8)

It remains important to point out that while many small states share similar characteristics, there is also great diversity between them, particularly concerning income and levels of development, as defined by the Human Development Index (HDI) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (see Crossley et al., 2011, for further discussion).

In more recent conceptual work on Small States, the classification of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) has emerged. While there is not yet any formally agreed-upon definition of SIDS, UNESCO does maintain a list of 52 such states, which were officially recognised as a formalised group at a 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development. Neither is this sub-group of small states homogeneous. Many of them do, however, face similar challenges related to sustainable development, including remoteness, susceptibility to natural disaster, and external shock vulnerability. This newer and more specific categorisation is particularly relevant to work on Education for Sustainable Development (ESD), as briefly discussed in the section on contemporary challenges, below. Before addressing this further, it is helpful to first consider the influence of the post-Jomtien era on the development of education in small states.
Table 1. Small States by Region and Population Size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population &lt; 1.5 million</th>
<th>Population, 1.5 – 5 million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Cape Verde; Equatorial Guinea; Gabon; São Tomé &amp; Príncipe; Swaziland</td>
<td>Botswana; Central African Republic; Congo (Republic of); Eritrea; The Gambia; Guinea Bissau; Lesotho; Liberia; Namibia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>French Guiana (FRORD); Suriname</td>
<td>Costa Rica; Panama; Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab States</td>
<td>Bahrain; Djibouti; Qatar</td>
<td>Lebanon; Mauritania; Oman; United Arab Emirates; West Bank and Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td>Bermuda (BROT); Falkland Islands (BROT); Faroe Islands (DENSG); Greenland (DENSG); Iceland; St Helena (BROT); St Pierre &amp; Miquelon (FRTC)</td>
<td>Jamaica; Puerto Rico (SGUT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>Bhutan; Brunei Darussalam; Macao-China (SAR); Timor Leste</td>
<td>Georgia; Mongolia; Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>Anguilla (BROT); Antigua &amp; Barbuda; Aruba (NETHFA) The Bahamas; Barbados; Belize; British Virgin Islands (BROT); Cayman Islands (BROT); Dominica; Grenada; Guadeloupe (FRORD); Guyana; Martinique (FRORD); Montserrat (BROT); Netherlands Antilles (NETHFA); St Barthelemy (FROC); St Kitts &amp; Nevis; St Lucia; St Martin (FROC); St Vincent &amp; the Grenadines; Trinidad &amp; Tobago; Turks &amp; Caicos (BROT); US Virgin Islands (UST)</td>
<td>Albania; Armenia; Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina; Croatia; Ireland; Latvia; Lithuania; Macedonia FYR; Moldova; Norway; Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Andorra; Cyprus; Estonia; Gibraltar (BROT); Guernsey (UKCD); Isle of Man (UKCD); Jersey (UKCD); Liechtenstein; Luxembourg; Malta; Monaco; Montenegro; San Marino; The Vatican</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Ocean</td>
<td>Christmas Island (AUST); Cocos Islands (AUST); Comoros; Mayotte (FROC); Maldives; Mauritius; Réunion (FRORD); Seychelles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>American Samoa (UST); Cook Islands (SGNZ); Federated States of Micronesia; Fiji Islands; French Polynesia; Guam (SGUT); Kiribati; Marshall Islands; Nauru; New Caledonia (FRORD); Niue (SGNZ); Norfolk Island (AUST); Northern Marianas (SGCUS); Palau; Samoa; Solomon Islands; Tokelau (NZSAT); Tonga; Tuvalu; Vanuatu; Wallis &amp; Futuna (FROC)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Countries in bold are members of the United Nations. Countries in italics are members of the Commonwealth. Data refer to 2008. Abbreviations: AUST – Australian Territory Administered from Canberra; BROT – British Overseas Territory; DENG – Self-governing Overseas Administrative Division of Denmark; FROC – French Overseas Collectivity; FRORD – French Overseas Regions and Departments; NETHFA – Part of the Kingdom of The Netherlands with Full Autonomy in Internal Affairs; NZSAT – New Zealand Administering Territory; SAR – Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China; SGCUS – Commonwealth in Political Union with USA; SGNZ – Self Governing in Association with New Zealand; SGUT - Self-Governing Unincorporated Territory of the USA; UKCD – United Kingdom Crown Dependency; UST – Unincorporated territory administered by USA Office of Insular Affairs.

Education in Small States in the Post-Jomtien Era

In the immediate post-Jomtien era, the potential significance of the small states framework, for education and for international development more generally, became increasingly clear in our own work. The Jomtien Declaration (UNESCO, 1990) and related initiatives did much to co-ordinate and focus the work of international education agencies, national governments, NGOs and other stakeholders from the early 1990s onwards. While this can be seen to have had many beneficial effects, coherent global attention to the EFA agenda prioritised investment and international support for basic education, as translated further in practice, to primary schooling. But, in the
context of many small nation states, primary schooling was, at that time, not their own, or only, key educational priority.

Belize, a Central American small state, provides an example of this tension. The Belize Primary Education Development Project (BPEDP) was the most prominent educational initiative undertaken in the country throughout the 1990s. This national project was supported by a combination of government, British and World Bank development funds with a notable degree of success (Van Der Eyken, Goulden, & Crossley, 1995). Within Belize, however, tensions were reflected by the fact that international financial and technical support was also being sought – with less success – for secondary and tertiary level educational development. Indeed, for many local stakeholders, the development of these post-basic education sectors was a greater priority at that point in time. Primary education sector development was already well advanced, and national education planning priorities had moved on to issues within other education sectors. Belize thus felt out of step with the global priorities of the day, or, like many other small states who had also done well in terms of internationally-agreed primary education enrolment targets, it was pressing ahead and pioneering other agendas to better meet its own felt needs.

Contextual differences lie at the heart of this dilemma, for even in the 1990s many small states had already achieved considerable success in providing widespread access to primary education, partly because of the advantages of small scale that made universal provision more easily achievable. This can be seen in the contemporary enrolment data, presented in Table 2, for primary education in small states.

The 2010 Global Monitoring Report (UNESCO, 2009) also indicates that:

18 of 24 Commonwealth countries with populations under five million for which data were available have reached an 80 percent primary net enrolment rate (NER) or better, with 11 of these having reached 90 per cent. (cited in Crossley et al., 2011, p. 26)

Following Jomtien, many small states were thus pressing against the prevailing currents, and looking for initiatives designed to improve the relevance and quality of basic education (Thaman, 1993), to reach out to marginalised groups through non formal projects (Crossley, Sukwianomb, & Weeks, 1987), and to make the most of their scarce human resources through the expansion of the secondary sector and the local provision of tertiary education and related professional opportunities (Crocombe & Crocombe, 1994). In many ways, small states were thus pressing at the boundaries of increasingly firm parameters that were integral to the internationally ‘agreed’ development agendas of the 1990s.

By coming together, and sharing educational experience under the small states’ banner, it can be argued that the distinctive needs and priorities of small states could receive more nuanced and contextually sensitive attention. The emergence of a distinctive literature also generated increased opportunities for local ‘voice’, critique and leadership to emerge. Following a highly influential pan-Commonwealth meeting on education in small states that was held in Mauritius during 1985 (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1985), and Bacchus and Brock’s (1987) seminal publication *The Challenge of Scale: Educational Development in the Small States of the Commonwealth*, the Commonwealth Secretariat played a lead role in supporting regional workshops, consultancies and publications focused directly upon small state priorities in education. These activities ran throughout the 1990s and included initiatives relating to the quality of education, teacher education, post-secondary
Table 2. Education Data for Select Small States

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<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>106</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
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Learning from Small States for Post-2015 Educational and International Development

Above 1.5 million

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<th>GER 2008 (pct) 0.96</th>
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<th>GER 2008 (pct) 2.1</th>
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</table>

Source: UNESCO (2009). Notes: GER = Gross Enrolment Rate; NER = Net Enrolment Rate; GPI = Gender Parity Index; GNP = Gross National Product

colleges/tertiary education, and comparative perspectives on examination systems in small states. The achievement and limitations of this work were reviewed in 1999 (Crossley & Holmes, 1999) where it is argued that, despite a need to challenge an overemphasis on perceived vulnerabilities and problems, there was much to be gained from collaboration in education between small states and from “increased efforts to promote...more substantial partnerships with non-Commonwealth agencies concerned with small states” (1999, p. 64).

The politics of international development cooperation, nevertheless, inevitably continued to impact upon national education policy trajectories in ways that generated tensions between the international agendas that shaped the nature of development assistance, and the local needs that inspired educational priorities within small states. The post-Jomtien era was, therefore, a difficult time for many small states to engage whole-heartedly with what were increasingly becoming accepted as international development agendas, goals and targets. Maintaining international engagement was crucial to secure ongoing development assistance and support, but the terms of engagement with many international agencies often failed to relate as closely as local stakeholders would have wished to local small states needs.

Contemporary Challenges and Achievements

While many of the educational and wider developmental challenges faced by small states in the post-Jomtien era continue today, it is important to recognise how, in recent decades, writers from small states have actively challenged the preoccupation of external researchers and the international community with what they perceive as small states’ problems, limitations and vulnerabilities (Baldacchino & Bray, 2001). To some extent, this led some critics to challenge the very concept of ‘small states,’ seeing it as a negative or belittling term. This can certainly be so, depending upon the nature and origins of the analyses being undertaken – but this need not always be the case, and, on the contrary, there are many compelling advantages for small states to come together under this collective banner. Nevertheless, it is for these reasons that in this article we have deliberately chosen to focus upon the positive experience of educational development in small states, upon what others could learn from this experience, and upon the implications of this for post-2015 educational and international development.

Having said this, given these aspirations, it is first necessary to identify the very significant global challenges currently facing all nations and development agencies as they look beyond 2015. Firstly, many ‘donor’ countries can be seen to be cutting their development aid, including aid for education, in the face of the current global economic crisis. At this level, the challenge is to find
Investing in people is no longer considered as overriding as it was. The human development paradigm that characterised the late 1990s and was reflected in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) goals of 1996 (and that formed the basis for the MDGs) is no longer dominant. Instead, there is intense attention and focus in the broad international community on jobs and growth on the one hand, and on sustainable development on the other, especially climate change. Such foci, whether correct or not, clearly also require significant attention to education (education is essential to acquire employment skills; education is a prerequisite for climate change mitigation). Yet this attention is simply not there. This is not especially a matter of declining interest by rich countries, though there is some of that. Rather, other issues receive more global attention by both developing and high-income countries. Neither the recent G8 meeting in Chicago nor the recent G20 meeting in Mexico paid attention to education; yet it is only a few years since education was an important G8 topic, notably at the St Petersbourg summit in 2006. (Burnett, 2012, pp. 25-26)

Such trends, moreover, can be seen to be influencing agencies that work closely with small states – most notably the Commonwealth itself. Thus, the most pressing and politically sensitive debates faced by ministers of education at the 2012 CCEM, pertinently held in the small state of Mauritius, focussed upon (1) the need for ‘robust advocacy’ to ensure that Commonwealth education priorities remain central to post-2015 international development planning, and (2) the need to ensure that ongoing strategic planning for the Commonwealth recognised the importance of maintaining funding, staffing and support for the education section and function within the Secretariat – in the face of proposed cuts and reorganisation (see the 18th CCEM Mauritius Communiqué, Commonwealth Secretariat, 2012b; Williams & Urwick, 2012).

The significance of these contemporary trends and developments for the future of education in small states within and beyond the Commonwealth cannot be overstated. Ministers from small states certainly came together at the Mauritius CCEM in recognition of the potential of the Commonwealth to support their collective interests in educational development – and to resist the perceived marginalisation of education in both the Commonwealth Secretariat and post-2015 development planning. As the Mauritius Communiqué testifies, the CCEM also called for greater flexibility in the framing of future international development goals and targets, recognising the diversity of needs and priorities held by member states.

Returning to the distinctive challenges faced by small states, the Mauritius Communiqué also prioritised the quality of teaching and learning, teacher education and mobility, school leadership and education for sustainable development – all of which emerge strongly in our own research as key priorities for future attention. Moreover:

Ministers reiterated that Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) was not only about climate change but also about other environmental, social, economic and political factors, and it was an issue requiring global action and not only by small states. (18th CCEM Mauritius Communiqué, point 15)
Such challenges are clearly multi-sectoral, but education is widely recognised as having an important role to play. The impact of global factors upon changing educational priorities is similarly reflected in our own research. In the period between the publication of the 1999 review of Commonwealth work on education in small states and the completion of our recent research, much has changed. Most significantly, our 2011 publication argues that contemporary priorities emerging within small states:

...are especially concerned with how small states can respond to major external shocks and challenges within the environmental, economic, cultural and political domains. (Crossley et al., 2011, p. xviii)

In the light of this, much attention is now being given to ways in which education can help to combat the potentially devastating impact of climate change and associated rises in sea level. This draws specific attention to the contemporary significance of the SIDS categorisation and the pertinence of international research on education for sustainable development, and of the lead small states can make and are making in this respect (Crossley & Sprague, 2011; Furivai, 2009; Koya, Nabobo-Baba, & Teadero, 2010; Nabobo-Baba, Koya, & Teadero, 2007). Education, for example, is being used in the Pacific to sensitize communities to the dangers of a rise in sea level, and of ways in which children can help prepare for environmental emergencies. Ways of learning about economically sustainable development strategies by drawing from Pacific cultures and indigenous knowledge are also being integrated into school curricula and teaching materials.

While the detailed findings of our recent research can be read elsewhere (Crossley et al., 2011), it is also pertinent to reiterate here that, consistent with our earlier argument, many small states, “are relatively advanced in their progress towards basic education global goals and targets” (2011, p. xiii). Most have already achieved almost universal access to basic education and may have either achieved or are close to achieving gender parity in primary and secondary schooling. The distinctive advantages of small scale have done much to make this possible, and to reinforce the commitment of many small states to ‘extending the boundaries’ of international development targets and goals. As we have already argued, they were among the first to move their attention, and that of the international development community, beyond simple access to basic education, and into the arenas of educational quality, retention, equity and inclusion.

Within small states there is, therefore, much successful experience from which others can learn. It is to this that we now turn in dealing with, for example, the factors influencing pupil retention in marginalised communities, as the case study extract relating to Botswana illustrates below.

**Case Study Box 1: Factors Influencing School Retention in Botswana**

A 2008 study in the isolated Ngamiland North West District in Botswana contributes to the research on basic school retention. It argues that factors leading to the poor retention of rural ethnic minority children include policy decisions that fail to recognise the impact of language and identity differences; in-school factors such as infrastructure, the language of instruction, and corporal punishment; and out-of-school factors including community poverty, cultural traditions, illiteracy, school-entry age, and early pregnancy (Pansiri, 2008).

Source: Crossley et al., (2011), p. 28

A second example drawn from our recent research draws upon the distinctive experience of many small states in relation to gender, and insights into the educational problems encountered by boys.
Case Study Box 2: The Gender Challenge in Jamaica

Jamaica has been the focus of much research on boys’ educational participation, drop-out and achievement (CCYD, 2010; Jha & Kelleher, 2006). Indicators of both enrolment and achievement favour girls, particularly at the secondary and tertiary levels (Jha & Kelleher, 2006).

The Ministry of Education, Youth and Culture (MOEYC), along with Jamaican sociologists (see Bailey 2003; Chevannes 2002; Evans 1999; Beckles 1996), have identified this gender inequality as based on academic under-participation, leading to poorer performance. Research has identified boys’ survival rates from enrolment to the end of secondary schooling as almost 50% lower than girls. According to CARICOM’s Commission on Youth Development (2010), there is a much higher percentage of boys dropping out of the school system than girls, with ‘drop-out’ youths (ages 15-24) – mainly boys - making up 30% of the total youth population (GOJ, 2009). Of this youth population, 26.2% of males (only 7.9% for females) are considered illiterate and 25% of those who have dropped out of secondary schooling have only a grade 9 or less of education.

Studies have identified a number of underlying social themes feeding into the problem, including a historical hegemony of black Caribbean masculinity; a culture of male marginalisation linked to curriculum and student-teacher interactions; absenteeism leading to underperformance; boys’ participation in crime and violence linked to socio-economic background; and perceptions of self, connected to gendered values of education.

Linking with our work on tertiary education in small states in collaboration with UNESCO/IIEP, we also emphasise that challenges relating to the development of tertiary education continue to command increased attention within small states. Much has also been achieved in recent decades, and in ways that consistently questioned the trajectory of international agendas--and helped to pioneer the extension of boundaries once again. Demand for the increased tertiary provision was also generated by the expansion of secondary education in small states, and our findings now reveal a complex architecture of tertiary education that includes a combination of post-secondary institutions, multipurpose community colleges, local universities, regional universities and large numbers of international collaborations, cross-border providers and distance learning initiatives (Chandra, 2011; Louisy & Crossley, 2011; Tewarie, 2011). Box 3 reproduced below also points to the application of new technologies and the emergent potential of the Virtual University for the Small States of the Commonwealth.

Case Study Box 3: The Virtual University for Small States of the Commonwealth

The establishment and growth of the VUSSC as a global network for higher education is based on principles of working together for the common good with few external resources. The structure complements the regional education networks (such as the Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network) through which countries cooperate to develop their human resources within a traditional political framework with support from international donor/lending agencies.

Facilitated by the Commonwealth of Learning (COL), the VUSSC rests on the work of individuals in small universities and colleges around the world who share their knowledge and learning materials about common issues such as teacher professional development, fisheries, construction, and disaster recovery. The internet is an essential tool (West & Daniel, 2009).

This innovative network illustrates what can be gained from collaboration between tertiary organisations in small states – in terms of course sharing, collective development and teaching,

Source: Crossley et al., (2011), p. 36

Source: Crossley et al., (2011), p. 47
Learning from Small States for Post-2015 Educational and International Development

cost-effectiveness, the benefits of scale and research potential – at the same time as it demonstrates the benefits to be gained from the small states concept and terminology, and joint endeavour.

For those interested in learning more about the development of tertiary education in small states, Martin and Bray’s (2011) collection of papers is a timely, helpful resource. We now wish to conclude this section by highlighting the fact that by extending the boundaries of dominant interpretations of international development targets and goals, many small states have pioneered innovative developments in education, across all sectors, from which others – in small states and beyond – have much to learn.

Learning from Small States for the Post-2015 Era

The year 2015 has long been set as a key benchmark for educational development in the post-Jomtien era. The series of UNESCO Global Monitoring Reports (for reports, see UNESCO, 2011) has repeatedly marked the significance of this, and as the deadline approaches, minds are now increasingly focussing upon what lies beyond (Barrett, 2012; Burnett, 2012), including international consultation processes and conferences to discuss post-2015 development priorities and the role that education may have (UKFIET, 2012; World We Want, 2012). Our own research on education in small states reveals how much experience in these contexts has already moved ahead and, anticipating a new era, has extended boundaries – often generating innovative educational and development experience from which others can learn with a view to the future.

By way of example, it is argued that the pioneering experience and achievements of small states in dealing with issues relating to the quality and cultural relevance of education has much to offer not only those in other small states, but also the wider international community. This is perhaps especially pertinent with regard to growing international concern with the progress of boys in schooling. Here, the experience and research base of Caribbean small states certainly has much to offer. Similarly, as new technologies are increasingly harnessed to support the expansion of higher education worldwide, the extensive and long-term experience of the small states of the South Pacific has much to contribute to the international literature and policy deliberations relating to distance and flexible learning (Chandra, Koroivulaono, & Hazelman, 2011).

At the broadest conceptual level, however, it is argued that the international community can learn much from the small states literature about the importance of contextual differences in educational policy research, development and implementation. The question of scale – the “challenge of scale” as seen by Bacchus and Brock (1987) – helps greatly to highlight how one size does not fit all, and how what might be ‘best practice’ in one context may not be appropriate elsewhere – even between small states. Indeed, from this perspective, the wisdom of the ‘best practice’ discourse is severely challenged in principle. Research on education in small states, perhaps more clearly than any other related work, helps to demonstrate how and why contextual factors deserve much greater attention by all engaged in international development co-operation. This also shows how small states themselves differ, how context sensitive international collaboration can be helpful, and why the strengthening of locally grounded research capacity within small states (and elsewhere) should be a future priority for development in the post-2015 era of international development.

The latter theme emerges most strongly from our long term work, and we argue here that this deserves greater attention today and in the post-2015 era. International and cross-regional collaboration that is supportive of this can do much to strengthen the impact of small state voice and influence in the international arena (Tuhiwai-Smith, 1999); it can facilitate learning from and between small states in the spirit of South-South collaboration (Chisholm & Steiner-Khamsi,
and it can play a strategic role in challenging global tendencies towards the uncritical international transfer of educational policy, practice and development modalities – while contributing innovative and pioneering experience from which others can learn as they move beyond the parameters of the Jomtien era.

As researchers in the field of comparative education have long pointed out we can learn much from each other, and from elsewhere, but in doing so we should look for insight and inspiration, and not seek universal blueprints and simplistic knowledge or policy transfer (Crossley & Watson, 2009, 2011). While the politics of international development will continue to shape policy priorities, increased context sensitivity and mutual respect and understanding (Sen 2007) is vital if sustainable economic, human and social development is to be more successful in practice than it has in the past. We therefore conclude with the words of Dame Pearlette Louisy, the Governor General of the small state of St Lucia in the Caribbean who argues that:

...while [small states] must continue to seek external assistance to implement their development strategies, they know best what their own needs are and what their priorities should be. They have much to contribute to international discourse and to policy deliberations worldwide. (Louisy, 2011, p. xv)

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or processes. *Comparative Education, 47*(1), 119–133.


Crossley, M. (2010). Context matters in educational research and international development:


Though the existing literature on the favelas (or shantytowns) of Brazil thoroughly documents the chaotic and violent nature of life within them, few connections have been made between the literature on favelas, fragility and small states, particularly with regard to the fragile state of educational institutions in favelas. This article summarizes the primary findings of prominent favela studies across the social sciences alongside the literature on fragility, drawing out a summative definition of fragility that easily applies to the context of education in Brazilian favelas. Primarily, this article argues that not only do the slums of Brazil qualify for classification as fragile small states, but such a classification by prominent multilaterals would open these areas to donor funding for educational programming that could greatly mitigate their fragility and advance educational equity, as occurs in other postconflict and fragile settings around the world.

Introduction

The social, political and economic dynamics of the favelas, or illegal urban shantytowns that have materialized in the hills around Rio de Janeiro and other urban centers throughout Brazil, have long provided a fertile basis for academic research and analysis across disciplines. Political and historical analysis (Gay, 1994; Penglase, 2009) has explored the political rivalry between drug cartels, local politicians and grassroots neighborhood associations for control of the hearts and minds of favela residents. Ethnographic work (Goldstein, 2003; Jones de Almeida, 2003; Leeds, 1996; Pardue, 2004; Soares, 2000) has extensively documented the day-to-day life of favela residents, as well as the particular forms of language, music and culture which have developed therein – both as responses to and as coping mechanisms for the economic and social inequalities experienced by Brazil’s urban poor.

However, despite the chaotic and violent nature of favela life, few connections have been made between the literature on favelas, fragility and small states. In this article, I summarize the literature on fragility, drawing out a summative definition of fragility as a weakness or lack of capacity in local institutions (Mosselson, Wheaton, & Frisoli, 2009; Vallings & Torres, 2005) that – I argue – easily applies to the context of Brazilian favelas, as well as similar low-income slums across the globe. While not currently classified as independent regions in a formal sense, favelas are often ruled by local political actors (whether legal or extralegal) that exercise de facto sovereignty which I argue, according to Baldacchino (2012), qualify Brazilian slums for classification as fragile small or micro-states. To support this classification, I then summarize the primary findings of prominent favela studies across the social sciences, highlighting those findings which indicate the precarious and fragile educational, political, and social institutions in favelas.

I argue that such a classification by prominent multilaterals would open favelas to donor funding that could greatly mitigate their fragility (especially with regard to education), as occurs in other postconflict and fragile settings around the world. I further argue that education – particularly educational programming that promotes community-level political participation – is a key type of donor support that would ease fragility in this context. To do so, I draw upon extensive literature that documents Brazilian popular participation efforts, especially those based in Freirean
educational models, and their mitigation of fragility in low-income areas of Brazil. In sum, I use the literature on fragility and small states, favela life, and popular education in Brazil to argue that the classification of favelas as fragile micro-states by multilaterals could lead to donor attention that, if focused properly on educational programs promoting popular participation, could greatly improve the precarious political and economic status of Brazil’s urban poor.

**Fragility: A Review of the Literature**

Though “fragility” is a standard term in the development literature, applied primarily to states that are recovering from some form of conflict or natural disaster, Mosselson et al. (2009) note that there is no standard definition of “fragility” or “fragile states” (p. 1). However, common threads arise when working definitions used by institutions and scholars are compared.

At its most basic, fragility is an inability to provide basic services, whether due to a lack of political will or a lack of institutional capacity (Mosselson et al., 2009, p. 2; see also Rose & Greeley, 2006, p. 5-7). Using this definition, Brazilian favelas definitely count as a fragile setting, due to the lack of state-provided security as well as the low quality of most existent state services, notably education.

However, localized settings like favelas do not meet most organizational definitions of fragility, as such definitions are currently very state-centric. Indeed, until recently the term “fragility” has been used less often than “fragile states” (Mosselson et al., 2009, p. 4). Mosselson et al. (2009) explain why, stating that it is a common commitment by donors and organizations to “[work] alongside governments” towards “state-building and governance priorities” (p. 2) that leads them to focus on fragility at the state level. In other words, the reasoning for a state-level focus seems to be two-fold: first, state-building is where donors and organizations have the most experience and expertise, due to their historical commitment to such. Second, there is the issue of receptivity on the part of the recipient state. States are usually not eager to be labeled as ‘fragile.’ As such, states that are not wholly fragile – but rather experience pockets of fragility – are often less willing to accept this label, especially since the funding that such labeling makes possible does not always reliably accompany it, making the decision something of a political gamble (Brown, 2006).

Due to this phenomenon, Mosselson et al. (2009) note that many donors are moving towards the concept of fragility rather than fragile states, a definition that allows donors and organizations to “move beyond the emphasis on governments” (p. 4). A term like fragility can be applied on the regional or local level as well as the state, and as such can be more widely applicable and useful. The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, or DFID (2005), has reflected this general shift with their use of the more general term “difficult environments.” Such open, dynamic terms allow more general application, especially pertinent to settings which are experiencing strong growth at the state level while maintaining pockets of extreme inequality and fragility, like Brazil.

Building on the argument that current global conditions require some “creative political economy” that moves beyond state-centric models (Baldacchino & Milne, 2008), Baldacchino (2012) provides a framework within which favelas and other sub-national areas can be seen as small states unto themselves, able to exercise some degree of autonomy and sovereignty. According to Baldacchino (2012), the globalized and postcolonial international relationships of the 20th and early 21st centuries extend beyond traditional national boundaries to include subnational areas that do not claim independent national sovereignty in the traditional sense. While traditionally “you either are sovereign or you are not” has been the standard for statehood, “this rule of thumb is increasingly found wanting in the 21st century” (Baldacchino, 2012, p. 239). As Baldacchino
(2012) further explains,

What is evident is that subnational units can target specific functions and powers (of sovereignty), which they then seek to secure...Although always dependent on context, all the functions and powers typically associated with sovereignty have been up for negotiation. (p. 245)

Within a Brazilian favela context, there are a number of local political actors that have historically negotiated a certain degree of de facto sovereignty, as will be explored more fully in the next section. As semi-autonomous micro-states exercising degrees of de facto sovereignty, favelas become defensibly classifiable as fragile even using a more traditional state-centric model of fragility.

Vallings and Torres (2005) provide a fragility framework that is particularly applicable and useful in a favela micro-state context. To Vallings and Torres (2005), the primary driver of fragility is weak political institutions and a lack of political participation. That is, “in areas where [state-level political institutions] are continuously changing, or in a state of transition...there is only a weak system of institutional coherence, so that individual parts of that system fall open to abuse by powerful groups or interests” (Vallings & Torres, 2005, p. 9). This lack of institutional coherence is what creates fragility.

As exemplified by the literature on favelas explored in the next section, Brazilian favelas are a clear example of such institutional instability. Through a review of the extensive social science literature on life in favelas, the following section will illustrate how the continuous power struggle between the police and drug cartels described by Penglase (2009) as “ordered disorder” leads to the “abuse by powerful groups or interests” described by Vallings and Torres (2005, p. 9). Similarly, the variously agitated and banal environment in favela schools that will be described by Guareschi (1998) clearly displays that Brazilian education can epitomize Vallings and Torres’ (2005) definition of a “weak institution.”

Life in Brazilian Favelas

The favelas of Brazil are plagued by a constant state of conflict and tension that Penglase (2009) described as a sort of “ordered disorder” or purposeful “(in)security” (p. 47) provided alternately by the state police, local drug traffickers, and local community leaders. Extensive literature on favela life (Arias, 2004; Gay, 1994; Leeds, 1996; Leeds & Leeds, 1977; Zaluar, 1998) addresses this “(in)security,” much of it from a partially historical perspective. These works will be discussed first, followed by works that focus on current conditions – particularly the state of education – in Brazil’s slums.

Leeds (1996) provides an introductory history of how favelas developed as a form of affordable low-income housing, in response to the growing need for cheap labor in Rio de Janeiro. Officially illegal but tolerated by the state due to the labor they provided, favelas were seen as acceptable so long as they remained invisible. This invisible status granted by the state laid the groundwork for favelas to develop into what Leeds (1996) calls the most “visible and tangible form of the violence used by the state” against Brazil’s urban poor (p. 50).

Several other authors, notably Gay (1994) and Zaluar (1998), build upon Leeds (1996) by focusing on the role of neighborhood associations, or associações de morro (AMs), in the formal establishment and development of Brazilian slums. In the language of small state jurisdictions explored earlier
by Baldacchino (2012), AMs are one of the primary actors that have endowed favelas with a sense of relative autonomy and sovereignty.

Since favelas first began to grow in the hills around Rio de Janeiro, AMs typically arose organically as small groups of neighborhood leaders would organize themselves to petition local government for legal title to their newly seized land. This role as broker between favela communities and local politicians granted AM leaders a great deal of political strength (Leeds & Leeds, 1977). However, as basic infrastructural needs for utilities, roads, and schools were eventually met, the importance of AMs began to wane (Gay, 1994; Zaluar, 1998).

Over time, AMs were replaced in their role as political brokers by drug cartels that increasingly developed patron-client relationships with local politicians and police (Arias, 2004). AMs were not completely replaced and remained important community figures – however, their survival often meant their inclusion in or association with the drug trade (Gay, 1994). It is this gradual growth in drug activity within favelas, and the accompanying violence and instability, which has brought favela life to its current fragile state.

There are many excellent qualitative favela studies which document the fragility of slum life due to the violent relationship between drug cartels and police, in which both sides fight for the hearts and minds of favela residents. Holloway (1993), in a qualitative study of Rio de Janeiro’s police force, describes the role Rio police see for themselves as providers of order for the greater population of Rio, justifying their violent containment and repression of drug activity in favelas as necessary for the greater good. Garotinho and his co-authors (1998) provide an analysis of how this has reinforced what they call “criminal legitimacy”: as police violence became pervasive enough to seem arbitrary, local residents turned to drug traffickers as de facto community leaders. Several other authors use qualitative data gathered in various favelas to document the same pattern. Goldstein (2003), in a larger ethnographic work on race and sexuality in a particular favela, notes that local drug gangs provide “a parallel or alternative rule of law” (p. 225) that settles local concerns due to a lack of resident faith in the police. Soares (2000), in an excellent Portuguese-language favela ethnography, emphasizes the perception of favela residents that drug traffickers, while despotic, provide order that strongly contrasts with seemingly arbitrary police violence. Leeds (1996), in her ethnography on the cocaine trade in one favela, also highlights the perception by favela dwellers “that the formal justice system does not work for them [and] has led a portion of the population to accept an alternative justice system” provided by drug cartels (p. 62). Perlman (2006), in a synthesis of ethnographic data collected over a 40 year period in a single favela, notes that the marginalization of the urban poor has only increased over that time frame due to increasing drug-related violence and a lack of opportunities for democratic participation.

Particularly, several studies focus on the unstable and inequitable nature of education in urban favelas. In her qualitative study of adolescent students in a favela school, Guareschi (1998) notes the degree to which her participants internalize (while still attempting to resist) messages of underachievement, marginalization and deviance received in school settings. Brazilian urban adolescents are marginalized by formal educational structures, a situation which has prompted the growth of alternative educational projects and community schools based around popular cultural forms such as hip-hop (Pardue, 2004) and traditional Afro-Brazilian music and dance (Jones de Almeida, 2003).

Looking at Brazilian education comparatively with educational systems in other Latin American countries, Vegas and Petrow (2008) point out that, although democratically governed since 1985,
Brazil has struggled to transition to a just society. For the last 60 years, expanded opportunities in education have been a significant factor in social mobility. However, much of this expanded opportunity sprang from privatized channels denied to marginalized groups, so educational inequality persists among racial minorities and low-income Brazilians, particularly in urban *favelas*. Consequently in Brazil, as in much of Latin America, income inequality correlates positively with educational inequality (Vegas & Petrow, 2008).

Several prominent articles provide compelling theoretical frames in which the dynamic of violence, patronage and educational inequality found in Brazilian *favelas* can be understood. Kerstenetsky and Santos (2009) – economists using a capabilities approach, or a development framework that focuses on what individual actors in a given setting are able to do – try to characterize *favela* life as poor due to a lack of freedom that results from insecurity and violence. This argument arose in response to several Brazilian economists that have argued that *favela* residents cannot be truly considered “poor” in an absolute sense when their average salaries are compared globally (see Silva, 2005; Valadares, 2005). Kerstenetsky and Santos (2009) make the point that *favelas* are “freedom-poor” due to their instability and lack of access to quality public services (particularly education), even if average incomes have reached a level that could be considered above poverty.

Rodrigues (2006) attempts to explain the roots of Brazilian urban violence, inequality and insecurity by tying such to a perceived lack of civil democracy. Basing his claims in survey data gathered in several *favelas* where various strategies have been used to increase stability, Rodrigues (2006) notes that attempts to build the legitimacy of public-level institutions (such as the neighborhood police and local elected officials) have had positive effects on perceptions of security, while efforts to build social bonds at the private level had no such perceived effect. While Rodrigues’ (2006) findings are interesting, they are limited due to their specific temporal and spatial context, especially given the fraught relations with police noted by most *favela* researchers.

As the last of the reviewed theoretical pieces, Penglase (2009) coins the term “(in)stability” to refer to the ability of drug traders to maintain political and social control through alternately inflicting local violence and providing local protection. In this sense, this author addresses the ambiguity of drug cartel control with a level of nuance that is lacking in other works. Penglase (2009) notes that sovereignty is determined just as much by “the ability to institute and suspend ‘normality’” (p. 47) as the ability to enact or enforce law. By deliberately creating instability and disorder, and interrupting the normal functioning of schools and other public institutions, drug gangs normalize such behavior and by so doing “naturalize their power” (Penglase, 2009, p. 51). With this theoretical construct of “(in)stability,” Penglase (2009) provides a compelling explanatory framework for how drug cartels can maintain power through the reinforcement of fragility.

Clearly, given the broader definition of fragility and micro-states described earlier (Baldacchino, 2012; Mosselson et al., 2009), the picture of Brazilian *favelas* and their schools captured by Penglase (2009) and others reveals these contexts to be fragile environments that act as semi-autonomous small states. Identification as “fragile” micro-states could help open Brazilian *favela* communities to an immense amount of donor wealth, at least with regards to global education funds like the Fast Track Initiative (Sperling, 2007), that could help to end “the [continual] marginalization of the [Brazilian] urban poor” (Perlman, 2006, p. 154) witnessed by countless researchers over the last century. The following section will review the literature on education and fragility, specifically in a Brazilian context, so as to build the argument for investment in education as a means to mitigate the fragility experienced by Brazil’s urban poor.
Where to Go From Here – Education and Fragility

Mosselson et al. (2009) have clearly noted the potential relationships between education and fragility – that is, education can either be a mitigating or exacerbating force (p. 6; see also Bush & Salterelli, 2000). Within a Brazilian context, a number of educational initiatives have been found to help reduce instability and fragility by promoting democratic educational institutions and political participation in schools and their surrounding communities. This section reviews several examples of these initiatives found in the literature.

One of the main results of increased gang violence and fear in favelas is a reduction in people’s willingness and ability to use the social networks and social capital available to them (Perlman, 2006) in community organizations (which, as Arias [2004] has previously noted, were quite common during the initial settling of Rio’s favelas). This stigmatization of community organizing and subsequent lack of political participation has been one of the main marginalizing trends in favela life. Strengthening local institutions (including schools) and increasing community participation could mitigate the instability and fragility experienced in urban Brazilian slums.

Several efforts at increasing local community participation have experienced a great deal of success in mitigating fragility in urban Brazilian contexts. One such effort, participatory community budgeting, has been explored at length (see Abers, 1996, 2000; Avritzer, 2010). Several southern Brazilian cities – most prominently Porto Alegre – have begun to allow local communities to publicly plan their own local spending budget, and the results have been well-documented. Living conditions for the poor in these communities have drastically improved (Avritzer, 2010), and perhaps more importantly (given the prominence of patron-client relationships between favelas and local authorities [Arias, 2004]), participatory budgeting has substantially lowered clientilism. That is, in a study of several communities with participatory budgeting, clientilistic neighborhood associations have largely lost access to public goods during their first years of participatory budgeting, and have reacted by changing social practices to become more transparent and democratic (Abers, 2000).

This same participatory approach to local governance has also been used in and through Brazilian schools to mitigate fragility, especially by movements and schools that have adopted the pedagogical model of Paulo Freire (1970). Perhaps the most visible example of this is the Movimento Sem Terra, Brazil’s nationwide landless peoples’ movement, which organizes community-run schools in all of its settlements. These schools are governed by community-level councils, which are responsible for school administration, curriculum selection, and day-to-day maintenance and governance of schools (Caldart, 1997; MST, 1999). Several researchers credit this democratic system as being one of the principal sources of the movement’s organizational stability and strength (Martins, 2006; McCowan, 2003).

Such a system could easily be applied in Brazilian favela community schools, as strong local governance systems such as AMs are already in place (Perlman, 1976; Resende de Carvalho et al., 1998). Donors and other international actors could sponsor the creation of local democratic governance systems within existent community networks such as AMs and schools, building capacity for locally run democratic governance systems. Democratically organized community schools are already a reality in many parts of Brazil, though documentation is perhaps strongest for the “citizen schools” of Porto Alegre (see Gandin & Apple, 2004). In these schools, students and their parents take an active part in organizational planning, and as a result the exclusion that often typifies urban Brazilian schools is replaced by a sustainable, locally-controlled institution that teaches students to think critically and work towards the betterment of their quality of life.
Arias (2004) calls for the expansion of these types of democratic systems as a potential solution to favela instability, asserting that through sponsorship of local democratic schooling initiatives, international actors can provide favela communities with the means to develop innovative solutions to community problems and petition for necessary changes in state policy.

Due to their outsider status, such organizations have the legitimacy to help identify and circumvent corrupt local actors, supporting nascent organizations until they have gained local credibility. Using data from several favelas where such programs have been implemented by international agencies, Arias (2004) describes how internationally-sponsored local democratic institutions have led to local police reform (p. 26) and increased safety. For instance, in urban Salvador in northeast Brazil one internationally-financed community school (most prominently funded by UNICEF) holds regular community meetings to plan community projects and address common concerns. Out of these meetings have come organized neighborhood watches, grant applications for vocational and other educational courses for neighborhood youth, and many other opportunities to which, without these meetings, this community would not have had access (G. dos Santos, personal communication, June 15, 2005). Recognition of favelas as areas of fragility would allow for further examples such as this by opening favelas up to further investment from educational fragility-minded donors and multilateral organizations.

**Discussion**

While this article has made the argument that Brazilian favelas could be made less fragile through international funding of educational programming, several questions remain: Should international organizations or the Brazilian state be held responsible for such work? If favelas were to be classified as small states using Baldacchino’s (2012) criteria, who at the favela level would be the sovereignty-exercising actors with whom multilateral investors should interact? This section will explore these questions.

First, regarding governmental responsibility for Brazilian favelas, international third-party intervention is hardly a new concept given the long-standing role of the international development industry in promoting such interventions, whether through multilateral funding organizations, non-profits or other non-governmental actors (Boli & Thomas, 1997). In areas in which governments fail to fulfill public needs, such intervention is common (Rahman, 2006), and the Brazilian government has arguably failed to fulfill its mandate to provide quality public education in low-income favela settings (Vegas & Petrow, 2008). While the state and local police have become increasingly present in the favelas around Rio de Janeiro through recent pacification efforts (Baroni, 2011; Veloso, 2010), this sudden governmental concern has not extended to the improvement of basic services, like education. As a result, international organizations could have a significant impact on those social sectors which have been neglected by state and national governments.

Local cartels, neighborhood associations (AMs) and non-profits are all actors that could solicit and maintain economically supportive relationships with international entities independent of the Brazilian government. This type of relationship could be problematic if cartels are the local agents soliciting support on behalf of their communities, due to the extralegal nature of cartel activities and the ambivalent support they receive from their surrounding neighborhoods (Garotinho et al., 1998). While there is abundant evidence of local governments in sub-national areas exercising sovereignty in making decisions for their communities (Baldacchino, 2012), these local governments have local legal authority which cartels have only been able to assert in a de facto manner. Further research would be necessary to determine whether, in any given particular
fa\textit{vela} context, cartels would be the local authorities most fit to solicit external support, as opposed to local neighborhood associations (AMs) or non-profits.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Through a review of the relevant literature, it is evident that Brazilian \textit{favelas} are sites of extreme instability, violence, insecurity, and educational inequity. Additionally, Brazilian \textit{favelas} easily qualify as fragile if, as Baldacchino (2012) suggests, the definition is extended beyond the state level. Such an application of the term “fragile” could prove helpful by opening poor \textit{favela} communities to greater donor investment in local schools and other community organizations. As illustrated in the examples above, such investment would prove especially helpful if used to promote stronger democratic institutions in schools and neighborhood associations at the local community level. Such initiatives have been shown to successfully mitigate \textit{favela}-level fragility, and an increase in similar programming and funding could reduce the educational and social insecurity experienced by \textit{favela} residents on a daily basis. Such intervention by international organizations in sub-national areas is philosophically defensible given the complex and nuanced potential definitions of contemporary statehood, within which areas like \textit{favelas} can be considered comparable to other small states or states-within-states (Baldacchino, 2012).

