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Economic Crises and Private Rates of Returns to University Education:  
A Conceptual Framework, Stylized Facts from Three Middle-Income Countries, and COVID-19 Implications

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In this study, we develop a conceptual framework that explains the reasons behind a widening of the gaps in private rates of return to university education during an economic crisis such as COVID-19. Next, we report stylized facts on the private rates of return to university education before and after economic crises in Indonesia, Pakistan, and South Africa. We further conduct panel regression analysis to assess the statistical significance of the relationship between private returns and crises in the three countries. We conclude by speculating on COVID-19 implications and future research.

Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has created an ongoing economic crisis that is leading to loss of jobs, lower incomes, and increased poverty. Preliminary evidence suggests that the impact of the crisis is not only immediate, with low-income workers suffering more than high-income workers (Reeves & Rothwell, 2020), but learning loss for the current cohort of students will cause a long run negative impact on their earnings which will be felt over the lifetime of individuals. Some recent estimates project the future earning gap at individual level to be over $11,000 USD globally (Psacharopoulos et al., 2020).

As predicted by pioneer education economist Theodore Schultz (1975), educated workers are better able to cope with the disequilibria brought on by economic crisis because they are able to adapt to the changing needs of employers and new technologies. The studies that document this pattern use data on educational attainment and earnings of workers, and belong to a subset of the extensive literature on the private rates of return to education (Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 2018). In Argentina, during the volatile period of 1992-2002, the earnings of educated workers were less affected by crises than the earnings of the less educated workers (Fiszbein, Giovagnoli & Patrinos, 2007). Educated workers in Mexico enjoyed larger advantages than less educated ones during non-crisis years, and even larger advantages during crises and recessions (Psacharopoulos et al., 1996). During the
2007-08 economic crisis in Greece, university educated graduates enjoyed better prospects in the labor market than those with lower educational levels (Cholezas et al., 2013). The private rates of returns to education also increased during crisis years in Venezuela (Patrinos & Sakellariou, 2006). Overall, the studies on the changes in private rates of return before, during and after a crisis suggest that the Schultz thesis holds about educated workers being more able to adapt to crisis-induced disequilibria.

In this paper, we contribute to the comparative economics of education literature in several ways. First, we present a conceptual framework that explains the reasons behind a widening of the gaps in the private rates of returns to education during an economic crisis; in particular, we note the conditions necessary in order for the Schultz thesis to hold. Second, we present stylized facts on the private rates of return to university education (versus secondary education) before and after economic crises in Indonesia, Pakistan, and South Africa, three middle-income countries (as categorized by the World Bank) from different regions and varied socio- and macro-economic contexts. Third, we use panel regression analysis to examine whether the relationship between returns and crises are statistically significant in the three countries. Finally, based on our findings, we speculate on COVID-19’s implications on education and income inequality and suggest topics for further research.

Conceptual Framework
The private rate of return to a level of education is the internal rate of return from completing a level of education for an individual. As mentioned earlier, we focus on the private rate of return to university education (versus secondary education), which is computed by comparing the monetary costs (foregone earnings from only secondary education) and benefits (earnings) of university educated workers. In Table 1, we consider three possible scenarios during an economic crisis. In this study, our focus in on current workers—we do not address students (that is, future workers) and parents whose decisions on investing in a university education are likely influenced by university returns during a crisis (Shafiq, 2010).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Changes in earnings of workers with university education</th>
<th>Changes in earnings of workers without university education</th>
<th>Change in rate of return to university education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓↓</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>↓↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b</td>
<td>↓↓</td>
<td>↓↓</td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ↓ denotes “decrease”, ↓↓ denotes “significant decrease”, ↑ denotes “increase”.
Source: Authors’ conceptualization.
In Scenario 1, and according to human capital theory, educational attainment increases cognitive skills and, hence, improves labor market outcomes such as productivity and earnings. In his seminal paper, “The Value of the Ability to Deal with Disequilibria,” Nobel laureate Theodore Schultz (1975) argued that educated (or skilled) workers are better able to cope with the disequilibria brought on by events such as economic crises because they are able to adapt to the changing needs of employers and new technologies. In addition, educated workers are better able to seek information about job opportunities from family, friends, advertisements, former employers, radio and the labor bureau (Oreopoulos, et al., 2012).

The ability to deal with disequilibria implies that the private rates of return to university education rise during a crisis. This is because the earnings of those with less education fall partly due to increased unemployment among the less educated. The resulting pool of unemployed less-educated workers dampens the wages of all less-educated workers. If the earnings of the university graduates remain unchanged or decline modestly, then the rate of return to university education increases during a crisis. Also, more educated workers can more easily find other work to maintain earnings. More educated workers can switch to better jobs quickly while less educated workers tend to take lower paying jobs during a crisis and typically do not have that ability to switch to better jobs (Autor, et al., 2014). Finally, employers may be reluctant to lay off educated workers because they are better able to adapt to changing economic conditions.

In Scenario 2, the Schultz disequilibria thesis does not hold as the rates of return to university education fall because university-educated workers experience greater declines in earnings relative to secondary-education workers. This can happen if the economy is not experiencing technological advancement (Katz & Murphy, 1992), or when higher education is over-expanded (Gonzalez & Oyelere, 2011). Both developed and developing economies can experience the phenomenon of over-education. Scandinavian countries, for instance, have an oversupply of highly educated labor, especially among immigrant labor. There is a relative penalty for this overqualification: while years of overeducation do increase wages, this increase is much less than the wage increase for those with adequate years of education (Halaby, 1994; Nielson, 2007).