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A Broader Definition of Fragile States


How to Make the Small Indigenous Cultures Bloom?  
Special Traits of Sámi Education in Finland

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This article discusses smallness from the point of view of the Sámi, an indigenous people of the Arctic, and describes today’s Sámi education in Finland, the factors that have affected its formation and the challenges in strengthening it. The purpose of the article is to provide ideas to develop Sámi education and encourage discovering methods that emanate from indigenous peoples’ own cultural premises. This article is based on our previous studies and data that we further analyzed into theoretical tools. Here, we discuss what it would mean to the Sámi to have a sovereign educational system. The challenges are viewed especially from the point of view of the Sámi being a small assemblage that inhabits four countries.

In The Language Garden Analogy, Ofelia García (2011) uses powerful words to portray language planning and refers to “sustainable languaging”: language planning must maintain a future-orientation, becoming dynamically situated in social context. Language diversity makes for a richer, more interesting, and more colorful world. Small (indigenous) languages need careful language planning and protection to preserve linguistic diversity in the world. Sometimes radical action may be taken to make small cultures and languages bloom (Garcia, 2011).

In this article, we present a small indigenous population as adding cultural and linguistic diversity and address issues associated with smallness as experienced by those indigenous populations when it comes to education. We will present the challenging historical-cultural background of the Sámi followed by a description of the present educational situation of the Sámi people. Then, we discuss the importance of finding ways to implement the Sámi culture in education. Finally, we argue that the Sámi should be seen as a small assemblage that would benefit from having (educational) sovereignty and language revitalization. We will discuss what it means for a small indigenous population to be considered a ‘small assemblage’– and how this viewpoint could contribute to the discussion of challenges that indigenous peoples face. This article is based on our previous studies on Sámi education in Norway and Finland (see Keskitalo 2010; Keskitalo & Määttä, 2011, 2012; Keskitalo, Määttä, & Uusiautti, 2011a, 2011b, 2012) that is now expanded through the theoretical analysis on the Sámi as a small assemblage. In this study, we ground our analysis on the data from Finland. The first study in Finland was carried out in 2005–2008: it was a school ethnography in elementary instruction at five schools in Finland including the analysis of the Finnish core curriculum for comprehensive education and interviews among ten teachers. The objective was to understand and present the state of Sámi education in Finland. Our latest study was conducted among teachers from the schools and daycare centers of the Sámi Domicile Area, local school authorities and representatives of the Finnish and Norwegian Sámi Parliaments and higher education (n=64, including people from all of these groups) who participated in the Sámi Pedagogy Conference in 2011 and were asked to share their experiences of Sámi education.

In this article, we will view the Sámi’s position as a small jurisdiction by focusing on Sámi education, as education can be seen as the means of strengthening a small assemblage’s autonomy. Godfrey Baldacchino (2006) suggests that “autonomies” should be recognized as viable politico-economic units in their own right. He also uses the concept of “nations without states” (p. 854) to refer
a small assemblage under the governance of a modern nation-state. Furthermore, researchers suggest that in the future, the recognition of small jurisdictions is likely to be a rule instead of an exception as small jurisdictions are emerging (Baldacchino, 2006; see also Anckar, 2003). This viewpoint provides the starting point of viewing an indigenous people as an example of a small assemblage. However, the case is not that simple. For example, Anckar (2003) claims that cultural diversities and strong regional traditions create pressures for decentralization and a dispersal of power. Anckar (2003) refers to federalism as an institutional response to societal divisions and diversities, but simultaneously points out that the extent to which small assemblages enjoy sovereignty can vary significantly. In this article, the special focus is on the Sámi as an indigenous people. The Sámi are a historically and culturally distinct community, a small assemblage (cf. Anckar, 2003) but a scattered one. Namely, there are approximately 70,000–100,000 Sámi – depending on country-based criteria – of whom about 40,000–60,000 live in Norway, about 15,000–20,000 in Sweden, about 2,000 in Russia, and about 10,000 in Finland.

When it comes to educational issues, small populations encounter specific challenges, threats and opportunities (Mayo, 2008). Bacchus (2008) argues that small assemblages experience problems achieving economies of scale in the provision of educational services:

Other concerns related to the internal features of their educational systems such as the challenges that they faced in developing culturally relevant curriculum materials, conducting examinations on a cost-effective basis, and providing appropriate higher educational opportunities to meet their limited demands for personnel with such education. (p. 127)

In fact, providing all students with equal educational opportunities and removing obstacles to learning, especially among the least successful students, have been the leading principles in Finnish educational policy since the 20th century but there are still issues to be reconsidered and improved, for example, concerning education for national minorities (Määttä & Uusiautti, 2012). Education would be an effective way to remedy the situation and should be seen as a counterforce against the colonization of the mind and heart. Implementing uncolonized pedagogy, a pedagogy that does not carry the dominating culture as given, but requires taking various cultural logics seriously (Mohanty, 1994). Yet, developing Sámi education is challenging: on the one hand it is affected by outer factors, like the pressure to assimilate, and on the other hand it is affected by inner factors such as the specific features of Sámi education. These factors reveal the difference between the majority and minority culture and their logics within an educational system. In uncolonized pedagogy, the Sámi culture is taken in the center to develop Sámi education successfully.

The Historical-Cultural Background
The Sámi belong to the Finno-Ugric people, whose first settlements arrived in Europe and northern Eurasia about 40,000 years ago. As a group, the Sámi are genetically different from other Europeans (Pimenoff, 2008). Permanent settlements in the North were created about 10,000 years ago. The Sámi have certain western characteristics and are partly descended from people who moved along the west coast of Europe during and after the Ice Age. The Sámi region was at its widest from the start of Common Era until the 11th century, when it included all of modern-day Finland (Carpelan, 2000). Historically, the Sámi have been divided by livelihood and region into reindeer herders, fishermen, and forest Sámi (Halinen, 2011). The traditional Sámi lifestyle, dominated by hunting, fishing and trading, was preserved until the Late Middle Ages, when the modern structures of the Nordic countries were established (Hansen & Olsen, 2004). The present state borders that divide Sámi regions were defined between the middle of the 18th century and
the Second World War. Due to the western settlement in the Nordic countries, the Sámi became a minority in most of their traditional areas.

The regions in which the Sámi live, Sápmi, expand from Central-Norway and Central-Sweden through the northern parts of Finland to Russia’s Kola Peninsula. The Sámi’s current situation involves moving from their official regions. For example, in Finland, the majority of the under-10-year-old Sámi-speaking pupils (75%) live outside the Sámi Domicile Area in other parts of Finland (Aikio-Puoskari, 2009). This fact poses new kinds of demands on teaching, services, and information distribution both in the Sámi language and about the Sámi people. Furthermore, the Finnish legislation on Sámi education supports education only within the Sámi Domicile Area (The Sámi Parliament, 2008).

The Sámi culture is diverse, with nine different languages spoken, each classified as endangered (Magga & Skutnabb-Kangas, 2001). The Sámi languages differ from each other to the extent that speakers of one language do not necessarily understand speakers of another (Carpelan et al., 2004). However, the Sámi have attempted to maintain a unified culture by creating a national flag, celebrating Sámi People’s Day, and instituting the Sámi parliament. Across Norway, Sweden and Finland, the parliament serves as the authoritative advisory agency in issues regarding the Sámi people, but has no legal or executive power. The purpose of the Sámi Parliament is to take care of the Sámi language, culture and issues regarding the Sámi’s position as an indigenous people. Assimilation pressures and the history of colonization affect the Sámi’s efforts to become uniform. According to Valkonen (2009), the goal of decolonizing practices means that the Sámi would be recognized as people that have the right to self-government. A salient purpose of decolonization is to disengage from colonalist practices and reach and implement self-determination in indigenous peoples’ regions (Smith, 1999). According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) (1989), indigenous peoples are

peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions. (Article 1, Section 1b)

The Sámi are recognized as an indigenous people in the Constitution of Finland. The Sámi as an indigenous people are allowed to develop their language and culture. However, Finland has not ratified the aforementioned ILO convention. Furthermore, according to the United Nation’s Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2008), indigenous people have the right to autonomy and therefore to educational self-determination, for example the right to establish their own schooling institutions, The Sámi’s education has been neglected or implemented along the Finnish mainstream guidelines (Keskitalo, Määttä, & Uusiautti, 2012). By viewing the Sámi as a small jurisdiction, the possibility of implementing a Sámi curriculum becomes more likely.

The church was introduced to the Sámi early, first in the 12th century and more powerfully again in the 17th century. The Christian church played a major role in western oppression and assimilation pressures targeted at the Sámi. The confrontation between the western and Sámi cultures was problematic (Kylli, 2005). The Second World War had ruinous effects to the Sámi education and language. The War’s legacy left the Sámi without education in any language for several years, which negatively affected their literacy rates and ability to transfer their language
to future generations (Anaya, 2011). Another powerful era of assimilation began around the 1950s and continued to the 1970s. In each country where the Sámi resided, the Sámi populations were subjected – through education and other means – to pressures of assimilation. The Sámi were forced to give up their native language and start using the dominant language, change their values and lifestyle. The Finnish culture and language dominated schools, and children were taught only the Finnish language and cultural tradition.

The history of assimilation affects the Sámi to some extent even today, in both practice (e.g., limited chances to use and study the Sámi language) and in lack of appreciation for the Sámi culture. Thus, many Sámi’s contact with traditional livelihoods disappeared because of school and boarding house arrangements. Eventually, some Sámi children grew away from their own culture, language and costume tradition (Rasmus, 2008). A distinct awakening of the Sámi identity did not take place forcefully until the 1960s. The awakening of the Sámi’s consciousness and the political activity was an important counter-reaction to nationalism (Kontio, 1999). In the 1970s, Finnish educational authorities started taking the Sámi’s opinions into account for the first time since the missionary era (Aikio-Puoskari, 2001). The Sámi school culture is molded according to the premises brought from outside the Sámi culture. The Sámi school culture is molded according to the premises brought from outside the Sámi culture—that is the influence of colonization. The counter process of colonization is decolonization, which is closely connected to the concept of self-determination (Kuokkanen, 2009). These concepts are worth considering when aiming at realizing the Sámi’s rights to educational self-determination as a small assemblage. When discussing educational self-determination as a small assemblage, we talk about – instead of economic values and affectivity – cultural values and cultural capital.

However, indigenous peoples’ education is closely connected with the concepts of power and democracy and the questions of human rights because the way their education is implemented depends of the status as a people given to them within the nation state they inhabit (King & Schiermann, 2004). Educational self-determination is limited: at the moment, the Sámi do not have much influence on the Finnish national educational policy.

The Implementation of Sámi Education

In addition to the outer factors, historical-cultural background of Sámi education, more attention must be given to the actions inside classrooms and schools in order to practically develop Sámi education. In this paper, we discuss the inner factors, the practices in the classrooms, because our studies have focused on them while the outer factors make the framework where the inner factors can be developed. The quality of teaching depends on how well pedagogy is grounded in the Sámi culture. Therefore, it is important to (1) develop the curriculum, (2) strengthen the position of the Sámi language, (3) create culturally-sensitive local teaching arrangements, and (4) diversify the wide-ranging co-operation of parents, teachers, school authorities and Sámi communities (Keskitalo, Määttä, & Uusiautti, 2011b). Similarly, the cultural features of traditional Sámi upbringing must be given an important position in schools (see Balto, 1997).

The Sámi curriculum must be the foundation of educational development within a small jurisdiction like the Sami (e.g., Bacchus, 2008; Crossley, Bray, & Packer, 2009; Levin, 1998). Composing a functional Sámi curriculum requires information about its multiple dimensions. In functional indigenous education, the curriculum combines indigenous peoples’ culture, knowledge, and language with the best parts of western educational tradition and research (e.g., reform pedagogy and other pedagogical innovations and the latest research findings about teaching and learning and indigenous people,) has to be developed through active co-operation with the indigenous
Respect and appreciation of one’s own and others’ cultures should be an essential and cross-sectional feature of the curriculum. The most important goal is to increase understanding, tolerance, and solidarity between various groups. In addition, the diversity and cultural value of the learning materials, such as textbooks, must reflect cultural diversity. Yet, it has been shown that, in addition to the quality of teacher preparation and instructional time, “the availability of textbooks and reading materials are all empirically related to higher achievement levels” (Fuller & Clarke, 1994, p. 134).

Small languages must endeavor to gain new speakers in order to mend the history of assimilation. This kind of language revitalization can also help the Sámi, who have lost part of Sámi cultural and linguistic characteristics because of assimilation. Using the Sámi language in various situations can help Sámi children learn to appreciate the Sámi culture and language, thus developing and advancing the continuity of the Sámi culture and identity. Sámi children must also learn about indigenous knowledge, which is local and unique to each culture. It has been the basis for agriculture, food preparation, health care, education, conservation and the wide range of other activities that sustain societies in many parts of the world. Indigenous people have a traditional knowledge of how to live sustainably. Whereas, formal mainstream education systems have disrupted the practical aspects of indigenous knowledge and ways of learning, replacing them with abstract knowledge and academic ways of learning (UNESCO, 2010).

Language and the right to use it is the most essential part of cultural heritage distinguishing minority groups from each other (García, 2011; Ghai, 2003). Likewise, the Sámi language is an endangered but salient part of the Sámi identity. It is therefore important to include the Sámi language not only as a school subject, but also as a language of instruction. Because of the variation in pupils’ Sámi language proficiency levels, teaching it can be challenging in addition to the fact that there are not many Sámi pupils per school class. Some pupils speak the Sámi language fluently and can read already when starting school. The challenge in teaching is to cater to those pupils whose Sámi language knowledge is weak. One way of teaching and revitalizing the Sámi language is using various language immersion methods to strengthen children’s language proficiency before they go to school (see Keskitalo, Määttä, & Uusiautti, 2012). Language immersion is a model for learning a second language in its natural environment, learning from meaningful experiences in co-operation with the surrounding community (Buss & Laurén, 1997). It is important to engage the whole Sámi society – students, parents, and teachers – in language revitalization. Moreover, language revitalization must engage Sámi elders, master craftsmen, artists, authors, and other bearers of the language and culture to cooperatively strengthen the Sámi language.

Even if indigenous languages and multicultural programs were widely used in teaching, many problems could occur. Not only is there a lack of culturally sensitive learning material in the indigenous language, but there is also a lack of bilingual or Sámi-speaking teachers. Furthermore, due to their previous experiences, Sámi pupils’ parents may be afraid that their children will not learn the dominant language well enough if they learn in Sámi. Therefore, value work is crucial: people in the field, educators and other stakeholders, need information about language revitalization. Even today, not all Sámi people appreciate the Sámi language and culture or find them valuable. Changing that attitude is essential for fully implementing a Sámi curriculum.
Implementing the Sámi Conception of Time, Place and Knowledge in the Curriculum

In any society there is a dominant worldview held by most members (Hart, 2010), including a shared conception of time, place, and knowledge. The learning environment of a Sámi school should lean on the Sámi conception of place, time and knowledge (Keskitalo, 2010; see also Keskitalo, Määttä, & Uusiautti, 2011b). The Sámi see time as sun-centered and bound to nature (Helander & Kailo, 1999). A Sámi pedagogy can put the Sámi conception of time in the center in planning and implementation of learning. Teaching could be arranged flexibly and in a pupil-oriented manner by giving up the standard 45 minute class schedule. Likewise, the Sámi’s eight seasons could be utilized so that school work is adjusted to seasonal duties of the community. By taking this perspective as a part of educational arrangements, pupils will learn to respect and become aware of the rhythm with the local Sámi culture. This would be a natural way of making the school function as a part of the surrounding community and nature (Rasmus, 2004).

Sticking to the linear scheduling typical in the dominant culture may constrict Sámi pupils’ cyclic time conception, which is bound to seasons and season-related duties. For example, the starting point of Sámi reindeer herding is to function according to sustainable development and flexibility (Helander & Kailo, 1999). The Sámi conception of space is not bound to square feet but is symbolically circular because the traditional dwelling places, goahti and teepees, have been roundish and closely connected to nature. That should also be the approach at school: to perceive learning environments extending outside the school building. When it comes to teaching arrangements, the Sámi conception of space requires understanding the school within its wider environment. Instead of staying inside the classroom, pupils should also learn outside, in the surrounding society and nature. Certainly, the challenge of indigenous pedagogy is how to pay attention to the connection with nature in school subjects and study modules (Kuokkanen, 2009). However, these approaches support the Sámi pupils’ identity encouraging them to make choices that are bound to their Sámi identity.

The central element of the Sámi fund of knowledge is that knowledge itself does not have a goal but is valued for its utility. People participate directly in producing and distributing information. Cabins, lean-to shelters, practical real-life working situations, and camp-fires function as scientific seminars, where the Sámi people discuss knowledge and share information based on their mutual conception of knowledge. Epistemological truth is revealed through narratives, discussions, negotiations, and by evaluating actions and recalling memories and experiences. Knowledge is also tested in various concrete situations in life and work (Helander & Kailo, 1999). When applied in the school context, it means that authorities do not possess knowledge, but it is held in common and results from negotiations.

Defining Teaching Arrangements That Follow Sámi Pedagogy

Hindmarsh (1996) suggests that “the concepts and tools of analysis should be shifted from a focus on smallness as the key organizing concept to that of the maintenance of cultural authenticity, self-determination and identity, chieftainship and sovereignty.” Certainly, respecting and maintaining traditions while adapting and developing traditional knowledge are vital features for modernizing Sámi culture. The curriculum and teaching arrangements can affect these because they are founded on the wider goals and value base set for education (Mayo, 2008). Table 1 presents the special characteristics of Sámi pedagogy.

The outer change of administrative structures does not solely guarantee learning nor will the reconstruction of education alone change work in the classroom. Administrators and educators, and everyone who has something to do with education including, for example pupils and
parents, must adopt new kind of thinking and new methods before the action can change permanently. Developing the inclusive multicultural Sámi school for all in the Sámi Domicile Area is a comprehensive process that concerns the entire school body and requires cooperation between families, community and society. A comprehensive school development forms the basis of teachers’ work and motivation to commit to the change.

In addition, the implementation of indigenous curriculum challenges teacher education and supplementary education. It is crucial that teachers exhibit the necessary information, skills, attitudes, motivation and ability to work as a teacher in the rapidly changing world. Increasingly, teachers are expected to bring the best out in pupils regardless of their cultural background (see e.g., Uusiautti & Määttä, forthcoming). In addition to general pedagogical skills, good teaching calls for special cognizance of indigenous people’s language and culture.

Teacher education plays key roles in the development and implementation of Sámi education. Fallona (2000) suggests that rather than giving teachers “a bag of tricks,” teacher-education programs should encourage future teachers to understand teaching from a wider perspective. University-based teacher-education programs should explicitly instruct pre-service teachers in the cultural knowledge necessary for teaching diverse learners (Sumara & Luce-Kapler, 1996). Indeed, the development of Sámi pedagogy hinges upon skillful teachers. Many Sámi teachers act as pioneers in renewing Sámi education, but they should be systematically supported in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teaching components</th>
<th>Sámi pedagogy</th>
<th>Ordinary teaching</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The pupil’s role</td>
<td>Active, autonomous, flexible</td>
<td>Passive, responsive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The teacher’s role</td>
<td>Advising, guiding, trusting</td>
<td>Dominating, distributing information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The curriculum</td>
<td>Local, appreciates and strengthens Sámi culture</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational goals</td>
<td>Cultural-sensitive, based on co-operation with the indigenous community</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conception of time</td>
<td>Cyclic, flexible</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conception of place</td>
<td>Connected with nature, wider than the classroom</td>
<td>Classroom-bound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conception of knowledge</td>
<td>Holistic, constructivist idea of learning</td>
<td>Subject and time allocation divided according to textbooks and lessons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>Communality and co-operation</td>
<td>Formal, controlled by teacher</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Teaching Arrangements Based on Sámi Pedagogy versus Ordinary Teaching
Finland (Määttä, Keskitalo, & Uusiautti, 2012). On the other hand, since the number of Sámi-speaking pupils is low: the smallness can be considered a reason for regarding the Sámi language as unimportant. However, the language garden analogy presented in the beginning of the article suggests seeing smallness otherwise, that languages are connected to the well-being and diversity of the world.

Conclusion

In this article, we contemplated the Sámi education and its meaning for the Sámi people as a small assemblage. Smallness can be considered a strength when it comes to educational issues. In small jurisdictions, single institutions can have a much greater impact in small systems than would be the case in large systems (Crossley, Bray, & Packer, 2009). Therefore, Sámi education should be developed by drawing from its own special characteristics, such as the Sámi conception of time, place, and knowledge (Keskitalo 2010; Keskitalo & Määttä, 2011, 2012). The purpose of education in indigenous contexts should aim at pupils’ “wholistic success” (Richard, 2012). In other words, their development as whole human beings includes their identity. In order to better meet the northern indigenous people’s cultural needs, the Sámi should further develop the Sámi pedagogy. Sámi curriculum should acknowledge the Sámi’s historical-cultural burdens while strengthening the unique features of Sámi culture. The salient question is how to make good use of the Sámi cultural heritage and philosophy to find models for realizing Sámi education and to conceptualize pedagogy that would strengthen the Sámi culture and identity.

Smallness is, however, a challenge, too: the reality is that there are not many Sámi-speaking pupils. On the one hand, smallness can be seen resulting from asymmetric power relations. Children need support to guarantee their success at school and in life overall (Armstrong, Kimmerer & Vergun, 2007). Furthermore, since the “territories and populations are divided into two or more sections, they may in fact have to manage severe physical diversity problems that are related to distance and remoteness” (Anckar, 2003, p. 110) because the Sámi do not live within the Sámi Domicile Area but also other parts of the countries inhabited by the Sámi. This truly challenges the realization of education but for example Internet can function as a tool for institutions in small jurisdictions as “people can have the same access through this medium as households and institutions in large states” (Crossley, Bray, & Packer, 2009, p. 732).

In order to further implement Sámi pedagogy, it is essential to develop an education paradigm that aligns with the needs of the Sámi community. Transforming the Sámi community’s own culture and tradition, its values, stories, expectations, norms, roles, ceremonies, and rituals into school knowledge would improve multiculturalism and the inclusion of Sámi culture in schools where Sámi curriculum would be utilized. Here, we need to look further than just inside the borders of one modern nation state, for example Finland. The Sámi live in the area of four countries, and the Sámi Domicile Area expands beyond state borders. Understanding this special feature challenges the prevailing administrative and educational systems. Levin (1998) calls for educational practices that must be locally and contextually specific. Indeed, we would like to emphasize that the Sámi when regarded as a small assemblage that is scattered in the wide area across Scandinavia need to have educational sovereignty to adjust the Sámi curriculum in various practices. Language and cultural revitalization and pedagogies that further it through indigenous people’s educational self-determination could foster the bloom of the small.
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How to Make the Small Indigenous Cultures Bloom

Buss, M., & Laurén, C. (1997). Kielikylypy matkii yhteisöä kielenopettajana. Asian ymmärtämiseksi ei jokaista sanaa tarvitse tietää [Language immersion imitates the community as a language teacher. To understand the matter, one does not have to know every word]. In P. Lehesvuoto (Ed.), Kielikylyyllä suu puhtaksi [Wash your mouth with language immersion] (pp. 7-15). Vaasa, Finland: In-Service Center of the University of Vaasa.


How to Make the Small Indigenous Cultures Bloom


Explaining Whole System Reform in Small States:
The Case of the Trinidad and Tobago Secondary
Education Modernization Program

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The University of the West Indies

This paper analyzes drivers and impediments to secondary school reform in Trinidad and Tobago during the period from 1999 to 2009. International assessment data suggested limited progress on improving system quality and equity. Several policy levers and barriers have been defined in current system reform theory. However, explanations for the failure or success of education reforms in Commonwealth small states must also consider theory related to their unique contexts, namely smallness and colonial history. In this study, whole system reform theory is bridged with contextualized small state and postcolonial theories to analyze themes derived from a qualitative analysis of experiences in a major reform project for the secondary school sector. The identified barriers to change were ambiguity, coherence, and stringency and the contextualized drivers were leadership, support, and participation. Small state and postcolonial theory had added explanatory value, providing more precise insights into the specific impediments to change within these contexts.

The Context of Education Reform in Small States
In the recent past, education reform in countries of the Global South has been mostly externally directed by funding agencies such as the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). In such instances, uncritical transfer of best practice from donor countries may have impeded efforts at change (Ibrahim, 2010). Increasingly, however, the relationship between donors and recipients is dependent also upon the strength of the recipient country’s economy (Johnson, 2006; Perry & Tor, 2008). Thus, less vulnerable countries have been able to develop collaborative partnerships with funding agencies in which indigenous sources of knowledge and local goals are used to plan and direct change (Tan, 2010). The issues of successful educational reform, use of indigenous knowledge in implementation, and uncritical education transfer are especially relevant to the small island nation developing states (SIDS) of the Anglophone Caribbean (Louisy, 2004).

Improving education systems as a component of social development is a critical developmental goal for SIDS, given the need to build economic resilience to help cope with the vicissitudes of globalization (Briguglio, Cordina, Farrugia, & Vella, 2009). Traditionally, the SIDS of the Anglophone Caribbean have invested heavily in education (Crossley, Bray, & Packer, 2011). However, the comparative lack of success in achieving sustainable reform points to the need for theory to better explain education change in these contexts (Louisy, 2004; Hickling-Hudson, 2006). Considering the social, economic, and political context of small island nation states is especially critical when considering education change and development. The SIDS categorization captures two notable contextual features of the Anglophone Caribbean: smallness and islandness. The feature of “islandness” may enhance the impact of contextual features associated with smallness such as vulnerability to economic shocks and natural disasters (Encontre, 1999). For SIDS, place vulnerability relates to economic, geographic, and socio-political factors (Briguglio, 1995; Turvey, 2007).
This paper analyzes the IDB funded reform of secondary education within Trinidad and Tobago, one of the high income nation states in the Anglophone Caribbean. The focus in particular is on identifying facilitators and barriers to whole system reform. In developing a theory of change, the paper attempts to bridge current system reform theory developed in a Western context with contextualized theories of change that apply directly to the features associated with SIDS (Crossley, 2008b). The contextualized theories used in this paper are small state theory which highlights social and economic features of small island states and postcolonial administrative theory, which explores the historical and political context. Interview and document data gathered from the implementing agencies for the reform project are used to capture and document the experience of change. Themes are then inductively generated from the text data. The explanatory framework bridging system reform and contextualized theories is then used to interrogate these themes.

The Trajectory of Reforming Secondary Education in Trinidad and Tobago

As shown in Table 1, since independence, Trinidad and Tobago has undergone three distinct periods of education reform and is currently within a fourth. The first reform was a 15 year education plan, extending from 1968 to 1983. The 15 year plan focused upon system expansion at both the primary and secondary level, with a proposal for universal secondary education up to age 14 (Alleyne, 1995). The second reform was focused upon improving the quality of basic education, with funding concentrated on the primary education sector. The third reform, the Secondary Education Modernization Program (SEMP), was designed to improve the quality of secondary education (IDB, 1999). The current reform, which began in 2009, is the system-oriented Seamless Education Project, focused, in part, upon the expansion of early childhood care and education, but also on further qualitative improvement in the primary and secondary sectors (IDB, 2006).

Table 1. Phases of Educational Reform in Trinidad and Tobago

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Program</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Primary Purpose</th>
<th>Funder</th>
<th>Size of funding (in USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 year Education Plan</td>
<td>1968-1983</td>
<td>Expansion</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>38.7 million*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Basic Education Plan</td>
<td>1996-2003</td>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>51.1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Education Modernization Plan</td>
<td>1999-2009</td>
<td>Quality &amp; Relevance</td>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>105 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seamless Education Reform</td>
<td>2009-2019</td>
<td>Quality &amp; Efficiency</td>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>55 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Three loans

Improving secondary education, the target of SEMP, is critical to the developmental pathway of small developing states because it is linked directly to key skills and competencies required in the workforce (Atchoarena, Da Graca, & Marquez, 2008). However, reforming secondary education has proved to be a challenge both for countries of the South and the North (di Gropello, 2006; Supovitz & Weinbaum, 2008). In Latin America and the Caribbean, Wolff and Castro (2000) identified six key targets related to equity, quality and relevance in the IDB reform strategy for secondary education. In Trinidad and Tobago, modernization of the sector in SEMP involved both an expansion of opportunity and qualitative improvement designed to link outcomes to expanded and diverse opportunities in tertiary education, including high level skills training in the technical-vocational sector.
London (1991) has hypothesized that in the Trinidad and Tobago education system, several models of high school are in operation at the same time. Four distinct school models were instituted in the different periods of reform. The traditional schools, built prior to 1950, are mostly denominational and closely follow the British Grammar school model, with an intake of high performing students from the Eleven Plus examination. The second model is the Government secondary school built between the 1950s and 1970s during the period of nationalism. This model offers mostly academic programs, but student intake mean scores are lower than the grammar school. The third model is the new sector comprehensive schools (academic and technical vocational) built between the 1970s and 1990s with funding from the World Bank. This school usually receives students with the widest ability range, but student intake mean scores are lower than either the grammar or government secondary schools. The most recent model is the IDB funded SEMP high school built in the 1990s. These include both government and denominationally managed institutions. Holsinger and Cowell (2000) highlighted the difficulty of repositioning secondary education within postcolonial societies such as Trinidad and Tobago where the colonial version of the secondary grammar school remains the model most strongly desired by stakeholders.

As a reform project, the SEMP consisted of four interrelated elements: (1) quality improvement in curriculum, teaching-learning, and assessment, (2) equity enhancement, including physical de-shifting and upgrading of schools, (3) institutional strengthening and increased efficiency, and (4) studies for improved sector performance measures (IDB, 1999). These elements were also reflected in the organization of the coordinating unit, with project managers for each designated area. The quality improvement strand included several sub-projects in curriculum development, professional development, and teaching-learning strategies. The equity strand involved building and de-shifting schools to facilitate a more equitable and unified model of secondary schooling. Institutional strengthening dealt with capacity and management issues and included the decentralization component. Studies of improved sector performance were designed to provide information on what works, presenting a platform for further development. In the past, the funding agency’s change strategy primarily involved institutional enhancement, but for the SEMP reform, added policy levers were leadership development and improved teaching and learning.

Judging the Effectiveness of the SEMP

The SEMP Program included a monitoring framework that focused on inputs rather than outcomes, such as improved student learning (Legall, 2005). Vegas and Petrow (2008) argued, however, that improving student learning remains the most critical challenge for reform in the region at this time, especially in light of the comparatively poor performance of several countries on international assessments. It might be useful, then, to compare the performance of students on large-scale assessments in the secondary sector before and after this quality focused reform. The Trinidad and Tobago secondary school population has participated in two international assessments, the 1991 International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) study and the 2009 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). The scores are not directly comparable because different assessment frameworks were used; however, judgments on relative performance can be used in a broad judgment of improvement.

In 1991, 14 year old students were tested in reading in 31 countries in the second IEA survey. The mean age of the Trinidad population was 14.4 years and the mean score was 479 for a ranking of twenty-fifth. In this early assessment of literacy skills in the secondary school, Trinidad and Tobago was the highest scoring country in the South above Thailand (477), Philippines (430), Venezuela (417), Nigeria (401), Zimbabwe (372) and Botswana (330). Notably, all of these countries scored below the international mean of 500 scale points. In the 2009 PISA, 65 OECD
and partner countries were tested. PISA measures achievement at age 15. Trinidad and Tobago’s mean score in the 2009 PISA was 416 and the country was ranked 53. This score was significantly lower than that of Bulgaria, Colombia, and Thailand but higher than Colombia and Brazil. Thus, despite achieving universal secondary education in 2001 and instituting the SEMP reform in 1999, Trinidad’s rank position on PISA reading remained more or less the same.

Explaining Whole System Reform

Sector reform projects like the SEMP are examples of large scale system reform in which policymakers are attempting to change several schools at the same time (Earl, Watson, & Katz, 2003; Fullan, 2009). Taylor’s (2006) analysis suggested that there are multiple reform outcomes outside the narrow dichotomy of success or failure. For example, change can be temporary or transient, and not sustained over time. In 2006, the SEMP reform was rep proficient and extended to 2009. Interestingly, the reprofiling analysis suggested that much of the change to that point had been nominal, with mechanisms and structures for sustainability notably absent (Fernandez, 2006). The superficial nature of the change is also documented by Joseph (2010), who spent six years as a project manager in the coordinating unit.

Change and change theory associated with successful whole system reform have evolved differently in the North and the South. The anatomy of a large scale reform project in the North might consists of (1) government directed policy, (2) an agency involved in the reform process, (3) specific drivers of the change process, and (4) a change strategy that identifies specific implementation barriers. However, in the South, there is often much less direct government control and choice of strategy, especially if the project is externally funded. In reality, the change strategy might be borrowed, distorted or non-existent. Moreover, the lack of indigenous knowledge data or dialogue with stakeholders on the reform agenda might mean that the context of implementation is never fully captured by the plan or change strategy (Louisy, 2004).

A current explanation for system reform failure in Western contexts relates to the use of wrong drivers. Fullan (2011) identified four right and four wrong drivers. A right driver is a lead policy or strategy with a high chance of achieving the result whereas a wrong driver is a deliberate lead policy or strategy that has little chance of achieving the result. Right drivers identified were capacity building, teamwork, attention to pedagogy, and a systemic coherent vision for change. For Fullan, wrong drivers were accountability, individual and teacher leadership quality, investing in technology ahead of improved pedagogy, and installing fragmented policies. These strategies, when employed, redirect and even retard the change process and have little chance of succeeding. Fullan’s theory is consistent with case studies of successful education change in high performing systems (Mourshed, Chijioke, & Barber, 2010).

Fullan’s (2011) description of right and wrong drivers is congruent with his earlier work on the seven big ideas for system reform in education (Fullan, 2010). These seven big ideas are (1) all children can learn, (2) a small number of key ideas, (3) resolute leadership/stay on message, (4) collective capacity, (5) strategies with precision, (6) intelligent accountability, and (7) all means all. The first three principles along with the fifth are aligned to developing a systemic and coherent vision for change. Apart from policy drivers promoting successful change; an effective whole system reform strategy must also identify specific barriers to change (Hall & Hord, 2010). Although these ideas on system change were generated from school districts and national systems in the North, they might also be applicable to other contexts, including small island nation states. However, education change in the South is often influenced strongly by the political, social, economic and historical context and this must be considered in constructing change theory

**The Value of Contextualized Theory**

Context is often critical to change and implementation (Luke, 2011). It seems logical that context should matter, but the question is, to what extent does it factor in explaining system reform? Jansen (2009) observed that the history and context of the diversified communities in post-apartheid South Africa strongly influenced the process of system change. He argued that in such contexts, change was frequently challenging and contextualized; imbued with politics and emotion. It might be that examining contextualized theories of change will allow a more illuminating exploration of local barriers and point to particular levers that might forestall implementation failure. Contextualized theory makes use of indigenous knowledge and identifies specific constructs related to the context in focus. These theories may add value to our understanding whole system reform in the South and can be successfully combined with current theory used to explain system change in the North.

Two examples of such contextualized understandings of change are found in postcolonial and small state theories. These theories are especially applicable to the context of Trinidad and Tobago as a small island state with a British colonial legacy. Postcolonial theory accommodates the political and historical context and small state theory captures important social and economic issues. Postcolonial theory is especially useful when studying change because it interrogates the institutional environment, identifying structures and processes that have emerged and persisted from the colonial era (Bray, 1992; Hickling-Hudson, 2006). Focusing specifically upon the postcolonial public service within Caribbean space, Jones (1975) and Jones and Mills (1976) used an explicit postcolonial frame to develop institutional change theory. They identified value-assumptions, attitudes and practices passed on from the colonial era that persisted. These continue to act as barriers to innovation and change in the postcolonial civil service (Jones et al., 1997). De Lisle (2009) applied this framework to governance, leadership, and reform in the education sector of Trinidad and Tobago.

The constructs in postcolonial administrative theory are consistent with the work on administration in small states, as found in the work of Murray (1981), Baker (1992), Bray (1991), Bray and Packer (1993), and Schahczenski (1990). Small state theory is also especially useful in explaining system reform because it accommodates smallness as one of the unique features of several Commonwealth countries (Crossley, Bray, & Packer, 2011). The term “small state” has been applied to nation-states with populations below 1.5 million. The core of the argument is that small nation states are not just smaller versions of larger states, but are unique entities with processes that are sometimes different from those found in larger metropolitan countries (Bray & Packer, 1993; Crossley, Bray, & Packer, 2009). In the Caribbean and elsewhere, small state theory has been successfully used to explain the economic and ecological vulnerability of small island states and the functioning of education systems (Bacchus, 2008; Bacchus & Brock, 1987; Baldacchino & Farrugia, 2002).

Some theorists have argued that being small might be an advantage especially when it comes to processes involved in educational change. For example, in small states, one person might theoretically be able to have significant influence (Crossley, Bray, & Packer, 2009). In theory, it might also be easier to manage system change within small states. However, several features characteristic of developing small states may also present serious barriers to change. Bacchus (2008), for example, identified the following: (1) uneven development and variation, (2) economic stringency, (3) resource capacity, (4) communal relationships, and (5) cultural diversity.
Explaining Whole System Reform in Small States

These features have important implications for system reform in small states like Trinidad and Tobago, especially in the area of funding and resources. Uneven development and variation mean that schools in urban areas usually have better resources and qualified staff so that system improvement must be differentiated. Economic stringency means that many developing states are subject to uncritical transfer of education policies and goals as a result of external funding (Crossley, 2008a). Resource capacity will severely limit the pace of even externally funded reform because of shortages in skilled personnel. Communal relationships add a social and political dimension to implementation as will the demand of multiculturalism. Both features present a human face to the change process, with communal relationships or emotional attachments proving to be especially strong barriers to change (Evans, 1996; Jansen, 2009).

Table 2 (see next page) presents an analysis of the major features of the two contextualized theories used in this study. This analysis is focused upon institutional or organizational processes most influenced and on likely implementation barriers. The analysis also aligns each feature to Fullan’s (2010) big ideas on whole system reform. As shown, many of the features identified in both postcolonial administrative and small state theory relate to collective capacity, identified by Fullan (2010) as an important driver for successful whole system reform. The “capacity” part of this term includes technical, financial and material resources as well as the ability of leaders and institutions to catalyze change (Smithers, 2011). The “collective” aspect implies the development of teamwork and complementary partnerships by actors involved in the process of change (Prahdan, 2010).

In the context of small states, collective capacity will be influenced not only by material and personnel scarcity, but also by the nature of the relationships, communication flow, and approaches to leadership. Thus, Baldacchino (2001) described how even service functions might become highly personalized and intertwined within a single individual, thereby limiting the professional quality of the service. Likewise, Boyce (1991) described the lack of flow of information between personnel within the Ministry of Education in Barbados and noted that “highly personalized atmosphere may sometimes create problems” (p. 122). These human resource issues become critical barriers to change when they prevent the development of collective capacity.

For postcolonial administrative theory, apart from the nature of leadership, the organizational processes most impacted upon are role ambiguity, collaboration, communication, and training. These processes can also become critical barriers to change in system reform because they can hinder the development of collective and internal motivation. In small states, poor communication from system leaders and ambiguity in assigned roles for whole system reform will inhibit severely the willingness of participants to “buy-in” because the vision of change is likely to be distorted. Likewise, the lack of attention to training and the absence of collaboration will work together to further limit the development of collective capacity.

Methods and Analysis

This qualitative case study made use data gathered from individual and focus group interviews, as well as the substantial documentation associated with the program. The interview and document data were obtained from the different units involved in implementing the SEMP in Trinidad and Tobago. These were the Secondary Education Modernization Program Coordinating Unit (SE MPCU), various departments of the Ministry of Education (MoE), selected units in the public service such as the Human Resource Division, and representatives of the funding agency. In all, eleven interviews were conducted. Ten individual interviews were conducted with SEMPCU project managers and MoE directors and a single focus group with the local representatives of the
## Table 2. Analyzing Drivers and Impediments to Whole System Reform Using Postcolonial & Small State Contextualized Theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature-behavior or processes</th>
<th>Institutional Process</th>
<th>Possible implementation barrier</th>
<th>Big Ideas (Fullan, 2010)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Consolidate power rather than delegate and collaborate</td>
<td>Participatory leadership</td>
<td>Strong resistance to developing collaboration and collaborative structures</td>
<td>Collective capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Privatize and confuse policy and administration issues</td>
<td>Teacher empowerment</td>
<td>Lack of clear overall vision and direction</td>
<td>A small number of key priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collaborative cultures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Obscure and deliberately make vague policy-making</td>
<td>Purposing &amp; visioning</td>
<td>Lack of involvement in decision making at the lower level/ Poor communication of vision and policy agendas</td>
<td>Collective capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Role ambiguity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Apply multiple standards in key administrative processes</td>
<td>Role conflict</td>
<td>Unclear roles and processes</td>
<td>Strategies with precision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fairness</td>
<td>Lack of trust</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Authoritarian, paternalistic and conservative leadership</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Inadequate leadership of change</td>
<td>Resolute leadership/ stay on message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Powerlessness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Use of myth to control subordinates</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Frequent miscommunication</td>
<td>Resolute leadership/ stay on message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Role ambiguity</td>
<td>Lack of trust</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Generalist ideology resulting in the belief that specialization and training is unimportant</td>
<td>Training systems</td>
<td>Limited support for training or capacity building during implementation/Poor resource management overall and at sites</td>
<td>Collective capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Uneven development &amp; variation</td>
<td>Lack of standardization in practice &amp; expectations</td>
<td>Multiple targets required/ Need for compensatory school systems</td>
<td>Intelligent accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strategies with precision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Economic stringency</td>
<td>Material scarcity</td>
<td>Lack of funding for key events</td>
<td>Collective capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Resource capacity</td>
<td>Personnel scarcity and limited training</td>
<td>Limited capacity</td>
<td>Collective capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) Communal relationships</td>
<td>Role conflict &amp; ambiguity</td>
<td>Unclear expectations/ Negative political and social influences</td>
<td>Collective capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) Cultural diversity</td>
<td>Role conflict</td>
<td>Negative political and social influences</td>
<td>Collective capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

De Lisit
funding agency, the Inter American Bank (IDB). Several documents associated with the program were also analyzed following the themes identified in the interviews. These included the various consultants’ reports generated at the planning and implementation phases as well as monitoring reports and internal empirical studies (Andrews, Keller, & Wideen, 1998; Fernandez, 2006; Gift, 2005; Harris, 2002; Legall, 2005).

In generating codes and themes, three options were available to the researcher: (a) generate codes and themes from the data, (b) use a priori themes from whole system reform theory, and (c) use a hybrid approach, combining induction with a priori themes (Bernard & Ryan, 2009). In this study, the data analysis procedure chosen was inductive, with themes derived directly from the interview and document text. This ensured that the voices and meanings of change for the participants were prioritized and governed the development of the themes. In post analysis, these inductively generated themes were then compared and linked to the concepts identified in system reform and the contextualized theories.

Data from all interviews were first transcribed. This text was then coded separately by two members of the research team. The separately generated codes were then reviewed by the entire team and a tentative combined codebook was constructed. The codebook was then re-applied to the text of the transcribed interviews and collated documents, including consultant reports and implementation manuals. Further revision and application of the codebook was attempted before finalizing the new themes. The main analytic strategies used in the process were constant comparative and content analyses. Constant comparative analysis was used to identify latent themes and content analysis of codes was used to provide a judgment on the frequency of each theme (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2008). Each theme and sub-theme were attached to participant responses and displayed in tabular format, following Miles and Huberman (1994). These tables were used to generate Tables 3 and 4 in this paper.

Findings

**Barriers to change**

For the SEMP, barriers to change were often more important than drivers of change, consistent with the fact that many innovations had failed to take root. The barriers identified were grouped under three broad themes derived inductively: (1) ambiguity, (2) failure to connect, and (3) resource constraints. These themes were linked to each other, with failure to connect and resource constraints linked to ambiguity, the most frequently mentioned theme. Table 3 provides a listing of each main theme with illustrative or sample statements.

**Ambiguity: its influence and consequences**

This most frequently mentioned sub-theme captured the vagueness of the reform goals for both stakeholders and staff. Under the four major components of the program, several projects were run independently. Often, however, there was a lack of clarity in plans and intentions within the initial consultant reports and a failure to contextualize plans. Further, the overall change strategy to be employed was not readily evident in any of the initial planning documents reviewed. This may have resulted in the multiple and different understandings of the program’s overall goals by stakeholders on the ground. This lack of clarity was evident even among senior personnel in the implementation and coordinating agencies. Commonly, therefore, even after the initial design, some innovations had to be further fleshed out during implementation [See Table 3 sample comments for ambiguity]. Although such refinement might be considered a normal part of the project cycle, the concern here was for changing conceptualizations and intentions of the projects.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Sample statements</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguity</td>
<td>[Projects] . . . which should be winding up, but they haven’t delivered yet. A lot of what should have been delivered in most of the projects, which I see, the issue has been that the idea is sometimes not fully conceived. And therefore when it goes out to the supplier, they are now finding out things which ideally should have been seen before. So you end up now going through a cycle of refining before you actually get to implement each [project]. So a lot of the projects have had a number of cycles of refining. When we look at what the mobile labs, there are significant concerns. The whole idea of technology education is to get the children involved and yet the mobile lab is constructed as a demonstration facility. So again the point is even when you look at what it is you have now, there are some concerns about how well it was thought out, given all of [what we see]. When we look now at the process involved, we had an original tender, which went out a few years ago and a number of people were looked at and eventually they decided on one particular supplier. And what happened after they decided on that supplier was that the concept was again changed in one of a number of iterations [from] what they originally thought they needed.</td>
<td>SEMPCU Project Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure to connect people, ideas, and institutions</td>
<td>Many changes have been introduced in the Ministry of Education. The structure has changed and the leadership is committed to bring about a significant change in the organizational culture. But these initiatives are still in process, in the minds of some[,] they are not seen as a whole but rather as disconnected initiatives that could lead to the creation of many new units that could be overlapping or even outright duplications. When [an innovation] is developed, it is transferred to the ministry and [then] it’s out of our hands. We take the [innovation] from [its] embryonic stage, develop it, [but] once it’s complete, [we] move on. That’s what we did with NCSE 1 and that’s what we did with the text book rental program. That’s what happened with the [new] form one to three curricula. [And] now we are paying for the finalized documents, and we are printing them; but again we are not the owners; so we are waiting on them.</td>
<td>Reprofiling Report Fernandez, 2006, p. 5 SEMPCU Project Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource constrained environment</td>
<td>I think because we didn’t have enough project managers on the ground paying attention to the individual projects. We had one man, and this is the sense of what I got, and it’s difficult to look after all these little things when you know you also have to focus on the big picture. We must have the human resource to deal with [implementing and sustaining the innovation]. We must get the human resource. I [just] do not see us coping if we don’t have the human resource because we have just been spreading ourselves extremely thin, [and] we will be compromising the quality.</td>
<td>SEMPCU Project Manager Director, Ministry of Education Unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A failure to connect people, ideas and institutions
The second significant theme for barriers to change was the lack of connection between people, ideas and institutions. Perhaps the foremost way in which this was evident was in the lack of harmony between the coordinating arm (SEMPCU) and the implementing units (various arms of the Ministry of Education) with roles and functions often unclear in the complex process of implementation. The conflict between these two major agencies was further exacerbated by the tendency of both to renegotiate roles or to narrowly define their scope of work. Thus, from the perspective of SEMPCU, its role was solely to “develop” the innovation and “hand it over” to the appropriate divisional unit in the MoE [See Table 3, first sample comment for failure to connect]. The bar for success, then, had been lowered and the scope of “coordination” redefined to simply handing over projects rather than supporting and coordinating implementation (IDB, 1999). The conflict between the MoE and SEMPCU over roles resulted in many core implementation functions being neglected.

The lack of connection between individuals was apparent in the uneasy peer to peer and hierarchical relationships, sometimes with adverse consequences for project completion. Frequently, there was a lack of collaboration and teamwork across and within the agencies, making implementation especially difficult. For example, the implementation of some projects such as the new curriculum and assessment systems (the National Certificate of Secondary Education) cut across several divisional units of the MoE, but cohesion between the units during implementation was not always apparent [See Table 3, second sample comment for failure to connect]. The failure to connect people and structures was reinforced by a lack of connection between projects. The lack of connection between the different projects was also evident in the way project managers demonstrated leadership. This proved to be a major concern for the funding agency and highlighted the local lack of capacity in leadership and management.

Distorted implementation due to resource constrained environments.
Implementation efficiency was strongly affected by shortages in the quantity and quality of human and physical resources. The reform agenda of SEMP was exceedingly complex with more than 50 on-going sub-projects under way in any of the four major divisions at the same time. This problem was further compounded by several changes in personnel of the coordinating unit over the life of the project [See Table 3, sample comments for resource constrained environment]. Shortages in human resources might be considered a paradox, given the fact that the SEMP was designed to build capacity within the implementing units in the Ministry of Education. In several cases, however, projects were initiated and even completed without the requisite training or provision of new staff. This was true for the Division of Educational Research and Evaluation (DERE) who were responsible for the implementation of the assessment component of the NCSE.

Resource constraints also resulted from uncoordinated and inefficient planning. Indeed, the failure to set up an in-house monitoring and evaluation system was a good case study of how constraints might be artificially created through lack of planning and strategic leadership. Although an initial monitoring and evaluation program was supposed to be set up at the start of the project, posts were never filled despite more than 200 applications. Even with the extension to 2009, a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system had still not been installed and consequently there was little hard data on changes in student outcomes. Poor planning and lack of collaboration interacted to enhance the effect of resource constraints environments. This was evident with the establishment of a professional development unit. Although the unit had been set up for more than two years, its vision, mission, and goals had not been established and consequently the unit remained poorly staffed.
Establishing Contextual Drivers

In terms of drivers of change, four themes emerged. There were very few projects implemented with high fidelity and intensity, so that drivers were identified by analyzing the most critical barriers to change. From this perspective, the most notable drivers were (1) leadership, (2) planning and support, (3) involvement and commitment, (4) collaboration and communication. Table 4 provides a listing of the main themes with illustrative or sample statements.

Table 4. Themes, Sample Statements, and Sources for Contextualized Drivers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic leadership</td>
<td>[Interviewee 3] It has to come back to one point and that is the [holders of] office have to take responsibility for making sure that there is coordination throughout the Ministry [of Education]</td>
<td>Local Representatives of Funding Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Interviewee 1] That’s a key point as well because the coordinating unit [SEMPCU] is [now] implementing the program for the Ministry of Education meaning [that communication must come] from the Minister and the Permanent Secretary who are ultimately the overarching people guiding the program</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and support</td>
<td>[There was] extensive training throughout the three or four years. . . The response we got from the principals was that they wanted some kind of a little more hand holding because a lot of them still [see this as] kind of a new requirement. So even though they’ve had the training from the RDAU, they [still] wanted somebody to probably come and sit down and just hand hold until they get the couple of few plans, you know, organized. And then you have the . . . consultants coming on board for the next month that look at [giving] principals and the heads and the deans more hand holding more support in developing their school plan.</td>
<td>Project Manager, SEMPCU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder involvement</td>
<td>Part of the whole [problem] must be getting [the] concerns [those implementing the projects] and addressing [these] concerns because if you [are] not doing that you are not going to get the project to go anywhere.</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration and communication</td>
<td>Well that’s been my biggest problem. If I am [Manager of the function] for the Ministry of Education, I would like to think that everything that SEMPCU does must pass through me because if it doesn’t, then we are a parallel organization operating. In any event whatever training SEMPCU is designing, developing, implementing or executing is training for my staff so it properly resides here and SEMPCU is in my view simply an executing agency. What has happened for the longest while is that SEMPCU operated independently of the Ministry of Education . . . so much so that people were on training and we didn’t even know they were on training, and worse than that, [We had no influence in their selection].</td>
<td>Director, Public Service Unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dynamic and strategic leadership

Strategic leadership at all levels was required to surmount the many tensions and lack of trust resulting from ambiguity over purposes and goals. The critical issue was the need for a clear and coherent vision to direct and guide change. This kind of leadership would provide clarity and commitment to a small number of goals. However, project managers at the Coordinating Unit were often unsure of who should promote the big picture. One project manager believed that it should be the Permanent Secretary or the Director of the Planning Unit, but the Permanent Secretary was not an education leader and the Planning Unit had not been directly involved in many of the reform projects.

Although personnel from the funding agency attributed reform failure primarily to a lack of collective capacity and believed that a phased approach could have helped the system better achieve its goals, the quality of educational leadership among Ministry personnel was also seen as important [See Table 4, sample comments for strategic leadership]. Strategic system leadership was especially absent at the top level of the MoE, with leaders, in the face of a lack of commitment by participants, often resorting to bureaucratic and restrictive management styles in an attempt to achieve symbolic rather than real successes. Although the SEMPCU had narrowly defined its own function as one of coordination, strategic leadership was also required from the top management of this agency to deliver on the reforms.

Improved planning and support

The high degree of ambiguity and lack of experience with successful change in the system made the provision of support necessary. The expressed need for support is best illustrated in the case of school-based management and system decentralization [See Table 4, sample comments for planning and support]. The Ministry of Education had actually set up a specific unit to manage this process called the Restructuring and Decentralization Unit (RDAU). However, the RDAU also delivered piecemeal reforms. Indeed, school-based management had been almost disconnected from the overall decentralization thrust. It was clear that the training delivered was insufficient. Most stakeholders wanted additional and continued support. This issue highlighted the tendency of the implementing agencies to neglect providing sustained support for projects, a critical factor given the general lack of strategic leadership.

Increased stakeholder involvement

An emerging theme in the interviews was the reluctance by practitioners to accept and commit to the SEMP innovations. This was evident in the dramatic changes associated with installing technology education and the consequent need for changes in structure, training and teacher roles, and positions. Leaders in the implementation units had very different strategies for dealing with stakeholder resistance, but few were appropriate, given the traditional autonomy of teachers and the lack of supervisory capacity in the Ministry of Education. The leadership style during implementation appeared grounded in the colonial, restricting participation and decision-making by stakeholders. However, much of the resistance on the ground came from the lack of clarity associated with the innovations and the large number of disconnected projects [See Table 4, sample comment for involvement]. It was this ambiguity coupled with the newness of the innovations which led participants to demand continued support. However, enhancing participation and involvement was rarely considered by either SEMPCU or the MoE’s divisional units, further exacerbating the situation.

Collaboration and communication

Although the units in the MoE were responsible for different projects, several projects crossed...
departmental boundaries. Thus successful project implementation required a great deal of collaboration between units. Examples of such projects include the SEMP curriculum and the NCSE examination. The Ministry of Education had considered using cross-functional teams in its strategic plan, but this was never implemented. In reality, consolidating power ran counter to collaborative leadership. This meant that the divisional units sometimes competed for functions as in the case of the Professional Development Unit in SEMPCU, The Teacher Education and Teacher Professional Performance Unit (TETPPU), and the Human Resource Unit.

The case of the training function illustrated the dynamics of the conflict between agencies and units over roles. Three units had shared responsibility for training: human resources (HR), the newly formed TETPPU, and the institutional strengthening component in SEMPCU. HR’s function ran across several Ministries, but the Director complained bitterly about other units’ lack of cooperation [See Table 4, sample comment on collaboration and communication]. The HR director’s language during the interview suggested that this conflict went much deeper than a simple lack of communication. Informal discussions with administrative staff of the different units suggested great discomfort over the shared function. Indeed, one of the project managers in SEMPCU believed that HR did not have the capacity to manage all aspects of training and that its role in the organization was badly defined. The Director of TETPPU was adamant that TETPPU should have an overarching role.

**Discussion and Implications**

This study focused upon whole system reform within the small island state of Trinidad and Tobago and explored the utility theories for explaining reform failure or success. Crossley (2008b) has proposed a bridging thesis, which promotes use of research and ideas from the North and South. This study attempts such bridging by utilizing whole system reform, small state, and postcolonial administrative theories applicable to explain education change in Trinidad and Tobago. Although the whole system reform framework put forward by Fullan (2010, 2011) proved useful in explaining some aspects of education change in this small island state, contextualized theory had stronger explanatory power when describing the barriers faced. For example, small state theory correctly predicted the strong negative impact of communal relationships and resource constrained environments, whereas postcolonial administrative theory identified strong barriers to change resulting from weaknesses in leadership, vision, and communication. These contextual features must be considered when developing change strategy for reform projects in small states (Crossley, 2012).

In terms of barriers to change, ambiguity, lack of connection, and the resource constrained environment were the most salient factors. The lack of resources and absence of connection were explained by small state theory, whereas postcolonial administrative theory predicted the ambiguity and lack of connection. Four important contextual drivers were identified: (1) participation, (2) communication and collaboration, (3) improved planning, and (4) strategic leadership and visioning. The links between each contextualized driver and barrier are illustrated in Figure 1. As shown, the lack of strategic leadership, planning and support limited the extent of visioning and this appeared to contribute directly to the high levels of ambiguity. There was also a direct link from planning and support to resource constraint. Participation and increased collaboration fuelled greater connectedness, which in turn impacted resource constraints and ambiguity. Increased participation resulted in greater participant commitment to the reform agenda. The relationships between the variables highlighted here are congruent with other analyses of SEMP implementation processes (Joseph, 2010).
The identified contextual drivers were consistent with Fullan’s (2010, 2011) analysis of the drivers of whole system reform. Increasing participation at lower levels parallels the use of internal motivation as an effective driver of change. The identification of collaboration and communication as drivers in this context was congruent with Fullan’s (2010) identification of collective capacity and strategies with precision as big ideas in successful whole system reform. Collaboration and communication were also consistent with Fullan’s (2011) focus on systemic rather than fragmented change. Improved planning also is the key to avoiding a fragmented approach. Strategic leadership is likely to have a direct impact on visioning, an important mediator variable captured in Fullan’s (2010) focus on resolute leadership and staying on the message.

**Figure 1. The relationship between contextualized drivers and barriers to change in the study of the Trinidad and Tobago SEMP.**
This study offered rare insights into the bowels of the administrative structure for leading and managing whole system reform in an externally funded project on a small island state. Externally mandated and funded education change in these contexts often run the risk of failure because they fail to capture essential elements of the context. It could be that a high income SID such as Trinidad and Tobago might gain an advantage by directing and managing education reform without the direct involvement of an external funding agency. One benefit of this approach would be the opportunity to contextualize both goals and change strategy. However, substantial collective capacity in planning and managing change must be developed locally to support such an approach. Whether or not external assistance is sought, however, small states engaged in education reform must develop explicit and precise strategies to guide education change. In this regard, current system reform theories are useful, but are much more effective when supplemented by contextualized theories. These theories provide a clearer focus on change processes within the unique political, historical and social context of postcolonial small states.

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Small States and Big Institutions: 
USAID and Education Policy Formation in El Salvador

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This article analyses the institutional power of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in the process of education policy formation in El Salvador during 2003-2005. The results show how bi- and multi-lateral institutions are able to leverage financial and intellectual capital to guide the policymaking process and sway which policies are seen as acceptable and desirable. As is shown, one key to this influence is how USAID was able to manipulate the policymaking process by creating key events and producing key informational inputs that led to future events and subsequent opportunities to present and emphasize their research. Additionally, this research underscores how even exceptional leadership and political will at the national level can be insufficient to avoid the agendas that are at times advanced by international institutions. Finally, it is suggested that research on education in small states expand the notion of smallness to focus on institutional capacity, particularly within the context of the “global architecture of education.”

Introduction
The ways in which the power of international institutions manifests in processes of education policymaking is a particularly pressing issue for small states. That is to say, while this is an increasingly relevant issue for states of all sizes (Jones, 2007), it is an especially compelling matter for small states given the limitations of capacity and resources that often accompany their reduced size (Bray & Packer, 1993; Mayo, 2010; Randma-Liiv, 2002). The present article takes this problematic issue as its central focus, and in so doing hones in on the dynamics of policy formulation, with particular attention to the way in which international organizations influence these processes. As will be shown, this is an area that has received insufficient scholarly attention in the literature on small states. Generally, however, it should be noted that the influence which international institutions possess and exercise in the making of education policy around the world has garnered much attention (Dale, 1999; Edwards, 2013; Mundy, 1998; Mundy & Ghali, 2009; Samoff, 2007, 2009; Verger, 2012; Verger, Novelli & Altinyelken, 2012).

In what follows, the present article unpacks and analyzes a specific process of education policy formation in El Salvador. Specifically, this article takes as its object the formulation of Plan 2021, a national strategy document for education which was produced during 2003-2005 and which was intended at the time to guide educational policy decisions through the year 2021. This is done in order to demonstrate how international institutions can permeate and affect education policymaking processes such that their preferred policies remain on the agenda – even when faced with a Minister of Education who possesses a significant level of authority before both domestic agents and international organizations. Necessarily, I will shed light on the realities, constraints, and challenges that can beset national educational actors in small states in the formulation of education policy. By breaking down the process through which Plan 2021 was created, the article will go beyond simply showing that actors from the national and international levels are inter-twined in such processes to also show how certain international organizations can subtly and purposively exercise what Barnett and Duvall (2005) define as institutional power (discussed below).
To be clear, a particular definition of policymaking process is invoked in this article. This definition sees education policy formation processes as those (often) lengthy and contested processes in which national level political, governmental, and, specifically, ministry of education representatives engage – along with international actors – in order to formulate or authorize an official policy text which contains the position assumed by the state (i.e., governmental institutions) with regard to the reforms or alterations that should or will be made to the education system (Edwards, 2013). It is, thus, with attention to such phenomena that the issue of institutional power is explored in El Salvador (Barnett & Duvall, 2005).

The research in this article is based on two rounds of data collection. The first occurred between September 2009 and June 2010; the second occurred from August 2011 to May 2012. A total of 19 interviews were conducted with key international and national actors who participated in the process of policymaking; in addition, documents directly related to each aspect of the process of formulating Plan 2021 were also obtained and examined. Interviewees were asked about their involvement in and perspectives of each of the events in the process of policy formation, as well as their view of the overall process. Specific data analysis methods were adopted which facilitate the identification, distillation, and explication of influence (Edwards, 2012). That is to say, the qualitative data analysis strategies employed were selected because they serve to clarify, from a structural and organizational perspective, the dynamics of interaction and the attribution of causality in education policymaking processes that involve actors from multiple levels.

The remainder of the paper begins with a discussion of El Salvador’s smallness, followed by a review of the relevant literature on education policymaking in small states. I then discuss the concept of institutional power, as defined by Barnett and Duvall (2005). Next, I present and discuss the results of the study, with an emphasis on the dynamics among key actors from government and bi- and multi-lateral institutions. The penultimate section addresses theoretical implications while the final section offers a few concluding remarks.

The Smallness of El Salvador

With regard to the focus of this issue of CICE, El Salvador’s characteristics make it a good case to investigate the dynamics of education policymaking, as Table 1 (next page) indicates. In terms of population size, for example, El Salvador meets the traditional threshold of 10 million (Kuznets, 1960). Geographically, this country is the smallest in Central America. Population cut-offs are, of course, arbitrary to a certain extent, and have changed over the years (Hindmarsh, 1996). While Kuznets (1960) set the limit for smallness at a population of 10 million, others have set it at 5 million (Demas, 1965) and, more recently, 1.5 million (Commonwealth/World Bank, 2000). Moreover, the country is susceptible to natural disasters; is dependent on an export-led growth strategy, large trade partners, and remittances; and is, subsequently, easily affected by fluctuations in the global economy – all traits that tend to be common among small states (Atchoaréna, Da Graça & Marquez, 2008; Commonwealth/World Bank, 2000).

Of most interest for the present research, however, are not the positivist quantitative indicators that are often used to classify small states (Hindmarsh, 1996). Instead, given that this article examines the dynamics of policymaking, the central dimension is institutional capacity. Table 1 notes that the MOE in El Salvador could be said to have a moderate level of institutional capacity. Education specialists working in El Salvador have noted, for example, that the MOE has been able since the 1990s to establish its credibility and its reputation as a capable public institution by executing a number of legal, organizational, and technical reforms that improved the functioning of and access to the education system (Gillies, 2010). Yet, as will be shown, the MOE in El Salvador has
at times had difficulty in managing and controlling the policymaking processes, not least because of the huge influx of development aid and international organizations (but particularly USAID and the World Bank) following the end of the civil war in 1992 (Edwards, Martin & Victoria, forthcoming; Gillies, 2010). This aspect of “smallness” – one that is pertinent not only to the small state of El Salvador – is at the heart of the remainder of this article (Smawfield, 1993).

**Literature on Education Policymaking in Small States**

A few scholars and reports have commented on institutional capacity and education policymaking in small states. The Joint Task Force on Small States of the Commonwealth Secretariat and the World Bank (2000), for example, have identified insufficient institutional capacity as a key characteristic that distinguishes small states. Though discussion around institutional capacity tends to be restricted to the ability of a government to provide public services (Commonwealth Secretariat/ World Bank, 2000), it is also a relevant factor in policy formation. To that end Atchoaréna, Da Graça & Marquez (2008) point out that “small economies and high levels of dependence on external

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Table 1. *El Salvador and Standard Dimensions of a Country’s Smallness*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>6.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Geographic area</td>
<td>8,000 square miles (equal to Massachusetts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>US$ 21.2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>GDP / capita</td>
<td>US$ 3,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Remoteness and insularity</td>
<td>Geographic proximity to other countries; free trade agreements with Central American countries, Chile, Columbia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Susceptibility to natural disasters</td>
<td>Periodically affected by hurricanes, earthquakes, flooding, volcanic eruptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Institutional capacity constraints</td>
<td>Capacity increasing over time, especially since the end of the civil war in 1992; MOE has moderate capacity to design and implement reform; as of 2005; MOE possessed credibility and reputation as a capable public institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Limited economic diversification</td>
<td>Historically dependent on agriculture, more recently diversified into manufacturing and services. Currently, agriculture accounts for 11% of GDP, industry for 30%, and services for 59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Country openness</td>
<td>Export-led growth strategy – dependent on a few large trade partners (e.g., the United States accounts for 48% of exports and 37% of imports); large outflow of emigrants (20.5% of the population lives outside the country); large inflow of remittances (received by 22% of families)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Income volatility and poverty</td>
<td>Susceptible to changes in the world economy due to export-oriented growth strategy; 38% of population below poverty line</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aid...put many constraints on policy development” (p. 167). Crossley (2008) likewise comments that, “where small states have engaged with internationally inspired development targets...their own development priorities have often been subsumed, overlooked, or ignored” (p. 247; see also Jules, 2008). While perhaps not all small states experience an institutional deficit when it comes to policymaking – Iceland, Switzerland, and the United Arab Emirates may be exceptions worth exploring – research has shown that many of them do, including those in the Caribbean (Jules, 2008) and the Pacific (Coxon & Munce, 2008).

When it comes to why small nations often face difficulties in managing the dynamics of policy formation, literature tends to point in the direction of certain international institutions. Jules (2006), for instance, speaks directly to the matter of how international organizations – but particularly bi- and multi-lateral institutions and renowned universities – intersect with the setting of education policy in small states. He argues not only that these institutions, because of the financial and intellectual capital that they are able to leverage, can influence which policies are seen as acceptable and desirable, but also that it takes exceptional leadership and political will at the national level to avoid the agendas that are constructed and advocated by these international institutions (Jules, 2006). Jules’ (2006) perspective is particularly insightful because he speaks from experience, having worked as the Secretary for Education and Human Resource Development of St. Lucia, as a member of the team that prepared the Education Plan for the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, and as the chairman of the World Bank’s Vision 2020 Task Force for the Caribbean (see also Jules, 2008). Separately, the World Bank’s own Operation Evaluation Group explains that small country institutional capacity is at least partially limited because “the activities and requirements of multiple donors place a disproportionate burden on already hard pressed administrative capacity in small developing states, with donors seeking to impose their own...priorities and administrative requirements” (World Bank/Operations Evaluation Department, 1999, as cited in Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank, 2000, p. 42).

The present research does not seek to negate the explanations offered in the literature as to why small states may struggle with the dynamics of education policy formation; rather, it seeks to nuance and problematize them in three ways. First, this research attempts to show exactly how financial and intellectual capital can be mobilized by international organizations in the service of their policy preferences. Second, this research aims to demonstrate that the imposition of policy by bi- and multi-lateral institutions, where it occurs, may not necessarily result from direct conflict or because one party somehow coerces the other. Third, this research endeavors to problematize the notion advanced by Jules (2006) that exceptional leadership and political will at the national level is sufficient to avoid the agendas that are at times advanced by international institutions. In order to address each of these tasks, I employ the concept of institutional power.

**Analytic Framework: Institutional Power**

Barnett and Duvall (2005) – in writing on the rules, structures, and organizations that guide, regulate, and control global governance – elaborate on the concept of institutional power. In their words:

Institutional power is actors’ control of others in indirect ways...[The] focus...is on the formal and informal institutions that mediate between A and B, as A, working through the rules and procedures that define those institutions, guides, steers, and constrains the actions (or non-actions) and conditions of existence of others, sometimes even unknowingly. (p. 15)
With regard to processes of policymaking, then, the task is to determine how A (e.g., an international organization) uses certain indirect institutional arrangements and the procedures that govern and mediate their development to steer the decisions of B (e.g., a Ministry of Education [MOE]) – and perhaps in ways that are unknown to B itself.

Conceptually, as Barnett and Duvall (2005) explain, while the above definition of institutional power hinges on the procedures that govern the direct interaction between institutions, institutional power is also advanced through “socially extended, institutionally diffuse relations” (p. 16). To provide additional specificity to the present analysis, it is suggested that the relations to which they refer be understood as a variety of elements – i.e., events and sub-processes that serve to comprise the contours of policymaking processes (Edwards, 2012). In particular, as Edwards (2012) notes, these can include the conduct, presentation, and diffusion of research and information – often through specific events and committees – as well as advocacy work, processes of national consultation, national commissions, international conferences and seminars, and international agreements. The implication for the present analysis, then, is that the process of forming Plan 2021 must be unpacked to show the ways in which certain international organizations, working through this diversity of elements, are indirectly able to guide, steer, and constrain the actions and conditions of existence of those entities – but primarily the MOE – at the national level that work to develop education policy.

USAID/ES and the Making of Plan 2021

Given the space constraints of this short article, it is not possible to address every aspect of the process that gave rise to Plan 2021 nor each policy provision found in the Plan’s content. Thus, while I do explain the overall process of policymaking, I hone in specifically on the efforts of the education office of the United States Agency for International Development in El Salvador (USAID/ES) to advance its central prerogative during Plan 2021 development – namely, that more attention and resources be dedicated to students in the most disadvantaged areas. While the focus of USAID/ES’s education office arguably constitutes a beneficial use of institutional power, the purpose of the present article is not to criticize USAID/ES for the content of its agenda, but rather to bring attention to the way in which institutional power manifests. Furthermore, restricting the focus of this article to the prerogatives of USAID/ES is not meant to imply that it is the only instance of institutional power in the process of formulating Plan 2021. Rather, the way in which USAID/ES’s involvement reflects institutional power is meant to be indicative of the state of affairs more generally.

There are eight key elements through which USAID/ES’s institutional power manifested in the process of formulating Plan 2021. Temporally, they began mid-year 2003 and concluded in March of 2005 with the finalization of the Plan’s content. These elements, and their dates, are detailed in Table 2 (next page).

Each of these elements is contextualized and explained below in order to show how USAID/ES, while working through formal and informal institutional arrangements and procedures, was able – indirectly – to influence not only the process of policymaking but also Plan 2021’s final content. First, however, I comment on the Minister of Education who presided over much of the Plan’s formulation, as well as the timing of her entry into this process. An understanding of the timing of her entry and her leadership will help in explaining, both, how international organizations influence policymaking and the significance of that influence.
Leadership of the Ministry of Education (MOE)
In June of 2004, immediately after Antonio Saca took office as the president of El Salvador, a new minister of education was appointed. Interviewees repeatedly spoke to her exceptionally strong leadership style and the fact that she was certain about her reform priorities. Her adeptness and savvy were the result of over 15 years of experience working not only with the MOE in a variety of high-ranking positions, including National Director of Education and Vice-Minister, but also with international organizations. As one international consultant working with the Academy for Educational Development (AED) stated, “in terms of management style, [she] knew very well what she wanted and, like most effective doers, she had a … very clear focus on those things. The rest of the things might be interesting, might be good, but she was going to focus on her agenda” (INTACT20).[5] Similarly, an international educational expert with more than 10 years of experience working in El Salvador with USAID and AED characterized the Minister in the following way:

It’s pretty safe to say that if [the Minister] didn’t want to do something, it wasn’t going to get done, and it wasn’t going to be in her plan. The Ministry, particularly under her…was very much in the driving role. The donors had probably less influence in Salvador than they had in many countries…Under [this Minister], the donors were, in effect, sidelined. They were told what to do. They were given, you know, here’s our plan, Plan 2021, it has these elements, you guys, USAID, you’re going to help us with this, you guys, the Spanish, you’re going to help us with this and this and this. You don’t need to chat with each other. You don’t need to have donor roundtables or anything like that because we’re the Ministry and we’re going to tell you what we want…Now, you don’t have to do that, but you’re not …dictating the terms of this relationship. (INTACT21)

Table 2. Key Elements in Plan 2021 Policy Formation Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mid-year 2003</td>
<td>USAID / ES publishes a request for proposals (RFP) to carry out a study of basic education in El Salvador.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>October-November 2003</td>
<td>Academy for Educational Development (AED) produces the basic education sector assessment (BESA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>December 2003</td>
<td>A series of roundtable discussions is conducted in San Salvador, El Salvador on future directions for education reform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>February-April 2004</td>
<td>A study on inequity in the Salvadoran education system is financed by USAID/ES and completed by an international consultant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>May 2004</td>
<td>The World Bank creates a “summary diagnostic” which combines all recent studies on the education system in El Salvador.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>A public event is held by USAID/ES on the issue of educational inequity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>August-November 2004</td>
<td>A Presidential Commission – appointed by the newly elected President, Antonio Saca – produces a report which elaborates a vision for the development of education in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>January-February 2005</td>
<td>The MOE works intensively to elaborate Plan 2021.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Undoubtedly, then, in the post-June 2004 landscape, the perception is that the process that gave rise to Plan 2021 was the domain not of international actors but rather of the MOE – and, particularly, the Minister herself. The problem, however, is that, albeit unofficially, many of the elements which fed into and influenced the content of Plan 2021 were produced before Meza took office. Moreover, after June 2004, a number of USAID’s formal and informal institutional arrangements, which were out of the control of the Minister of Education, would have an indirect impact. It is for these reasons that the making of Plan 2021, despite particularly strong leadership from the MOE, was susceptible to the institutional power of USAID/ES, as will be shown.

**USAID/ES and the Elements of Formulation of Plan 2021**

Element 1: Mid-year 2003, knowing that the presidential elections were less than a year away, and recognizing that a study had not been done in many years on the state of the education system, the new education director for USAID/ES put out a request for proposals (RFP) to conduct research on the basic education sector. With this action, USAID/ES education team set out to produce “studies that would be useful [to policymaking in the new administration] – not just more research” (INTACTFG1). However, while the RFP called for an investigation of many aspects of the basic education sector, a specific purpose of the RFP was to initiate a process of research and dialogue that would place the idea of educational equity at the center of policy discussions. As USAID’s education director stated:

> The equity thing...was my particular issue...I was in a position with some power and I used that power to try to influence equity issues...The RFP that came out in 2003 did have a lot of that [(i.e., emphasis on investigating the state of education for the poorest)], and I was hired before that; for the first task, I had to write it. (INTACT2)

The contract for this study was awarded to AED, a global non-governmental organization (NGO) that specialized in health and education research and project implementation. Before proceeding, it is important to note that this RFP initiated the long process that would produce Plan 2021, albeit unofficially.

Element 2: Between October-November of 2003, AED managed the production of the study. To be sure, the resulting Basic Education Sector Assessment (BESA) covered a range of issues including teacher quality, management information systems, preschool education, and education finance, among other things. Unmistakably, however, both the introductory framing as well as the recommendations of the report – both authored by USAID/ES’s education director – were designed to draw attention to equity. The following statement gives an indication of this: “The challenge for the new administration is to demonstrate true commitment to the education of the poor...it is clear that policies applied over the past decade have not placed a high enough priority on providing quality learning opportunities for poor children” (Schiefelbein et al., 2005, p. 9). Moreover, three of the study’s ten recommendations relate directly to the issue of equity. These recommendations encouraged the government to (a) “promote access to preschool education… from the 40% of households with the lowest incomes”; (b) “set priorities to improve the quality of basic education in...zones inhabited by lower-income children”; and (c) “promote initial access, regular attendance, and retention in school for children from the 20% of households with lowest incomes” (Schiefelbein et al., 2005, pp. 16-18).

Element 3: In December 2003, with the BESA in hand, USAID/ES organized a series of roundtable discussions[7] in San Salvador attended by “more than 70 key individuals from the education...
sector” on future directions for education policy in the country (Schiefelbein et al., 2005, p. 22). These roundtables are salient to the overall process of formulating Plan 2021 for three reasons. First, as one education specialist in attendance from the MOE has stated, the roundtables were “an important factor” because they served “to reinforce...relevant themes...[and] to create a common platform of concepts, ideas, problems, and solutions” (MOENL7). Second, they “provided a good ‘point of departure’ – a clear signal, ‘guys, we’re moving forward from here’,” as one international education specialist put it (INTACT20). This sentiment was echoed by Salvadoran education specialists, who shared that the roundtables, in the months following, continued to be “cited... as an instrument of reflection, dialogue, and consultation that provided inputs to the making of Plan 2021” (MOENL10). Third, the roundtables were important to the overall process because the education director of USAID/ES was able to generate consensus on the need for further research on key issues of interest. Thus, following the roundtables, the education director of USAID/ES led an informal, inter-institutional group of researchers that included counterparts from the MOE and AED.

Element 4: Between February and April 2004, while a member of the “research committee,” as this group was known, the education director of USAID/ES financed an in-depth study conducted by an international researcher specifically on educational inequity in El Salvador (Rosekrans, 2006). Although the BESA contained recommendations and language that pertained directly to issues of equity, USAID/ES perceived the need for an additional study that would demonstrate in a more detailed fashion the inequitable distribution of educational access, educational resources, and educational outcomes across El Salvador, and particularly in the rural and impoverished areas. The idea was that this report would provide sufficiently convincing and detailed information such that it could be directly useful to and influential in the setting of priorities and the design of education policy in the new political administration. As the education director for USAID/ES stated:

> We took advantage of the moment to stick in the data, the reality of what was really going on on the ground and the needs of the country, and the equity issues in terms of where the resources needed to be. It was kind an opportune moment of intervention in the thought process of these actors. (INTACT2)

In order to increase the probability of the study’s impact, USAID/ES ensured that the findings – based on econometric analysis – were written in such a way as to be intelligible to non-researchers (Edwards, 2013).

Element 5: With May 2004 came the creation of a “summary diagnostic” by the World Bank, at the request of the departing Minister of Education. Located in this diagnostic was each of the studies that had been performed over the previous eight months (including, but certainly not limited, to those financed by USAID/ES) on various aspects of the education system. The importance of this document is that, when “the newly-appointed Minister took her position [the following month], she and her team decided to use the [summary diagnostic] as one of the main inputs for the new 16-year strategic plan, Plan 2021” (Rosekrans, 2006, p. 8). The future Vice-Minister of Education in the Saca administration shared that a conscious decision was made not to perform additional investigation because both he and the incoming Minister of Education “valued very much the research and studies” which had been produced in the eight months leading up to the change of administration (MOENL7). The external studies were seen as sufficient.

Element 6: In June 2004, just after the inauguration of President Saca, USAID/ES decided to host another event – a public forum – in order to raise awareness on the issue of equity. In
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attendance were over one hundred policymakers, government officials, MOE staff, and social policy experts, as well as the media. At this event, in addition to a presentation of findings by the author of the equity study, there was discussion by a group of distinguished Salvadoran education and development professionals. The second component of the event featured a World Bank consultant who spoke on multiple issues, including compensatory programs in Mexico, focusing more resources on poorer students, why that was important, and how it could be done. In the end, creating this event, inviting the media, and showcasing both studies and specialists which highlighted equity issues was, as the education director of USAID/ES put it, all “a way of building a momentum around paying attention to equity” (INTACT2). Interviewees repeatedly indicated that these efforts had the desired effect, both within the MOE as well as within the Ministry of Finance, representatives of which also attended the public forum.

Element 7: After June 2004, there are two more elements in the production of Plan 2021. The first of these is the Presidential Commission (or simply Commission) which was created by Presidential decree in late August 2004. This commission – composed of 16 high-profile and notable individuals from Salvadoran society – was given the task of producing a document that would contain a vision for the development of the education system in El Salvador in the years to come. The process of developing the vision would produce consensus among key actors, and would also provide the resulting content of Plan 2021 with a measure of credibility, given the stature of the Commission’s members, and the fact that the MOE would take the Commission’s vision into consideration when establishing the orientation of Plan 2021 itself. In the end, the Commission did produce a wide-ranging proposal for how the education system should develop, and it contained both macro-level goals as well as specific targets. In order to develop this document, however, each member of the Commission was given a copy of all the studies which had been conducted during the previous year. In addition, the Commission listened to presentations made by specialists on certain issues. USAID/ES’s education director and the author of the equity study made one such presentation in order to emphasis the fact that spending on education in the poorest regions of El Salvador was regressive (Edwards, 2013). The net result is that, in its proposal, the Commission reproduced the same suggestions that first appeared in the recommendations of the BESA from a year earlier.

Element 8: The last element addressed here in the production of Plan 2021 was the concretization of its content.[8] This occurred between January and February 2004 and, as MOE officials described, it required the formation of numerous technical teams to work on the design of the specific programs that would give shape to Plan 2021 in practice. What stands out is that, as the Vice-Minister of Education stated, the work at that time had to do with the “operationalization of ideas” (MOENL7). He recounts that each “group took the relevant informational inputs ... and then put together all the necessary documentation for that area” (MOENL7). Because the majority of the informational inputs which were taken into account were produced by bi- and multi-lateral institutions,[9] the implication is that the main task of the MOE in the finalization of Plan 2021 was to translate into programmatic terms the major themes that had been raised by the studies which had been conducted over the previous year and a half, in addition to the report of the Presidential Commission. This explains why the content of Plan 2021 itself – unveiled in March 2005 – reflects the issues which USAID/ES had been indirectly promoting via research studies since late 2003. For example, among the Plan’s principal goals, one sees that the MOE decided to focus on “increasing basic education services, with priority given to the poorest sectors” (MOE, 2005, p. 19). Moreover, one of the “priority actions” was to “augment grade offerings in the most poor rural municipalities” (MOE, 2005, p. 20).
Nevertheless, the MOE certainly still played a key role. In particular, it not only had the difficult task of the actual elaboration of the documents that bear the name Plan 2021, but also the duty to design the mechanisms that would make its new programs a reality, and the responsibility of ensuring that these programs were feasible in budgetary terms. Yet institutional power was still prevalent in the process that produced Plan 2021. The key to perceiving the impact and importance of institutional power in this process is to understand that the Presidential Commission as well as many other elements in the policy formation process since mid-2003 were influenced either directly or indirectly by USAID/ES, such that the perception held by the incoming MOE officials regarding which issues merited attention was itself affected. This is discussed in more depth in the next section.