In Scenarios 3a and 3b, the rates of return to university education remain unchanged because the crisis has a similar impact on secondary-educated and university-educated workers. The difference between scenarios 3a and 3b is that the earnings reductions are more severe in 3b than 3a. The reduction in earnings between both groups of workers is such that the rate of return is the same before and during the crisis. Therefore, the Schultz thesis does not hold in scenarios 3a and 3b because university-educated workers do not have an advantage in coping with the disequilibria during a crisis.

Stylized Facts from Past Crises in Indonesia, Pakistan, and South Africa
To present stylized facts from past crises in the three countries, we use data on economic growth rates from the World Development Indicators and estimates of the private rates of return to university education from a variety of sources. As noted earlier, these countries were selected because all three middle-income countries are from different
regions and varied socio- and macro-economic contexts. In addition, these countries were selected because our study required available rates of return estimates for multiple crisis and non-crisis years. Table 2 presents details on the years and sources of rates of return estimates.

Table 2. Country, Years and Sources of Private Rate of Return Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

We use the Mincerian earnings function due to its simple structure. The parsimonious nature of the equation enables us to estimate returns over repeated cross-sectional data for multiple countries. The general form of earnings equation is usually defined as:

\[
\ln w_i = a + b_1 S + b_2 EX + b_3 EX^2 + u_i
\]

where the natural log (ln) of \( w_i \) —the real earnings of individual \( i \) — is a function of years of schooling (\( S \)) and experience (\( EX \)); \( a \) is the constant term, \( b_1 \) is the coefficient of schooling (returns to schooling), \( b_2 \) and \( b_3 \) are the coefficients of experience and experience-squared, and \( u \) is the residual.

The literature identifies a variety of methodological issues in determining the private rates of return specifically comparing the parsimonious Mincer type estimation to more econometrically elaborate approaches requiring detailed individual level data (Fasih, 2008; Heckman, et al., 2006; Patrinos, 2016). Research shows that the Mincerian function delivers a precise method of modeling the relationship between earnings, schooling and experience, though with the caveat that it might be biased upwards (or downwards) due to omitted variables. Hertz (2003), after correcting for nonclassical measurement error, finds rates of return to education to be of almost half the magnitude of those using OLS estimates for South Africa. Duflo (2001), using a large-scale school construction policy in
the 1970s in Indonesia, finds an economic rate of return to education in the range of 6.8-10.6 percent. Research has also identified over the years that unlike the initial studies on rates of return to education, returns have a convex profile over levels of education with lower returns for primary education and higher returns for university education (Moll, 1996; Mwabu & Schultz, 1996), and higher for women (Aslam, 2009; Behrman & Deolalikar, 1995). The convexity of returns has important implications, as it leads to an increase in demand for university education and puts pressure on policymakers to decide on expenditure between education levels (Patrinos, 2016). Nevertheless, more robust estimates of the causal impact of education on earnings are in line with the parsimonious estimates (Harmon, et al., 2003; Patrinos, 2016). Finally, we also wish to acknowledge that the rates of return analysis have been criticized for not capturing numerous non-monetary benefits, and having a disproportionate influence on government resource allocation decisions in education (Klees, 2016).

Figures 1, 2 and 3 present economic growth rates and the private rates of return to university education in Indonesia, Pakistan and South Africa. These three figures reflect 33 separate private rates of returns estimates. Despite the different social and political circumstances, we find two patterns across the three countries. First, the returns to university education steadily increased in all three countries. With globalization and economic development, including the expansion of the service sector, automation (reduces the earnings of secondary-educated workers) and the technological revolution (increases the earnings of university-educated workers) those with university education experienced higher earnings growth than those with only secondary education for most of the years (see, for example, Goldin & Katz, 1996).

Figure 1. Economic Growth and Rate of Return to University Education in Indonesia. Sources: Computed from Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2018); Montenegro and Patrinos (2014)
Figure 2. Economic Growth and Rate of Return to University Education in Pakistan. Sources: Computed from Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2018); Montenegro and Patrinos (2014); and authors’ calculations.

Figure 3. Economic Growth and Rate of Return to University Education in South Africa. Sources: Computed from Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2018); Montenegro and Patrinos (2014).

The second pattern in all three countries is that returns to university education rise during economic crises years. In short, we find support for Schultz’s thesis during the financial crises of the 1990s and the global recession of the late 2000s. In Indonesia, returns increased from 12.3 percent to 15.6 percent, a 27 percent increase, during the 1998-2002 recession. Pakistan experienced low (but not negative) growth during the 2008-2010 recession, and returns increased from 15.3 percent to 16.2 percent, a 6 percent increase. Finally, South African returns increased from 27.2 percent to 35.9, a 32 percent increase, during the 2007-2009 recession. After the crises, private rates of return to university...
Economic Crises and Private Rates of Returns to University Education

education narrowed to pre-crisis levels in Indonesia and Pakistan. In South Africa, however, the returns to university education continued to widen.

**Panel Data Regression Analysis**

To assess whether there is a statistical relationship between crises and the returns to university education, we turn to panel regression analysis. Before proceeding, we wish to acknowledge a causal inquiry is beyond the scope of this article. We are simply interested in whether there exists a statistically significant correlation in Indonesia, Pakistan and South Africa for the years considered.

To select an appropriate panel regression model, we need to examine the data characteristics. We have a long panel because there are more years of data than number of countries. The panel is also unbalanced because not all individuals are observed in every year. Furthermore, the sample is small, which affects model selection as well the number of control variables that can be included.