Discussion: Institutional Power and Agenda-Setting
The eight elements presented above show the repeated manifestation of institutional power. This is clear when one considers that institutional power operates indirectly, through both formal and informal means. This is a key point because at no moment in time did USAID/ES have direct control over the MOE. Rather, institutional power worked through intermediary organizations (e.g., AED), informal arrangements (e.g., the research committee), incidental interaction (e.g., Presidential Commission), informative events (e.g., roundtables, public forum), and, perhaps most importantly, informational inputs (e.g., BESA, equity study). Thus, in these ways, USAID/ES was able to influence the overall process, impact the agenda for reform, guide the thinking of the MOE, and impact a portion of the reform agenda for Plan 2021.

This display of institutional power helps to nuance how we understand the influence of international organizations in education policy formation. That is, though Jules (2006), in his writing on small states, correctly argued that bi- and multi-lateral institutions (as well as prestigious universities) are able to leverage financial and intellectual capital such that they can guide the policymaking process and sway which policies are seen as acceptable and desirable, the present research contributes by showing a particular manner in which that can happen. As discussed, in this case, USAID/ES contributed to and manipulated the process by creating key events and producing key informational inputs that led to future events and subsequent opportunities to present and emphasize their research. Of course, neither those events nor the research bore the name of USAID/ES alone; in each instance, actions were either taken in partnership with the MOE and/or AED or were financed by USAID/ES while being guided and modified to reinforce its cause (as with the research report in Element 4).

Relatedly, the present research speaks to the commonly mentioned notion of imposition. To be sure, research on policy formation generally, as well as scholarship on policymaking in small states specifically, refers to imposition and defines it as one actor coercing another, perhaps by threatening to withhold something, such as development aid (Dale, 1999; Lukes, 2005; World Bank/Operations Evaluation Department, 1999, as cited in Commonwealth/World Bank, 2000). In the case of Plan 2021, however, we see that international influence manifested in ways that were not so direct. USAID/ES materially affected the process by strategically structuring events through which its perspectives and preferences would embed (Samoff, 2007). At least in part, USAID/ES was able to do this for structural reasons.

To be sure, those structural aspects that enabled USAID/ES’s influence need to be problematized. Consider the implications of the gap in time between when the new minister – who officially presided over the construction of Plan 2021 – was appointed and when the process to formulate Plan 2021 initially – albeit unofficially – began. This gap in time allowed USAID/ES to take
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preliminary steps that would impact the discussion around and agenda for reform before, during, and after the change in administration. On one hand, there is a benefit to the fact that USAID/ES and other international institutions remained engaged across multiple administrations. That extended engagement can facilitate continuity and stability. On the other hand, however, it inherently shapes the nature of the discussion around education reform in ways that are not explicit. Moreover, incoming administrations tend to operate within the pre-existing discussion, especially when that discussion is founded on a series of studies which are produced by renown consultants or credible institutions and which are then bolstered by high-profile public events that guide consensus on which issues are most pressing (and, often, which solutions are most appropriate) (Berman, 1992; Hall, 1993).

Such was the case in El Salvador. This is of note because the Minister of Education which entered in June 2004 was particularly experienced, knowledgeable, and confident. As Gillies (2010) notes, “the Minister of Education was regularly identified in public polls as the most trusted and capable cabinet officer. It would be difficult to overemphasize this point as MOE’s power to negotiate reforms is greatly enhanced by this reputation and credibility” (p. 76). Despite these and similar claims that, “under [the Minister of Education], the donors were, in effect, sidelined” (INTACT21), the present article has shown that institutional power combines with the timing of political transition such that, contrary to Jules’ (2006) assertion, even exceptional leadership is not immune. USAID/ES did not dictate the terms of the relationship, but it was able to indirectly influence process, agenda, and content in meaningful ways.

In light of the above points, future research should investigate institutional power further to ascertain the prevalence of the forms of manipulation found here – forms that may be common among small states, given the limited administrative, financial, and technical capacity they often experience. Where such manifestations of institutional power are not present, comparative lessons should be drawn as to those characteristics that enable small states to overcome or mitigate the strategic actions of international organizations and the structural limitations that such institutions are able to use to their advantage.

Theoretical Implications

Despite the micro-level lens employed in this research, a few implications for theory can be drawn. In particular, this research on Plan 2021 demonstrates the importance of understanding policymaking in processual and relational terms, as those terms encourage us to see how events generate events which impact the formation of policy (Robertson, 2011). External influence often does not insert itself through one direct action, but rather through a series of events and actions which link together and bridge across national political administrations such that, as Samoff (2007) points out, the perspectives of the funders are effectively entrenched. Finally, shedding light on the dynamics of policymaking in El Salvador and the way that USAID/ES carefully and intentionally operationalized its influence through intermediary elements gets at what Cowen (2009) labels the ‘geometry of insertion’ – i.e., the careful positioning, sequence, and intensity of elements – in education policy formation such that ideas from international actors or locations enter national policy spaces.

While the preceding comments have focused on the contributions of the present research to scholarship that brings more of a political economic perspective to the study of education policymaking, the findings of this article also have implications for another theoretical perspective – namely, world culture theory (WCT). To that end, there is one particular point that can be made: We see that national education policy does not always follow from a common world culture
which holds up certain liberal values and policies over others and which has been rationalized, institutionalized, and spread by international organizations and their representatives (Chabbot, 1998; McNeely, 1995; McNeely & Cha, 1994; Meyer, Boli, Thomas & Ramirez, 1997).[10] While WCT posits that states automatically, unproblematically, and for purposes of legitimacy enact policy priorities that reflect the content and norms exhibited by and contained in international agreements (e.g., Education for All, Millennium Development Goals), the constitutions of multilateral organizations (e.g., UNESCO), and international development professionals and their networks, the present research suggests that agency and intention are central to policy formation. Indeed, as was seen here, the education director from USAID/ES purposively and repeatedly used her power to raise the profile of the issue of inequitable education funding and to insert that issue on the agenda and in the thought process of key Salvadoran education specialists within and outside the MOE. Moreover, it bears mentioning that the issue of inequitable education funding is not an issue at the global level; rather, it was her “particular issue” (INTACT2). The push for that priority thus did not emanate from a world culture, but was driven by the personal preference of a key institutional actor.

To summarize, the implications can be stated in the following way. First, education policy formation may at times have more to do with institutional power and personal agenda and less to do with global culture than WCT theorists propose, particularly in small states, though more research is necessary to further clarify this point. Second, for political economy scholars, the manipulation of education policy formation by international actors may be less evident, more complex, and more indirect than is readily obvious, especially as policymaking spaces within small states (and states of all sizes) find themselves in new and different constellations of actors and are penetrated in new and different ways by of ideas from elsewhere (Robertson, 2011).

Conclusion
The analysis here of Plan 2021 has shown how an international institution – in this case, USAID/ES – has been able to permeate and affect education policymaking in the small state of El Salvador. More specifically, this article has highlighted three aspects of that policymaking: (a) how USAID/ES combined the strategic use of financial and intellectual resources with institutional power to engender a focus on equitable education finance to marginalized areas; (b) that manipulation of process and information – more than imposition, in the traditional sense of direct coercion – accurately characterized the dynamics among international and national actors; and (c) the fact that strong and determined MOE leadership was not sufficient to control policy formation, due both to the issue of finance and capacity as well as to the structural issue that USAID/ES’s involvement spanned both administrations and provided it with the opportunity to sustain and ingrain its perspective through crucial elements in the process. Given the questions that these findings raise, this article can be seen as research that encourages further exploration, as opposed to offering closure on the issue of institutional power and policy formation – both generally and in small states.

To that end, two suggestions are offered. First, and most obviously, while it is to be expected that institutional power is always present[11] in processes of setting education policy, it is suggested that not all international institutions are able to exercise institutional power in the ways seen here by USAID/ES.[12] Those institutions whose knowledge products enjoy particular clout, and those who have worked in and been integral to both a country’s development and education policy for many years (as has been the case with USAID in El Salvador [Gillies, 2010]) likely are able to leverage institutional power to a greater extent. Relatedly, given that institutional power operates through informal arrangements and intermediary organizations, it is those institutions which are
extensively networked which may be more potent when it comes to influencing the prevailing thinking at the national level regarding general priorities and specific policies for reform.[13]

Second, and finally, it is suggested that future research should take the lead of Hindmarsh (1996) in questioning the ways that we understand smallness, and what the implications of that are for how we understand education policymaking. As seen in the present article, though El Salvador qualifies as a small country on a number of commonly accepted dimensions, the “smallness” that has been central to this analysis has centered more on El Salvador’s capacity and the way that has interacted with structural constraints and processual manipulation. The suggestion is thus that the smallness of a country be considered not only in relation to quantitative indicators but also, and perhaps more importantly, in relation to the “global architecture of education” and the ability of a country (or its ministries) to autonomously engage (or not) in it (Jones, 2007, p. 325). Though indicators of GDP or income, for example, may be related to a conception of size as based on capacity, certainly a positive correlation does not always exist. In-depth and long-term case studies may be well suited to uncovering this aspect of smallness, how it may or may not change over time, for what reasons, and with what implications for education and policymaking.

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Endnotes

1. The year 2021 was chosen for its symbolic value as the 200th anniversary of the country’s independence from Spain.
2. Given this focus, issues of policy implementation are outside the scope of the present essay.
3. It should be noted, though, that the group of 45 small nations on which the Joint Task Force focused are developing, and thus omits small developed countries that may differ in this regard, such as Iceland, Greenland, the United Arab Emirates, Cyprus, Malta, and Switzerland.
4. For extensive citations to other literature on education policymaking in El Salvador, see Edwards, Martin, and Victoria (forthcoming).
5. Interviewees’ responses and observations are referenced in this article using author-assigned interviewee codes and numbers.
6. It should be noted that USAID/ES’s education director was able to highlight this issue because it meshed with USAID’s regional strategy at the time (USAID, 2003).
7. These roundtables were co-financed by the World Bank and the MOE.
8. Concurrent with the Presidential Commission, a process of national consultation was carried out in El Salvador. USAID/ES contributed to this sub-process by partially financing the consultants who facilitated reflection and gathered the information. Then, in December 2004, a seminar financed by USAID/ES was held at Harvard University in order to foment reflection and discussion among a small group of prominent individuals on educational issues that were of priority to the Salvadoran Minster of Education. For more on these events, see Edwards (2013).
9. Indeed, it should be noted that, in addition to USAID/ES, the World Bank and the Spanish bilateral cooperation also produced reports which were taken in hand by the MOE as it produced Plan 2021.
10. The development of world culture theory has recently taken center stage in debates about policy
formation. For a critical perspective, see Carney, Rappleye and Silova (2012). See Jepperson (2001) for an alternative account of its evolution.

11. The extent to which it is successful is, of course, another matter.

12. Other scholars have also suggested that research should discern the differences of engagement, influence, and purpose of various international organizations (e.g., Berman, 1992; Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu & Zegarra, 1990; Steiner-Khamsi, 2010; Verger, Novelli & Kosar-Altinyelkin, 2012).

13. For an indication of the extent to which USAID has been intimately networked in El Salvador for many decades, see Quan (2005).

References


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Small State, Large World, Global University?
Comparing Ascendant National Universities in Luxembourg and Qatar

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Comparing the small states of Luxembourg and Qatar, I analyze their ascendant national universities to find out the extent to which these higher education institutions reflect global norms relating to research universities – or the traditions of their host countries. Which characteristics of “world-class” universities exist in the Université du Luxembourg and Qatar University, embedded in two unusual small states that are hyper-diverse culturally and extremely wealthy? Despite significant cultural differences, both Luxembourg and Qatar have compensated perceived vulnerabilities of small states as they invest in national skill formation and the production of knowledge. Although tensions remain regarding the languages of instruction, the international recruitment of scholars and students, and sustainability, these universities are growing in prominence regionally and globally.

Introduction
Science, based on intellectual dialogue, conferences, and publications in the lingua franca of the day, is a thoroughly worldwide activity. Research universities offer spaces for multilingual, multicultural learning and for scientific discovery. Increasingly, national progress relies on successfully institutionalizing universities that promise to generate the “knowledge society” and the respective economy (Ramirez & Meyer, in press). Today, all countries invest in higher education, often in a national university. Because the world has many more small than large nations, examining university institutionalization in such countries can help us gauge global scientific capacity-building. At the same time, the “global financial crisis” since 2008 has shown the importance of sustainability – and its limits (Calhoun, 2011).

The costs of tertiary education have risen by 15% across the developed world since 2000 (OECD, 2011). Some of the most prestigious and well-endowed higher education institutions, both private and public, have had to radically reduce their teaching and research investments. Can the dramatic expansion in student services and expenditures of tertiary education institutions in the Anglophone world that have long led the global league tables be sustained – or be successfully emulated elsewhere? Given massive current financial dilemmas in UK and US higher education (see Head, 2011), striving states and institutional entrepreneurs farther down in the rankings have a tremendous opportunity to attract the best and brightest. However, this must largely be financed through considerable state investments, which were also crucial in the initial growth and world renown of leading European and American universities. Creating new institutions from the ground up may involve high costs and myriad challenges, especially for small states due to limited highly-qualified human resources and lack of economies of scale (Crossley, Bray & Packer, 2011; Martin & Bray, 2012). Numerous successful universities in regions around the world, such as the National University of Singapore (www.nus.edu.sg), have provided considerable returns from national investments in education and science (Salmi, 2009). Newly-established universities may capitalize on the freedom to bypass old paradigms and utilize new technologies.

Two nascent national universities with ambitious agendas – the Université du Luxembourg and Qatar University – are embedded in very small but exceptionally wealthy states in which each
university emulates global goals simultaneously with serving local needs, such as labor market
demand. Comparing recent institutionalization processes there provides insights into how small
states compensate being on the perceived periphery of a scientific world characterized by stark
and increasingly global rivalry. These attempts to produce an internationally-competitive higher
education institution emphasize key features of what it means to be a “small state,” and helps
to explore the transformation of barriers into advantages. The comparison of Luxembourg and
Qatar emphasizes similarities and differences in the strategies developed and investments made
in attempts to join the elite ranks of world-class universities.

From the beginning, universities have been standard-bearers of the nation-states in which they
are located, often serving to train elites – from civil servants and business leaders to clergy and
intellectuals. Yet they have also reached beyond such boundaries, be they political, linguistic,
or disciplinary, oriented as they are to universal goals such as truth-seeking and cross-cultural
understanding. Higher education, more than ever due to massive educational expansion in
societies worldwide (Schofer & Meyer, 2005), is often viewed as the most assured pathway to
elevated social status for individuals and to economic growth for societies, as those with tertiary
education qualifications often enjoy higher salaries and lower unemployment rates than other
groups.[3] Higher education, while exhibiting durable national differences (and sometimes
nationalistic tendencies, seen in the training of diplomats and development of science-based
armaments), has become increasingly international in orientation over recent decades.

To analyze the contemporary internationalization of higher education in small states, this
contribution uses available research literature to compare two relatively recently founded national
universities, striving for international reputation, that belong to states among the smallest but
wealthiest globally: Luxembourg in Europe and Qatar in the Middle East. Reflecting the theme of
the special issue, I proceed by discussing ‘smallness/ and briefly portray these two small states
that host ascendant research universities. I then discuss major trends in the internationalization
of tertiary education. Delving into the two case studies, I compare these universities in their
respective contexts, asking if and how ‘smallness’ is reflected in each national university. What
goals and functions does each national university have? Finally, which characteristics do these
newly-founded universities – striving to be ‘world-class’ – exhibit?

Theoretical Approach
Theorizing smallness, an often-overlooked characteristic in the research literature on statehood
(but see Katzenstein, 1985), demands attention to definitions, theoretical goals, and empirical
measures. Small states have particular advantages and disadvantages (see, e.g., Bray & Packer,
1993), yet many ascribed characteristics do not hold empirically, also when confronted with the
two cases under investigation here. Indeed, as Bacchus (2008) emphasizes, regardless of their
size, small states “can improve their development prospects by skillful planning” (p. 127). Here,
I discuss three layers in which national universities in small states develop and attempt to realize
their global ambitions: small state context, transnational trends in education, and the research
university locally and globally. I examine two nascent educational organizations in small states
of different world regions, being constructed within contrasting institutional environments, and
utilizing very different resource-bases to grow. These universities are similar in their ambition
to become part of global dialogue (and to compare favorably with hundreds of other research
universities), to be regional leaders, and to address local and national needs. Yet they have chosen
particular emphases and selected different strategies to reach these goals.
‘Small’ States?
Many characteristics come to mind when ‘small’ states are considered. Often, these seem to be vulnerable and peripheral, due to both the lack of large populations and little land, due to their geo-political location, or due to limited economic capacity (Bacchus, 2008; Bray & Packer, 1993). Yet, as is evident in the cases of Luxembourg and Qatar, even very small states may exert influence via elite networks, supranational coordination, and business acumen far beyond their population size or land area. For example, these countries host powerful media companies, Al Jazeera (www.aljazeera.com) in Qatar and Radio-Television-Luxembourg (www.rtl.com) that wield considerable regional influence by shaping political consciousness. Furthermore, successful small states may convert perceived disadvantages, such as the lack of considerable domestic consumer markets, into factors of strength, such as highly successful trading relationships with other countries near and far. Import/export flows and labor migrations are also necessary because these countries are not self-reliant or self-sustaining; this is also true in academic markets. Due to the reliance on other countries’ universities to train their citizens, both their labor forces and their education systems reflect a high degree of internationalization, especially at tertiary level. The two countries chosen for in-depth comparative analysis are atypical in many ways, as they compensate well for their modest physical and population size. Both have chosen to invest in founding and expanding their own national university to respond to changing global norms and economic conditions. Most importantly, Luxembourg and Qatar now attempt to convert their current economic success into long-term affluence via education and science.

As a correlate of heavy in-migration and cultural diversity, multilingualism is a further hallmark of life in these small states, although languages are also often highly stratified in their usage and prestige. Internally, less functional differentiation and tight social ties can ease decision-making and bundle resources across boundaries that in other contexts would be challenging. For example, cosmopolitan life and elite communication in both countries is centered in a single dominant city. Other strategies to compensate for their lack of military force are advanced diplomacy (as seen in regional integration attempts, such as the Benelux or the Gulf Cooperation Council) or political neutrality, which led to Luxembourg to host several European Union institutions, such as the European Court of Justice. Perhaps decisively, these small states have amassed vast wealth from their strategic dominance in key industrial sectors. They have done so whether through discovery and extraction of national resource holdings, like Qatar’s traditional pearl trade or its current oil and natural gas reserves, or in highly profitable global industries, such as Luxembourg’s traditional steel foundries, now largely replaced by supranational governance and banking. Thus, while small in terms of population and area, these states are large in resources and influence. Indeed, the countries chosen for this comparison are listed first and second by the International Monetary Fund (2011) in terms of GPD per capita: Qatar at Intl$102,891 and Luxembourg at Intl$84,829.

Both countries have fashioned high-tech campuses for their universities. University City, in the capital of Doha, Qatar, hosts a number of prominent foreign universities’ branch campuses; Qatar University’s own campus is also ultramodern. The Université du Luxembourg, while still housed in several regal structures, will soon move into a completely refurbished former steel factory site (Campus Belval), alongside the border to France. This Cité des Sciences initially budgeted at €600 million and comprising 20 new buildings, has begun to accommodate research institutes, banks and retail stores, and R&D companies. Making up for lacking private endowments, these small states are investing heavily in top-quality foundations for education and science.

Thus, these countries provide good cases to examine what remains of smallness when this
Small State, Large World, Global University?

The concept is separated from the challenge of finding sufficient financial resources to establish the material and human infrastructures that are necessary but not sufficient to create a university competitive with top institutions worldwide. In both countries, elites have marshaled support for these universities because they recognize the importance of education and science for the future development of their countries, which depends, more than ever, on transnational economic, political, and cultural networks. Before analyzing the relationship of each organization to its state, its region, and the rest of the world, the changing conditions for higher education and science – whether attempted in Europe or the Middle East – must be addressed. To what extent are these universities orienting themselves to global norms and higher education trends, such as massification, mobility, and Internet-based teaching and learning – or rather focusing on national priorities? What challenges exist for these universities aiming to become world-class?

Large World: Transnationalization of Higher Education and Science

The ongoing trans-nationalization of higher education and science tests traditional nation-based analyses of institutional change in education. Yet even cross-national analyses often discount longstanding differences in the foundational principles undergirding these complex systems. In response, neo-institutional analyses of higher education have explored the diffusion of worldwide ideas and norms relating to higher education (Drori, Meyer, Ramirez, & Schofer, 2003; Schofer & Meyer, 2005). Such work has uncovered the ideologies, values, and assumptions that guide educators and policymakers as they continuously attempt to optimize their institutions and organizations based on comparisons with other countries.

Continued growth in the numbers of youth and adults attending all types of higher education institutions is a key element behind both growing scientific capacity and the role of the university in knowledge production. For example, about half a million students, or just 1% of the youth age-cohort, were enrolled in higher education worldwide in 1900; a century later approximately 100 million youth were enrolled, representing 20% of the college-aged cohort (Schofer & Meyer, 2005). This phenomenal growth forms a critical base for the recruiting and training of the world’s future scientists and scholars (Altbach, 2005). It also supports the growth of scientific literacy and educational attainment that affects occupations, businesses, and indeed all dimensions of society (Baker, forthcoming).

While the motivations for pursuing internationalization are myriad, most suit small states extremely well, because of the aforementioned structural and cultural conditions often present. The rationale and vision shared by many governments of how to build capacity for science is easily grasped: infrastructure for research lies at the heart of the knowledge triangle – “the beneficial combination of research activity, specialised education/training and innovation that advances our knowledge” (EC, 2010a, p. 3). In terms of teaching today, internationally-oriented universities aim to prepare students for employment as well as for global citizenship, especially in states that rely to a large extent on foreign workers and the export of goods and services. In terms of research, governments hope universities will strengthen institutional capacity and broaden networks, to contribute to knowledge production on key issues, to enhance prestige and visibility, and to generate revenue (Salmi, 2009).

The Global Research University

To what extent are the young universities in Luxembourg and Qatar on the path to becoming global research universities? Are they or will they likely become globally competitive? To address such questions, the characteristics of world-class universities synthesized by Levin, Jeong and Ou (2006) are helpful (see also Salmi, 2009). The priorities most-often considered are excellence in research
(top-quality faculty); academic freedom; self-governance; and adequate facilities and funding. Further crucial factors include diversity; internationalization (foreign students, scholars, and faculty); democratic leadership; and a talented student body. Also vital to ensure competitiveness are informational infrastructure (ICT, library); high quality teaching; connection with society and serving community needs; and within-institution collaboration. These dimensions are compared as each “world-class” research university measures itself against several hundred other well-resourced and performance-oriented organizations worldwide. Universities compete in a growing number of rankings, for example, Times Higher Education, Shanghai-Jiao Tong or Webometrics, among others. Unmistakably, direct comparison and competition as well as regional coordination (as in the Bologna process in Europe) are key factors that have intensified institutional change and seem to facilitate isomorphism in higher education (Powell, forthcoming).

Both the universities in Luxembourg and Qatar are oriented toward global standards, at least according to their mission statements and annual reports, and seek to become “elite” universities. Yet the target is shifting, as the best of the best, also known as “super research universities” (SRU), have undergone striking recent development (Mohrman et al., 2008). This model emphasizes certain qualities a handful of Western universities have pioneered – extraordinary research capacity, science and technology parks, and preeminent faculty clusters. The principles upon which the SRU has developed emphasize particular qualities of universities in producing scientific knowledge: their missions are explicitly global; they are research intensive, contributing to the expanding “scientification” of all types of societal challenges (Drori et al., 2003); they focus on knowledge and economic integration and form public-private partnerships, given that university-based knowledge production is believed to enhance both social and economic progress. On the cutting edge, SRUs proclaim that they are at the forefront and should define global norms, whether related to graduate/professional training or research production and patent development. Growing budgets dedicated to these twin tasks and their prominence intensify the university’s role as a major leader in scientific knowledge production. Such universities engage in capacity-building via advanced training programs, by establishing cutting-edge research centers, and through interdisciplinary research units. Even if only very few of the thousands of universities actually achieve membership in this “world-class” group, the model they provide is significant for all stakeholders, regardless of SRU sustainability; the principle of knowledge generation builds upon the conception of the SRU as vital both to worldwide economic competitiveness and national social development (Geiger & Sá, 2008).

The emphasis clearly differs by university, with some world-class universities remaining very much an “ivory tower” and others embracing strong roles in improving living conditions in their countries (Ramirez, 2006). Depending on region and especially languages spoken and scientific traditions practiced therein, universities appeal to scientists, who more often than not publish their cutting-edge research in English and train their most ambitious students in multiple languages to facilitate career advancement. I now turn to the case studies to analyze the extent to which the ascendant national universities of two exceptional small states reflect these broader global trends in higher education. To do so, I briefly portray the country and the university and then place the university into regional and global contexts.

Université du Luxembourg

The Country
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, nestled between Belgium, France, and Germany, covers 998 square miles in the heart of Western Europe. Today, the city of Luxembourg, a banking center, is
the seat of multiple European Union institutions. Though ruled by a grand duke as a constitutional monarchy, Luxembourg is a representative democracy (see Pauly, 2011). The country prides itself on active membership in myriad regional and supranational associations of economic, political, and military integration, including Benelux, the OECD, the EU, NATO, and the UN. Luxembourg has a population of around a half million people, of which three-fifths are natives. Reflecting its varied heritage of Romance and Germanic Europe, the country is trilingual, with Lëtzebuerghesch, German, and French the official languages. With a large immigrant population, mainly from other European countries, Luxembourg is predominantly Roman Catholic. Daily, many tens of thousands of workers commute from surrounding countries, bringing their native language (mainly French and German) and cultural sensibilities with them. More than half the workforce consists of cross-border workers. Luxembourg benefits from a diversification of industrial sectors (from financial services and iron and steel production to information technology and telecommunications) and low unemployment rates. Building on its strong financial industry and the EU institutions, Luxembourg has the second highest per capita GDP worldwide (IMF, 2011).

The University
The Université du Luxembourg (UL), building upon the legacies of several postsecondary training institutes, was founded in 2003 as a private, government-dependent institution (établissement public) directed by a seven-member council, the Conseil de Gouvernance. Most funding is provided by the state. From the very beginning, Luxembourg has relied heavily on student mobility and tertiary education provided in neighboring countries to supply qualified personnel, especially teachers, judges, and physicians; this has generated cultural hybridity (Rohstock, 2010, p. 44). Although the university’s antecedents can be traced back to the early 1800s, when the national school system was first established, it was not until 1974 that the Centre universitaire du Luxembourg, hosting several humanities and social science departments, was opened alongside teacher training institutes and an Institut supérieur de technologie (IST), which offered technological courses of study (Rohstock, 2010).

As its three founding principles, the contemporary university’s leaders chose multilingualism, interdisciplinarity, and internationalization. These foci accentuate the strategy developed to capitalize on Luxembourg’s history as a trading crossroads, its contemporary situation of linguistic and cultural diversity, as well as to compensate being a new university in a very small state through strategic investments in promising research areas. The mission statement emphasizes that as “a small-sized institution with an international reach, [it] aims at excellence in research and education. In a reduced number of research fields identified by its successive strategic plans, its ambition is to be among the world’s top universities. UL intends to be innovative, centered on research, primarily interested in the quality of the structure it offers to its students, its teachers and its researchers and attentive to the needs of the society around it” (University of Luxembourg, 2005). With nearly 100 nationalities represented among the 5,700 students (2010/11), around half of whom are not natives, the university is extraordinarily diverse. Likewise, the 189 faculty members represent 20 nationalities. If the country has three official languages, the university replaces the local language with the current international scientific lingua franca: English. Regardless of nationality, each student pays tuition of just €200 per semester. Thus, the state ensures that its national university can attract students from around the world.

Aiming to develop strengths based on both international trends and local/regional needs, the university has three faculties, all decidedly multidisciplinary: (1) Science, Technology, & Communication; (2) Law, Economics, & Finance; and (3) Humanities, Arts, & Education. Further, two major interdisciplinary research centers aim to advance the cutting-edge internationally,
namely the ‘Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust’ focusing on information systems, and the ‘Luxembourg Centre for Systems Biomedicine’ (the latter with €140m of funds over five years). The university’s total budget for 2008 was €71.3 million, with external funding of 14% (€13m), but both have grown in recent years. By identifying in advance the most promising research areas that also reflect Luxembourg’s economic and geographic contexts, the university concentrates its resources.

A major state investment has established a new campus, in the southern city of Esch-sur-Alzette. Belval, located on the brownfield site of Luxembourg’s formerly dominant steel industry, is set to unify the faculties in state-of-the-art facilities rising next to historically-preserved blast furnaces. Symbolizing issues of sustainability in educational, ecological, and financial terms, this campus requires considerable, long-term commitments on the part of government. For Luxembourg, recycling a former industrial site as the incubator for its future economic strength represents its approach. The university’s strategic plans call for an ecologically-sustainable campus. This may be realized if faculty, students, and staff live and work there and use the on-campus rail station; however, Luxembourg has among the highest automobile densities per capita in the world. The university actively participates in international networks on sustainable campus development; in fact, the ‘Sustainable Campus Charter’ of the International Sustainable Campus Network (ISCN) and the Global University Leaders Forum (GULF) was prepared there. Regarding financial sustainability, the current fiscal difficulties in Europe pose a threat to the livelihood not only of the university, but of the country and the region. Simultaneously, the university promises desired economic diversification.

In terms of recent and planned reforms, the role of the Ministry of Culture, Higher Education and Science has shifted from administration to a more strategic one of defining the overall framework and main goals of the university. In future, the university is to counteract social selectivity and “attract more young people from underprivileged SES backgrounds into higher education” (EC, 2010b, p. 13). This goal, shared by many expanding tertiary education systems throughout the world is, however, counteracted by differentiation that often diverts students from lower-class backgrounds into less prestigious tiers (Shavit, Arum, & Gamoran, 2007). Yet in small countries with only one university, the crucial distinction is whether to study at home – or to go abroad, and today all BA students are expected to do so for a semester.

The university aims to achieve excellence in research by recruiting top faculty members. Although the funds provided by the national government are considerable (top-ranked in Europe), organizational autonomy is very low (www.university-autonomy.eu). In a hyper-diverse society, internationalization has been present from the start. A key challenge is to attract a talented undergraduate student body, since the tradition in Luxembourg was to study abroad. While the small classes, low tuition fees, and high quality of the campus and faculty should attract students, questions of sustainability will rise. Especially given the research focus on information technology, professional informational infrastructure is good, but the library holdings remain quite limited. The transfer of knowledge and meeting community needs is an area requiring investment, as is within-institution collaboration among the campuses, currently spread across the country.

The University in Global Context
Not even a decade after it opened its doors, the university is ranked 867th globally (Webometrics, 2012). The government mainly evaluates the university by performance indicators for high-impact research. Its research output is measured in publications in peer-reviewed journals and the journals’ impact index; the numbers of citations, patents/licenses; published dissertations;
and participation in European research funding programs, such as the European Union FP7 and the European Research Council (EC, 2010b). In terms of teaching, only the indicators of teacher/student ratio and overall modules organized are counted (EC, 2010b). In its quest for reputation, the most important scientific currency, the university places considerable emphasis on international agreements. Funded by the EU, the network of universities of the “Greater Region” connects universities in countries that share borders (www.uni-gr.eu). In terms of bilateral cooperation worldwide, the University has agreements with organizations in more than twenty countries. In sum, Luxembourg has invested both considerable capital and strategic planning in the establishment of its national university, aiming to compete on a global scale by concentrating its resources, both intellectual and financial, and by building on the country’s strengths and priorities. Alliances with other universities in the region and internationally underscore its international outlook.

Qatar University

The Country
The State of Qatar, occupying a 4,416 sq. mile peninsula surrounded by the Persian Gulf, shares a border with Saudi Arabia to the south. Formerly a British protectorate, Qatar gained its independence in 1971. An absolute monarchy, it has been ruled by the Al-Thani family since the mid-1800s (see Fromherz, 2012). It is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab League. Although this small Gulf state has a rapidly growing population (currently around 1.7 million), only about 15% (roughly 250,000) are ethnic Qataris. A traditionally Muslim country, today Qatari society is characterized by multiple cultures. Its native Arabic society and the bulk of its population and labor force, migrants mainly from Asia (especially India and Nepal), are highly stratified, with the latter facing exploitation (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Despite the nearly-complete reliance on the work of migrants, a government priority is “Qatarization” of the private sector and professional jobs currently held mainly by expatriates (Rubin, 2012). Considerable social and economic investments are needed to implement Qatar’s ambitious national development program – the Qatar National Vision 2030 (Qatar, n.d.), especially because of the lack of an “indigenous knowledge economy” and only several decades of educational expansion (Donn & Al Manthri, 2010). Financed by enormous resources derived from its oil and natural gas reserves, Qatar has the world’s highest per capita GDP in the world (IMF 2011).

The University
Qatar University (QU) was first established in 1973 as a college of education. More recently, the 2,500-acre campus “Education City,” funded by the Qatar Foundation, hosts diverse education and research organizations, attracting Western universities to establish international branch campuses (IBCs) (Lane & Kinser, 2011). As of 2012, the following universities operate there, bringing expertise in targeted fields: Carnegie-Mellon (computer science), Georgetown (foreign affairs), HEC Paris (business), Northwestern (journalism), Texas A&M (engineering), University College London (museum studies), Virginia Commonwealth (design), and Weill-Cornell (medicine). These institutions draw the elite of Qatari students who seek “the gold standard” in tertiary education (Lewin, 2008). In part to enhance Qatar University’s competitiveness given the exclusive offerings of the mostly American university branch campuses, since 2003 the university has enjoyed considerable government funding as part of the country’s major development program. This significant reform has transformed and expanded the university, which aims to achieve the vision that Qatar University “be a model national university that offers high quality, learning-centered education to its students” (Moini et al., 2009, p. 75).
Governed by the Supreme Education Council (SEC), the university was originally controlled by a state administration with little autonomy due to considerable ministerial oversight and control. Today, the Emir continues to be the “Supreme Head” of the University, with President Prof. Sheikha Al-Misnad, herself an alumna (1977), responsible for the curricular and organizational transformation of Qatar University into a leading university in the Arab world. The IBCs of Education City, as well as further institutions not housed there, bring their own principles, personnel, and “student cultures” (Wood, 2012), even as they contribute their homegrown reputations to Qatar. By contrast, QU clearly reflects national priorities and is set to facilitate their attainment.

If the vision is to serve national needs, the mission statement emphasizes that Qatar University is “the national institution of higher education in Qatar. It provides high quality undergraduate and graduate programs that prepare competent graduates, destined to shape the future of Qatar. The university community...contribute[s] actively to the needs and aspirations of society” (Moini et al., 2009, p. 75). Furthermore, QU seeks to “promote the cultural and scientific development of the Qatari society while preserving its Arabic characteristics and maintaining its Islamic cultural heritage...The University shall provide the country with specialists, technicians, and experts in various fields, and equip citizens with knowledge and advanced research methodologies” (Moini et al., 2009, p. 75). While crucial to remember that education in Qatar has only been formalized beginning in the 1950s, with the state replacing within-family instruction, this development is being cemented with tremendous investments – US$4bn was spent on education and science in 2008 alone (Fromherz, 2012, p. 152). “Qatar has set the bar high with its goal of becoming a knowledge-producing economy at record speed. But the country holds some strong cards: a clear vision, highly committed leadership, and abundant resources to devote to the cause” (Rubin, 2012, p. 4). While QU has long been considered among the better universities in the Middle East, the recent reforms have counteracted what many viewed as deteriorating performance (Moini et al., 2009).

The university, emphasizing undergraduate teaching in particular, had 8,706 students in 2009/10, with 38% being Qatari nationals and three-quarters women. Students of Qatari origin study tuition-free. Students are taught by a large group of 653 faculty (all ranks), with non-Qatars (70%) on one-year contracts and tenure held by Qatari faculty members (30%) (QU, 2010); thus the teaching staff is highly stratified by origin. QU’s structure reflects language divisions, consisting of Colleges in Education (Arabic); Humanities and Social Sciences (Arabic); Science (English); Sharia, Law, and Islamic Studies (Arabic); Engineering (English); and Business and Economics (English). Given its department of computing and engineering, solid ICT infrastructure is provided. Addressing the needs of its community has been a hallmark of an institution located in a society experiencing massive demographic and economic change.

In terms of resources, Qatar has chosen to use its wealth to rapidly develop a high-quality education system – and to fund scientific research with 2.8% of GDP. In 2009/10, the research funding for QU amounted to US$60m (QU, 2010). The university sets out to improve its teaching and research by recruiting researchers globally. Generous funding from the national government (and through Qatar Foundation, especially for Education City) provides excellent facilities. Yet, both academic freedom and self-governance remain partial; the university is not led democratically. Recognizing the discordance with global academic norms, reform initiatives aim to strengthen these dimensions to which most world-class universities conform. As in Luxembourg, the internationalization of all status groups is the rule due to the extraordinarily diverse population of the country, although there are inequalities; for example, only Qataris can study at QU free-
of-charge. Attracting a talented undergraduate student body is difficult because traditionally the brightest students have gone abroad for their studies. The large majority of female students at QU results from their higher probability of seeking tertiary educational opportunities close-to-home. Gender is a major cleavage that leads to pervasive and persistent social inequalities. In QU’s gender-segregated libraries, the holdings are growing.

Questions of sustainability are particularly trenchant here. In a desert biome on a peninsula surrounded by the Persian Gulf, Qatar’s capital city Doha boasts many of the world’s tallest skyscrapers; the construction industry thus far has not embraced sustainable design and green architecture. The country has tremendous fossil fuel resources. Its inhabitants have by far the highest carbon dioxide emissions per person in the world, exacerbated by freely-provided utilities and the highest water usage per capita worldwide – although Qatar must use intensive desalination to ensure that precious water supply. Exemplifying recent developments of such issues, the Qatar Sustainability Assessment System (QSAS) provides a toolkit to evaluate sustainability in built environments; this requires far more attention in future.

Long-planned initiatives (e.g., the Qatar National Vision 2030) are balanced by recent reforms. In country and university, Arabic and English are the two key languages, although this duality is contentious. In early 2012, the SEC decision to switch some disciplines from English to Arabic instruction was accompanied by controversy that reflects fears among some groups that younger Qataris are neglecting their heritage and Arabic language skills in favor of the necessity of English for global communication and knowledge transfer (Harron, 2012). The debate about the language of instruction emphasizes the continuous challenge of serving different groups and aiming to place graduates in labor markets at home and abroad.

The University in Global Context

In the Webometrics (2012) ranking, Qatar University placed 1,824th in the world and 21st in the Arab World. In annual reports, while research is underscored, concrete performance indicators seem less important than those of teaching: presenting successful accreditation of courses of study; listing new programs, events, and projects; and monitoring awards, partnerships, and university innovations (QU, 2010; 2011). QU has chosen to focus on preparing qualified graduates for Qatar’s dramatically expanding labor market, as do the Western universities’ branch campuses. As in Luxembourg, it remains to be seen when these considerable investments in education and science will provide QU with a reputation as a world-class university.

In sum, Qatar has chosen a two-pronged strategy: to entice Western universities to bring their know-how and reputations and to establish and grow its own national higher education institution. In the past few decades, Qatari education, economy, and society have experienced transformative growth. The fit between the diverse international branch campuses of Education City and the local initiatives to strengthen Qatar University and the goals of the family-led state will require further adjustment. Similar to the Luxembourg case, significant economic prosperity provides leaders with a vision of myriad opportunities to construct some of the newest and most impressive university campuses anywhere. Yet issues of linguistic plurality, environmental and financial sustainability, and organizational autonomy remain challenging – and international scientific collaborations and reputations must be established over the long-term.

Conclusions

In this paper, I compared the kind of “small state” that Luxembourg and Qatar represent. Unlike many other small states, these two countries are unusually international, ethnically diverse, and
prosperous. Almost completely dependent on international trading relationships and global markets for capital and labor, both countries have experienced extraordinary recent growth. Over the past decade, Luxembourg and Qatar have further intensified their investments in education and science. The reactions of the institutional actors in each country to perceived vulnerabilities of small population, small size, or peripheral geo-political location show that Luxembourg and Qatar can compensate these features with economic prowess and media influence – and by taking the lead in regional governance, whether the European Union or the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The two ascendant national universities reflect their host countries, whether in the disciplines and research areas chosen or languages spoken; yet their ambitions are not limited to their national contexts. Indeed, governments of Luxembourg and Qatar seem to have found promising mechanisms to compete globally, such as significant investment in selected, high-potential, and often multidisciplinary research fields; the building of cutting-edge campus facilities; and establishment of a range of undergraduate and graduate programs to train local elites and others interested in these universities’ dynamic organizational contexts. Of course, many characteristics of the strongest universities took decades to develop, but both of these young organizations have many of the necessary but insufficient conditions to achieve that “world-class” status.

Tensions remain regarding national demands for language representation in curricula and university operations. Recruitment of international scholars and students to these lesser-known universities takes considerable effort, as do international and regional partnerships of differing depth and significance. Due to direct state involvement, organizational autonomy is lacking. Finally, the periods required to convert material resources into human capital or scientific advancement and reputation are much longer than the government-directed investment plans suggest. Arguably, competition in tertiary education and scientific activity will continue to increase worldwide, especially due to the massive expansion of education and science systems in East Asia, such as in China, South Korea, Taiwan, and elsewhere. While both Luxembourg and Qatar have shown their dedication to fund ambitious experiments in capacity-building via university institutionalization, questions surrounding sustainability simultaneously arise, with the University of Luxembourg explicitly debating these issues. Whatever the future holds, these young universities are now the official national standard-bearers. These cases, along with other small societies like the Nordic countries and Singapore, suggest that not the size of a host country, but rather a prescient vision and concentrated resources are the crucial factors to enable cutting-edge science and higher education today.

The examples provided by these strong small states raise doubts about the often-posed association between small population or geographic area and poverty and geo-political marginality. Despite their historical, social and political differences and the similarities of being extraordinarily economically successful in recent times, leaders in both Luxembourg and Qatar have accepted the principle that the future belongs to education and science, though they have not granted their universities full autonomy. Elites in these countries believe that to be successful, they must have a research university that adequately meets national needs – and can compete internationally.

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Endnotes

1. The net long-term economic advantage of having a tertiary degree instead of an upper secondary degree is more than US$175000 for a man and just over US$110000 for a woman; OECD average (OECD, 2011: Indicator A9).

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Overcoming Smallness through Education Development: A Comparative Analysis of Jamaica and Singapore

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University of Southern California

Between 1960 and 2010, Singapore’s real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita skyrocketed from $4,383 to $55,862, while Jamaica’s barely increased from $6,417 to $8,539. It is plausible that differing rates of GDP growth are associated with differences in the development of education systems but causally the linkage is not well understood. Using a comparative analysis of education in Jamaica and Singapore, this paper explores the critical factors in education development in small states. This article argues that education development can substantively help small states overcome many of the limitations of their smallness that are exacerbated in an increasingly global economy. Three significant factors that shaped the education development of Jamaica and Singapore are identified. First, the timing of reforms is important, not just the content of educational reforms. Second, having a vocational strategy is key. Third, a balanced, forward-looking education development strategy that closely ties education, economic and national development is crucial.

Introduction
Since the 1980s, the educational problems facing small states have garnered the special attention of many agencies such as the Commonwealth Secretariat and World Bank (Bacchus, 2008; Bray & Packer, 1993; Crossley, Bray, & Packer, 2011). Financial, cultural and political globalization have exacerbated the vulnerabilities and fragilities of these small states in the twenty-first century, making the success of small states largely dependent on the quality of their human resources (Bacchus, 2008; Mayo, 2010). Despite the heightened interest, many of the publications on small states fail to capture the contribution that education can make to the development of small states in light of increasing globalization (Bacchus, 2008). Diverging economic growth rates among small states compel researchers and policymakers to re-conceptualize the limitations of ‘smallness’ and the role of education development strategies in overcoming constraints facing small nation states in an increasingly global economy.

Several studies have focused on the relationship between economic growth rates and the quality of education (Aghion, Caroli, & Garcia-Penalosa, 1999; Barro, 1991; Hanushek, 2008; Hanushek & Woessmann, 2007; Sen, 1999) but there are relatively few comparisons between these metrics and national strategies for education development especially among developing countries. Consider two cases. In 1960, Jamaica had a higher real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita than Singapore. Over the next 50 years, Singapore’s real GDP per capita grew exponentially compared to Jamaica’s anemic economic performance. During this period, Singapore’s GDP skyrocketed from $4,383 to $55,862, while Jamaica’s barely increased from $6,417 to $8,539 (Heston, Summers & Aten., 2012). Figure 1 shows the real GDP per capita (at Purchasing Power Parity 2005 constant prices) for Jamaica and Singapore between 1960 and 2010.

How do two countries with similar starting points in 1960 have such divergent economic development outcomes over the next half-century? This article is an exploratory study based on secondary sources including analysis of cross national data from the World Bank and Penn World Tables to detect patterns in education and economic metrics, document analysis of policy briefs from the Ministries of Education and a review of previous literature on education development.
Overcoming Smallness through Education Development

in both countries. The central research question guiding this study is: What are the critical factors that shape education development in small states? Although this paper posits that quality education is a core component of economic and national development, economic growth is a complex endeavor and the relationship described is based on consistent covariance rather than implied causality.

Education development is defined by changes in access, equity, efficiency and quality. This definition is operationalized by outcome measures including literacy rates and average years of school attainment as well as inputs such as public spending on education. There is a conscious focus on factors not directly related to teacher quality and recruitment since a growing body of research has confirmed the importance of teacher quality in student achievement and education development strategies (Barber & Moursched, 2007; Coleman, 1966; Murnane, 1991; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Cain, 2005). Though population size is the standard defining characteristic, small states can also be defined by location, geo-political positioning and economic capacity (Bacchus, 2008; Bray & Packer, 1993; World Bank, 2000). This article uses a population size of below five million (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2009; Crossley et al., 2011) and islands with a geographical mass of less than 12,000 square kilometers to define countries as small states. Both Jamaica and Singapore meet these criteria.
This article offers three plausible grounded hypotheses for the critical factors that shaped the education development of Jamaica and Singapore. The factors posited are not proven conclusions but claims requiring further empirical support and analysis. First, the timing of educational reforms (the when) and not just their content (the what) is important. It is plausible that the varying education policies of each country in the immediate post-independence era (1960-1980) have had lasting effects. Second, having a vocational strategy is key. Singapore’s extensive efforts in vocational education signaled that the political leadership was thinking consciously about linking education and labor markets. Third, a balanced, forward-looking education development strategy that closely ties education, economic and national development is crucial. In what follows, the varying contexts of the two countries are outlined. Next, a brief selective history of education development in Jamaica and Singapore from 1960 through to 2010 is provided. The three aforementioned hypotheses in the development of education systems in small states are discussed using the experiences of Jamaica and Singapore.

Similar Starting Points, Contrasting Contexts
Jamaica and Singapore provide a comparison between countries with compelling similarities and differences. Both nations are islands, members of the Commonwealth and former British colonies that started their development journey in the 1960s. However, both countries had vastly different roles within the British Empire that shaped their post-independence policy directions and path to economic growth. Indeed, the education development of small states cannot be separated from the impact of social, cultural and geo-political factors (Crossley & Holmes, 1999). Thus, in comparing Jamaica and Singapore, a few points of context are important as they may partly explain the disparities in economic growth as well as contextualize the education policies pursued by each country.

Jamaica and Singapore gained independence in 1962 and 1965 respectively, but with different colonial legacies. In contrast to the assimilation process that complemented colonization in the Americas, Singaporeans in the colonial era could freely practice their own religions and speak their own language (Boon & Gopinathan, 2006). Jamaica was under British colonial rule longer than Singapore and both countries had different economic drivers. It is difficult to assess how the infrastructure in each country differed in 1960 because of limited primary and secondary data, however, it is plausible that colonial experiences play a role in post-independence education strategies. Table 1 summarizes the basic economic, political and social features of Jamaica and Singapore from 1960 to 2010.

Jamaica and Singapore had different histories of colonialism by virtue of the different roles each colony played in the British Empire. Jamaica provided raw materials and markets for the British Empire while Singapore was mainly a regional trade node. Jamaica was a plantation society with slavery and a predominantly black population. As was typical of countries in the Anglophone Caribbean, education in Jamaica was restricted to the planter class and a tiered system of educational opportunities persisted into the post-independence period (Evans, 2001; Jules, 2010). In contrast, Singapore was a diverse state composed of Chinese, Tamil and Malay ethnic groups with no slavery.

Both countries inherited the Westminster parliamentary system but over the next 50 years, Jamaica maintained a two-party democracy compared to Singapore’s de facto one party democracy. Between 1960 and 2010, Jamaica had 11 parliamentary elections with eight different prime ministers and the government has changed several times between the two major political parties. On the contrary, Singapore has had three prime ministers and the same party has been
Table 1. *Political, Economic, Education and Cultural Features of Jamaica and Singapore: 1960-2010*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land area</td>
<td>Approx. 11,000 square kilometers</td>
<td>Approx. 700 square kilometers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British colonial rule from</td>
<td>1655 to 1962</td>
<td>1819 to 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieved independence</td>
<td>August 1962</td>
<td>August 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary system</td>
<td>Bicameral parliament is legislative branch of government in parliamentary democracy</td>
<td>Unicameral parliament is the legislative branch of the government in parliamentary republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>8 different prime ministers in competitive multiparty elections</td>
<td>3 different prime ministers; People’s Action Party has won every election with majorities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP (1960)</td>
<td>$6,417</td>
<td>$4,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP (2010)</td>
<td>$8,539</td>
<td>$55,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resources</td>
<td>Bauxite and alumina</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main economic activities</td>
<td>Tourism, bauxite export, agriculture (sugar, banana, coffee), remittances</td>
<td>Manufacturing, services, hi-tech industries, trade. In 1960, mainly trade-based economy; in 1980, economy diversified to manufacturing, financial services oil refinery. In 2010, a highly developed market-based economy with manufacturing, services and high-technology driven industries, highest trade to GDP ratio in the world with more than 7000 multinational corporations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Ed. role</td>
<td>Oversees formulation and implementation of all policy</td>
<td>Oversees formulation and implementation of all policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Literacy</td>
<td>Adult literacy rate (1999) – 80%</td>
<td>Adult literacy rate (1980) – 83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adult literacy rate (2009) – 86%</td>
<td>Adult literacy rate (2009) – 95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure on education (%) of GDP</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (1960)</td>
<td>1.6 million</td>
<td>1.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (2010)</td>
<td>2.8 million</td>
<td>4.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority of population is of</td>
<td>African descent: 95% Black</td>
<td>Approximately 3 million people are locally born signaling an influx of foreigners and large number of immigrants. Majority of population is composed of three ethnic groups: Chinese (74%), Indian (13%) and Malay (9%). There are four official languages: English, Malay, Tamil and Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaican patois is national</td>
<td>and most spoken on the island but English is the official language</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emigration is heavy and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consistent to US, UK and Canada</td>
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</tr>
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Sources: Aldcroft, 2000; CIA Factbook, 2012; Heston et al., 2012 (Penn World Tables, 7.1); World Bank (2011).
in government over the last 50 years. Given that social and political instability are central factors that may curtail the development of small states (Wint, 2002), education development strategies in Singapore were undoubtedly influenced by the stability of the political leadership of Singapore’s first Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, who remained in power for nearly three decades. Since 1972, Freedom in the World, a comparative assessment of global political rights and civil liberties, has consistently rated Jamaica as ‘free’ while Singapore is rated as ‘partly free’; Jamaica, unlike Singapore, is classified as an electoral democracy (Freedom in the World, 2012).

In many instances, the agenda of education in small states is significantly influenced by paradigms advanced by multilateral organizations instead of endogenous development imperatives (Jules, 2006). Thus, geo-political positioning and the impact of international financial institutions, regional groups and other special interests on education development strategies may also vary between the two countries. Singapore started the development process in the 1960s in a fragile geo-political environment that prompted rapid industrialization with an abundance of unskilled, low cost labor (Ashton, Green, Sung, & James, 2002). Historically, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), a regional organization of Caribbean states formed in the 1970s, has played a limited role in the education policy of individual countries (Jules, 2010). Since Education for All (EFA), an international initiative launched in 1990 with significant inputs from Caribbean countries, there has been a greater effort towards synchronization of education policy in the Caribbean with mixed results (Miller, 2000).

Although Singapore’s economic growth has been attributed to the work ethic and culture of Singaporeans (Yew, 2000), it is difficult to compare the role cultural differences played in the education development of both countries. Similarly, the coordination between different agencies within the government, the promotion of greater collaboration between education and other state ministries, and variations in management and administrative skills pose challenges in comparing the two countries. Population flows and the levels of foreign direct investment substantively vary between the two countries and may point to critical differences regarding the available talent pool for education administration between the two island nations. While Jamaica has suffered from severe brain drain, Singapore has high people flows and a substantial amount of Singapore’s population is foreigners. The net inflow of human resources in Singapore compared to the outflows in Jamaica may be indicative of the differences in the link between education development and job availability in each country.

Though primary and secondary school enrollment is near universal in the two islands, Singapore’s education system has markedly outperformed Jamaica’s since both countries gained independence in the 1960s. As of 2009, Singapore had the higher literacy rate of the two countries with 95% compared to Jamaica’s 86% (World Bank, 2011). In Jamaica, females have higher literacy rates than males while the opposite is true in Singapore. In terms of educational attainment and achievement, Singapore has a better gender balance than Jamaica. A comparison of public spending on education as a percent of GDP in the latter half of the twentieth century indicates that Singapore spends relatively less than Jamaica (roughly 3.5% vs. 5.5%). This disparity in expenditure suggests that how funds are used is perhaps more important than the scarcity of funds that small states often face. Moreover, the comparative experience of the two countries implies that there are significant factors beyond increased funding that are necessary for substantial improvement in education outcomes.

Expanding Access to Primary and Secondary Education: 1960-1980
The period of 1960 to 1980 was a transformative, post-independence era in Jamaica and Singapore.
Upon independence, Singapore inherited a fragmented system with English and non-Ministry Of Education (MOE) funded vernacular schools and the main policy challenge was to unify the system and integrate the various ethnic groups through education (Boon & Gopinathan, 2006). Since 1953 every public primary school in Jamaica has had its own independent school board, which hires and fires teachers and this has also been the case of secondary schools from the latter part of the 19th century (Miller, 1999). In the 1950s, access to secondary education in Jamaica was very limited but a major expansion of secondary schools beginning in the 1960s resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of secondary schools (Miller, 1990). Tables 2a and 2b summarizes the main policy events in the education development of Jamaica and Singapore from 1960 to 2010.

Upon their independence, expanding access to education was a major imperative in both countries (Jules, 2010; Law, 2008). However, the countries diverged in deciding which level of schooling to prioritize and how to balance competing goals in the development of education systems. Both countries adopted the goal of universal primary education (Boon & Gopinathan, 2006, Miller, 1997). Yet the education development strategies pursued by each country illuminate differences in promoting primary education and the impact of post-independence policies on the overall development of education systems in developing countries.

Jamaica focused on further access to secondary and post-secondary education to meet the expanding demand for skilled labor as evidenced by the rapid growth in enrolment in higher education until the mid-1980s (Nkrumah-Young, Huisman, & Powell, 2010). In contrast, Singapore emphasized the quality of primary schooling as well as technical and vocational education while expanding secondary schooling (Ashton et al., 2002; Law, 2008). Singapore employed a sequential strategy to education development by focusing on primary education then moving up to higher levels as the skills demanded by the economy changed (Aldcroft, 2000). Indeed, in its initial years of independence, the Singaporean government allotted the majority of its annual budget to primary education followed by secondary education and higher education (Boon & Gopinathan, 2006). This paper posits that this key strategic difference in the 1960s partly explains the disparity in education development and economic growth between the two countries over the post-independence period.

A significant differentiating factor in the immediate post-independence period is how each country chose to resolve the language ‘problem’. The language of instruction is a potentially contentious issue in an education system as it is deeply intertwined with feelings about personal and national identity (Mourshed, Chijioke, & Barber, 2010). In Singapore, the learning of a second language was made compulsory in all primary schools in 1960 and this policy was extended to secondary schools in 1966 (Boon & Gopinathan, 2006). The government viewed the bilingualism as a critical component of the education system for achieving social cohesion and economic prosperity in a largely plural society (Boon & Gopinathan, 2006). Conversely, Jamaica continues to grapple with the dual language issue as English is the language of the classroom but patois is the language of homes, especially in lower-income families (Bryan, 2004). The role of patois in the Jamaican classroom remains contentious and unresolved.

Jamaica
Changes in the lending policy of the World Bank enabled Jamaica to obtain loans for the extension of educational facilities placing great emphasis and importance on the expansion of secondary and post-secondary education. Between 1966 and 1980, 50 new secondary schools were built and a Canadian loan scheme at the same time sponsored the building of 40 primary schools (Whyte, 1983). Notwithstanding, there have been continued variations in access to the different types
of secondary schools for different social classes (Evans, 2001). For instance, the ‘all-age’ school serves as a primary and secondary school as it offers instruction from Grades 1 to 9. ‘All-age’ schools were established after slavery was abolished to prepare the children of ex-slaves for the labor market as laborers in a highly stratified society (Turner, 1987). In the post-independence period, ‘all-age’ schools were attended mainly by children of the lowest earning quintiles of the Jamaican population (Evans, 2001).

In the early 1970s, the Michael Manley led government adopted educational reforms aligned with its overarching goal of putting Jamaica on the path towards democratic socialism. Consequently, there was a flurry of initiatives in education as the MOE was radically reorganized and modernized. In 1973, ‘Education Thrust’ was instituted as a comprehensive program intended to address all levels of education, with improved access to all levels of education from primary to adult education. This reform resulted in the first mass literacy campaign in the Anglophone Caribbean and an increased focus on adult literacy with the formation of the Jamaica Movement for the Advancement of Literacy in 1972 (Jules, 2010). The shift system was implemented as a supposedly temporary measure to increase the number of places in high schools. In addition to establishing a vocational unit, the MOE also formed a research unit which has conducted several studies since the mid-1970s (Miller, 1997).

In the 1960s, Jamaica’s education development strategies were seemingly subjected to significant influence from multilateral agencies. While it may be true that primary education has a higher economic value at lower levels of development (Psacharopoulos, 1985; Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2002), special interest groups may push for investment in higher levels of education. This also implies that the state will be more likely to foster economic growth by initially investing in lower levels of schooling then shifting government spending and expanding access to higher levels of schooling as the country becomes more developed. In the 1970s, there was still significant investment in higher levels of schooling as from 1973-1976 the budget for tertiary education increased more steadily than for primary and secondary education, though it was acknowledged that the greatest needs were at the lower levels of education (Nkrumah-Young et al., 2010).

Singapore

During the 1960s, Singapore focused on access and increasing enrollment; primary and secondary schools were built at a rate of one per month between 1959 and 1968 (Mourshed et al., 2010). During this time, Singapore emphasized an intimate and deep link between education and economic development. A Five-Year Plan (1961-1965) initiated a focus on primary education that was sustained throughout the 1970s. Singapore pursued the standardization of subject syllabi and educational structures across the various language streams, and the institution of common terminal examinations (Tan, 1998). By the late 1960s, Singapore had a high level of access and literacy rates at the primary level (Aldcroft, 2000).

Singapore had very little vocational and technical education (VTE) prior to independence (Law, 2008) but it grew significantly from the late 1960s to early 1970s as emphasis in the school system begun to shift from general academic education to VTE (Kam & Gopinathan, 1999). VTE refers to training designed to enhance an individual’s general proficiency, especially in relation to occupation rather than a profession. In 1964, the government established secondary vocational schools (Boon & Gopinathan, 2006). A need to expand VTE arose from the increasing pace of industrialization and by 1972, there were nine vocational institutes in Singapore and the number of graduates had increased to over 4,000 from only 324 in 1968 (Law, 2008).
Balancing Quantity, Quality and Equity: 1980-2010

By 1980, both countries had achieved high levels of enrollment at the primary level and continued expanding secondary education (Boon & Gopinathan, 2006; Miller, 1997). However, dissatisfaction with inequitable access in secondary and post-secondary education, low educational quality, and lackluster achievement outcomes was common across the two small states (Miller, 1997; Mourshed et al., 2010). The new millennium gave rise to the knowledge economy and found nations focusing on reorienting their education systems towards the global economy (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010). The rise of service industries as the main global economic activity placed greater significance on an educated workforce with critical thinking and adaptive skills. Both countries differed in managing the tradeoff between quantity and quality as well as reorienting their education development strategies to take advantage of globalization. Balancing quantity and quality in educational outcomes posed a constant challenge for Jamaica and Singapore, and the response to this challenge can be posited as a key differentiating factor in the education development of the two countries.

Over time, the equity and quality of educational opportunities became the major concern in both countries as opposed to access to education. Indeed, research has shown that educational achievement, as measured by the percentage of eligible students receiving a secondary education, is not a significant predictor of economic performance in small states but that the nature and quality of education that students receive are far more important (Wint, 2002). It is reasonable that after resolving access issues at the primary and secondary levels, the next natural (and perhaps overlapping) cycle of educational reforms is to address the quality of education. Singapore may have reached this cycle of reform before Jamaica as by the 1980s Singapore was only a few years from stellar results in the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study.

Competition-driven reforms have prompted many governments to pursue decentralization (Carnoy, 1999) and as each government has transformed its education system to prepare students for a knowledge-based economy, the dynamics between centralization and decentralization has shifted. Both countries retain fairly centralized control over central elements such as curriculum (Ashton et al., 2002; Kam & Gopinathan, 1999; Miller, 1997) yet each government seems to strike a different autonomy balance – by allowing autonomy on the one hand and limiting it on the other – that has critically shaped the development of the country’s education system. It can be argued that decentralization in Singapore has strengthened central control over the strategic agenda while achieving tactical efficiency (Tan & Ng, 2007). Compared to Jamaica, it appears that Singapore had explicit measures and incentives to promote and induce competition among schools to improve the quality of education that proved to be a successful education development strategy.

Singapore

The main challenges that the Singapore education system faced as highlighted by the 1978 Goh Report included: low rate of progression from the primary to secondary level (almost 30% of students did not progress); low literacy achievement; and poor and uneven quality of instructional materials (Mourshed et al., 2010). The Goh report introduced streaming but the government attempts to incorporate VTE into the curriculum had to be revised because of the low status attached to vocational education (Ashton et al., 2002). In 1979, when the economy was restructured toward high technology, more capital intensive industries such as petrochemicals and biotechnology, the VTE policy responded (Law, 2008). In the late 1980s, Singapore initiated moves to give schools (initially extended to the top eight academic schools) greater autonomy as the system had grown overly centralized (Tan & Ng, 2007). There were also efforts to improve the
quality of vocational education resulting in significant changes in the image and public perception (Law, 2008).

Reforms were introduced in 1990 to extend the minimum period of education to 10 years and the Institute of Technical Education (ITE) was established as part of efforts to upgrade technical education (Ashton et al., 2002). Since the late 1990s, the Singaporean government has introduced measures to decentralize the education system as the state transitions to a supervisory steering model from a direct interventionist control model (Tan & Ng, 2007). Singapore has a regulated and not a free market as the government dictates the terms under which schools compete, and parents have a wide range of quality educational choices for their children (Tan, 1998). In the 1990s, the emphasis of Singapore’s education system began to shift from mastery of content to acquisition of critical thinking and learning skills (Kam & Gopinathan, 1999). Since the 2000s, Singapore has positioned itself as an education hub to attract foreign students and internationally renowned universities as the service sector of the economy grows (Law, 2008; Law, 2010). From the late 1980s to mid-2000s, the gap between the percent of Chinese, India and Malay primary school students that are eligible for secondary school has substantially narrowed (Mourshed et al., 2010).

**Jamaica**

In contrast, the late 1970s to late 1980s was a stagnant period in education reform in Jamaica and cutbacks adversely affected confidence in the system between the major stakeholders as expenditures on education declined and student-teacher ratios increased (Miller, 1992). In 1982, the Human Employment and Resource Training (HEART) Trust was created and has played a pivotal role in the provision of VTE in Jamaica. HEART Trust was reorganized into the National Training Agency in 1994 centralizing and planning the analysis of VTE. There has also been progress in VTE in the 1990s, especially in certification. Jamaica’s VTE program has impacted many and serves as a model for CARICOM countries (Lewis, 2008). Yet, in 2003, approximately 80% of employed and unemployed workers and 74% of first time job seekers in Jamaica had no vocational, technical or professional training (Blank & McArdle, 2003).

By the 1980s, Jamaica offered some type of secondary schooling to 50% of the 12-17 age cohort (Miller, 1992). In the 1990s, improving the quality of primary education was a national imperative (Miller, 1997). Prior to 1994, there was no common curriculum for secondary education and the Reform of Secondary Education program launched in 1993 introduced a national curriculum for grades 7-9 (UNESCO-IBE, 2010). Jamaica made substantial improvements in data reporting and analysis, and extended the role of student assessments beyond selection mechanisms (Miller, 2000). In 1999, the National Assessment Program (NAP) was launched with Grade 4 and Grade 6 achievement tests to all primary school students as part of a shift in the testing policy. Social promotion was discontinued and standards for promotion at the primary level were introduced, stipulating that a student should not advance above Grade Four without the requisite functional literacy (Miller, 2000).

In recent decades, there has been a notable regional and international influence on Jamaica’s national educational reform strategy. The island participated in the EFA international initiative, and educational reform efforts were dominated by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) projects at the primary level and World Bank projects at the secondary level (Miller, 2000). In spite of the reforms undertaken, quality remains a major challenge. In 2003, 30% of primary school leavers in Jamaica were illiterate and only about 20% of secondary school graduates had the qualifications for employment or entry into a postsecondary program (Davies et al., 2004).
The Timing of Reforms

The comparative experience of Jamaica and Singapore suggests that timing (the when) is important, not just the content (the what) of educational reforms. Education systems are constantly reforming though the nature and extent of reforms differ among countries (Cuban, 1999). Singapore is a good example of how a system shifts in emphasis as it evolves. Singapore’s stages of education development can be broadly classified as “survival-driven” (1959-78), “efficiency-driven” (1979-96), and “ability-driven” (1997-present) (Mourshed et al., 2010). Jamaica initially adopted a more project driven approach to education development in the 1990s but gradually shifted to a more comprehensive strategic approach to education development by 2000 (Miller, 2000). It can be argued that Singapore enacted more comprehensive reforms in the post-independence period compared to Jamaica’s mostly project-driven approach to education development. Singapore undertook a series of four comprehensive education reform cycles (in 1961, 1979, 1991 and 1997) compared to Jamaica’s two (in 1973 and 1999).

Although it is difficult to be definitive about the impact of the timing of reforms given the multitude of confounding factors, it is reasonable that the timing of reforms was a major contributor to the progress in education development in both countries. The notion that not only did Singapore undertake more comprehensive reforms rather than a project-driven approach but the timing of these reforms roughly every 20 years as opposed to Jamaica’s approximate 30 year cycle may be an explanatory variable of the disparities in education development and subsequent economic development. Furthermore, it appears that educational reforms that accompany and complement economic reforms may be crucial. For instance, in Singapore in 1979 and 1991, comprehensive economic plans were followed by major educational reforms (Law, 2008).

Differences in education development strategies between both countries in the immediate independence era were pivotal. It seems that there was an important policy window in both countries between 1960 and 1980. The period was defined by a confluence of factors including social demand, political will and economic means that made bold educational strategies and policies feasible. In the 1960s, when Jamaica had a seemingly weak appetite for embracing educational reforms with major projects sponsored by multilateral agencies, Singapore was remaking its education system with policy moves addressing bilingualism and curricular choices. In Southeast Asia, earlier investment in primary and secondary education had substantial effects on economic growth in the early 1980s (Birdsall & Sabot, 1995); and high literacy rates and enrollment at the primary level of the 1960s is positively related with economic growth rates in the 1970s and 1980s (Aldcroft, 2000; Barro, 1991). It is plausible that Singapore is reaping the benefits of the strategies for education development implemented in the early independence period while Jamaica is paying the costs.

Many of the education development strategies Jamaica began to pursue in the 1970s such as an increased focus on the quality of primary schooling and vocational education were employed by Singapore nearly a decade earlier in the 1960s. This article argues that Singapore’s head start played a critical role in developing human resources to take advantage of the transition to the knowledge-based economy and economic globalization. Though it is difficult to associate education policies and the changes in per capita GDP growth rates this paper posits that there may be a lagged link. Early differences and changes in education development during the 1960-1980 period may be associated with economic growth from 1980-2010, with the late 1960s and early 1970s being key turning points. The underlying logic is that the instrumental education development strategies Singapore pursued between 1960 and 1980 prepared its economy to capitalize on changes in the global economy between 1980 and 2010.
The 70/30 Scholarship system is implemented to provide access to secondary schools for the poor and working class.

The Independence Plan proposed expanding teacher training facilities and reformed the selection process for admission to secondary schools.

The New Deal in Education policy focused on expanding access to secondary and post-secondary education and resulted in the creation of “Junior Secondary Schools”.

Education Thrust- Free Education for All policy made compulsory primary and secondary schooling free, focused on the quality of primary schooling and led to significant reorganization of the Ministry of Education (MOE).

The Technical and Vocational Education unit in the MOE was established.

The Education Act established four formal levels of the system and redefined the roles and responsibilities of the MOE.

The Human Employment and Resource Training (HEART) Trust was created.

HEART Trust launched Traineeship program; 7 HEART academies are opened between 1984 and 1988.

The introduction of six regional offices in the MOE with responsibility for supervising schools and schools’ personnel; National Training Agency (NTA) was created to co-ordinate and evaluate all activities within vocational and technical education (VTE).

Cost sharing scheme at the secondary level was introduced.

Reform of Secondary Education (ROSE) was launched as part of the MOE’s 15 year program to reform secondary education. The program introduced a common core curriculum for grades 7-9 nationwide; National Council on Education (NCE) was established to provide leadership in stimulating, advising and promoting consensus in the development of educational policies.

HEART trust was reorganized into the NTA; National Council for Technical Vocational Education and Training (NCTVET) was launched with responsibility for certification issues in VTE.

The Grade Six Achievement Test (GSAT) replaced the Common entrance exam (instituted in 1958) as the criteria for selection and placement in secondary schools; the National Assessment Program was launched with 4 tests in primary schools.

ROSE II Project is launched as a follow up to the ROSE I (1993-2000) with a strong focus on literacy and numeracy and improving the cognitive skills of secondary school students.

Jamaica: A Transformed School System, a report by the Rae Davis-led task force reported significant deficiencies in education system and led to the formation of the Education Transformation Team (ETT).

Jamaica Movement for the Advancement of Literacy (JAMAL) was transformed into the Jamaican Foundation for Lifelong Learning with responsibility for providing non-formal adult continuing education.

Cost-sharing program was abandoned.

The National Education Inspectorate (NEI) is established to evaluate and report on the standards and quality of education at the primary and secondary levels.

Sources: Blank & McArdle (2003); Boon & Gopinathan (2006); Kam & Gopinathan (1999); Law (2008); Miller (1997); Ministry of Education, Jamaica (1999a, 199b); Mourshed et al., (2010)
Table 2b. Key Events in the Education Development of Singapore: 1960-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>The 70/30 Scholarship system is implemented to provide access to secondary schools for the poor and working class</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Bilingualism was mandated by the government; all students were required to study English as well as a second language at the primary and secondary levels</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>The Technical Education Department was established in the Ministry of Education (MOE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>The first Industrial Training Board (ITB) was created to centralize and coordinate industrial training</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>The Goh-led Report on the Ministry of Education found the bilingualism policy ineffective and proposed streaming students based on academic ability at the primary and secondary levels. Streaming was introduced shortly thereafter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>The Vocational and Industrial Training Board (VITB) was established through a merger of the ITB and the Adult Education Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>The Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore was formed to produce teaching materials for schools. It was eventually closed in 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>The Schools Council was established and involved principals in the decision making process in the MOE. It is viewed as the initial step towards greater autonomy at the school level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Government mandated that starting in 1987, English would be the language of instruction in all subjects</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Towards Excellence in Schools, a report by a group of principals who visited the United States and United Kingdom leads to the creation of Independent schools in 1988</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>New Apprentice system, patterned after Germany’s Dual System of Apprenticeship, was introduced</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>The MOE adopted a policy of a minimum of 10 years of general education for all students; Edusave scheme launched to provide grants for educational expenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Institute of Technical Education (ITE) (formerly VITB) was established as a post-secondary educational institution to create additional opportunities in post-secondary VTE; the Open University Degree Program formed to help working adults obtain degrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Autonomous schools were created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Thinking Schools, Learning Nation policy was launched with a focus on student ability;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>School clusters were established to increase collaboration at the local level with a pilot program involving 59 schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Teach Less, Learn More initiative is launched to give schools and teachers freedom to customize the curriculum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Importance of Vocational and Technical Education in Small States

The role of VTE is another crucial differentiating factor in the education development of the two islands. The level and nature of investment in VTE varied significantly between both countries. It can be argued that one of the primary challenges both countries faced in VTE policy was combating the low status of VTE as an educational pathway for less academically inclined students. Before reforms in 1991 that mandated 10 years of general academic education, earlier policy in Singapore streamed students on the basis of insufficient education (Aldcroft, 2000; Kam & Gopinathan, 1999). In the Commonwealth Caribbean, the VTE is often positioned and offered as an alternative education avenue for low academic performers (Lewis, 2008). A key difference in the VTE policy between the two countries is the emphasis placed on access to and quality of post-secondary VTE. In contrast to Singapore that has expanded and improved post-secondary VTE, Jamaica has limited access to post-secondary VTE (Morris, 2008).

VTE is a crucial element in Singapore’s economic-education modernization. The Singaporean government has invested heavily in VTE and VTE has evolved in tandem with a changing economic landscape (Law, 2008). Technical education focused on engineering to meet the needs of industrialization and the government actively sought to increase the prestige of VTE (Tan, 1998). Institutional mechanisms emerged that linked the output of education to the skill demands of the present and future economy (Ashton et al., 2002). In essence, Singapore’s VTE policy enhanced the ability of production to anticipate and effectively respond to market changes. The government overcame parents’ resistance by improving the prestige of VTE, facilitated the gradual upgrading of skills of the labor force to the demands of emerging high-value added industries, and contained the increasing demand for academic rather than vocational education (Ashton et al., 2002; Law, 2010).

Although a technical college was established in Jamaica in 1958 and the island had six technical high schools by 1978 (Miller, 1999), there seems to have been less emphasis placed on VTE in Jamaica’s education development relative to Singapore’s. In Jamaica, it can be argued that VTE was viewed as a relatively low priority and not pursued with as much vigor and innovation, especially immediately after independence in 1962. Starting in the 1970s, there was a shift in the VTE policy and an increased focus on vocational education as evidenced by the establishment of a network of non-formal vocational training centers. Following a massive reorganization of the MOE, the Technical and Vocational unit was established in 1975, nearly a decade after Singapore established the Technical Education Department in 1968 in its MOE.

The differences in approaches to VTE between Jamaica and Singapore may be partly attributed to vastly different historical contexts and how policymakers view the link between changing labor market demands and education development. The types of jobs available due to resource differences may also be accountable for the differences in VTE policy. The two countries have different labor market structures and Singapore aimed to continue its trading advantage as an entrepot with a small labor force, thus its VTE policy had to deliver progressively higher level skills to a limited range of industries (Ashton et al., 2002). Conversely, the World Bank discouraged and de-prioritized investment in VTE in the Caribbean on the basis of low returns (Lewis, 2008). Also notable is the fact that Singapore retained and expanded Polytechnics from the earlier British model while other countries phased out these career-oriented schools (Law, 2008).

Linking Education Development and Economic Development in Small States

Although VTE is an essential component of aligning economic and education development, a balanced, forward-looking education development strategy that closely ties education, economic
and national development must be considered a necessary factor for small states overcoming the constraints of smallness. Effectively linking education development to economic development goes beyond an effective VTE policy into forging a national identity and purpose which places education at the core of the wealth of the nation. It is a pronounced emphasis on the central role and importance of education to national identity building, social cohesion and economic prosperity. In this regard, it seems that Singapore did a relatively better job than Jamaica at linking increasing human capital to national and economic development in formulating and implementing educational policies. Given its limited natural resources, one of Singapore’s highest priorities since independence has been education and human capital development (Law, 2008). In Singapore, education policy was used to foster national identity before ceding strategic importance to economic priorities in later decades (Aldcroft, 2010).

It is plausible that the lack of natural resources compared to Jamaica was advantageous to Singapore’s education development. Singapore’s experience lends credence to emergent evidence of a negative association between education development and natural resources and supports the notion that natural resources prevent economic development in developing countries (Collier, 2007). The lack of natural resources compelled Singapore to develop the habits and culture of increasing people’s skills. A team from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development found a significant negative relationship between the money countries received from natural resources and the knowledge and skills of their high school students (Freidman, 2012). In addition to extra emphasis on human capital, this paper contends that Singapore’s lack of natural resources reduced its susceptibility to global shocks as the country was not dependent on the fluctuating prices of commodities on the global market. The differences in education development between Jamaica and Singapore support the notion that societies with natural resource endowments for various reasons encounter greater problems in student achievement outcomes.

Singapore placed greater emphasis on manpower and human capital as a significant resource that resulted in a strong link between education and economic development. Singapore constantly invented education pathways, expanded curricular options and catered to different learning experiences while considering the labor market and productivity growth. An early emphasis on human capital led to a better educated workforce and enabled Singapore to capitalize on the rise of service industries in an increasingly globalized economy.

Conclusion
This paper identifies the timing of reforms, the centrality of VTE and a strong bond between education development and economic development strategies as salient factors in the development of education systems in small states. Singapore oriented education policies to changing economic needs while addressing current challenges. In contrast, Jamaica made education relevant to the current economic needs without a parallel focus on aligning education development with the diversification of the economy. Singapore also had an earlier emphasis on both the access to and quality of education compared to Jamaica. This paper contends that these differences in education development strategies partly contribute to the disparity in educational outcomes and levels of GDP per capita between the two small states in the post-independence period.

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References


Overcoming Smallness through Education Development


Welsh


Overcoming Smallness through Education Development


Internationalization of Higher Education in Post-Soviet Small States: Realities and Perspectives of Moldova

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Internationalization of higher education has become a priority for many universities in post-Soviet small states. Focusing on international communication networks, student mobility, or international curriculum development, universities invest human and financial resources to prepare graduates to meet global challenges. Globalization and post-Soviet independence have promoted emerging patterns of international education strategies and new approaches to managing international activities. This study explores current trends of university internationalization in post-Soviet Moldova as understood and interpreted by Moldova state universities' administrators. International Relations Department officials who are responsible for the design and implementation of international education programs discuss their perceptions of post-Soviet small state international outreach strategies, smallness and marginalization, and the unique aspects of academic internationalization in Moldova. Respondents’ diverse internationalization techniques and expectations illustrate the importance of academic dialogue with post-USSR small states and raise possible standards for international collaboration with Eastern and Southern European universities.

Higher Education and Global Developments

Mental programmes do change, but slowly and not according to anyone’s master plan. Changes take decades, if not centuries. If the inheritance of the Roman Empire still separates Belgium from the Netherlands, two countries in intimate contact for over 2000 years, one should not believe one can change the minds of Serbs, Russians or Albanians within a few years…we better take mental programmes as given facts.

(Hofstede, 2001, p. 11)

Irrespective of their economic development and political inclinations, the post-Soviet small states are experiencing an increasing demand for access to higher education. This is partly because such states have entered into “an accelerated process of multidimensional global changes encompassing the fields of economy, finance, science and technology, communication, culture, politics and education” (Gacel-Avila, 2005, p. 123). University graduates in Chisinau, Riga or Vilnius are expected to adequately react to these changes by meeting the demands of globalization. As a result, post-Soviet small states universities are “not immune from global-minded preoccupations” (Altbach, 2002, p. 27). Internationalization of curricula, growing student and faculty mobility, academic exchanges and research joint ventures, play an important part in the current life of local higher academic institutions. Western universities offer post-Soviet small states universities different opportunities for knowledge exchange and sharing. Small states universities in their turn explore opportunities and try to reconsider their internationalization mission, tasks and responsibilities in the context of new academic collaborative priorities.

State universities in the Republic of Moldova are at the centre of global outreach higher education policies. Moldova has paid serious attention to the internationalization of higher education as a major tool to supply its educational system with current international curricular and
methodological innovations. International outreach creates a foundation for up-to-date research and development in the transitional post-Soviet economies and builds regional multi-level collaborations (Kushnarenko, 2010). Academic institutions in Moldova generate knowledge for collaborative academic plans with foreign universities (Cojocari & Tvircun, 2010; Birladeanu, 2008) and become centres of social change (Kushnarenko, 2010).

A widely intensifying and growing impact of internationalization of higher education on Moldovan universities explains the current effort to improve their existing curricula, research networks, internal organizational structures and modes of communication in order to meet the demand for new trans-border activities. State universities in Moldova tailor their internationalization policy frameworks according to the requirements of their foreign counterparts’ collaborative program format (Abrahamsson, 1993) and re-establish university-government relations in order to better manage financial and human resource pressures. Numerous strategies have been suggested for improvement on how to speed up university global outreach (Altbach, 2002; Marginson & Sawir, 2006), increase international student flows (Altbach, 2002), and design joint curriculum development activities (Kushnarenko, 2010; Cojocari, 2008). However, little has been said about what Moldovan international education policy leaders think about higher education internationalization, how they define it and understand the university mission in the global academic setting.

Mundy (2005) recognizes that many nation-states have been unevenly affected by globalization processes and “competition states” (Mundy, 2005, p. 47) have arisen as a result of globalization. In the contemporary geopolitical environment “the growing tensions between powerful localising and globalising forces increasingly mean that local issues cannot be understood without reference to the global context” (Crossley & Holmes, 2001, p. 396). With this in mind we investigate: (1) what post-Soviet Moldovan academic leaders think about current global academic competition and impact of globalization on educational restructuring (Mayo, 2009) of contemporary Moldovan university, (2) what impact the perception of smallness can have on the shape of international operations, (3) how post-Soviet small states demonstrate their unique way in setting collaborative networks, and (4) whether ex-USSR small state universities experience a dominant influence on policy and international education joint venture operational management from foreign universities. We explore why Moldovan international education university policy makers consider international education activities as their current institutional policy priority. We pay particular attention to the definitions used to frame internationalization, methods to evaluate institutional infrastructure, the human and financial capacity to carry out internationalization, and Moldova’s potential as a small post-Soviet state to participate, compete and collaborate globally.

At this stage of the investigation our aim is to indicate the current issues and challenges confronted by Moldovan university administration as they attempt to internationalize university functions.