Conceptually, an economic crisis is inversely related with rates of return to university education. Accordingly, in Model 1, we include the economic growth rate and also include the squared-growth rate to consider any non-linear relationship between growth rates and returns to schooling. In Model 2, we assess the robustness of the crisis and returns relationship by adding a control variable; as noted earlier, the small sample size does not permit the inclusion of multiple control variables. The labor market unemployment rate is a good candidate for the control variable because it may inform the relationship between crisis and returns in several ways. For instance, during an economic crisis, unemployment rises disproportionately among the secondary-educated compared to the university educated. The secondary-educated workers who remain employed are likely the ones who can adapt to the crisis; their earnings are included in the samples used for returns. If the earnings of university educated workers remain relatively stable, then the returns computed during crisis years could actually be smaller than in non-crisis years. By controlling for unemployment rate, we assume that unemployment rates are the same during crisis and non-crisis years and focus on the direct relationship between the crisis and returns.

Since there is correlation across individual countries, we follow the recommendation of using generalized least squares (GLS) rather than the default ordinary least-squares. For such cases, the typical panel regression models are fixed effects, random effects and mixed models (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). Each model has its strengths and weaknesses, and recommended tests (such as the Hausman test) provide no clear answers on which model is most appropriate for our long but small panel dataset. Accordingly, to examine the relationship between economic crisis and rate of return to university education, we present the results from six different regressions: fixed effects, random effects, and mixed models with and without the unemployment control variable. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the panel data. As noted earlier, the sample size of 33 reflects the three countries and different years.
### Table 3. Summary Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Indonesia Mean (SD)</th>
<th>Pakistan Mean (SD)</th>
<th>South Africa Mean (SD)</th>
<th>Pooled Mean (SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variable:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of return to university education</td>
<td>14.14 (3.04)</td>
<td>14.09 (3.38)</td>
<td>29.55 (6.74)</td>
<td>20.19 (9.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent variables:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth</td>
<td>1.13 (10.68)</td>
<td>4.99 (2.02)</td>
<td>3.35 (1.92)</td>
<td>3.53 (5.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth-squared</td>
<td>99.18 (149.19)</td>
<td>28.69 (19.60)</td>
<td>14.66 (10.04)</td>
<td>38.12 (73.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>4.38 (1.75)</td>
<td>1.03 (1.02)</td>
<td>28.19 (3.49)</td>
<td>12.44 (13.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of years</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Data obtained from sources described in Table 2.

Table 4 presents the fixed effects, random effects, and mixed model GLS regression results where we regress the rate of return to university education on economic growth and economic growth-squared (which captures the non-linear relationship). One set of regressions includes the control variable (unemployment rate). The results show inconsistent statistical evidence in support of the inverse relationship between returns to university education and economic crisis. Consistent with Schultz’s disequilibria thesis, the results from the random effects and mixed models with control variables show that the rate of return to university education increases during an economic crisis. But the statistically insignificant coefficients elsewhere suggest that the support for the Schultz thesis is sensitive to the model and consideration of control variables.

### Table 4. Regression Results from Fixed Effects Models, Random Effects Models, and Mixed Linear GLS Regression Models: The Effect of Economic Crises on the Private Rates of Return to University Education (N=33)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome variable: Rate of return to university education</th>
<th>Fixed Effects Models</th>
<th>Random Effects Models</th>
<th>Mixed Linear Models</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coeff. (SE)</td>
<td>Coeff. (SE)</td>
<td>Coeff. (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth</td>
<td>-0.211 (0.107)</td>
<td>-0.261 (0.167)</td>
<td>-0.190* (0.093)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth-squared</td>
<td>-0.011 (0.008)</td>
<td>-0.128 (0.012)</td>
<td>-0.016* (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.532 (0.269)</td>
<td>0.530* (0.029)</td>
<td>0.530* (0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>21.350* (0.684)</td>
<td>28.215* (3.194)</td>
<td>24.790* (1.205)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Data obtained from sources described in Table 2.
The interpretation of the regression coefficients is tricky since they include both the within-entity and between-entity effects. In the case of our three-country data, it represents the average effect of economic growth over returns to university education when the returns change across time and between countries by one unit. Although the data and regression models do not permit generalizations or projections for the three countries beyond the years covered, the results provide some statistical evidence confirming the negative relationship between economic growth and the rate of return to university education in the three countries.

**COVID-19 Implications and Future Research**

We acknowledge that it is improper to make generalizations on years beyond those covered in our study, and for countries other than Indonesia, Pakistan, and South Africa. As a speculative exercise, however, we consider the following as possible implications during the COVID-19 pandemic in the three countries and beyond.

Based on the simple analyses of percentage changes in the three countries, one could posit that the returns to university education will increase by 25 to 33 percent in the three countries during COVID-19. The emerging data from the United States and Europe during COVID-19 provides further support for Schultz’s thesis: the unemployment rate for those with university degrees rose less than the unemployment rate for those without university degrees (Berube & Bateman, 2020; Lund et al., 2020; Fuchs-Schundeln et al., 2020). These patterns are likely to be even stronger in low- and middle-income countries because of the larger differences in technology education provided in universities versus secondary schools. That is, university educated workers in low- and middle-income countries may be far better at adapting to work-from-home technologies, or shifting to jobs that require technological skills, compared to the secondary-education graduates in their countries. Given the severity of the COVID-19 crisis, it is possible that the rates of returns to university education will increase by even more than the levels suggested in this study.

Going forward, we need more research in real time on the actual impacts of the crisis on employment and earnings by level of education as well as across occupational status. The COVID-19 pandemic has caused an economic shock that has brought about sudden change in the demand and supply in the labor market (Kramer & Kramer, 2020). Different occupational groups are differentially impacted which will in the medium term change the relative returns to occupations among university-educated workers. It is also critical to understand how the returns to university education have changed differently for women and racial minorities during COVID-19. Having a handle on what these mean for
educational policy and equity should be an important consideration for governments globally.