Moldova and Higher Education

Moldovan state universities are teaching and research state universities with the average student body of approximately ten thousand students and one thousand staff members (The National Bureau of Statistics of Moldova, 2011). Each university designs its own strategies for internationalization. The universities attract students from all over Moldova, as well as the neighbouring post-Soviet states. They have also developed numerous international partnerships with higher education institutions in Europe, Asia, Africa, and North America. The Moldovan state universities have close relations with universities in Romania, Estonia, Lithuania, and the Ukraine, and have developed vibrant academic networks using technology as a major source of
communication. Collaboration with international organizations and associations is facilitated and administered mainly by international university-partners and various international organizations, such as the American Councils for International Education: ACTR/ACCELS, Renaissance Foundation, British Councils, German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), Romania-Fulbright International Educational Exchange Program (The Ministry of Education of Moldova, 2012). These relationships have provided Moldovan universities with opportunities to participate in international academic projects and to distance themselves from Soviet legacies. During the Soviet era, higher education training and academic research were artificially separated from each other, while so-called basic research was conducted under the auspices of various research institutes of the Republic of Moldova Academy of Sciences. Moldovan universities were deprived of research funding, precluding their participation in research projects.

Internationalization of Higher Education and Post-Soviet Small States

Internationalization of Moldovan higher education attempts to overcome the post-Soviet legacy by proposing activities that could and serve as a tool to improve curricula, give an opportunity to participate in joint academic projects and serve as an alternative funding source for research and innovations. In this respect, internationalization efforts follow the UNESCO World Conference on “Higher Education in the XXI Century: Vision and Action-2000,” which prescribed internationalization of higher education as an integral part of the institutional missions for world universities and academic systems (Gacel-Avila, 2005). Each institution of higher education is called upon to envisage the creation of an appropriate structure and mechanism for promoting and managing internationalization (UNESCO Conference Final Paper, 2005). Many countries, including small post-Soviet states, are reconsidering university missions and reorganizing management structures in order to facilitate international collaboration more effectively.

Various international collaborative networks penetrate the post-Soviet ex-autonomous academic systems, none of which have managed to escape this process. Small states universities realize that they cannot meet the demands of the globalized world acting alone. However, the strengths of indigenous academic systems, the privileges of autonomy and the necessity “to protect national cultural identity with the growing ability to compete internationally” (Fim’yar, 2008, p. 12) remain the core of local university visions and missions (Chicus, 2012). Certainly, focusing on local identity may contribute to the successful performance of national economies and educational systems in the post-Soviet environment, but they may limit their institutional strategies with regard to global outreach. The increasing variations and trends towards international collaboration among institutions of higher education in post-Soviet small states and foreign universities have never been more vibrant and kaleidoscopic. Small states universities seek to develop a more systematic approach to the marketing and exporting of their educational products and services. The Moldova State University and the “Ion Creanga” State Pedagogical University, for instance, consider international collaboration to be an important element of their missions and make considerable efforts to provide their students with international and intercultural skills, responding to the needs of contemporary global labour markets (Cojocari, 2011).

According to Kushnarenko (2010) the majority of post–Soviet small states universities are currently looking for strategies for incorporating innovations and research made in collaboration with foreign universities into their own systems. Small post-Soviet states approach higher education internationalization with different amounts of resources, interest, expertise and openness. Moldovan universities, in particular, consider their involvement in international endeavours as a serious step towards their understanding of foreign university academic traditions. The independence from Russia, with the increasing transparency of the national borders and the
Emerging academic and workforce mobility gave Moldovan institutions the chance to redesign their internationalization strategies in order to actively participate in global education networks. For instance, close connections and wide institutional collaborations with Romanian universities have proposed a range of student/staff exchanges and curriculum development initiatives to improve Moldovan university pedagogies, university administration and international program management (Cojocari, 2008). Collaboration with faculty and instructors from Baltic post-Soviet small states helped to train emerging Moldovan academic leaders to speed up academic innovations in sciences and propose the necessary organizational changes in student services at Moldovan state universities (Kushnarenko, 2010).

Methodology
There are many ways on how to investigate academic internationalization activities. On one hand, international educators employ various tools to research relationships between international policies in higher education and their actual implementation (Kushnarenko, 2002). The dynamics of internationalization and international academic mobility challenge researchers to develop new cross-cultural interview methodology paradigms (Cojocari & Tvirun, 2010). On the other hand, taking into consideration the evidence from current research on international partnership developments and collaborations (Crossley & Holmes, 2001), researchers meticulously structure their investigation, using old and tested methods of cross-cultural investigation. In our research we use qualitative research methodology because of its ability to focus a researcher on cross-cultural attitudes to internationalization operational techniques. We notice that qualitative research methods are flexible in adapting researcher-interviewing skills to investigate sensitive cultural social contexts and international partners’ reaction towards challenges of internationalization in action. It was obvious for us that to conduct qualitative research in an intercultural environment was a challenging task. We paid special attention to a role culture plays in the investigation and its influences on sharing knowledge and expertise in cross-cultural contexts.

Culture is the most complex and changing context, “an intertwined system of values, attitudes, beliefs, and norms that gives meaning and significance to individual and collective identity” (Adler, 1998, p. 236). We realized that a cultural component of the internationalization investigation depended on our specific interpretations. We noticed that the researchers’ bias, manipulation of research design and direction, and consideration of himself/herself as a representative of a certain cultural group can have a major influence on the results of the research. We conducted eleven interviews with university international outreach policy makers/administrators of the Moldova State University in Chisinau, the State University “Alecu Russo” in Balti, and the State University “Bogdan Petriceicu Hasdeu” in Cahul who guide international education initiatives. These universities have a reputation of strong commitment to internationalization in order to improve their curricula. Our interviewees were chosen by the recommendation from the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Moldova and due to their active participation in the Ministry’s Higher Education Internationalization Policy Committee. At their universities they are responsible for the development and implementation of university internationalization plans.

The interviews took place in April 2012 in Chisinau, Moldova. During in-depth, open-ended interviews, the administrators were invited to share their experience with international education innovations. We asked administrators to emphasize how internationalization affects their university mission, identity, educational practices and management. It gave us an opportunity to understand post-Soviet small state universities’ capacity to cope with internationalization challenges. We employed qualitative coding to organize information and analyze the meaning of the data collected. The chosen research design is flexible to allow for new themes to emerge from
the investigation. We analyzed the administrators’ answers employing the computer N6 software package, which assisted with coding and categorizing the interviews. We identified cross-case patterns according to the key themes based on our research questions; in the section below we summarize these patterns in narrative form.

**Findings: Interpretations of Internationalization**

We now consider the interview data and would like to begin with a definition of higher education internationalization in Moldova, as understood and performed by university administrators. We continue with the specification of their key experiences in the field. Here, too, we explain the origin of interest in an international collaborative action and define obstacles and highlight necessities for its sustainability.

According to the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Moldova instructions *On International Cooperation in Higher Education* (2012), Moldova considers values of the national education system as the major engine in implementing plans of internationalization. Moldovan universities, according to a university administrator, believe that internationalization of higher education is an important element of strengthening its national academic tradition “because we have enough to be proud of and to share.” Comprehension of foreign academic cultures, receptivity to foreign curricula innovations, new technologies, methods, academic services and products happen through sharing local knowledge with international partners. The university leaders tended to express the common concern that their institutions have the major responsibility to educate future “managers of the Moldovan economy” through “preparing them for the challenges and opportunities brought by globalization.” Internationalization constitutes one of the major components of their academic plans, motivates and guides the local academic agenda. And it is up to them to establish new policies and priorities. The new independent academic and administrative context has prompted a greater demand for international network development meshing with university values. When asked to identify the elements of national culture that promote internationalization, respondents highlighted the following: importance of free mobility of people, high moral standards, top quality teaching and student oriented university environment, and value of cultural exchanges. Moldovan universities historically have been promoting indigenous cultural values which encourage a desire for free people movement among countries and continents. Moldovan best faculty are the pioneers in new teaching methodologies often designed in collaboration with partners from universities in the neighboring countries. A teaching philosophy of Moldovan faculty is a student oriented approach which promotes an innovative course delivery and fosters learning environment which is challenging, interesting and thought provoking. One of the Moldovan administrators commenting on current innovations in international curriculum development mentioned the necessity to improve the international program financial support, revise management of faculty international activities and reward internationalization pioneers. Clearly the administrators take those initiatives into account by focusing on internationalization.

The administrators’ aspirations coincide with the Moldovan Ministry of Education’s recent declarations to act in unison with UNESCO slogans, highlighting that: “The Ministry will continue to give special attention to cooperation with international and regional bodies such as the Council of Europe, European Union, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, UNESCO and CIS” (Ministry of Education of Moldova Declaration on International Cooperation, 2012b). The Moldovan international academic developments confirm the determination and desire to prepare global-minded graduates. A well-developed network of seventeen state universities in Moldova and the advisory role of the Ministry of Education created a somewhat unique mechanism for preparing national cadres according to the current economic and social needs of the home country.
The internationalization aspirations of former Soviet small states are accompanied by a focus on national issues. This assumes a global consciousness paradigm development through “local” internationalization activities, which tips the scales in favour of “internationalization at home/on campus” and “international diploma without leaving the country” initiatives. The focus on the national dimension of internationalization, particularly through its local operational parameters, may lead to creating, as one administrator noticed, “the Joint International and Development Education Centres at Moldovan major state big cities.” The creation of such academic centres in collaboration with foreign universities was further interpreted as an option for training the Moldovan future workforce because: “it is cheaper, quicker, safer and will calm the families of our students knowing that their kids are learning from the best international professors at their home country.”

However, a growing number of the Moldovan political and economic elites are preoccupied with their aspirations for more border openness, travel abroad, international academic activities and opportunities for international exchanges. New international public-private partnerships also encourage young people to travel more extensively internationally. Among the recent examples are the Moldova State University educational administration initiatives with University of Uppsala (Sweden), Moldovan-Romanian academic joint ventures in science and technology and the Area Studies Curriculum Development Programs with leading European universities. Such exchanges and collaboration play an important role in the development of Moldovans’ global consciousness, give an opportunity for students to understand other cultures, and for staff to reconsider their existing standard of teaching.

The administrators were asked to define internationalization and explain what they understood by the term. An administrator defines internationalization as “a set of academic activities designed to promote convergence in academic and organizational strengths of Moldovan universities overseas. It is an important mechanism to share and borrow what we/Moldovans consider is necessary to our system...and activities, which promote tolerance to different cultures and pride for our own.” Another interviewee added that “international education is a set of offshore and domestic academic initiatives and an opportunity for us to promote our university growth through the connections and comparisons with foreign educational institutions according to the priorities indicated by a Moldovan university. It is an opportunity to...[implement] global phenomenon in local conditions.” Knowledge of other systems has become for Moldovan universities a necessity as problems they encounter require an international approach and joint planning. To achieve this, however, they try to deal with the dilemma of preserving their national values while participating in global networks. Institutional collaboration among Moldovan universities and foreign university partners constitutes one of the most important conditions for nurturing trust and mutual understanding through indigenous knowledge sharing, respect of and interest in the Moldovan academic traditions. While the administrators expressed their concern with economic globalization – which represents a competition for markets, exclusion and marginalization, rising unemployment, ethnic conflicts and environmental challenges – they describe the internationalization of higher education and cultural exchange as positive aspects of globalization, and call internationalization, “globalization with a human face.”

However, until recently, the international integration of various Moldovan academic institutions has been largely to “test the waters,” according to a university administrator, rather than to actively promote internationalization initiatives. A proactive internationalization group of interviewees actively supports “a more aggressive type of academic negotiations with foreign universities” and promotes “a vibrant approach to existing programs and policies via more brave
and intensive international mobility and participation in offshore research initiatives.” They believe that a “Go Global” policy will help Moldovan graduates to promote the understanding of “interdependence between peoples and societies, to develop student appreciation of other cultures and a greater respect for pluralism and multiculturalism.” In this new environment, Moldovans try to reform their way of thinking about collaboration with foreign universities. They change their approach from passive rhetoric about internationalization as a vital intellectual necessity to direct involvement into the process of communication with foreigners.

Internationalization for Moldovan universities is a challenging activity. An administrator mentioned that his university has inadequate infrastructure, financial resources and human capacity to undertake a paradigmatic change to their internationalization policies. The lack of highly qualified human resources, the difficulties in achieving internationalization goals because of lack of network models and insufficient diversification of institutional fabric (Martin & Bray, 2011) are among major challenges to pursue academic internationalization. Moldovan universities recognize that some of the post-Soviet small states universities have been marginalized, still experience an “elder brother attitude” and do not perform globally according to their potential because of “the lack of information about their universities, their research and their country as an independent sovereign entity.” An administrator respondent explains that their current difficulties with international outreach are due to the Moldovan universities’ periphery position in the Western university-dominated academic world. According to the administrators, the geographical position and membership of the small states post-Soviet club creates a combination of the following factors

- a current perception of Western colleagues as nurturing Moldovan faculty: “a lot of our exchange and joint research foreign partners still baby-sit us as an emerged post-Soviet independent child”
- self-perception of Moldova as a small state with a great potential for sharing: “we need to stop thinking in the previous categories of a small republic of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. We have more people than Estonia has (1,340,000) or Lithuania (3,187,000) or Latvia (2,217,000). We can tell the world a lot about our education and our values...we simply do not have enough opportunity to do that.”

According to the administrators, Moldova’s position as a small state enables it to have a unique contribution to internationalization because their universities are not only recipients, but also agents of internationalization. Moldova finds itself the biggest of the post-USSR small states, and associates the internationalization capabilities of its universities with current favourable demographic trends, which increase opportunities for its growing student population. An administrator highlights the emergence of a Moldovan university’s ambitious self-task agenda: “we need to pay more attention to our recent and future international research agenda, international program content and organization in terms of its appropriateness to local practices and global competition. Our periphery position in this case has an advantage: we enjoy our own right of choice and select what we need or reject relentless pressures to innovate if it carries signs of cultural degradation.” Moldova is interested in international consultation, collaboration and new forms and levels of academic partnerships (Crossley, Bray & Packer, 2011), innovative methods and approaches to research and academic practices of delivering higher education. In our discussion a Moldovan administrator focused on locality and periphery and made more emphasis on possessing and preserving indigenous knowledge having an ability to use it in worldwide arena. Universities, trying to develop their own plans and strategies to internationalize research programs, make hard choices in establishing internationalization priorities: national
and international interests should co-exist happily, tending to emphasise local priorities and accumulate knowledge and skills for an effective international dialogue.

Internationalization is connected with the search for new financial opportunities and sources. During Soviet times Moldovan universities were bound to the Ministry of Education for research subsidies to deliver a traditional research financing to their departments. Now, as one administrator noticed, there is an “understanding and desire to look outside the Moldovan borders and search for possible joint financial opportunities.” The administrators mention that their universities put time and effort to look for support from international funding agencies to financially sustain an environment that attracts creative and globally resourceful faculty to participate in international activities.

Another factor, as one administrator noticed, is a serious dependency on English as a dominant language in the current international academic discourse as “the majority of our academic research and scientific innovations are published in Romanian in the leading Moldovan and Romanian journals. Probably, they are not considered by our Western counterparts as those which are worth to translate and to pay attention to.” The dependency on English in international academic relations is one of the effects of globalization on international higher education institutions and is a world-wide phenomenon. The core priorities of Moldovan universities have been shifting and among them a serious attention has been paid to study of English as a foreign language. The discipline and research domains of ESL curricula have become broader, and the ESL extra curricula initiatives have aimed at establishing a campus-wide global orientation. The intensification of English language learning at Moldovan universities has contributed to new joint publications in English.

The Moldovan university administrators’ specific approaches to higher education internationalization management differed from Western universities’ approaches on many levels. As one administrator noticed “it differs developmentally in tactics, operational methods, time and resources management, etc., which do not coincide with goals and regulations of the Western international education and training management. We have different flexibility and deadline limits, different capacity to consider options and make decisions. We are different in our attitude to foreign aid, purpose of internationalization and its mandate for change.” Many administrators, particularly those who exhibited progressive and innovative approaches to international programs, mentioned the managerial structure. The centralized dimension of Moldovan university internationalization efforts – in administering, advising, coordinating, implementing and maintaining the university international activities – is evident. At the same time, the most successful programs were initiated by an individual faculty member who designed, promoted and creatively developed a certain program. One of the administrators mentioned a rapidly changing international education initiatives management discourse among Moldovan international education project managers. The Soviet system produced academic program management staff with particular kinds of knowledge and skills suitable for an authoritative system. Given the size and complexity of academic internationalization issues, as well as the time investment and changes in international project management, the current Moldovan pragmatic approach to internationalization has been successfully carried out through joint management efforts with foreign universities.

A Moldovan administrator, who for two years served as a consulting scholar for the University International Relations Ministry Department, addressed the Moldovan faculty members’ desire to collaborate with the Ministry on internationalization policy and practice issues: “What we
really need is to involve ourselves in on-going discussions of the perspectives of international education with our Ministry officials. We are dragging behind Western universities and we are out of their radar, the foreigner’s openness to the outside world is amazing. With the Moldovan tempo of the commitment to international education we can lose important strategic connections, time, and enthusiasm of our own people.” Moldovan state universities are divided between those with “advancement in internationalization” and the “other,” which were not as active in international affairs and do not put internationalization of their institutions on a list of priorities. In order to upgrade curricula, investigate new academic markets, borrow progressive methodological approaches and build new offshore partnerships, Moldovan universities lobbied the Ministry to upgrade a state policy on internationalization. The administrators noted that “it the curriculum upgrade will bring creativity to think and possibly act outside the box in the generation of strategies, actions and commitment to international outreach, bringing- potential partners together to make a difference in the system and influence the major policy institutions.”

According to an administrator, Moldovan educators, participating in new international initiatives, “push their universities forward in global outreach” by establishing “strong personal connections with foreign university faculty, trying to use every opportunity to persuade the management of international programs at their institutions to participate.” The majority of international education champions in Moldova relate to the most profound current feature of modern campus: the increasing interdependence of academic life. In order to succeed in academia, faculty put their efforts into improving collaboration and the co-production of knowledge.

Achieving that, an administrator suggests that Western universities do not show enough evidence of

...sufficient knowledge of the Moldovan academic culture. It seriously weakens international collaboration. Foreign universities are polite and intelligent partners, they are good learners and try to be diplomatic in what they say and do. However, the details of their behaviour and specifics of their advising show that they are incapable of grasping the holistic picture of the Moldovan academic challenges. They do not know our rules well, or maybe they simply think that our themes are too contrasted to the academic negotiation tones preferred by foreigners.

The Moldovan academic, cultural and managerial context – drawing from a range of post-Soviet traditions – is a complex set of judgments and approaches to which foreigners are exposed. Foreign partners’ ignorance of this context is natural, taking into consideration hectic personal and academic schedules. However, it confirms a certain degree of insufficient homework done by international partners. Being, as Moldovans describe their counterparts, skilled communicators and dynamic problem solvers, foreign faculty do their best in their attempt to establish “the insider’s knowledge” of the current Moldovan university developmental peculiarities. Partners understand this and, when they get it right, are more than ever determined to improve existing connections and establish new ones.

Another administrator echoes the previous observation: “the exercises of our internal management show little reciprocity with the united and disciplined managerial ensemble of international partners. Our foreign partners prevail in the speed of decision-making resulted in favour of sophisticated management practices of foreigners.” It is a matter of time and commitment for Moldovan partners to lead international teams and show an example in shifting international education priorities in the light of global changes.
Conclusion

We have highlighted the major internationalization issues which were indicated by those who design international programs and work on their implementation at state Moldovan universities. Those universities try to accommodate their systems to the new post-Soviet realities and global interdependence. Such adaptation requires knowledge, competence, commitment and capacity to respond to the increased challenges of international academic collaboration in higher education.

Three concluding thoughts from this investigation can be offered. The first relates to the national level, where the majority of Moldovan universities experience a lack of a coordinated and coherent national government strategy to enhance internationalization efforts. At the institutional level, universities have seen their internationalization aspirations suffer from insufficient financial and human resources. They have not yet developed the organizational and managerial capacity to negotiate as equals with international university partners. The existing managerial and logistical challenges, alongside the absence of necessary and mobile access to information, however, have not prevented Moldovan institutions from responding to proposals for international engagement. At the third individual level Moldovans have a cohort of forward thinking university faculty who are ready to initiate and perform collaboration. They see international collaboration as an activity based on the Moldovan national values and academic traditions which serve as an engine to exchange information and knowledge.

Moldovans admit that current academic internationalization activities not only occur in a context of insufficient local management, financial turbulence, national value-orientation and foreign university dominance in policy and managerial strategies, but they often happen because of a foreign partner’s initiative. Design and algorithm of external aid projects (Coyne & Bray, 2006) is often crafted at Western universities with minimum involvement of small states counterparts. Western universities as collaborative partners of post-Soviet small states universities would need to do additional homework in order to consider themselves, according to a Moldovan administrator, “as a major initiator and contributor to a successful performance of small states’ academic systems international outreach.” Approaching post-Soviet universities Western institutions may consider a policy of small steps and expect to meet Moldovan universities in particular half-way teaching and sharing what Moldovan universities have to offer. Moldovan administrators think that internationalization content flexibility, tolerance for foreign international project management peculiarities and provision of a variety of international curricula choices will be among the major reasons for Moldovan partners to show positive developments and strong commitment to internationalization in the region.

We would like to finish with an interesting thought of a Moldovan administrator, who challenges the Western perception of peripheries and talks about the internationalization dilemma his university currently faces:

The word ‘internationalization’ is difficult for me to pronounce. It is a Western term and its meaning is still unclear for many here. International education, as I understand it, is supposed to be a moral category, rooted in culture and values. I am raising my voice on behalf of the so-called “peripheries” that are hesitant to participate in activities which go over our university capacity of influence. There is nobody to complain to if your partners do not respond to those invisible signals which only your culture could recognize.

It is obvious that internationalization of higher education for many Moldovan educators
is not an easy thing to plan or manage, much less accept its results. It is easier to operate in an environment which is safe, close to their heart and culture. Moldovan educators mention problems with a vague terminology usage, uncertainty with changing priorities of international higher education, reconceptualization of the role of nation-states, quality concerns and fear of unexpected consequences of international collaboration networks. It shows that serious work on various outreach scenarios is needed for Moldovan educators and their international counterparts to succeed in their collaborative aspirations. For Western universities there is a growing need “to examine the impact of changing global contexts, to document the changing nature and significance of recent and contemporary education policy priorities, and to advance the case for new and strengthened initiatives for education in small states” (Crossley, Bray, & Packer, 2011 p. 1). This also illustrates the importance of academic dialogue with post-USSR small states, and raises possible standards for international collaboration with Eastern and Southern European universities.

Internationalization forms a commitment to improve Moldovan universities’ global standing. Internationalization is a major focus for Moldovan universities, and those who embrace it will benefit the most. Western universities express a current vision to prepare not just their own students, but an international academic community to meet the challenges and opportunities of our globalized life. Small state universities, though challenged with the growing degradation of their indigenous values, are optimistic about growing opportunities to investigate and further internationalize their systems.

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Acknowledgments
The authors thank Professor Mark Bray of the University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong and Ms. Margaret Brennan from University of Toronto, Canada for their helpful comments in the drafting of this paper.

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Publications.


Inclusive Education in Bhutan: A Small State with Alternative Priorities

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Bhutan is a ‘small state’ according to the World Bank, and therefore categorized as fragile and vulnerable to local and global challenges. However, since the 1960s, when the country first engaged in ‘modernization’ development and global politics, Bhutan has been anything but fragile and helpless. The Royal Government’s focus on sustainable development, cultural heritage, and Gross National Happiness as a template for all social policies has empowered Bhutan to become a leader in the alternative development of small states. This article explores Bhutanese development in one specific area: inclusive education. As Bhutan has shifted its educational policy from elite monasticism to secular ‘Education for All’, issues of educating a heterogenous student population led to the development of inclusive education policies. This article examines how equity-based educational policies provide an alternative to economic-based policy prescriptions of the World Bank for small states.

Introduction

Nestled amongst the towering peaks of the Himalayas, the country of Bhutan navigates itself in the twenty-first century in a cautious and calculated manner. In many ways, the difficult topography of Bhutan has kept it isolated from global movements both positive and negative. Bhutan was never colonized by Europe, engaging only with its immediate neighbors of Nepal, Sikkim, India, Tibet, and later Britain. Today, Bhutan has become a country in the global network and tasked with re-negotiating its identity and place in both regional and international imaginations. A specific recent development in Bhutan has been its education system, having only begun in earnest since the 1960s (Namgyel, 2011). As secular, government-initiated schooling came to prominence and eclipsed elite Buddhist monastic education since the 1960s, issues and dilemmas were raised in Bhutan – amongst other things – as to how a mass education system can benefit an inclusive society. In this paper, I argue that the manner in which Bhutanese educational policies addresses this concern indicates a complex engagement with the limitations and possibilities of being a “small state” according the World Bank (2012) in that the World Bank frames education in small states in terms of human capital development. I also argue that Bhutanese educational policy and goals defies the characterization of small states as fragile and vulnerable (Mayo, 2010), and ultimately presents an alternative to economically-driven development policies for small states (World Bank & Commonwealth Secretariat, 2000).

Education has been expressed as a human right through United Nations agenda-setting such as the Jomtien ‘Education for All’ Conference (UN Inter-Agency Commission, 1990), the Dakar World Education Forum (UNESCO, 2000), and the Millennium Development Goals (UN, 2000). While reactions and effectiveness of conceptualizing education as a right for every child has been mixed (Lewin, 2005; World Bank, 2006), most nations have been engaged in building their educational capacity. The reasons for engaging in educational development range from economic externality and human capital arguments (Becker, 1994; Heyneman, 2000), to arguments of education to promote democratic civic engagement and social justice (Gutmann, 1987; Nussbaum, 2011). Regardless of how education is currently framed, discursively it is viewed as a vital element in nation-state development. Education has been argued as one of the key ingredients to national...
growth, from the United States (Friedman & Mandelbaum, 2011) to the smallest of states (Bacchus, 2008; World Bank, 2012).

If education is to be assumed as a human right and a catalyst for national development – whether or not this is empirically true – policy problems include issues of access, cost, and quality. One policy solution that attempts to address all three of these concerns is **inclusive education**. While many definitions and conceptualizations of inclusive education are in play around the world, the UNESCO (1994) definition provides the broadest definition:

> [S]chools should accommodate all children regardless of their physical, intellectual, social, emotional, linguistic or other conditions. This should include disabled and gifted children, street and working children, children from remote or nomadic populations, children from linguistic, ethnic or cultural minorities and children from other disadvantaged or marginalised areas or groups. (p. 3)

While inclusive education was – and still is – a primarily rights-based policy approach, some research has argued that it is both cost-effective (Metts, 2004) and increases overall educational quality (Ainscow, Booth & Dyson, 2006).

I argue that the development of and interest in inclusive education as a policy solution in Bhutan presents a complex reality for the conception and characterization of small states as defined by the World Bank (2012). First, I explore the assumptions and definitions made of small states and how Bhutan problematizes these assumptions. Second, I detail the vast changes that have occurred to the Bhutanese education system in the past fifty years. The policies that guide these changes indicate a unique Bhutanese conceptualization of education. Third, I explain how inclusive education has been formed as a policy and highlights alternative priorities within education policy in Bhutan.

This article is focused at the level of policy discourse, which limits our understanding of what policies actually do and how they are interpreted, but as Rizvi & Lingard (2010) suggest, policies are value statements “designed to steer actions and behaviour, to guide institutions and professionals in a certain direction” (p. 8). In this paper, it is the values of educational policies that are most important in understanding Bhutan relative to small state characterization. The primary methodology used in this article is one of policy document analysis: policy documents from the Ministry of Education, 5-year plans from the Royal Government, and white-papers disseminated by governmental organizations. This was also followed by a review of scholarship on the Bhutanese education system. This resource gathering took place both outside of Bhutan, as well as within the country as part of a larger ethnographic project on Bhutanese schools. This article only presents the discursive elements of policy and scholarship written on Bhutan for an international audience (Steiner-Khamsi & Stolpe, 2010; Jules, 2008) and the reality on the ground is much more complex. This is a limitation for this study, and also a case for a richer “vertical case study” (Vavrus & Bartlett, 2009) to follow up this research.

**Small States, Complex Realities**
The definition of a small state generally focuses primarily on population size. Bacchus (2008) identifies several definitions that place small state populations anywhere from under 1.5 million to under 5 million people. These population numbers do not seem to be based on any sort of
justified measurement. Both the World Bank (2012) and the Commonwealth Secretariat (Crossley, Bray, & Packer, 2011) use the under 1.5 million population figure as their definition, but the World Bank (2012) also notes that the term ‘small states’ is applied to a diversity of countries of different levels of development. Bhutan has a population estimated around 708,000 people (Government of Bhutan, 2012) which certainly places it squarely into all population definitions of a small state.

While population serves as the main criteria in defining a small state, and despite the World Bank/Commonwealth Secretariat’s (2000) inclusivity of diverse economic conditions, the characterization of small states is that they are ‘developing’ countries with small economies (Bacchus, 2008; see also World Bank, 2000). This characterization exists despite the fact that per capita GNP among small states ranges from $180 (Guinea-Bissau) to over $14,000 (The Bahamas) (World Bank, 2012). Bhutan has an estimated per capita GNP of $590 (World Bank, 2012) but, as I will argue below, this indicator is not the measurement that Bhutan uses to gauge its overall success as a country.

Despite major steps in global engagement and modernization, the Royal Government of Bhutan has been quite cautious and calculated in its external affairs (Galay, 2004). Tourists are allowed into Bhutan only through government-sanctioned tour companies and most international non-governmental organizations are not allowed to enter the country. There are also heavy restrictions on foreign investment in Bhutan (National Council of Bhutan, 2010). While Bhutan has accepted immigrant labor from Nepal and India in the past, recently the government has revised these policies (Magistad, 2011). These policies, among others, represent the larger theme in Bhutanese governance of striving to maintain itself in the twenty-first century.

Bhutan in the 21st century is filled with the paradoxes, contradictions, and complexities of an enmeshed global world. In many ways, Bhutan has embraced its ‘small state’ image both for itself and in the world at large. For much of its history, Bhutan has been in isolation, only getting pulled out of it from time to time by Tibetan invaders or British-India land disputes (Crossette, 1996). While Bhutan desires development and modernization, it also rigidly clings to its ‘traditional culture’ and perspective. The *driglam namzha* policy, for example, enforces a national cultural dress code, architectural design uniformity, and public social codes of conduct (National Library, 1999). This effort can be considered either a protection against outside cultural influences or, as Phuntsho (2004) argues, an “invention of tradition” (p. 575). There is much complexity in having a policy such as *driglam namzha*, in that it created much friction with the Nepali minority in southern Bhutan and raised questions about exactly whose culture was being upheld.

All focus on economic development in Bhutan is filtered through its Gross National Happiness (GNH) policies. GNH is a rejection of the standard international development indicators of economic consumption and production, such as gross national product, and instead pays deference to the nine alternative domains: “psychological wellbeing, health, education, time use, cultural diversity and resilience, good governance, community vitality, ecological diversity and resilience, and living standards” (The Centre for Bhutan Studies, 2012, GNH: Concept section, para. 1). These domains represent the holistic vision of the Royal Government to modernize Bhutan without sacrificing core Buddhist-cultural beliefs, referred to as Bhutan’s “middle way” (Walcott, 2009). The ethical guidance of the GNH on policies has led to a significant limitation on un-sustainable industrial growth (Zurick, 2006).

It remains to be seen how Bhutan’s ‘middle way’ fits into the World Bank’s vision of economic development. Certainly, it can be observed that Bhutan is not embracing the traditional ‘stages of
development’ that are all too often taken as fact by the World Bank and others (see Sachs, 2005). I argue that Bhutan has even recently become more emboldened to challenge the meanings of ‘modernity’ and ‘progress.’ In an interview with the United Nations news agency, Prime Minister of Bhutan, Jigme Y. Thinley, advocated:

[Measuring development through GDP] is flawed and it has many deficiencies. It is flawed in that it promotes limitless growth in a world that is finite. It has deficiencies in the sense that it does not measure or account for so many things that are important to the well-being of a human individual – which ultimately is the purpose of development. (“Interview with Prime Minister of Bhutan,” 2012, para. 9)

Subsistence agricultural economies – such as the case in Bhutan – are problematic to Western conceptions of what a ‘developed’ and ‘modern’ nation looks like (see Escobar, 1995) but, regardless, Bhutan is embracing a hybrid model of sustainability, tradition, and modernity. I argue that this is a far cry from the characterization of a small state as fragile and vulnerable (Mayo, 2010). Bhutan is not afraid to reject economic suggestions and aid from international agencies, as it did in 1980s when the World Bank wanted to fund a dam in southern Bhutan that would have flooded a major conservation area (Worden, 1991). This, of course, is not to say that Bhutan rejects taking international development money – far from it – but Bhutan is not simply a ‘taker’ of policies from international organizations, as is the frequent characterization of small states (Bacchus, 2008). One policy area where Bhutan is especially building its capacity is education, which I will turn to in the next section.

**Education in Bhutan: From the Monastery to the Modern School**

Prior to 1959, education in Bhutan was primarily a Buddhist monastic system that taught only a select few. This monastic school system avoided the dilemma of teaching a diverse group of learners because the selection criteria for attending these schools eliminated such youth whom struggled with literacy, numeracy, and otherwise academic learning by rote. Education – primarily literacy and numeracy – was also available to aristocratic youth through the hiring of private masters that primarily came from Tibet (Phuntsho, 2000). Within Bhutan pre-1959, understanding written language was not considered an important skill to acquire and had little impact upon the everyday lives of its citizens (Dorji, 2008). It was more important to know how to grow food, make materials for living, and have good relations in one’s community. These are skills that are acquired through practice and cultural transmission that do not require the institutionalization of schooling.

Beginning with modernization efforts in the 1960s, public education for the general Bhutanese population began in earnest and has risen precipitously ever since. As Phuntsho (2000) argues, “It may not be an exaggeration to claim that of all the changes and developments that the Kingdom of Bhutan saw in the last half of the twentieth century the ones in education are the most evident, momentous and far-reaching” (p. 97). The Third Druk Gyalpo [Dragon King], Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, initiated modernization efforts during this time believing that Bhutan needed to position itself effectively in a modern global society (Dorji, 2008). This can be viewed as a preventative measure to make sure that Bhutan became a global citizen on its own terms rather than be overcome by India or China, which were becoming emboldened during that period (Pradhan, 2012). In the First Five-Year Plan in 1961, education is featured prominently in
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Bhutan’s development agenda and the Royal Government began to sponsor public community schools (Dorji, 2003). Major changes occurred in the conceptualization of education with the introduction of ‘modern’ education. For instance, while monastic education emphasizes personal enlightenment and life-long reflection, modern education is seen as emphasizing the acquirement of skills to be used externally, that is, to be used after school is completed (Phuntsho, 2000). During its early development, the education system was almost entirely imported from India, including curricular materials and the teachers themselves (Chhoeda, 2007).

In the 1980s, the Royal Government took tangible steps away from the Indian system by localizing the curriculum, localizing the teaching force away from Indian expatriates, investing in new Bhutanese-based curricular materials, localizing school certificate examinations which were previously held in New Delhi, and embracing activity-based/inquiry-based pedagogy away from a more strict British-Indian model of lecture and memorization (Chhoeda, 2007). These educational reforms began with the New Approach to Primary Education (NAPE) in 1985 and expanded in the 1990s through support from the Asian Development Bank (Bray, 1996).

Bhutan has borrowed educational policies from India but also, increasingly, from internationalized sources. Bhutan is a signatory to major UN initiatives such as the ‘Education for All’ (EFA) conference in Jomtien and the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. There is also, at present, a strong desire for an educated citizenry and democracy in direct correlation with Bhutan’s commitments to initiatives such as EFA and the UN Millennium Development Goals (Ninnes, Maxwell, Rabten & Karchung, 2007). Several international organizations – such as the US-based Bhutan Foundation, JICA [Japanese International Cooperation Agency], DANIDA [Danish International Development Agency], and UN agencies such as UNICEF [United Nations International Children’s Fund] and UNDP [United Nations Development Program] – have a presence in developing Bhutan’s educational institutions. For example, the Bhutan Foundation and UNICEF are engaged in significant consultation on the new Special Education policy that is set to be released in 2013 (J. Dorji, personal communication, September 19, 2012).

Education is free and compulsory for Bhutanese youth from ages 6-16 and its commitment to educational equity allowed Bhutan to reach gender parity in its schools very early in its development (Ministry of Education, 2010). While it is invested in meeting the commitments proposed in UN human rights initiatives, Bhutan is also committed to modernize and develop in its own unique way. Beginning in the 1990s, the concept of GNH became central to Bhutan’s education strategy, as the government commits to “maximize the happiness of all Bhutanese and to enable them to achieve their full and innate potential as human beings” (Royal Government of Bhutan, 1999, p. 12). Denman and Namgyel (2008) argue that the Bhutanese system eschews standardization, privatization, and competition. All educational policies must receive the approval of the Gross National Happiness Commission before they are allowed to be enacted.

Making modern education curriculum better fit the culture and values of Bhutan provided an education system that was more relevant and more acceptable to the everyday lives of the Bhutanese citizenry. Chhoeda (2007) suggests that localization and community participation in Bhutanese curriculum “provided flexibility for Bhutanese educators to introduce new Bhutanese content and value systems in the education program” (p. 58). While, as cited earlier, the educational system in Bhutan faces many similar challenges to other educational systems around the world (Ministry of Education, 2004), the outcomes expected for students at the end of primary school reflect a balance between the academic expectations of a ‘modern’ country with a uniquely Bhutanese cultural twist. Namgyel (2011, p. 62) suggests that the 1980s became a period
of ‘Bhutanization’ of its education system. During this time, subjects like environmental studies became core aspects of the curriculum and the Royal Government of Bhutan debated the negative aspects of ‘Western education.’ Today, among other curricular goals, the Bhutanese education system promotes the following (as cited in Chhoeda, 2007, p. 60):

- A deep sense of respect and pride in being Bhutanese, and in being citizens who are loyal, dedicated, productive, contented, and happy with a high standard of moral ethics and discipline
- A greater understanding and appreciation for the predominantly agriculturally-based rural lifestyle and a developed sense of resourcefulness and dignity of labor

These goals, in particular, highlight an education system not merely focused on the acquisition of skills that benefit the Bhutanese economy. Bhutan has seemingly managed to integrate the academic demands of a modern education with the socio-cultural traditions of its citizenry, although there are still tensions between the traditional monastic educational system and the modern educational system (Denman & Namgyel, 2008; Phuntsho, 2000).

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One of the primary challenges for a modern education system is contending with human difference. Whereas the monastic educational system in Bhutan had only to pick those youth who naturally inclined towards literary activities and spiritual practice – while the majority of the population engaged in agricultural activities without the need for literacy – the modern educational system brings heterogenous community youth together in one classroom with one teacher with the expected outcome that they all learn together. Dorji (2008) argues that “for the [Bhutanese] teacher...the secular system was more difficult as he or she had to deal with a number of pupils with varied learning abilities and problems” (p. 22). As has been the case in the development of other educational systems, committing to compulsory education for all summons the dilemma of how to educate youth with differing abilities effectively and efficiently with limited resources (Schuelka & Johnstone, 2012). Bhutan has begun to address these concerns through its increasing attention towards special education and inclusive education.

Within the past ten years, the Royal Government of Bhutan and the Ministry of Education have become more interested in how to best educate youth with disabilities in schools. In the Ninth Five-Year Plan (Royal Government of Bhutan, 2002), a Special Education Unit was established within the Ministry of Education to specifically address the needs of both staff and students involved in the education of youth with disabilities. The Royal Government (2002) estimates that 3.5% of Bhutanese youth have a disability, however the criteria for determining a disability diagnosis remain unclear. While the exact number of youth with disabilities participating in education is unknown historically, it has become a top priority for the Royal Government (2002; 2009) and the Ministry of Education (2004; 2010). The Royal Government (2009) has claimed that 10-12% of children do not attend school because either they have a disability or live in extremely remote areas of Bhutan. Partly, the priority of getting all school-age children into school is an internal motivation, but Bhutan’s engagement with international initiatives such as EFA and its commitments to various UN conventions can also be conscious or unconscious motivators.

The Bhutanese Department of Education, within the Ministry of Health and Education (2003), spells out its vision on education for students with disabilities in *Education Sector Strategy: Realizing Vision 2020*. Their vision is as follows:
All children with disabilities and with special needs – including those with physical, mental and other types of impairment – will be able to access and benefit from education. This will include full access to the curriculum, participation in extra-curricular activities and access to cultural, artistic, recreational and leisure activities ... Children with disabilities and those with special needs will, to the greatest extent possible, be able to attend a local school where they will receive quality education alongside their non-disabled peers. (p. 36)

Inclusive education continues to resonate within Bhutanese policy documents such as the Royal Government’s Tenth Five-Year Plan (2009) and the policies of the Ministry of Education (2010).

While there are still large gaps between idealized inclusive policies and the material, curricular, and personnel capacity to commit them to praxis, Dorji (2003) suggests that Bhutanese culture is already comprised of the values necessary for an inclusive approach to education. Both Dorji (2003) and Namgyel (2011) label this as “wholesome education.” At least going back to 2001, the Kuensel national newspaper has been covering issues and challenges related to persons with disabilities in Bhutan. Editorials (see The government needs to do more, 2009) call for the increased capacity of schools to properly educate youth with disabilities. The priorities of the Royal Government concerning equity in education, along with the media’s portrayal of the policy problem of educational and societal exclusion of persons with disabilities, present inclusive education as a natural policy solution.

The institutionalization of inclusive education policy into the educational structure of Bhutan represents a concerted effort in building an inclusive Bhutanese society. This is a far cry from the GDP-related educational priorities of the World Bank (2012). As alluded to by both Dorji (2003) and Namgyel (2011), as well as Lokamitra (2004), education in Bhutan is deeply connected to its Buddhist culture and is expressed in both conscious and unconscious ways. The belief in the inter-connectedness of all beings naturally lends itself to forming and expressing policies that support inclusiveness. While the belief in karma can be problematic in the conceptualization of disabilities (Schuelka, 2012), Bhutanese GNH-influenced policies are supportive of persons with disabilities through a Buddhist lens. I think it goes without saying that the World Bank does not view the world through a Buddhist perspective, nor do I think it will embrace Buddhist development practices anytime soon.

**Conclusion: Building Inclusive Education Policy in Small States**

As shown above, Bhutan is empowered to enact educational policies that envision a better society – not just in Bhutan but for the world at-large (“Interview with Prime Minister of Bhutan,” 2012). While the World Bank (2000; 2012) is primarily concerned with small state economic development and issues of markets and incomes, Bhutan is choosing its own path. Galay (2004) writes, “[T]here can be no universal theory which can explain the behavior of small states with different culture, politics, domestic institutions and perceptions of security” (p. 106). It would be most appropriate, given the case of Bhutan, to identify that small states may not be prioritizing capitalistic economic growth as the *prima facie* of ‘development’; that, perhaps, there are other dimensions to education and society that can be prioritized. Crossley, Bray, and Packer (2011) make the argument that small states have been engaging in making their education systems more inclusive and expansive. Many states lack the infrastructure and capacity to fully realize these goals, and resort to focusing on an educational system that is designed to foster economic skills for economic development – leaving education for marginalized youth populations in the hands of NGOs, special schools,
or not at all (Schuelka & Johnstone, 2012). Given that the entire education system in Bhutan is only fifty years old, Bhutan has made significant progress in shaping a comprehensive public education system that is unique and not solely based upon adopting out-of-context pre-packaged international education policies.

An alternative reading of Bhutanese education policy in regards to inclusive education could be that the presence of these progressive and international-friendly policies are just another form of ‘global speak’ in which the words are mere representations of what donors and international policy experts want to hear. In defining “global speak,” Steiner-Khamsi and Stolpe (2006) suggest, “[t]here is always and everywhere a huge gap between policy talk and policy action” (p. 185). While this may certainly be the case in Bhutan – given education policy is often analyzed by international audiences and not by those tasked with carrying it out locally (Jules, 2008; Steiner-Khamsi & Stolpe, 2006) – the entirety of its development philosophy cannot be overlooked. Of course there will always be gaps and ‘loose coupling’ between any policy and its practice, and I argue that persistently pointing this out is no longer helpful research.

Steiner-Khamsi (2010) describes the ability of policy-makers to address international donors in one ‘language’ and then to address local constituencies in another as “policy bilingualism.” Jules (2008) takes this analysis one step further and suggests regional policy language as another aspect of “policy trilingualism.” These description do not entirely work in Bhutan as there is little reliance on external donation, but there may be some analogy to Bhutan gaining international political capital by being for its alternative development strategy. Regionally, Bhutan is quite unique and set apart from its neighbors in SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] in its history, politics, education strategy, and its development philosophy. In the case of the new Special Education Policy in Bhutan that is to be released in 2013, the policy has not only been reviewed by international experts but also is reviewed internally by Gross National Happiness experts. While UNICEF is involved in inclusive education and child-friendly schools in Bhutan, they are not dangling money in front of the Ministry of Education and incentivizing the policy to become ‘multilingual,’ nor is there any of form of international aid bribery that has been so criticized in the past in other regions. In my opinion, the presence of such policies in Bhutan are a natural off-shoot of its desire for national development balanced with a focus on inclusive societies and a commitment to the spiritual, material, and psychological well-being of its citizens.

It is an over-simplification to say that Bhutan is not interested at all in its economic growth because, indeed, it is quite concerned with its economy. However, the Royal Government is equally concerned with the well-being of its people and through its GNH policies, the well-being and happiness of Bhutanese citizens becomes the primary overall concern. The Bhutanese are very proud that they are considered an outlier of development and economically-biased policies, as evidenced by the recent interview at the United Nations by Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigmi Y. Thinley in which he said:

Bhutan has never really sought fame or popularity. And in fact, GNH is something that we did not seek to promote, but the knowledge that people do know about GNH and associate this idea with Bhutan gives me a sense of hope in the future of mankind. It means that people are aware that there is such a thing as an alternative way living life, an alternative way to living life in such a way that life as we live it can be meaningful and can become sustainable. (“Interview with Prime Minister of Bhutan,” 2012)
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A focus on economic capacity development in small states misses the fuller picture of society and culture within those small states. While it is true that inclusive education is expensive and uses more resources (Metts, 2004), there are many intangible rewards and creative solutions to limited resources in education (Schuelka & Johnstone, 2012). Bhutan, like many small states, recognizes that education is not solely an economic enterprise.

How Bhutan challenges the World Bank (2000, 2012) ‘small state’ status is that it is not looking for development by Western definitions of the term. Bhutan is crafting its own ‘modernity’ and hardly fits neatly into either World Bank conceptualizations or expectations for small states. The World Bank (2000) calls for small states to be exposed to global markets, have large export markets, feature diversified economies, and access to capital (see also World Bank, 2000). To Bhutan, these things are unacceptable either because they are unsustainable, un-Buddhist, or unrealistic to the realities of its geography and position. To the Royal Government of Bhutan (2011), GNH is a much more sustainable and locally-relevant philosophy of development and one of the primary ways in which this is expressed is through its education priorities.

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References


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Building on Living Traditions: 
Early Childhood Education and Culture in Solomon Islands

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The Solomon Islands, a small developing nation in the South Pacific, demonstrates an emerging community-based kindergarten model with the potential to promote context and culture relevant early learning and development, despite deeply embedded foundations in colonial legacies. Based on the Kahua region of Makira-Ulawa Province, this collaborative, ethnographically-informed, study explores how the kindergarten is situated at the core of a cultural revolution. Findings enlighten how the kindergarten is serving as the basis to building on living traditions through cultural reinvigoration efforts, while the very essence of the kindergarten’s sustainability has become dependent upon the revitalization of traditional practices historically fundamental to Kahuan society. From this, implications drawn address how community-based initiatives can facilitate early childhood education while still supporting context-specific cultures and identities through sustainable initiatives.

Introduction
The postcolonial landscape in the South Pacific continues to illustrate how Western values, attitudes, and practices permeate present-day life, in addition to how colonial-era knowledge and practices particularly persist in dominating regional education systems. The current reality of early childhood education[1](ECE) in the Solomon Islands (SI), and islanders’ understanding and perceptions of such programs, is intricately linked with the nation’s colonial history. This article explores the distinctive efforts of the Kahua people in the SI to reclaim ownership over their early childhood educational systems, in culturally-reinvigorating ways, amidst colonial legacies. This is framed around an overarching research question of “How have cultural and contextual factors influenced the development and sustainability of Kahua community-based ECE?” Through this exploration, influences of cultural and contextual factors on ECE programs’ sustainability[2] are explored as key foundational elements to societal cultural maintenance.

Many cultural beliefs about the nature of childhood and children’s development have been unexamined by interventionists in the creation of ECE initiatives, thereby contributing to a propagation of universalized views of childhood (Cleghorn & Prochner, 2010; Dahlberg, Moss, & Pence, 2006; Nsamenang, 2008). This in turn has had a strong impact on international policy and practice development, such as the first Education for All (EFA) goal[3], reflecting what Nsamenang (2006) calls an institutional universalism that often does not translate to non-Western cultures. Consequently, many ECE programs around the world dramatically resemble the practices and values of a Western-based model, with a decidedly specific discourse for high quality programs for children from birth through age eight. This can be seen in knowledge transfers from the West (i.e. Euro-American ideologies and research) that promote restricted practices inclusive of rigid classroom routines, artificial child-centered learning environments, active play-based learning models, individualistic social orientations, and child-specific classroom artifacts (e.g. learning resources, child-sized furniture, soft flooring materials). As a result, a self-perpetuating set of practices and values have emerged that are frequently uncritically transferred around the world to dissimilar contexts and cultures. Arguably, these Western-dominant ECE practices prevent recognition of, and efforts to reinvent, more culturally-relevant, locally sustainable programs.
in the Majority World[^4]. For many Majority World societies, early learning has traditionally been embedded within children’s active involvement in meaningful daily practices throughout their communities. Therefore, dissimilarly to artificial child-centered Western ECE formal learning environments, children in many of these non-Western cultures are integrated in adult-world activities, as engaged through observer-based models of learning and learning through apprenticeship in informal education environments.

In contrast to the international transfer of ECE policies and practices, many small states’ indigenous efforts have arisen to counter the continuation of colonization now under the guise of educational globalization (Super & Harkness, 2008). In this article, small states are defined as those with populations under 1.5 million (Holmes & Crossley, 2004). Situated at the forefront of the intersection between international ECE discourses and localized counter-movements is the small South Pacific nation of the SI and their recent developments in community-based kindergartens (i.e. “kindy”). These kindies are typically leaf huts, locally resourced with bush materials, and conducted in mother tongues by minimally trained local villagers. To date, many remote villages are proving unable to independently establish, run, maintain, and sustain these community-based programs. This challenge has become a critical threat to the wider SI education system since the enactment of a national policy requiring all children’s attendance in kindergarten for three years prior to entering primary school (Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development [MEHRD], 2008). To explore the cultural and contextual underpinnings to these developments, this article is based on a collaborative, ethnographically-informed, case study, situated in the remote Kahua region of Makira-Ulawa Province.

**Education Foundations in International Literature**

Western theorists such as Rousseau, Pestalozzi, and Piaget have historically exerted considerable influence in shaping perspectives on early learning and development. Their argument was that children acquire knowledge and awareness of their surrounding world through learning experiences that enable them to individually construct their own learning (LeVine, 2007). However, more recently, sociocultural and postmodernist literatures have shifted the view of young children to emphasize the culturally and socially communicated nature of knowledge and learning (Edwards, 2005; Rogoff, 2003). This assertion has largely evolved from Vygotsky’s (1978) fundamental premise that knowledge acquisition and the development of intellectual potential within a community is due to the sociohistorical context. Thus, children are not individually constructing knowledge; instead, this process must be defined through the social and cultural practices, beliefs, and experiences of the community. More recently, this idea has been expanded upon by Rogoff (1990), who argues that individual development is shaped by the cultural and social context in which it occurs; therefore, it cannot be defined in universalistic terms. Exemplifying this is Whiting and Whiting’s (1975) study of *Children in Six Cultures*, which emphasizes the importance of historical traditions and environmental conditions guiding parents in child-rearing. Their position is furthered by research on cultural values and parental goals mediated by environmental demands (LeVine, 1974), claims that parental beliefs/goals/behaviors are linked to sociocultural contexts (Field, Sostek, Vietze, & Leiderman, 1981; Rogoff, 2003), and how culturally distinct contexts influence origins of parents’ belief systems (Goodnow & Collins, 1990) and ethnotheories (Harkness & Super, 1996). Ultimately, all children arrive at formal education with informal learning systems they have developed within their local cultures, comprised of learning strategies and contexts that have fostered their early development (Ninnes, 1995). It is widely acknowledged that different cultures provide different settings, and different experiences within those settings, affecting children’s engagement in various situations based on the culture’s particular beliefs and values (Gauvain, 2001; Tudge et al., 2006).
By not accounting for cultural practices, parental beliefs, and environmental constraints, ECE programs are not likely to be sustainable endeavors due to their incongruence with the particular cultures and context in which they are being implemented. Puamau (2005) writes,

Because formal schooling is largely derived from foreign value systems, there is a serious cultural gap between the lived experiences of most Pacific Island students and what is offered in schools, including the way schooling is organized and structured, the culture and ethos of schooling, its pedagogical practices, and the assessment of learning. (p. 13)

Despite increasing rhetoric suggesting greater responsiveness to issues of cultural sensitivity, this mainstream ECE literature has not delved deeply enough to develop context-informed understandings that can be applied within specific ECE programs (Cole, 1998; Fleer, 2003; Rogoff, 2003). This is not to overlook the increasing research rooted in Indigenous methodologies within the Majority World (Kagitcibasi, 2000; Kim, Yang, & Hwang, 2006; Nsamenang, 2000).

Within the Pacific, the past forty years of educational reform initiated by donors and governments have been regarded by Indigenous scholars as largely a failure. This is particularly with regard to two factors: (1) insufficient quality human resources to achieve development goals, and (2) a lingering vagueness of the vision for Pacific education and the purposes it aims to fulfill.

Education reforms have remained largely fixated on improving various aspects of the quantification of education, but there has been little questioning of the values and assumptions underpinning formal education or development. (Pene, Taufe‘ulungaki, & Benson, 2002, p. 1)

Global discourses around ECE have generally been framed in terms of outcomes, instead of defining ECE as a cultural process or tool. As argued elsewhere (Burman, 2001; Kincheloe, 2000; MacNaughton, 2005), ECE is at risk of “inadvertent complicity in a neoliberal imperialist agenda to secure and expand the hegemony of individualist, often European-heritage, positivist values, goals, and pedagogies in early learning and development” (Ball, 2010, p. 3).

Similarly, within Pacific Forum island nations, education scholars have deemed it critically important to rethink education in context in response to the lasting regional colonial legacy (Daiwo, 2001; Foote & Bennet, 2004; Puamau, 2005; Thaman, 1998). In recognition that culture is continuously evolving, space must be left by practitioners/policymakers/villagers to continually reflect on and revise approaches to, and goals for, ECE. Arguably, this should be inclusive of locals’ own evolving images and not merely a dominant image of middle-class, Anglo-American, English-speaking cultural constructions of the child.

**Contexts of “Smallness”**
Both the SI and the specific Kahua region studied here epitomize the concept of smallness. The SI is itself a small state, with a population of 506,967 (World Bank, 2011); Makira-Ulawa Province has a population of 38,000 of which the Kahua population is approximately 4,500 (Fazey, Latham, Hagasua, & Wagatora, 2007). In this context, the small educational initiative of kindergartens, which have only recently become valued and implemented in pockets of the country, gains interest.
The SI – a double chain archipelago of nearly 1000 tropical, fertile, reef-fringed islands and coral atolls – lies northeast of Australia in the southwest Pacific Ocean (Figure 1). The nation faces a variety of challenges, including smallness of scale, remoteness of location, diversity of cultural and linguistic groups, colonial history, and potential for local ownership amidst a highly active foreign aid and political interest arena. Within the context of SI, the study focuses on the Kahua region (i.e. East and West Wanione) of Makira-Ulawa Province, as located in the far eastern portion of the SI archipelago. Kahua was chosen as the focal context due to the region’s

1. culturally and socially tight-knit communities, which facilitated research across the region through strong human networks;
2. reputation throughout the nation as one of the least developed regions in terms of economy, infrastructure, and educational achievements, yet high resiliency in maintaining traditional kastoms\(^{[5]}\); and
3. widespread developments in ECE, as spurred by an international nongovernmental organization’s support to the provincial Ministry of Education, beginning in Kahua.

Furthermore, the Kahua region consists of forty-eight remote, predominantly coastal, communities, with an approximate annual growth rate of 2.7% (Fazey et al., 2007). The majority of families are dependent on subsistence livelihoods, supplemented through small-scale copra and cocoa farming, and live largely without access to electricity, infrastructure (e.g. roads), or telecommunication services. As a result of rapid population growth, limited natural resources, and increasing Western influences, the region is beginning to change from a subsistence- to monetary-
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Based economy. As such, like many contexts globally, the Kahua people increasingly value the importance of education to improve the potential of their future generations. Kindergartens in particular have seen a dramatic increase in numbers across Kahua, from only one in 2000 to over 18 a decade later. Collectively, the above features specific to the Kahua region made it a prime location for this study’s exploration of ECE development and sustainability in the midst of changing cultural contexts.

Theoretical Underpinnings and Research Design

Research using a variety of methods to understand the multifaceted components of ECE and development in culturally diverse contexts has increasingly succeeded in developmental research over the past decade (Harkness et al., 2006; Garcia-Coll et al., 2002; Weisner, 2005). In particular, sociocultural theorists recognize that early learning and development are not individual constructions, nor are they universal, but instead acknowledge that they are highly mediated by one’s context and culture. This study is rooted in a sociocultural-ecological perspective (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Rogoff, 1990, 2003; Super & Harkness, 1986), which acknowledges the holistic nature of ECE as a process defined by the social and cultural practices, beliefs, and experiences found in a particular context, yet also incorporates biological and environmental factors. The theoretical assumptions underpinning the study guided a methodologically synergistic research approach, defined for the purposes of this study as a collaborative, ethnographically-informed, case study. Drawing from these different methodological perspectives facilitated the development of methods for understanding local realities of the Kahua people, as verbally expressed. It also facilitated delving deeper into local realities by observing and partaking in aspects of participants’ daily lives. This thereby additionally accounted for nonverbal features and eventually allowed for comparisons to be discussed and drawn between individuals, families, learning environments, and villages. Supporting this research methodology is a strong unifying assumption about the social world as being co-constructed, context-bound, relational, and situated (Susman & Evered, 1978), while recognizing that human existence is fluid, contextual, and relational (Jardine, 1990). Accordingly, it became critical for the lead researcher (a non-Kahuan) to extensively collaborate with a local research team, and more broadly with Kahua communities, to best access and interpret local perceptions and realities. Notably, the term collaboration is used here to convey a deeper experience of mutually consciousness-raising interactions and involvement in the research process; this is contrasted by participation and merely implying peripheral participant involvement in researcher-designed activities (Crossley, Herriot, Waudo, Mwirotsi, Holmes, & Juma, 2005; Trist, 1986).

Methods and Research Strategy

The research was led by an expatriate Caucasian female and a gender-balanced research team of four local Kahua kindergarten teachers and chairmen. The lead researcher trained the local team for one week prior to beginning the study. Key training topics included basic understandings of ECE, qualitative research facilitation approaches to be used in the study (with hands-on practice), translation skills, and data management to ensure proper documentation throughout fieldwork. Together, the team collaborated with ECE stakeholders from all levels of Kahua society through extensive participant-observations, interviews, and participatory focus groups. Recognizing the limitations of approaching the research from a single perspective (e.g. insider versus outsider, female versus male, academic versus villager), the research team’s diversity of perspectives facilitated greater rapport building with wide ranging participants and deepened their collective understandings throughout the research and analysis processes. The lead researcher approached the study as an ethnographer, striving to deeply understand the local context, which in turn provided the basis for strong rapport building within Kahua. However, it was ultimately through
the collaboration within the local research team and Kahua participants that deep dialogue and mutual consciousness-raising was able to occur. This thereby resulted in richer data collection and conclusions drawn than would have been possible from an individual external researcher perspective.

Also of great importance to the study was the research teams’ collaborative working relationship with the local grassroots Kahua Association. The Association was officially launched in 2005 in response to limited external support for their small region’s development and as a unification effort against resource exploitation. This demonstrates local communities’ commitment to promoting their own sustainable development and more effective resource management, as deeply embedded with cultural and societal understandings. The Association also symbolizes a unifying effort of the Kahua people as a cultural group, with desires to reassert the importance of their traditional cultural practices and beliefs, based on democratic principles of upholding equality and social justice for all Kahua people. Such collaboration formed the essential basis for the study’s theoretical underpinnings and research design. It subsequently provided a means for the researchers to connect with communities through local leaders and turn the research process and findings into practical sustained actions for Kahua.

Similar to any ethnography with a discovery-based design (Fife, 2005), the focus of this study unfolded as the fieldwork evolved. Therefore, much like the activity of grounded theorizing (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), fieldwork began with a broad exploration, predominantly implementing participant-observations and unstructured interviews in a single village for four months. Subsequently, this provided shape and focus for designing and conducting eight additional months of fieldwork with more structured methods throughout the Kahua region (i.e., semi-structured observation tool and interview schedules for different categories of participants). Throughout the study, dialogue within the research team also served a reflective research tool to deepen understandings of the data collected (Schensul, Schensul, & LeCompte 1999).

The research team began the study by exploring the wider range of formal, informal, and nonformal early learning provisions available in Kahua communities (e.g., church, peer-to-peer, chiefly cultural teachings, etc.) so as to be able to identify features that potentially related to the sustainability of community-based kindies. This was based on the general premise of the Developmental Niche conceptual framework, which brings together the interactive relationships between the (1) physical and social settings of the child’s everyday life, (2) culturally regulated customs of child care and child rearing, and (3) the psychology of the caretakers (Super & Harkness, 1986). By observing and discussing different environments of early learning in Kahua communities, as well as their underlying historical cultural changes, consonances and dissonances in approaches to learning could be identified. For example, customs underlying the teaching-learning process was explored between current institutionalized learning (i.e., kindy) and traditional culturally-relevant exchanges of knowledge through shared experiences (i.e., kastom learning in home). With such an understanding of sustained traditional, and more recent, teaching methods and types of information shared, implications could then be drawn for application in enhancing culturally relevant and more sustainable community-based institutionalized early learning.

Over the course of one year, a total of 30 villages were engaged in extensive research team participant-observations, unstructured and semi-structured interviews, and 32 participatory focus groups (inclusive of 135 male and 149 female participants in 9 villages). Observations and interviews were conducted throughout villages to develop broad understandings of the interplay between early learning approaches, contexts, and cultures. Participatory focus groups
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involved small separated groups of men and women (in accordance with cultural norms). These groups were engaged in stone-ranking activities and discussions about community values, understandings, and support towards various early learning environments in their immediate community. In order to understand children’s learning in context, whilst capturing the deeply embedded and influential contextual factors, the methods implemented were repeated among different individuals and communities. Extensive purposive sampling was used to obtain a broader range of perspectives across participant ages, gender, social status, relation(s) to children, and geographic location. In addition to heightening different viewpoints, and averting singular visions, triangulation was used to validate data by checking a variety of sources across these diverse ECE stakeholders’ interactions with the research team (including data from interviews, focus groups, and participant-observations) (Cornwall, Musyoki, & Pratt, 2001). This thereby strengthened the reliability of the research findings.

Of greatest significance to this study was the dialogic processes that proved to be most informative. These were facilitated by the relationships and social environments promoted by the research team, through the combination of ethnographic and collaborative research methods. Over extended periods of time, authentic engagement with communities around the research issues, as well as open acceptance of local cultures, allowed for deep rapport building between the research team and villagers. Word of this support for the research and research team then spread throughout the region, easing the process of rapport building in community after community. Without these strong relationships, discussions related to the research topics would have likely been far more guarded, as would participants’ comfort to carry on as usual when being observed. This necessitated approaching the study from the sociocultural-ecological perspective, recognizing that to understand local practices, beliefs, and experiences for the purpose of addressing the research question, then mutual consciousness raising and co-construction of knowledge between the research team and communities was essential.

Data Analysis Strategy

As a result of the evolving research design throughout the fieldwork, data analysis was not a distinct stage. Instead, it was an ongoing process for the research team in which research questions were reformulated, reexamined, and clarified, based on the iterative process central to grounded theorizing. Data (i.e. notes from observations, interview notes and transcripts, and focus group data forms) were analyzed holistically to draw out themes to feed back into guiding the research. This required using thematic analysis, in which emerging themes and patterns were identified across the different data obtained from all research methods and team members. Data were thematically analyzed using a two-step process of open and focused coding, which was ongoing and cyclical as new data was continuously obtained (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Esterberg, 2002). Open coding allowed for the micro-analytical level of analysis in identifying themes/categories of significance to the inquiry, out of which focused coding then refined the process (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996). Focused coding is similar to open coding but focuses more specifically on previously identified recurring themes. After refining the recurring themes into more focused coded categories, content analysis was then used to explore quantitatively the frequencies of themes identified and qualitatively to use narrative description to illustrate the themes.

Findings: Building on Living Traditions

“Learning” in Kahua

To understand the cultural context of ECE in Kahua, one must first understand the concept of learning in context. There are two distinct types of learning within Kahua. In the Kahua language,
these are known as *ramatenia* and *hagasuria*. Ramatenia refers to kastom teachings that form the “commandments” which guide one’s life and interactions with others. In contrast, hagasuria refers to more general life skills/knowledge teachings, such as those learned in formal schooling. These two aspects of learning are situated in the Kahua Principles that form the basis, at least traditionally, of life for the Kahua people (Table 1, as applied to early childhood learning).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Translation</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hemoti</td>
<td>Sharing</td>
<td>Children must share everything (e.g. during snack time, share food with other children/teachers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herongogi</td>
<td>Asking</td>
<td>Children must ask first before doing/taking something (e.g. ask the teacher to leave the classroom to “go to sea” to toilet).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hemakuani</td>
<td>Care</td>
<td>Children must respect others’ property by taking care of it, whether the owner is present or not (e.g. during bathing time, children are not to steal other children’s trousers; children are not to knock down others’ block constructions).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hekarigi</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Everything must involve dialogue and discussion with others (e.g. teacher engages children in discussion during free-play time about what they are working on).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramata</td>
<td>Kahua</td>
<td>Ramata are inclusive of a process for discussion and the types of behaviors required to maintain respect. They emphasize how to live a good life by understanding what are acceptable and unacceptable behaviors, as all rooted in expressions of respect. Traditionally, ramata are taught and applied at family levels, but they are also taught in a less formal manner within the kindergarten.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Kahua Principles are comprised of four overarching local Kahua cultural values, which provide the basis for how the Kahua people are to behave and interact. Underlying these long-standing, locally defined, traditional principles are deeply rooted obligatory Kahua practices of respect, love, and compassion for others. Additionally, the Kahua Principles give rise to *ramata*, which are the traditionally unwritten specific operational rules for how the Kahua people must lead their lives. The Principles remain near exclusively an orally transpired tradition, unwritten until the past few years through the work of the Kahua Association. Nevertheless, their traditional understanding as a set of principles to guide daily life, and inclusion in direct and indirect teachings to children, are imperative. In present-day Kahua, specific knowledge regarding these principles was found to be quickly diminishing, such as an awareness of the specific vernacular terminology used to express each of them. However, the fundamental actions addressed and enforced through them were observed to still provide a firm basis for daily human interactions throughout the region.

**Codification and Objectification of Kastom in ECE**

Explicit knowledge of the Kahua Principles by the vast majority of Kahua people has been on the decline for over sixty years, as was extensively ascribed by Kahuans to increasing “Western” influences (e.g. local interest in formal education teachings, “Whiteman” material possessions, church/Christianity). However, recently there has been a resurgence of traditional practices (e.g. sharing kastom teachings, enforcing gender specific clothing, learning traditional handicrafts).
Most commonly, this was expressed in association with a local frustration in society’s falling prey, as opposed to adequately adapting, to modern external influences. Using Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) Ecological Systems Model, the development of education, and ECE specifically, within the SI can be seen as a microcosm for what has been happening on the exosystem to Kahuan culture and macrosystem in Solomon society. Through increased incorporation of Western-ideologies – as historically introduced with the arrival of the church and formal education by Christian missionaries and more recently through international agendas – an objectification of kastom currently can be seen as an effort to circumvent anxieties of this encroaching modernity to SI.

Throughout communities in Kahua, the case of shifting approaches to early childhood learning in varied microenvironments stands as a concrete example in alterations to Kahuan epistemologies. These illustrate a move from the traditional emphasis on *ramatenia* (i.e. teachings related to kastom beliefs and practices) being replaced by that of *hagasuria* (i.e. teachings related to general knowledge), as executed through non-Indigenous (Western) forms of learning at church and in formal school-based education. Notably, Kahuans did not describe these two forms of learning as being at complete odds with one another, but instead expressed a need for balance between traditional cultural and non-Indigenous knowledge. As one young mother said, “The ways of Kahua are being lost. People here are adopting new wisdoms and understandings from Whiteman as a result of the education system” (personal communication, September 27, 2009). This sentiment was reinforced by a Kahua kindy teacher,

Kahua culture has changed over time because of Western learning. Nowadays, people send their children to primary schools, secondary schools, as far as universities overseas out from our Solomon Islands’ society...when they return, they just live in Western style...when Western systems come in, it convinces people that they do not need to think highly of our kastoms and people. (personal communication, November 2, 2009)

However, the research team found this local concern over declining cultural knowledge to be met by a countermovement towards cultural reinvigoration, as seen with a codification of kastom. Exemplifying this is the fact that only in the past few years have the Kahua Principles been documented and more abstractly discussed, in contrast to their historical oral existence and largely unspoken incorporation into all aspects of life. Accordingly, much of the cultural reinvigoration effort in Kahua began with community elders and the Kahua Association’s efforts to combat problems of lacking cultural respect in their communities. Subsequently, a majority of parents and primary school teachers have also begun to recognize their lacking knowledge of traditional cultural wisdom to pass on to children, which has been compounded by their realization of the near extinction of this knowledge with their aging community elders. These findings by the research team are of great significance, since on the surface one can observe an intergenerational cultural decay in Kahua; however, underlying this (yet to be fully realized), the kindy was found to hold much potential as cultural reinvigorator in addressing these cultural concerns. As one Kahua grandfather and kindy chairman expressed,

Good Kahua cultural values are quickly fading away due to Western world influences. Such styles are sure enough to dominate Kahua culture in not a very long time. Kahua leaders should not ignore this issue. I recommend kindy school as a first ladder to step forward in education. It is where a traditional leader, a government leader, or a church leader is shaped and can later shape others for the best future and betterment of our nation, the Solomon Islands. (personal communication, November 2, 2009)
Fundamental to the sustainability of community-based kindy initiatives appears to be a dependency on this community-level reinvigoration of culture for generating community-wide support and cooperation in shared beliefs.

**Community Support for Early Learning**

To explore issues relating to context and culture influencing ECE program sustainability, it is important to understand how truly fitting these formal education programs are to local contexts and cultures. The majority of teaching-learning practices, verbalized beliefs regarding learning, and aspirations for children in Kahuan ECE microenvironments were found to relate to simplified versions of *kastom*. Accordingly, teaching tools, such as songs, traditional stories, and material resources presented surface-level cultural relevance. Yet, their underlying implementation for the transpiration of learning and cultural reinvigoration were found to frequently be objectifications of deep Kahua culture. Based on an analysis and compilation of data from interviews and participant observations, Kahua kindies were found to be situated on a spectrum between traditionalism and Western ideologies, as demonstrated in Figure 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spectrum of Approaches to Learning</th>
<th>Primary School (Pre-class/Class 1)</th>
<th>Church / Sunday School</th>
<th>Kindy</th>
<th>Home</th>
<th>Wider Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Extrinsic motivation to learn: preparation for future schooling and paid employment</td>
<td>Intrinsic motivation to learn: preparation for life; kastom/tradition/subsistence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach to Learning</td>
<td>Rote learning, memorization</td>
<td>Legitimate peripheral participation (observation-modeling)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning Model</td>
<td>Theoretical, abstract, practical</td>
<td>Practical, personalized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrust</td>
<td>Towards change and independence</td>
<td>Towards conformity and interdependence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership of Knowledge</td>
<td>Public, commodified knowledge</td>
<td>Private: belongs to families, tribes, and lineages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of Knowledge</td>
<td>Western; scientifically and formally documented information</td>
<td>Traditional; kastom beliefs, values, skills, and practices</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learners’ Personal Orientation</td>
<td>Openly competitive, low autonomy</td>
<td>Quietly competitive, high autonomy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questioning by Learners</td>
<td>Actively encouraged and practiced</td>
<td>Discouraged and regarded as challenge to experts’ authority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Context</td>
<td>Information-oriented, focus on individual achievement</td>
<td>Individual-oriented, emphasizes unity, stresses interdependence, foundation in significance of understanding and respecting local kastoms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language of Instruction</td>
<td>English, Pidgin</td>
<td>Vernacular: Kahua</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning Resources</td>
<td>Manufactured materials</td>
<td>Local bush materials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 2. Spectrum of early learning approaches in Kahua microenvironments* 

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The spectrum of early learning in Kahua microenvironments (Figure 2) identifies and arranges five microenvironments by the degree to which they incorporate Western and traditional learning approaches, based on prominent objectives identified across microenvironments. Through each of these microenvironments, a transition was observed by the research team:

- Starting with the wider community, traditional learning approaches, although still prominently evident in the home, begin to change as some parents prepare children for kindy, such as through school readiness activities (e.g. counting, drawing, and more structured behavior). Additionally, kastom teachings were said to be increasingly overt, such as taught to groups of children by the village chief when parents no longer have the knowledge or willingness to do so through their daily practices in the home.
- Kindy then advances children’s development through the incorporation of more Western-oriented learning approaches in preparation for children’s transition to primary school (e.g. handwriting practice, early math concepts, classroom rules). However, kindies still bridge back to the home and community microenvironments through predominant use of the vernacular as language of instruction, use of local resources for learning materials, and incorporation of kastom teachings.
- Church and Sunday school link back to the community, largely through language (services in vernacular despite most denominations using English Bibles) and communal practices, while Church teachings are distinctly imported from the Western world. However, in many ways, some teaching (i.e. Biblical values) are also similar to traditional values, such as sharing and fellowship. Over time, due to devout beliefs, Christianity has become a component of locally perceived present-day culture to the majority of Kahuans.
- Primary school is situated at the extreme end of the spectrum, towards a Western learning approach. To a great degree, classroom pedagogy, materials, routines, curriculum, etc. are virtually indistinguishable from Western classrooms. However, there is still room for further movement along the spectrum. For example, although the language of instruction is mandated to be English, as per the national curriculum, the vast majority of these classrooms are conducted in SI Pidgin (a mix of vernaculars and English) due to insufficient English skills of both teachers and students for English to be the sole language of instruction.

Each of the microenvironments discussed above can be viewed with particular distinctions across a spectrum of learning approaches, origins, goals, etc. Yet, fundamental to them all was found to be the underlying (desired, even if not always fully realized) cultural values, as also significantly reflected in local religious beliefs and Kahua Principles: respect, love, fellowship, and knowledge of kastom. Therefore, although nearly all participants consistently voiced a strong perception that local cultural knowledge is being lost in Kahua, observations revealed that it still remains a strong foundation to nearly all early learning interactions throughout the villages, regardless of the specific early learning microenvironment.

Based on participant observations, community support for early childhood learning microenvironments was found to be greater in each of the four independent microenvironments (i.e. wider community, home, church, and primary) in comparison to community support for the kindy. By applying this to the conceptual Development Niche framework, the lacking support for kindies can be associated with greater shared understandings of approaches to learning in the other microenvironments, as compared to those of the community in relation to the kindy. It is through these overtly observable deeper shared understandings, which have developed over longer periods of time, that have allowed for the creation of states of equilibrium between...
externally introduced ideas to Kahua and long-standing internal cultural beliefs and practices. For example, historical accounts about childhood conveyed through interviews suggest that acceptance of formal primary school has led communities to place less priority on children working in subsistence gardens. Over time, many parents have come to prefer their children attain a good formal education so they can find paid employment to financially support their extended families. Contrastingly, a dissonance was observed between the kindy and parental beliefs about children’s learning. SI ECE curriculum emphasizes children’s learning through play, while community cultural beliefs and objectives largely only recognize a narrower, academic understanding of formal education. For example, while shells and stones are collected as kindy classroom resources to support learning through play, when children bring such materials into the home, they are typically roused outside for bringing what is considered rubbish into the house. These ECE consonances and dissonances were found to affect the levels of community support for educational activities and environments. Most notably, this resulted in limited support for community-based kindies due to a lack of community shared values and understandings with this new formal ECE initiative.

Championing the ECE Vision: The Case of Two Kindies
Exemplifying challenges to kindy sustainability, and the potential influences of the kindy on culture, are two case studies, as were revealed through extensive participant observations and interviews in two villages. On the surface, these two communities are quite similar: both follow the same Kahua traditions, cultural practices, and predominantly subsistence lifestyles. However, the effects of beliefs in a paranormal phenomenon about people living beneath their island of Makira has developed significantly dissimilarly in each context, particularly as understood through the functioning of their kindies.

Kindy 1 serves as an exemplar community-sustained ECE initiative, having been established and independently maintained since the 1980s, which was long before other communities were even aware of such programs. Despite never having received external support, financially or through training, the masterminding of merely a sole inspirational champion for the program has since garnered his community’s support in the vision of supporting ECE. Nevertheless, during the past few years, this support has dramatically changed due to community separation into two groups over beliefs regarding the aforementioned paranormal phenomenon. The community divide became so severe that even the community church was torn down until a “belief-consensus” could be achieved. With churches in Kahua serving as the center of communities, and a significant site of social interactions, the demolition of the church in this community exemplified the demise of amicable daily interactions between these two opposing groups of villagers. This not only affected the quality of communal life, but it also undermined the Kahua Principles of respect and compassion for others. Through this time, the kindy provided the sole unifying element in the community. While adults became estranged over deep-seated beliefs, uniting them has been an enduring commitment to their children’s development, which has demanded cooperation in the preservation of a functioning program. Beginning with kindy leaders and village women, slowly the kindy is serving as grounds to rebuilding amicable community relations.

In contrast to Kindy 1, a second kindy demonstrated a more deeply segregated village over the paranormal beliefs movement. Located in the small back portion of a community building, this kindy has had few resources and little community support throughout the few years since its establishment. Villagers attributed this to poor kindy and village leadership. Upon arrival of the new beliefs movement, disunity amongst villagers reached such a degree that nearly all community-wide endeavors ceased, including mere social greetings to others while in passing.
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The kindy reflected this segregation with an inability to bolster community support for making resources; regular attendance by children; or commitment to support, monitor, compensate, and train teachers. Individualist attitudes flourished in the community, such as demonstrated by those with the highest formal education levels, who chose to home-school their young children and recommended a private fee-based kindy as opposed to the faltering community-based program. Fundamentally this contradicts the essence of most community-based kindies, which have developed as communal projects, respectful of the different degrees of financial and in-kind support individuals are capable of contributing. Further, this conflicts with the deepest values of the Kahua Principles: respect, sharing, and compassion for others.

These two kindy cases depict differing leadership styles, thereby inciting different reactions from their communities in terms of support for their kindies. Fundamental to Kindy community 1, in addition to the strong leadership of the program and community, was their roots in fellowship, as is central to their South Seas Evangelical community church. Communities throughout Kahua of this denomination were observed to embody the highest levels of community unity and cooperation, which are in direct unison with traditional Kahua Principals. Contrastingly, Kindy community 2, notably being of Anglican denomination, demonstrated much stronger individualist behaviors with lacking regard for community-wide children's education. Based on these examples, the revitalization of Kindy 1 appeared to be associated with the presence of competent leaders for the ECE vision, effective community collaboration, community awareness of ECE, community embodiment of local cultural values, kindy staff involvement, and program responsivity to the local context. As the founder and chairman of Kindy 1 stated at the grand opening of their newest leaf hut classroom,

Our past failures do not bring us discouragement but an encouragement to see our mistakes and put things right. This school was not supported by any organization or government – it was stated by our own concern and we find it hard sometime to meet materials and support for our teachers. [But] let us promote manpower by using our power. (Personal communication, July 22, 2008)

Concluding Discussion: Drawing on the Past, Giving Rise to the Future

This study began with an a priori assumption that local knowledge is valuable, which provided justification for the collaborative nature of the research. Further supported by ethnographically-informed methods, the overarching methodological approach allowed for in-depth exploration, incorporating wide-ranging perspectives, of the evolving Kahuan culture and its critical role in both supporting and being supported by local institutionalized ECE (i.e. community-based kindies). Through this, living Kahuan traditions were built upon to give meaning to the present reality of early learning across Kahua communities and insights into the future sustainable development of Kahua kindies.

A decidedly cultural foundation to ECE has been taken in this article, which was supported by local priorities to reinvigorate Kahua kastoms, as embodied by the Kahua Principles. While cultural change has become one foundational justification for the sustainable development of kindies, two additional critical societal elements raise the stakes for their sustained development in Kahua at this time. Firstly, parents increasingly have long-term employment goals for children, which require formal education, in light of a societal move towards a cash-based economy. Secondly, should children desire this formal education, national SI ECE policy requirements now mandate children’s attendance in kindergarten for three years before being allowed entry into primary
school. Recognizing the continued significance of kastom in the Kahua people’s cognition and conduct raises insights into their perceptions of education at this time of societal and educational change. It is important to note that kastom is not limited to observable cultural features of cooking, handicrafts, attire, etc., but instead extends deeply into Indigenous values, beliefs, and mere existence. As such, kastom has become an important consideration for supporting formal education, and therefore not simply an externally imposed concept that hinders local expression and development. This is supported by previous research suggesting that learning and identity are tied to one’s sociocultural background; and as such, approaches to learning must be adapted to students’ cultures, contexts, and social worlds.

In Kahua communities, this study found early childhood learning microenvironments to be situated on a spectrum of increasing international transfers of a Western-based learning ethos. More specifically, in the kindergarten context, the study revealed that ECE epitomizes a transitional institution between traditional practices (from the home and community) and imported institutions from the West (such as church and formal education). Within this spectrum, a general trend was identified away from the traditional model and values of learning, as associated with kastom. This cultural shift was ascribed to what here has been termed an intergenerational cultural decay, as has been widely attributed by locals to the increase in external influences on Kahuan society, at the detriment of Kahua kastom.

As counteragent to an intergenerational decay of traditional culture in Kahua, the kindy was found to hold potential to serve as cultural reinvigorator by reuniting communities. However, not only was the kindy found to be severely challenged by numerous barriers in maintaining regular program functioning, the very foundational sustainability of the kindy itself was found to be largely dependent on this cultural reinvigoration, and as such, maintenance of local traditional values. Through a revitalization of key cultural values and practices rooted in the Kahua Principles, future generations could better be able to continue embodying the fundamental local values of respect, fellowship, love, and compassion for others, as locally deemed necessary to maintain a harmonious Kahuan society. To achieve this in communities and kindies, research findings raised the need for inspirational local championing of the vision for culturally-relevant ECE, local ownership-taking based on increased awareness of ECE, and sustained communal cooperation rooted in a reinvigoration of traditional kastoms. As the Kahua Association builds their capacity to practically influence and initiate locally defined development in Kahua, it holds great potential to become a key stakeholder in ECE, through serving as a regional champion for the ECE vision, societal cultural reinvigoration, and regional reunification on the whole. Already, strengthened local cultural understandings in Kahua were found in turn to be supporting community-based educational initiatives in context-sensitive ways. This is thereby perpetuating a cycle of traditional cultural learning and practice, which if sustained, could influence generations to come.