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References


Economic Crises and Private Rates of Returns to University Education


Language, education, and power in refugee camps: A comparison of Kakuma Refugee Camp (Kenya) and Thai-Myanmar refugee camps

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While there is growing attention to language as a central issue in education for refugees, this policy area still appears to be dominated by an apolitical, technical, and instrumentalist perspective. Through a comparison of language-in-education policies in two refugee camp contexts, Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya and the refugee camps along the Thai-Myanmar border, this paper demonstrates how language policies are always deeply political in nature. In refugee contexts in particular, language policies in education reflect and reproduce existing power dynamics that can exclude refugees from decision-making processes about their own future. In Kakuma, language issues in education are decided by the international humanitarianism regime based on efficiency and cost-effectiveness over the linguistic rights of the refugee community. Even when refugees are in control in the Thai-Myanmar refugee camps, decisions over the language of instruction are still political choices that serve to exclude many people.

Introduction
In the midst of a new global educational agenda that seeks to ‘leave no one behind’ in equal access to quality education, education for refugee children and youths has emerged as a key area of concern for international humanitarian and development actors (Education Cannot Wait, 2017; Education Commission, 2016; Global Education Monitoring [GEM] Report, 2018). Recent policy discourse and practice in this area also signals a growing recognition that language is a central issue in refugee education, whether in pre-resettlement, post-resettlement, or repatriation settings (Dryden-Peterson et al., 2018; Chopra & Dryden-Peterson, 2015). However, language policies in refugee education still appear to be predominantly treated as an apolitical, technical issue, where language competency and literacy is simply an instrumental tool to access more education and a better future. This paper is a comparative case study of language-in-education policies in two refugee camp contexts, Kakuma Refugee Camp (Kenya) and the various refugee camps along the Thai-Myanmar border, drawing on a review of the scholarly and grey literature on education in these contexts. With an explicit engagement with power dynamics in language planning in education, this paper highlights how language choices and policies in education are always deeply political in nature.

In particular, in Kakuma Refugee Camp, language issues in education are largely invisible with a de facto language policy that derives from the larger agenda of integration into the Kenyan national education system. These decisions, made mainly by the international humanitarianism regime, point to an apolitical style of policy-making that privileges
efficiency and cost-effectiveness over the linguistic rights of the refugee community. This in itself is also a political move as it reproduces an unequal power hierarchy with international aid agencies at the top and refugees at the bottom. However, even when refugees are in control of language-in-education policies such as in the Thai-Myanmar refugee camps, decisions over the language of instruction are still political choices that serve to exclude many people. Though the nature of the power elite and their particular agendas differ between these refugee camp contexts, issues of language in education in these contexts are always tied to power, inclusion and exclusion, and contestation over what should be the future for refugees. Given how language cuts across all dimensions of the human experience and the essential role that languages play in empowerment and development, it is important to elevate and prioritize language planning in refugee education and ensure that all community stakeholders are involved in decision-making.

In the next section, I will provide a brief context of refugee education and review how language issues have been discussed in the refugee education literature. This is followed by the methodology section, which includes a description of the two camp contexts. The findings lay out the language issues in education in Kakuma Refugee Camp and then in the Thai-Myanmar border camps. The article ends by discussing the importance of recognizing and prioritizing political deliberation over language-in-education policies in refugee education contexts.

Refugee Education and Language Policies

Literature Review Context of Refugee Education

Distinct from development aid, the international humanitarianism regime is characterized by an emergency and medical approach that seeks to meet the basic physiological needs – food, water, sanitation, and shelter – of human beings caught in situations of active wars, conflicts, and displacement (Malkki, 1995; Pandolfi, 2003; Rajaram & Grundy-Warr, 2004; Ramadan, 2013). While education has always been in high demand among refugee populations, the provision of schooling has historically been neglected due to its awkward fit with this emergency medical humanitarianism approach favored by refugee assistance agencies (Waters & LeBlanc, 2005). In a report commissioned by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) – the United Nations (UN) refugee agency and main international actor responsible for refugee protection – to chart future steps in policy and programming for refugee education, Dryden-Peterson (2011) observed, “[T]here is little evidence of tangible organizational commitment by UNHCR to guarantee the right to quality education for refugee children and young people” (p. 9). For many years, UNHCR did not have a single education officer. Most humanitarian officers saw education as an area beyond the capacity of the institution, believing that education would invite a false sense of permanence in situations that should only be temporary. It was only at the beginning of the 21st century that education was recognized as a legitimate humanitarian need due to its link to psychosocial wellbeing, with schools becoming seen as healing spaces that can help refugee children return to the routines of daily life and recover from the trauma of displacement (Waters & LeBlanc, 2005).
Thus, for many years, refugee educational policies in countries of first asylum, where refugees await either repatriation or resettlement to other places such as the U.S. or Australia, were quite ad hoc and dependent on the power dynamics in each setting. In many refugee camps, UNHCR dictated that the education system would follow the curriculum of the refugees’ countries of origin, due to the belief that the refugee children would soon be repatriated when conflicts at home ended (Waters & LeBlanc, 2005). However, the reality that displacement is always protracted eventually prompted a shift in UNHCR’s educational policy towards promoting ‘national integration’ into the host countries’ education systems (UNHCR, 2012). The rationale of ‘national integration’ is that the education systems in the host countries would already be established in terms of curriculum, teacher training, accreditation, and consequently would be able to provide a higher quality and more cost-effective education to refugee children. This, of course, ignores the fact that most refugees fleeing conflicts end up in neighboring countries that are also developing nation-states with their own educational issues. However, ‘national integration’ also appears to be the most favored approach by scholars and practitioners working in the field of education for refugees (Dryden-Peterson et al., 2018; GEM, 2018).