Drawing on the research presented in this article, it becomes apprehensible how uncritical international transfers of ECE policies and practices cannot directly meet the context and culture sensitive needs and desires of the Kahua people. Building on this, it is recommended that Kahuans next begin to locally define context and culture specific measures with which to encourage the localization of ECE programs. This will require regional collaboration to maintain culturally-defined quality assurance standards with which to develop and regularly monitor programs. In applying this call for future education developments, it goes hand in hand with continued research capacity development in Kahua. “[P]art of the rationale for such capacity development is to strengthen the ability of small state voices to engage actively with and, where appropriate, challenge the nature and influence of powerful international agendas” (Crossley, 2008, p.249).
Eventually, as Kahua’s culture-relevant ECE initiatives become quality, sustained endeavors, then local voices will be positioned to influence the wider realms of education discourse in the SI and beyond.

In concluding this collaborative study with the Kahua people, the final words are left to a local Kahua kindy chairman. He emphasized the utmost importance of local significance for Kahuans in championing the future of sustained context and culture-sensitive ECE for their children, as resonates with the fundamentals of the Kahua Principles. He asserted, “We must not give up easily because once you give up, you give up for good. The future of all children and teachers in Makira needs us to take pride in early childhood education” (personal communication, August 15, 2009).

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Endnotes

1. Early childhood education is used in this study to refer to formal, nonformal, and informal contexts of learning for young children of kindergarten age (approximately 3-6 years old) in the Solomon Islands. Reference to formal SI ECE, known as kindy, is based on the National SI Curriculum developed in 2009 “Valium Smol Pikinini Blong Iumi” (“Valuing Our Young Children”), which states, “Early childhood education must enable all young children to acquire the necessary skills, knowledge, values, and attitudes for meaningful participation in Solomon Islands society.” (MEHRD, 2009, p. 2).

2. Sustainability is used in this study to include cultural and contextual elements, as defined by program responsiveness to ever-evolving local needs, demands, and limitations, while maintaining focus on original program objectives (i.e. culturally-sensitive, appropriate, and meaningful ECE for specific context) and populations served (i.e. children 3-6 years old) (Daiwo, 2001; Kirpal, 2002; Mancini, & Marek, 2004).

3. Education for All Goal 1: “Expand and improve comprehensive early childhood care and education, especially for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children” (UNESCO, 2000, p. 15).

4. Majority World is used to represent what is commonly referred to as developing countries, third world, and the South. This term intentionally highlights the fact that these countries are the majority of humankind, in a manner that emphasizes what they are in positive connotations rather than what they lack.

5. Kastom is the Pidgin word used for custom throughout Melanesia, predominantly to refer to long-established local practices and/or behaviors. Within Kahua, this term is most significantly associated with behaviors of respect.

6. Based on research team’s cumulative interviews and observations in Kahua.

7. Modified and expanded from Teaero’s (2002, p. 80) work on Kiribati Indigenous education based on extensive observations and interviews by the research team throughout Kahua.

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In an era when good governance features prominently on the global development agenda, there seems to be a corollary spotlight on state fragility. In this book – a quick read that covers much ground – the authors wade into the conceptual waters of state fragility with the following aims: (i) sketching more clearly its conceptual parameters, including its core characteristics; (ii) dissecting its connection to violent conflict; (iii) analyzing the role that international society has played in relation to fragile statehood; and (iv) laying out two proposals for tackling its intractability. These analyses are conducted through the prism of three case studies: The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Afghanistan, and Haiti.

Fragile states are sometimes called “weak states” or “failed states”; at times, the terms are used interchangeably, and at other times, distinctions are made. From the onset, the authors explicitly resist the urge to extensively engage the debate surrounding terms such as ‘fragile’, ‘weak’, ‘failed’, ‘failing’, ‘quasi.’ Instead, they aver that “the question of labelling is not crucial here; as long as we accept that summarizing concepts are needed, who wins the terminological beauty contest is less important” (p. 15). Their exhaustive exploration of the characteristics that actually constitute fragile statehood does perhaps sufficiently buffer them from criticism for their aversion to terminological debate. However, it ought to be briefly noted that nomenclatural imprecision may not necessarily present major heuristic challenges, but ontologically, the wide ranging possibilities of ‘fragile/ weak/ failed’ may be a catch-all phrase that merely complicates efforts to tackle issues that do require actual differentiation.

However, one of the book’s strengths is its elucidation of the three core characteristics of fragile statehood, which center on the realms of government, economy, and nationhood. The first of these characteristics refer to the inefficiency and corruption of institutional and administrative structures whereby the legitimacy of the state is almost non-existent: “there are no effective mechanisms for holding leaders accountable to the populations” (p. 16). The second characteristic is constituted by a deficient and fragmented economy whereby consistent provision of even rudimentary services for the populace is often all but impossible: “fragile states lack coherent national economies which are capable of sustaining a basic level of welfare for the population and of providing resources for running an effective state” (p. 16). The third characteristic concerns nationhood, whereby any concretized coalescence around the notion of an imagined national community is non-existent: “in these states, ethnic identities connected to tribal, religious and similar characteristics continue to dominate over the national identity. The national community of sentiment has not grown strong, partly because the state has not been able to create effective citizenship” (p. 17).

Brock et al. adroitly compare state formation in Europe circa 1648 and onward to today’s states. The comparison explains how imposition of a violent colonialism contributed significantly to discontinuities, clientalism, and nepotism that are germane to fragile states, while simultaneously acknowledging that “state formation proceeds in dissimilar ways and moves in different directions” (p. 6). The authors aver that “fragile states owe their continued existence to the ‘world culture’ of the sovereign nation-state which emerged with decolonization and triumphed with
the break-up of the ‘Socialist World System’” (p. 39). However, it is at this junction that they part ways with ‘radical dependency theory.’ They concur with its basic tenets regarding the role of external domination in facilitating the weakness of fragile states, but critique it for its omission of or lack of comprehensive attention to endogenous factors: “fragile states have emerged from a mixture of domestic and international conditions, both of which are fundamentally unlike anything experienced by the successful states in the West” (p. 10). This nuanced analysis, upon which I will elaborate below, is the core strength of this book.

That state fragility is a consequence of both endogenous and exogenous factors is a cornerstone of this book, and by deploying the DRC, Afghanistan and Haiti as three geographically disparate case studies, the authors are able to highlight these factors. They feature, inter alia: a long history of external domination, including colonialism and subsequent interventions; protracted violence; identity politics; self-seeking elites; and grossly mismanaged resources which become a “curse” rather than a source of widely distributed economic benefit.

Because violence is often such a staple of fragile states, Brock et al. expend considerable effort in deconstructing the connection between violence and state fragility: they “do not argue that there is a deterministic, law-like relationship between state fragility and violence” (p. 48); but acknowledge that “state fragility...is both a cause and a consequence of violence” (p. 47). Within the calculus of violent conflict, the authors do consider the role of resources, economics, and identities, but posit that these are ‘enabling factors’, that may prolong/fuel the conflict, rather than being the ‘basic causes’ of the conflict/violence; that is, these are all subordinate to the “political processes that generate and perpetuate violent conflict” (p. 52). While it is an arduous task to disentangle the political from the socio-economic, Brock et al. anchor their analysis within a structure/process perspective, which factors in the impacts of colonialism, the Cold War, neoliberal politics and economics, and the U.S.-led War on Terror (subsequent to the 9/11 attacks). In this context, it may be useful to consider a dynamical systems approach to studying state fragility, as a way of overcoming the urge to prioritize political factors over the socio-economic. Such an approach involves visual mapping of the complicated and multi-layered connections of myriad factors (For an application, see for instance Peter Coleman’s 2011 work, The Five Percent: Finding Solutions to Seemingly Impossible Conflicts.)

Despite the authors’ weighing of both internal and external factors to state fragility, they pivot to a critique of interventionism, arguing that “both domestic and international conditions make interventions problematic undertakings” (p. 97). They posit that the increasingly reified notions of sovereignty and non-intervention that were promulgated in the decolonizing era have been tested and/or sullied as a result of the botched affair in Somalia, the international paralysis over the Rwandan genocide, the delayed Bosnian intervention, the Iraq war and the most recent Libyan revolution. In fact, these suggest an incoherent global template for interventionism, despite the 2001-created agenda entitled ‘Responsibility to Protect’. Brock et al. demonstrate how the hesitancy by nations of the West and the Global South is not unfounded, since the impacts of interventions (both military but especially development aid) in the three case studies – DRC, Afghanistan, and Haiti – have been mostly nullified by the fragility of those states and the endogenous conditions that constitute them.

The authors conclude that the aforementioned presents the global community with a significant dilemma between respecting national sovereignty and protecting citizens from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (p. 162). This dilemma is aggravated by the fact that the international community seems to lack the capacity to foster sustained stability.
within fragile states. In the face of these conundrums, Brock et al. offer two proposals: (i) the need to “re-examine external conditions and forms of engagement that foster or support the mitigation of fragile statehood” and (ii) that the global community should “be ready to do more, and with much greater speed in emergency situations” (p. 165). A requisite component of the first proposal involves an overhaul of international development, whereby effective self-help is fostered and the more economically advanced economies revisit the disequilibrium of “trade relations, market access, investment rules, financial regulation, the rules and regulations of the international organizations, and ‘transnational bads’, such as smuggling, the drugs trade, the arms trade, [and] international terrorism” (p. 167).

These are indeed worthwhile recommendations, though more effort should have been expended on their elaboration. Nonetheless, this book represents a strong contribution toward widening our understanding of fragile states; and despite the far-ranging analysis of both endogenous and exogenous factors that shape state fragility, the authors are perhaps quite right when they insist that “fundamental social change must come from [within and] not from outsiders” (p. 136).

– Reviewed by Hakim Mohandas Amani Williams, Gettysburg College


Citizenship Education in Commonwealth Countries analyzes the use of citizenship education as an educational intervention to promote respect and understanding in different Commonwealth countries. According to McCowan and Gomez, “given that half of the 2 billion people in the Commonwealth are under 25 years old, citizenship education, whether implicit or explicit, represents a window of opportunity to influence a world of active citizenship and peace for the next generation” (p. 25). With this in mind, Citizenship Education in Commonwealth Countries offers a complex look at citizenship education in a global era. The authors explore both what it means to be a citizen in a global society and how to create cosmopolitan citizens through education. Spanning the range of issues associated with citizenship education from theorizing citizenship to implementing interventions, McCowan and Gomez provide useful insights into innovative teaching strategies that foster respect and understanding in cosmopolitan citizens.

In the most traditional sense, citizenship “involves a relationship between the citizen and other citizens or the state, and involves concessions and privileges on both sides” (p. 14). Because citizenship education has often been framed by patriotic citizenship in a given nation-state, it has failed to address issues of international conflict. However, defining citizenship in a global era proves particularly complicated, as members of diverse ethnic and religious groups claim citizenship within the same national boundaries. In this context, the ideal cosmopolitan citizen emerges – not a national citizen focused on competing successfully in global markets, but a cosmopolitan global citizen who displays empathy through respect and understanding for diverse groups of people. Aiming to build cosmopolitan citizens through education, McCowan and Gomez employ Martha Nussbaum’s three capacities: critical self-examination, world citizenship, and the narrative imagination.

Across different Commonwealth countries, citizenship education has been practiced in different ways and to varying degrees. McCowan and Gomez review those practices in case studies of
five Commonwealth countries: Canada, England, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Vanuatu. They analyze citizenship education practices in each of these countries with respect to the goals of strengthening democracy and building social cohesion. Each case involves a unique context in which to implement citizenship education, and the interventions are unsurprisingly diverse. Across all five cases, McCowan and Gomez cite similar factors that either promote or harm the effectiveness of citizenship education. Three factors supporting citizenship education include teacher involvement and ownership, democratic school management and pedagogy, and a democratic environment outside the school.

Vanuatu, the only small state in the group, has had particular difficulty implementing citizenship education because of its ethnic diversity, geography, and post-colonial political complexity. For Vanuatu, “the more complex issue for citizenship education is that of reconciling multiple cultural influences, tradition and modernity, national and local. The formal education system, while on its way to addressing access issues, has yet to find ways to balance multiple cultural influences to promote social cohesion and civic knowledge” (p. 50). According to McCowan and Gomez, this small state needs to engage its citizens to build an agreed-upon identity that takes into account the Vanuatu’s ethnic diversity and colonial history. As this case shows, postcolonial small states face unique challenges in implementing citizenship education.

In addition to describing five case studies of citizenship education, McCowan and Gomez present examples of best practices and innovations from across the globe. These innovations span a broad, if somewhat random, group of innovations. As McCowan and Gomez state, “[m]ost do not come under the label ‘citizenship education’ as such, but represent innovative ways of working towards political empowerment and intercultural understanding, and so share the same aims” (p. 53). By grouping together innovations from Model UN to refugee education in Thailand to intercultural universities in Mexico, the authors illustrate how citizenship education can be effective through diverse means in a variety of contexts. Even though the programs’ content, delivery methods, and contexts are unique, each intervention promotes respect and understanding. The cases included could provide insights for teachers or curriculum writers interested in fostering cosmopolitan citizenship among students.

Citizenship Education in Commonwealth Countries uses the idea of citizenship education as a vehicle for promoting peace and intercultural understanding. Taking into consideration identity and the state of citizenship in a global society, McCowan and Gomez present a nuanced look at citizenship education with an optimistic yet pragmatic aim of promoting peace through respect and understanding. Most impressively, the authors present not only the theoretical basis for promoting citizenship education, but also tackle the problem of implementation. In doing so, they provide both policy-makers and educators with concrete ideas and insights to create new innovations in citizenship education. In addressing implementation across such a broad scope, the authors include a wide array of innovations across different contexts. While presenting such diverse approaches to citizenship education is clearly useful, it would also be helpful for these innovations to be presented within a more coherent framework for implementation. Both educators and policy-makers – two groups that might find this work most interesting – would benefit from such a framework when looking to create new strategies for building citizenship education programs.

By seeing citizenship education from a cosmopolitan perspective, McCowan and Gomez provide a compelling vision for the future. Nationalist or patriotic versions of citizenship education seem anachronistic in the present context. Yet citizenship is still widely understood as an imperative
for living in community with others. By extending their notion of community, and encouraging a citizenship education that encourages international respect and understanding, McCowan and Gomez take a step forward in the path to peace through education on an international scale.

– Reviewed by Beth Wright, Loyola University Chicago


Sixteen scholars contributed to nine chapters in Peter Mayo’s edited book that drew on articles that *Comparative Education* published as a special issue in 2008 (Volume 44, Issue 2). The chapters covered issues that range from basic education, adult education, and entrepreneurship training, to the impact of globalization on educational restructuring, career guidance, advancement of educational research, and funding of higher education in specific small state regions. In spite of a seeming lack of coherence the papers weave in and out of five main research strands: politics and policy making; economic development and labour market characteristics; education and human resource development; administration and sociocultural issues.

One of the major strengths of the book is its diversity in terms of not only the range of issues but also the representation of work done on *small states* – a not easily defined concept – in the Southern Pacific, Caribbean, African, European, and Mediterranean regions. Some of the claims authors make about the notion of small scale are very specific while others are more tentative, taking into consideration other variables and the presence of similar challenges in regions and communities that might not be categorized as ‘small or smaller’. The authors agree that the question of size is indeed a very critical issue for jurisdictions that grapple with creating educational systems that allow them to better prepare students at all levels of the educational system to participate in a global economy. While some authors seem to focus on the seemingly negative aspects of size, others look to the positive and the advantages of being ‘small,’ or attempt to strike a balance.

Of great importance to this book is the contribution of the late Kazim Bacchus, a leading scholar in international, comparative and development education. Bacchus’ scholarly work over the years positions him to adequately provide a historical background and introduction to the many issues raised in other chapters of the book. Of great significance is his reference, though some scholars might argue somewhat uncritical, to the work of the Commonwealth Secretariat, World Bank, and other organizations and the role they played in identifying the educational challenges facing small states, and supporting their integration into the competitive global economy of the 21st century. It is important to note that as Crossley suggested one of the priorities of small states should be the strengthening of their capacity to do research and evaluation. The lack of funds to do this kind of work is a major limitation in terms of small states’ ability to participate in global initiatives, make public the achievements of small states, and challenge the hegemonic discourse of many of the research paradigms used to study local contexts.

Given the focus of the text, Bacchus’ discussion on the varying definitions of ‘small state’ is most critical and relevant to an understanding of its influence on what these various so-called entities find they can and cannot do as they attempt to participate in global imperatives and regional initiatives. The economic, sociocultural, and political issues, their relationships to size, and the
kinds of possibilities for small states, are the crux of this and many of the chapters in this book. Bacchus and many other authors bring to the fore challenges relating to the structure of the educational systems of small states, including the teaching strategies used in the preparation of ‘students’ to participate in a competitive global economy and meet the needs of the communities.

An important aspect of most of the chapters is the focus on historical and social contexts and culture of the regions and the challenges faced primarily because of the dependence on aid from external sources. Indeed, they point to the influence of aid agendas on small states’ ability or inability to achieve their communities’ individual goals and objectives. These discussions highlight the issue of power relationships, disparity, and the negative effects on the educational projects that are aimed at ‘development’. Generally, the authors critique the lack of focus on indigenous ways of knowing and doing of the local cultural contexts and its contribution to the ongoing inability to allow for authenticity in terms of planning and implementing educational programs and training to meet the needs of a global and knowledge-based economy.

Baldacchino makes an interesting turn in his discussion on the role of education in the development of entrepreneurship in what he chooses to term smaller European jurisdictions. He uses his study to make a case for entrepreneurship on the ground instead of allocating money, effort and resources to educational programs. He hits the nail on the head in arguing that governments should spend more time and resources fostering an environment for the emergence of entrepreneurs than focusing on internal training and development. Creating the environment will lead to the emergence of the entrepreneurial class whether they come from an internal or external source. The “right” training environment needs to be in place as well. I am uncertain if I agree with the idea that it has to be entrepreneurial training. Are we talking about a formal transfer of knowledge, the teaching of behaviors, an informal mentoring programme, or all of the above? I found the definition of the “training” absent, so any critique will be tentative at best. However, Baldacchino makes a strong case for an alternative to what he considers a pessimistic scenario in which education is proposed as the panacea for all the challenges smaller states face.

Sultana’s chapter provides what I found to be a careful assessment of the research that has been done on issues surrounding education in small states. Indeed, his adoption of a more cautious approach (given the exploratory nature of the empirical data and the difficulty of establishing causation in social sciences research) is one that I highly recommend to researchers.

All too often scholars and educators at the graduate level are not able to find texts that speak to a diversity of regions and allow for a more international focus. The chapters of this edited book note that the question of size brings with it a series of challenges: educating the populations at various levels of the educational systems, human resource development, sustainability, the use of learning technologies, and the role of donor countries in the development of small states. All of these topics are well served in this text, which offers a contribution to curricular discussions with a focus on international comparative education. Even more significant is that the discussions on education/training are not limited to any particular level but range from classroom to post secondary, higher, and continuing education. Scholars and graduate students who use this text can benefit greatly from the presentations of the various historical contexts from the perspectives of a range of scholars and their relationships to the jurisdictions’ ability or inability to compete and cope with the global demands.

– Reviewed by Janice B. Fournillier, Georgia State University
There is a lasting perception of the ocean as an endless resource, a vast expanse that is fundamentally asocial. As Philip Steinberg writes, the ocean is imagined as “a space ‘outside’ society...an abstract point on a grid, to be developed” (Steinberg, 2001, p. 207). However, covering almost three quarters of the planet’s surface, ocean space has always played and important role in societies for sustenance, livelihoods, commerce, and culture. The fact that almost half the world’s population lives within 200 km of the coast demonstrates our extensive connection to the sea (Cohen, 1997). The world’s ocean faces dire threats, including rising acidity, oil, nitrate and phosphate pollution, as well as the everyday human trash that finds its way to even the most remote marine regions. As a voluminous medium of constant movement and change, the ocean is a difficult place to govern or regulate. These physical properties complicate questions of management, responsibility, resource allocation, sovereignty, and security.

One way of wrestling with these complex issues is by examining how they play out in subnational (or non-sovereign) island jurisdictions (SNIJs): a category of analysis suggested by Godfrey Baldacchino in his timely 2010 book, Island Enclaves. By reviewing mainland/big state-island/small state relations as they affect SNIJs, Baldacchino examines a broad range of strategies and technologies of creative governance that have taken offshoring to new heights in the 21st century.

One policy domain where such novel manifestations of sovereignty are crafted and expressed is that of ocean governance. As small island states know only too well, ocean space still comprehends contested legal regimes, with their oddly striated jurisdictions, extending progressively offshore: Territorial Waters, the Contiguous Zone, Exclusive Economic Zones, extended Continental Shelves, and ending in the High Seas or international waters. Each of these jurisdictions establishes a gradient of ownership and liability. As a contested and peripheral region, it is a sought after space for economic development and, as Baldacchino writes, “contestable, border regions – such as the ocean depths [and including] outer space, and increasingly the Arctic, are treated as fair game for mainland subjugation and organization” (p. 35). And like Baldacchino’s islands, ocean spaces also represent exemplars of ‘fractal sovereignty,’ ‘ambiguous zones’ and ‘non-spaces’ “… ‘locations that are [seen as] devoid of identity, [of] organically arisen relationships and history” (p. 26).

The legal construction of the ocean stems from the 1982 United Nations Conference on the Law of The Sea (UNCLOS III). The resulting heterogeneous jurisdictional spaces are an attempt to strike a balance between full state enclosure of the ocean and a need to preserve freedoms of navigation so important for shipping routes and global trade. These dual functions serve capital well in this legal framework, with the ocean serving as both a horizontal surface of transport and a vertical exploitable resource. They are, however, not without contradictions that manifest in ocean governance, geopolitical tensions, and environmental impacts. As Steinberg (1999) describes it, ocean space is “a domain that is resistant to direct state surveillance and territoriality but that nonetheless has been incorporated within statist discourse...[and these] contradictory tendencies in modern-era marine governance...may be viewed as reflecting the ebb and flow of contradictory tendencies in the spatiality of capitalism” (p. 254).

Of course, the spatial articulation of capitalism has been limited by the physical properties of the ocean, retarding its complete reconfiguration of the seascape, as it has done to many landscapes, as Harvey (1985) puts it, in striving “to create a physical landscape in its own image and requisite
to its own needs at a particular point in time” (p. 150). But neither the ocean’s resources nor pollutants hesitate to spill over any politically, legally or socially constructed boundaries. Efforts to territorialize the sea simply further extend the terrestrial boundaries of coastal nations, imposing fixed grids on this seething expanse; yet managing the ocean as a static space has failed to capture its materiality and led to ambiguity regarding sovereignty, security, management and responsibility. One alarming outcome of this has been transboundary environmental degradation in the form of trash gyres: diffuse collections of garbage that gather under a migrating atmospheric high-pressure area in open waters. The complexity and scale of this environmental problem makes it extremely challenging. Five large trash gyres have been ‘discovered’ in the North and South Pacific, North and South Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean. The North Pacific trash gyre is thought to be the largest.

While most ocean pollution originates on land, this waste once at sea, becomes ephemeral and fragmented, allowing it to evade quantification and resist the Cartesian spatialities imposed upon it. Despite these, the North Pacific trash gyre has been widely represented in the media through a terrestrial imaginary, adopting such categories as solid, visible, stationary – even described as “an island twice the size of Texas” (Hoshaw, 2009). These constructions of the sea, as sharing properties of the terrestrial, are incongruent with the physicality of ocean space. These portrayals paint a much different picture than the diffuse and pervasive detritus, constantly in motion. In actuality, this gyre phenomenon shares the properties of its medium, something that flows, penetrating to unknown depths, resistant to tracking or collection, incompatible with these island-like notions. Like Harvey’s description of an assemblage, the gyre embodies “ephemerality, fragmentation, discontinuity, and the chaotic” (Harvey, 1991, p. 44).

The resources of the high seas are the common property of all countries, and the largest convergence zone for the North Pacific trash gyre inhabits international waters. But still, its seasonal circulation and interactions with different currents does bring it into the purview of many other jurisdictions, and particularly small island developing states like Fiji, Kiribati and Samoa. The gyre also migrates seasonally, crossing these boundaries with prevailing winds. This drifting clearly complicates matters of responsibility, occupying regions that are treated as extraterritorial or non-space. “Moreover, being on the edge, out of sight and so often out of mind”, as Baldacchino writes: “paradigms tend to be weakest at their peripheries; challenges to sovereignty [are] most apparent at the margin, where power is more clearly contested” (p. 14).

Despite the evident land / sea binary, the juridical enclaves of the islands discussed in Baldacchino’s book seem to share many commonalities with spaces of ocean governance, such as a ‘fuzziness’ of sovereignty, contestable borders, and the probability of being subjugated by mainland entities. But they also share the potential for alternative modes of viable ‘development’. As stated above, the complexity of dealing with this environmental issue is an extremely challenging problem. Managing the ocean as a static space has failed to disrupt the incursion of everyday consumer products, such as lighters, plastic bags, soda bottles, and other flotsam and jetsam, journeying thousands of kilometers from their terrestrial locales to drift at sea and eventually sink into the depths or dissipate into increasingly smaller particulates.

The spatiality of capitalism demands that ocean space be treated as either a surface of transport or the location of exploitable resources. However, the obvious maritimity of the world’s small island states and territories demands a more comprehensive concern with, and stewardship of, the sea. The degradation of the ocean by marine debris – and noting the equally galling crisis in fish stocks worldwide - necessitates new legal, political and social understandings. Perhaps, the
‘fuzziness’ of sovereignty and juridical ambiguities may allow a chance to, as Baldacchino writes, “exploit a situation to serve [another] purpose” (p. 27), one beyond just the economic exploitation for which the Law of the Sea seems intended. Perhaps, by better aligning our aquatic imaginaries with the physical spatialities of ocean space, we can begin to envision policies that reduce trash production, prevent ocean pollution and restore the ocean’s health.

Other Works Cited


—Reviewed by Katherine G. Sammler, *The University of Arizona*


The teaching profession has been the subject of perpetual scrutiny for several reasons, but one of the most prevalent criticisms is that educators’ practices are not supported by standards. It is true that most professions have a set of norms regarding conduct for their members. Teachers also have sets of standards, but they are usually more relevant to the actual training of instructors or the way in which the curriculum is to be taught. The natural concern for having a benchmark by which professional conduct is evaluated is that school environments can vary so wildly within even a single district that these standards may be rendered irrelevant depending upon the circumstances. With this problem in mind, Charlotte Danielson does an admirable job of outlining the standard of conduct to which educators should strive to adhere in *Enhancing Professional Practice: A Framework for Teaching*.

Danielson’s aim is elegant in its simplicity: create a framework which supports new teachers while enhancing the abilities of veteran teachers by giving them a common language to communicate
with one another, providing a basis for self-assessment, while always keeping students’ learning at the forefront. However, its utility falls into question due to a lack of widespread applicability for atypical learning environments, specifically those differing from the United States. The book’s strength lies in its ability to identify important elements present in the teaching profession (the idea that teachers are viewed as professionals is an important keystone of the book). She breaks her framework into four ‘domains’, the first three of which focus on teacher preparedness and student-teacher relations. Creating a positive learning environment with clear expectations and being able to demonstrate a mastery of the subject being taught are critical to the success of the framework. Danielson posits that if students feel respected and know what is required of them to succeed in class then their learning will ultimately benefit. These are not new or farfetched ideas, but where her framework succeeds is providing both methods that will serve to create such an environment and, more importantly, potential pitfalls that may arise in attempting to implement these ideas. Classroom management is a notoriously difficult skill to master for new teachers and, instead of stating her framework as a way things must be done, it serves more as a guiding light by which educators can align themselves with in a way that best fits their teaching style.

The fourth ‘domain’ Danielson outlines place an emphasis on introspection for the teacher as well as external learning factors. She places great weight on fostering positive, working relationships between new instructors and their veteran counterparts. However, students’ families are also considered an integral part of the learning experience and uses the old adage ‘it takes a village to raise a child’ as the basis for her work in this domain. It is at this point that it intersects with the work of Crossley et al. Education in Small States: Policies and Practice. Their work eloquently presents the tremendous challenges inherent to small states. Using sources and interviews from all corners of the world, they seek for the book to be a stimulus for policymakers to take action and create a comprehensive set of goals for small state education systems. Their work reads as much as a call to action as it does a plea for help in these regions. Throughout the book the reader is taken through the barriers to academic success both students and educators face, and it is in this vein that Danielson’s Framework falls short in its goal to create a baseline for professional development that is broadly applicable.

Crossley et al. immediately point out, then consistently reinforce, the idea that frameworks intended for larger states are often not applicable to the small states they examined. Furthermore, even across small states there are a great number of contextual factors which preclude a global framework from being truly effectively implemented. It is also important to note that many of the ideas Danielson sets forth border on impossible for small states given their limited resources. Perhaps the most glaringly apparent dichotomy that exists between Danielson’s frameworks and the learning environments discussed by Crossley et al. is the heavy emphasis Danielson places upon specialization. She sets forth dozens of frameworks for educators based upon specific subject areas or student types. Having teachers who are able to devote themselves to a subset of students is not a luxury enjoyed by the small states studied by Crossley et al.

Danielson and Crossley et al. both fulfill the intended functions of their books to a limited extent. Danielson demonstrates a framework for educators that is both useful and easily applicable for systems with adequate resources, however it is ill-equipped to handle many of the challenges presented by small states. Crossley et al. provide an excellent overview for readers about the issues that arise in small state education environments. It serves well as an informative call to action, which ultimately is the purpose of the book. Would Danielson’s Framework be able to
be read and used in small states? Perhaps portions that speak broadly to the intrinsic nature of schooling itself, but it would not be useful as the global framework Danielson seeks to create.

– Reviewed by Bradley A. Kirshenbaum, Loyola University Chicago


In Neither World Polity nor Local or National Societies: Regionalization in the Global South – the Caribbean Community, Tavis Jules offers revealing insight on the development of education policy used for and within a purposefully constructed regional space. Methodologically, the book is based upon an analysis of policy documents, interviews and other primary sources coded to discover common themes embedded in efforts by policymakers within the Caribbean Community – aka CARICOM, a 15-member organization composed of Anglophone nations of the Caribbean area – to develop a “policyscape” (Carney, 2009) which would provide benefits for each member in ways they could not attain on their own. To this end, the book uses education policy to unearth how, through functional cooperation, these countries came together to form a trans-regional regime to help promote global awareness of the fragility and vulnerability of the Caribbean region. Further, CARICOM set up the Caribbean Single Market Economy (CSME), established the tenets of the “Ideal Caribbean Person,” and enabled the construction of the Caribbean Educational Policy Space (CEPS) to further educational development.

The book is divided into three main parts. In Part One, “The Limits of the World Polity Inquest,” Jules introduces the reader to the theoretical base upon which the book is built, with individual sections given such titles as “The Substratum of Neo-Institutionalism,” “Dogmatic Isomorphic Tendencies,” and “Amalgamating Lesson-Drawing, Externalization, and Policy Transfer.” In general, this opening section is not for the masses; it requires a good foundation in the theories of neo-institutionalism, policy formation, and transfer and lesson-drawing in order to understand the complex manner in which the author begins to showcase his findings and draw conclusions. As the book is a discussion of an institution formed by and inclusive of nations with similar histories and populations, Jules uses “the neo-institutionalist school of thought (guided by John Meyer, Francisco Ramirez, and others) focused on the ‘increase in the common education principles, policies, and practices among countries with various characteristics’” (p. 40) to show how CARICOM came to be and its effects on three different levels: how each nation’s policies relate to each other, to those of the regime, and to those on an international level. Jules grounds his research within neo-institutionalism, and his data is drawn from in-person interviews and document analysis. The discussion of the findings remains at the discursive level; the book does not focus on how policy intersects with local context or practice.

Part Two, “Caribbeanization: Regional Educational Policy-Making and National Metamorphoses” begins with a history of the evolution of regionalism within the Caribbean, starting with colonialism, The West Indies Federation, and finally the birth of CARICOM. A detailing of the structure of CARICOM and several of its divisions, here called “organs,” follows. The policy analysis begins next, as the author details the emergence of the CSME, the outcome of years of policy debate, exchange, interpretation, and implementation. As the CSME is a reflection of CARICOM’s economic vision, Jules spends less time on it than he does on the efforts that led to the CEPS. Several sections including, “National Education Systems,” “Education in the Region:
A Background,” and “The ‘New’ Role of Regional Policy in Education,” offer details on the foundations, purposes and development of education and education systems within the region. This is a strong section, as Jules utilizes policy documents such as the Treaty of Chaguaramas to highlight directly the evolutions from nation-centric educational programs to those that include all member nations under the banner of CARICOM. In this way, Jules highlights his shift from the use of the nation-state as the unit of analysis towards one which centers on the trans-regional regime and its extended role in educational development. Additionally, he begins to lay the groundwork for his use of functional cooperation and policy transfer as conceptual frameworks to separate 20th century CARICOM educational policy into three distinct periods.

Part Three, “Dummy Transfer or Real Transfer: The Semantics of Policy Harmonization” is separated into three sub-sections, each relating a distinct policy period within CARICOM which Jules was able to glean from the data analysis. The first period, Intensified Functional Cooperation, describes the policy era between 1990-1996. Jules suggests that although CARICOM “arose out of a general trend in the 1970s: the collaboration of developing countries in the Global South to form powerful economic trading blocs” (p. 137), it has gone beyond that function to serve as a receptacle and distributor of a variety of policies throughout the region. The nations primarily used lesson-drawing as a policy tool, relying on each other to set their own policy agendas. Endogenous Bouleversement describes the policy period between 1996-2002, highlights of which include the foundations of the CSME and the codifying of the characteristics of the “Ideal Caribbean Citizen.” This era is significant because of the turn from nation-specific policies to regional ones used to buttress against the growing pressures of globalization; this upheaval era was “categorized by the lack of national policies and the commencement of a battle at the regional level for a regional policy identity” (p. 170). Finally, Jules uses the concept of Policy Trilingualism to explain the period between 2002-2008 and is presented as an effort to extend Steiner-Khamsi and Stolpe’s (2006) work on policy bilingualism. The essential argument is there are not two, but three separate, interrelated conversations occurring simultaneously between actors and their respective audiences: (1) the nation-state and national audience, (2) the trans-regional regime and regional audience, (3) supranational organizations and international audience. Here Jules adds to the existing literature by suggesting fragile nations can create a trans-national regime, in this case CARICOM, as a connector, mediator, translator, and shield against “endogenous” and “exogenous” pressures, particularly those arising on the international stage. Further, this new actor can take on a life of its own, enabled by those who created it initially. Therefore in the Conclusion, the author offers a new take on “glocalization”: G-Regionalization, whereby trans-national regimes will be the new buffer between development and participation in a global market while keeping entire regions and their citizens viable and competitive as well.

This book is for scholars and others interested in the formation of cooperative international regimes, policy creation and functionality, and how the small and fragile nations of the Caribbean utilize their commonalities to build a regional structure to enhance their position in the globalized worldwide political, social, and economic realities. In addition, it adds to the literature on lesson-drawing, policy discourse and education development within the Caribbean. Finally, the book can be useful to see how CARICOM tends to inhabit the space between neo-institutionalism and cultural divergence theories in comparative education research. Drawing from both neo-institutionalist literature that emphasizes worldwide trends toward educational convergence, and other literature that showcases the significance of local cultural contexts, Jules builds an argument to demonstrate that local forces can meld together to form a more viable, sustainable force against globalization in the form of a trans-regional regime, and then create communicative systems to exchange, cooperate and develop as a region. Indeed, as Jules writes, the “small states”
of CARICOM have been able to “[devise] ingenious ways to survive globalization” (p. 49).

**Other Works Cited**


— Reviewed by Landis G. Fryer, Loyola University Chicago


This book provides a comprehensive introduction to tertiary education in small states encountering the effects of globalization. The book is organized into four sections. The first outlines concepts and goals related to research of small states. The second section provides a series of studies of the ways small states have initiated and reformed tertiary education at regional and national levels. All of the case studies in the second section illustrate ways that small states have developed and conducted their work in tertiary education in the global context, noting challenges and successes of specific, contextual strategies. The third section examines how a select set of small states have designed effective policies related to technology, funding, and quality assurance issues. The fourth section draws conclusions based on the research discussed throughout the text.

A key point that is made early on in the work is that small states are not just “scaled down versions of larger ones” (p. 25). This enables us to rethink our understanding of the challenges that small states face, but it also asks us to consider the lessons we can learn from the strategies and development processes that small states undergo. With this in mind, the authors offer the rationale for considering tertiary education as the book’s focus, noting UNESCO’s International Institute for Educational Planning’s (IIEP) concern with the unique features and of small states. The IIEP began a specific project on tertiary education in small states because they see a strong link between tertiary education and efforts by small states to build human capital and expand resources. The main challenge that had been identified then by IIEP was funding for tertiary education in small states. An important outcome of the IIEP project was the Policy Forum in 2009 and UNESCO’s conference on higher education in 2009, which enabled representatives from an array of small states to discuss institutional strategies and supports. This edited collection contributes to previous research agendas of IIEP and UNESCO.

The authors spend some time defining key terms in order to place conceptual boundaries around tertiary education in order to distinguish it from higher education. Drawing on Henchy (1990), they argue that tertiary education is a level of advanced learning, beyond secondary, that adults seek at institutions such as universities, colleges, institutes, or advanced schools that are distinct from the structure of primary and secondary education. In addition, tertiary education includes full-time and part-time programs that are both part of universities and other professional trainings.
Thus, in contrast to higher education, tertiary is defined as not just limited to a connection with a university.

Next the authors argue that one ought to employ quantifiable indicators when defining “small state.” For example, they consider population size and other indicators of smallness such as geographic area and size of economy. In doing this they follow a tendency in the literature on small states that use population size as a defining marker of smallness. A final comment on definitions relate to globalization. The authors take a broad definition of globalization that emphasizes a “shrinking world,” “interconnectedness,” “integration,” “consciousness about the global condition” (p. 30). This characterization of globalization suggests they see small states as both the receivers of globalization without much attention to the processes or agents of globalization.

The three chapters in the first section focus on the conceptual literature on small states, the expansion of tertiary education and its implications, and the necessity to strengthen educational research capacity. First, in Bray’s chapter, readers will find emphases that commonly recur throughout the scholarship on small states: economic challenges such as narrow resource base, lack of economies of scale, relative openness, infrastructural costs, remoteness, natural disasters, and international capital markets. Bray considers more than just economic challenges to include the changing perceptions of the role of interconnections between national, regional, and international institutions. Second, Martin makes two contributions as he points to the increased social demand for tertiary education and as he emphasizes the impact of a globalized economy offering new demands for advanced skills. Third, Crossley argues the need to strengthen educational research capacity in light of globalization and the rise of the knowledge economy. The priorities of a research agenda are connected to the effects of globalization; effects such as an “increased pace of social and technological change, knowledge and knowledge-generation” (p. 102) are seen as necessary for national economic competitiveness.

In section two, case studies involving the development and challenges of tertiary education are offered. The Universities of the West Indies, Fiji, Saint Lucia, Malta, Oman and Armenia are discussed. In these chapters, it is clear that the tension between regionalism and nationalism persists. In addition, it is clear that the call for regional cooperation and integration in conjunction with national development will be a feature of developing tertiary education across various small states, specifically the Pacific Island countries.

The chapters in section three provide insight into growth and improvement of distance education in small island developing states (SIDS), and offers policy lessons for building and funding sustainable tertiary education systems. These essays acknowledge that small states’ governments need to assess the value-added for supporting tertiary education. Once again, the chapters in this third section stress the importance for regional cooperation as a key strategy for developing and funding tertiary education. Additionally, this section argues there is a need for improved quality assurance frameworks in order to enhance coordination and international partnerships.

Two relevant critiques emerge after reading this book. First, oftentimes, the scholarship in this book falls back on taken for granted assumptions and definitions of globalization as if it were an inevitable, economic process, but in the conclusion we become aware of the fact that regional movements and coordination are more likely agents or carriers of globalization. The authors situate the tertiary education phenomena in the context of regional movements and regional communities. While each of the case studies in the second and third sections of the book highlight local dilemmas and challenges in the face of globalization, they merely mention the presence of
regional coordination and its persistent tension with national agendas. Perhaps, then, researchers have a responsibility to move past grand narratives of globalization by focusing more intently on the historical, political and socio-cultural dynamics underlying regionalization and its local impact.

A second critique is that greater connection across the use of these cases would guide researchers toward understanding the rationale for tertiary education. While Martin and Bray conclude by demonstrating similarities, differences and variation across small states’ strategies in addressing the challenges of tertiary education, more effort to provide specific, concrete strategies that can be tested could be a useful pathway for researchers to pursue. With that said, select essays such as Martin’s (2011) outline a clear quality assurance framework. But, testing these frameworks and developing research to evaluate the strategies, and specifically the quality assurance frameworks, are still needed.

As an attempt to advance academic thinking about smallness, this work falls short from offering a new theoretical contribution. Nevertheless, this book will be useful for introductory graduate courses in comparative education, international education researchers. In addition, policy-makers and program evaluators working on projects related to small states, tertiary education, or within international organizations may find these chapters of interest.

Other Works Cited


– Reviewed by Sophia Rodriguez, Loyola University Chicago