**Language in Refugee Education**

The impetus to support refugees’ quick integration into national education systems, many of them following languages other than the students’ home languages, has once again highlighted languages as a serious educational concern for refugee children and youth. Language barriers and language acquisitions have always been prominent areas of educational research on refugee students in post-resettlement settings (Kanno & Varghese, 2010; Loewen, 2003; Watkins et al., 2012). In countries of first asylum, language has also been consistently identified as one of the main challenges to educational quality and student achievement (Dryden-Peterson, 2016; Mendenhall et al., 2015).

Despite this recognition of language learning as a significant issue for refugee children and youth, on the whole, existing research and policies in refugee education have rarely addressed the need for explicit language planning and the formation of language-in-education policies in refugee contexts. This planning would include decisions over which language(s) will be the language of instruction, how they will be taught, or how different languages will be promoted. The default position seems to be to promote learning the language(s) of the host countries, based on a simplistic instrumentalist view that this will have positive impact on refugees’ lives by enabling their integration into economies and societies (Ameen & Cinkara, 2018; Mburu et al., 2004). For example, in the only place where ‘language’ appears on the UNHCR’s Global Education Strategy 2012-2016, it is to discuss ‘language training’ as one of the key activities to ensure that refugee children will learn better. More recently, the 2019 GEM Report with the theme of migration and displacement once again raises ‘limited language proficiency’ as one of the main obstacles that refugee students face in trying to integrate into a new education system. This conforms to a meta-framework in language policy-making that only conceives of language-as-problem, where the overarching concern is to solve the minority students’ lack of proficiency in the dominant language and promote their assimilation/integration into society (Jong et al., 2016; Ruiz, 1984).
However, language acquisition is never neutral. It is not just a process of learning the standard grammar, pronunciation, vocabulary, and rules for usage as the functionalists would assume. Rather, language acquisition is wrapped in a hierarchy of values attributed to its speakers, where the ‘right’ to speak and to be heard is rarely equally shared (Bourdieu, 1991; Norton & Toohey, 2011). Language choices are also deeply implicated in individuals’ sense of self, identities, and communities of belonging. In minority communities in particular, language practices can be a powerful reservoir for solidarity-building, enactment of agency, and contestation of power (Valentine et al., 2008). As such, decisions over language-in-education policies are political choices that should be made after careful deliberation by all community stakeholders, rather than defaulting to a technical solution of teaching refugee’s language(s) to facilitate their integration into their new environments. While the political nature of languages and language maintenance in post-resettlement refugee communities has been highlighted in existing research (Perry, 2008), such issues have rarely come up in work within pre-resettlement refugee camps.

**Methodology**

This paper is a literature review of existing studies on education in two refugee encampment settings, Kakuma and the Thai-Myanmar border. The two sites were chosen for this study because both are long-standing refugee camps in the world and have had enough research and knowledge produced about their education systems to enable a comparison of their language-in-education policies, despite the fact that these policies have rarely been the main focus of research in the field.

Kakuma Refugee Camp was established in 1992 in the poor and remote Turkana region of Kenya, where the semi-arid climate and bad soil conditions prevent any agricultural development attempts. Originally established to serve Sudanese refugees, the camp is now home to over 100,000 refugees of 21 different nationalities, the majority of whom are South Sudanese and Somali, though they can also be divided further along ethno-linguistic lines (Lutheran World Federation, 2015). The Thai-Myanmar border camps refer to a collection of nine refugee camps along the border between Thailand and Burma/Myanmar. By January 2021, an estimated number of 92,000 people still live in nine refugee camps (The Border Consortium, 2021). Two of the camps in the north are predominantly Karenni, while in the other seven camps, the Karen are the majority – both are ethnic minorities in Myanmar. Nevertheless, just like in Kakuma, each camp context is marked by considerable ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversities. Those living in both Kakuma and the Thai-Myanmar refugee contexts are subjected to severe limitation on their mobility and eligibility to work, and conditions of living in the camps are extremely dependent on international assistance.

The sources reviewed include 70 peer-reviewed and grey publications, as well as policy documents, published in English from 1998-2020. I first conducted a database search on Educational Resource Information Center (ERIC) and Education Source with keywords related to the two refugee camps contexts and education and schooling. I also conducted a Google search for the grey literature. Additionally, I drew from the list of references to add to my literature review. These sources were examined for issues of language in
education for refugee children and youth (if discussed at all), and how decisions about languages are made or not made in each refugee camp context.

As a literature review, this article is limited by its dependency on previous research, which can be dated. Furthermore, it is also restricted by the limited space that other researchers had given to language planning, and my review was often an exercise of reading between and behind the lines. Even so, through connecting various traces and arguments on language issues in previous publications, this literature review brings to the surface a less-discussed yet highly important policy area in refugee education.

Findings

Language-in-Education Planning in Kakuma Refugee Camp

Although Kakuma Refugee Camp has been running for over two decades, observers have commented that its education system is still barely functional. Within the camp, there are now six preschools, ten primary schools, and one secondary school (Wright & Plasterer, 2012). This system is mainly managed by a network of international non-governmental organizations (I/NGOs) and led by UNHCR. As of 2014, refugee children are legally allowed to attend government-run schools outside of Kakuma, but due to the costs, in reality only exceptional students are sponsored by NGOs to do so. It has been estimated that nearly half of school-age refugee children and youths in Kakuma remain out of school (Bellino & Dryden-Peterson, 2018). For those still in school, the severe infrastructural limits mean that the average class size is 147, and in primary schools alone it is 156 (Lutheran World Federation, 2015). This is further compounded by other issues such as low educational achievement, high drop-out rate due to employment or marriage, and lack of training and support for teachers leading to high absenteeism.

When schools were first established in Kakuma Refugee Camp, most refugees and some administrators wanted to follow the Sudanese curriculum (Mareng, 2010). First, following the Sudanese curriculum would prepare the children and adolescents to re-integrate into the education system once they return home to Sudan. Secondly, most of the teachers in the camp at the time had been trained in the Arabic system and did not know either English or Kiswahili to teach the Kenyan curriculum. However, because any hope of finding gainful employment in Kenya would require obtaining the Kenyan Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) and the Kenyan Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE), schools in Kakuma Refugee Camp decided to follow the Kenyan curriculum, which also includes their language of instruction policy. Mareng (2010) argued that this decision was highly influenced by UNHCR’s preference. In addition to exacerbating the mismatch between students’ home languages and the languages of instruction in schools, this decision in effect stripped the already-qualified refugee teachers of the ability to teach, which was also one of the very few ways to earn an income in the camp.

While the official Kenyan language-in-education policy allows for the mother tongue as the language of instruction up to grade 3, in camp settings, refugee children must learn both Kiswahili and English since grade 1. While refugee children originating from Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo have prior knowledge of Kiswahili, they
lack English proficiency and end up being placed in classes with younger children, thus falling behind in age-appropriate academic content (Bellino & Dryden-Peterson, 2018; Dryden-Peterson, 2016). South Sudanese and Somali children tend to not meet the proficiency level required to do well in schools in both languages. This issue of proficiency is further exacerbated by whether their teachers are capable and/or willing to address the heterogeneous linguistic needs of their children. Kenyan teachers in the camp have been shown to be resistant against shifting the curriculum to accommodate refugee students’ needs (Bellino & Dryden-Peterson, 2018). Refugee teachers can speak more languages but teach exclusively in English, no matter their actual level of English proficiency. Moreover, given the lack of training and support that refugee teachers receive—most have had no more than five days of training—it is no surprise that refugee teachers have expressed difficulties with using their students’ home languages to support the acquisition of English and Kiswahili (Dryden-Peterson et al., 2018; Mendenhall et al., 2015).

In this linguistically diverse environment, English has emerged as the lingua franca in education and social settings in general, which is not without the various problems associated with this dominance of a former colonial language (Brock-Utne, 2000). Many NGO programs in Kakuma share a common emphasis on English instruction to meet needs such as women empowerment, communication between community leaders and relevant authorities, professional development of refugee teachers, and out-of-school youths needing to re-enter the education system or obtain jobs (Saucier, 2013; Wright & Plasterer, 2012). Early childhood education programs also focus on providing early English instruction, which are typically identified by refugees as positive and valuable initiatives (Mburu et al., 2004; Perry, 2008). English is always discussed in a beneficial sense of a neutral language that serves to promote social integration within the camps and the educational achievement of refugee children. For example, an NGO staff noted the importance of English literacy in conflict resolution, “English helps leaders to come together and talk to understand each other, to appreciate one another, and therefore it becomes a tool of reconciliation – a tool of peace” (Wright & Plasterer, 2012, p. 47). However, anecdotes from refugees have shown how the hierarchy of languages in Kakuma Refugee Camp, with English at the top, fuels rumors about unequal treatment of refugees based on language choices (Perry, 2008). The lack of languages represented in the school system also means that many refugees lack print literacy in their home languages and instead have to rely on English for written communications, which poses quite a challenge for refugees’ attempts to protect not only their languages but a sense of normalcy, community, and belonging in what is already a reality of extreme loss and deprivation (ARC Centre of Excellence for the Dynamics of Language, 2017; Perry, 2008).

**Language-in-Education in the Thai-Myanmar Border Camps**

In contrast to the Kakuma Refugee Camp, the Thai-Myanmar refugee camps have a relatively well-established education system that is almost entirely managed by the refugee communities themselves (Maber, 2016; Oh & van der Stouwe, 2008). In the seven predominantly Karen camps, 64 basic education schools, 22,438 students, 1,005 teachers (Oh et al., 2019). Additionally, in the two Karenni camps in the north, there are also 11 schools. It is generally believed in the refugee community that access to education is equal
to everyone: everybody who wants to can attend school and receive an education (Thawda et al., 2007). Although the Royal Thai Government officially has overall authority over the education in these camps, they have quite a laissez faire approach to education and leaves educational policy and provision for refugee children to the community education management system. The less salient presence of UNHCR in the border zone between Thailand and Myanmar has also allowed the refugee communities themselves to fill the position of the pseudo-state often assumed by UNHCR (McConnachie, 2012; Oh & van der Stouwe, 2008). The Karen and Karenni in exile each have their own Education Department which provides standardized educational policy-making in the camps. This non-state, community-organized education system is so strong and well-coordinated that some young people have specifically sought to become refugees and residents in the camps precisely for the educational opportunities offered there (Lee, 2014; Maber, 2016).

Despite the community ownership over the education process in these refugee camps, language still serves as an exclusionary mechanism for many refugee children and youths living here. The education system in the seven predominantly Karen refugee camps use Skaw Karen as the main language of instruction. However, Oh and van der Stouwe (2008) estimated that in three of the camps, only 40-56 percent of refugees are Skaw Karen speakers, 32-41 percent are Pwo Karen speakers, and 12-24 percent are Burmese speakers. In the other four Karen camps, while most residents (between 75 and 88 percent) are Skaw Karen, there is still a significant number of refugees who do not speak this as their mother tongue and are thus more disadvantaged in the school system.

To deal with the language mismatch, in two camps, the Burmese-speaking Muslim community has organized specially designated Muslim schools, which do not provide religious education but rather uses Burmese as the language of instruction. In the other camps, though there are no specific Muslim schools, the Muslim groups there originated from parts in Myanmar where they would have gained bilingual proficiency in both Skaw Karen and Burmese, enough to follow the curriculum. However, the Muslim schools only provide up to Grade 7, and students would then have to transfer back into the Skaw Karen system. Oh, and van der Stouwe (2008) found this to be a significant cause of drop-out, as many students cannot transfer because their Skaw Karen is not good enough. While at the primary level, about 23 percent of all students are Muslim, this percentage drops to only 4 percent at the high school level. Some schools and teachers provide catch-up language classes, but these are only provided on an ad-hoc basis (Oh & van der Stouwe, 2008).

The role of English in these border camps is also complex. In the early days, most textbooks used in the camps were in English because they were provided by the international donor community. The provision of these textbooks aligned with the emergency approach to humanitarianism, which tries to adopt quick fixes, like already published English-language textbooks, rather than invest resources in textbook development (Oh, 2010). Moreover, the presence of English-speaking international volunteers, as well as the refugee communities’ own desires to learn English for better chances in the resettlement process, also drove up the teaching of English in these camps. One of the influential foreign NGOs in the Thai-Myanmar region, ZOA Refugee Care,
used to be quite active in advocating for more attention toward language-in-education issues as a fundamental dimension of educational inclusion and equity. In their 2007 position paper, ZOA explicitly brought up the issue of language of instruction: “[S]tudents who do not fully understand the language of instruction are excluded from the learning that occurs in school” (Thawda et al., 2007, p. 10). To that end, they were in the process of translating textbooks from English into Skaw Karen as well as assessing the language curriculum and training needs of teachers in bilingual education pedagogies. Unfortunately, however, this NGO had stopped its operations in the Myanmar-Thailand region since 2012, due to a wider trend of international donors disassociating themselves from community organizations in this border zone and redirecting aid towards the Myanmar government (Décobert & Wells, 2020; Ma Night Awa, 2011).

This recalibration of aid is an effect of the changing political landscapes in both Myanmar and Thailand in the past decade, with other significant impact on education and life in the refugee camps. While in Myanmar, 2010-2020 marked a very gradual process of liberalization and political reforms towards democratization, Thailand has undergone a reverse process with its military coup in 2014. Subsequently, the Thai military began to impose stricter monitoring and restrictions on the refugee camps. Coupled with the reduction in international aid to the camps and the ethnic minority groups at the border, this has led to the gradual dismantling of schooling in the refugee camps, with the students beginning to look towards Myanmar to continue their education (Oh et al., 2019). At the same time, the Myanmar government has indicated some willingness to work with ethnic minority groups to ensure that the children can receive quality education and accreditation. In particular, it has taken the initial steps to introduce mother tongue-based multilingual education, with a clause in the National Education Law in 2014 that encourages instruction in ethnic languages alongside Burmese, “If there is a need, an ethnic language can be used alongside Myanmar as a language of instruction at the basic education level” (Chapter 7, Clause 43).

Nevertheless, language is an ongoing source of conflict and distrust between the ethnic minorities and the central Myanmar government. For example, in 2016, the Minister for Border and Security Affairs made official complaints about how schools run by the Karen Education and Culture Department still used Karen as the language of instruction (Oh et al., 2019). Moreover, discussions between the Karen and the government on the recognition of refugee students’ credentials and allowing them into government schools have stalled (Shiohata, 2018). On the other side, recent studies with the Karen education leadership in particular have revealed discontent with the government’s expansion of control, with the perception that this is “a deliberate attempt to undermine their community education systems, as well as their ethnic language and identity” (World Education, 2016). From how political and educational negotiations with other ethnic minority groups have gone in Myanmar, language and mother-tongue based education will continue to be a very contested debate with no clear consensus on the role of the ethnic language, the dominant Burmese language, as well as a possibility of English as the lingua franca (South & Lall, 2016).
Language, education, and power in refugee camps

Discussion
In Kakuma Refugee Camp, language-in-education issues are still very much tied to the need to integrate and assimilate into the status quo that is the Kenyan national education system. Consequently, the education for refugee children in Kakuma Refugee Camp ends up reproducing the same language issues that plague Kenya’s education in general, including the disadvantages experienced by students whose mother tongue is neither Kiswahili or English and the troubling ongoing dominance of English that is akin to “the recolonization of African mind,” Brock-Utne (2000). In this particular case, however, these language choices do not stem from typical dynamic of the dominant groups’ interest in reserving educational benefits only to a small elite (Brock-Utne, 2000). Rather, they were made by UNHCR in their function as a pseudo-state in the context of Kakuma. In this paternalistic role, UNHCR made language and curricular choices that were the opposite of what was originally desired by the refugee community, yet framed them in the neutral, apolitical rhetoric of the need to integrate into Kenya’s education system for efficiency.

In other words, in Kakuma’s language-in-education policies, we can witness the depoliticization of refugee lives because their situation is supposedly only an ‘emergency’, an overarching but false logic in humanitarian aid that various scholars have critiqued (Barnett, 2011; Calhoun, 2008; Fassin, 2007; Pandolfi, 2003; Versmesse et al., 2017). This logic of emergency and crisis provides international actors with the moral justification to parachute into conflict situations and engage in certain state-like activities, e.g., tracking and governing the population, delivering services, setting up rules and regulations (Cardozo Lopes & Novelli, 2018; Pandolfi, 2003). In addition to empowering this transnational regime of international donors, the logic of emergency also works to divest refugees of their right to participate in political discussion and decision-making that affect their own lives. Under the assumption that refugees can only be the voiceless victims, international organizations have often been ambivalent toward attempts within refugee communities to self-organize and engage in their own development initiatives. In Kenya, for example, UNHCR staff had been active in breaking up traditional structures of power in Dadaab Refugee Camp so that UNHCR would remain the pre-eminent governing authority for Dadaab (McConnachie, 2012, p. 36).

In determining that refugee communities in Kakuma should have little voice in making curricular decisions, the international refugee regime operating in this camp context is effectively taking away language as a matter of community deliberation and solidarity-building. Curricular choices, including language of instruction, are always intertwined with the inherently political project of determining the collective ‘we’ of the future (Waters & LeBlanc, 2005). In other words, this in effect decides the future of refugees in Kakuma for them, rather than with them, as one of integration into the Kenyan society – despite the reality that the Government of Kenya has never indicated an opening to this integration. However, community control of educational policies is not necessarily better in terms of educational equality or a more equal distribution of power in the community, as the case of the Thai-Myanmar refugee camps demonstrate. The Karen-dominated refugee camps follow a standardized Karen curriculum which uses Skaw Karen as the main language of instruction to serve the ideological purpose of promoting Karen and Karenni ethno-nationalism and secessionist movements. This has led to the exclusion of other ethnic
minority groups such as the Burman, the Mon, or the Karen who speaks other languages such as Pwo Karen or Burmese (Oh & van der Stouwe, 2008). It shows how language-in-education policies, as well as the education system as a whole, are often driven by a need to produce a new cohesive nation. However, as Oh and van der Stouwe (2008) commented, “The irony is that the ‘Skawization’ of Karen society in the borderlands and refugee camps resembles aspects of the Burmanization carried out by the military government” (p. 611). This is because the leadership structure within the Karen-dominated refugee camps is also highly authoritarian and dominated by a small group of Christian Skaw Karen elites; likewise, the leadership in the Karenni refugee camps are not so much representative of the communities but rather of the Karenni government-in-exile (Demusz, 1998).

Yet it is also important to remember that dynamics of power are constantly shifting, and that Karen and Karenni elites also have to manage an imbalance of power against international actors and national authorities. This has been most clearly demonstrated in the period from 2010-2020 with changing trends of support in the international aid community. Prior to 2010, as part of the opposition to the military junta in power in Myanmar, international donors were enthusiastic to support community-organized nonformal education. However, as the government began to pursue democratization reforms, international donors have been diverting resources and support for ethnic groups toward the central government (Décolbert & Wells, 2020; S. A. Oh et al., 2019; World Education, 2016). Ethnic educators and exiled activists on the Thai side of the border have felt a sense of exclusion from the national education reform processes, expressing that their decades of work and expertise in education were being ignored by government and international actors (Maber, 2016). The increasing influence that the Myanmar state now plays in areas previously controlled by the ethnic minorities is raising new questions and contestation over the role of languages in conflict prevention, peace promotion, and education. Furthermore, as the situation in Myanmar deteriorates again with the military coup in 2021, refugees and other ethnic minorities living in the Thai-Myanmar borderland will continue to have to figure out new strategies to survive in constantly shifting states of precarity.

Conclusion
The two cases examined in this article reveal problematic dynamics of power as manifested through policies on language in education. The case of Kakuma show how language policies are often decided not by refugees but by international humanitarian actors, guided by an apolitical approach toward integration into the status quo that strips refugees of their linguistic rights and agency. On the other hand, the case of the Thai-Myanmar refugee camps reminds us that politicization of these issues in the normative way, through linking language with ideological purposes of building national unity, only reproduces problematic and authoritarian power hierarchies.

An interesting avenue for future research would be to examine actual language use in refugee camps to examine how refugees from diverse settings come together and engage in hybridity and translanguaging practices. They can take an asset-based approach that recognizes the benefits of developing multilingual language capabilities and examines
how education settings can draw on the strengths of multilingualism to enhance learning for all in a linguistically diverse community. This asset-based approach should also inform more practical efforts and interventions at cooperative language planning in education within the refugee camps, with the goal of promoting multilingualism rather than just the transition of the speakers of the minority languages to the majority language(s) (Jong et al., 2016). One way this can be done is inviting all community stakeholders to facilitated dialogues that are guided by professionals in language-in-education issues, informed by research and local expertise, to deliberate the role of different languages and how they should be fostered in the education system (UNICEF East Asia & Pacific, 2016). The first step is to resist the invisibility or temptation to turn language-in-education issues in refugee education, into another apolitical, technical problem to be solved. As refugee education research, policy, and practice continues to grow in the coming years, language should be centered as a major issue of concern. Linguistic rights are human rights.

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**References**


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I While Myanmar is now the official name for this country, many continue to use ‘Burma’ because they consider Myanmar an imposition by the military dictatorship.

ii The schools within the Thai-Myanmar refugee camps are part of a larger cross-border and nonformal education network that also include schools in the Karen-controlled territory in Myanmar, migrant learning centers for migrant communities in Thailand’s border regions, other informal vocational learning sites, and post-secondary community education programs run by grassroots organizations, women’s networks, and NGOs. Many of these educational sites serve de facto refugees from Myanmar who would rather become ‘illegal’ migrants to the Thai authorities than to be confined within the refugee camps. For more research on migrant education in this region, see Lee (2014), Maber (2016), World Education (2016), Shiohata (2018).

iii This is also a consequence of the Royal Thai Government’s policy to keep UNHCR out of this conflict until the late 1990s, in part due to a desire to pretend that this was not a refugee situation.

iv I would like to express my appreciation for the feedback provided by Melanie Baker Robbins, Brendan DeCoster, Jeremy Gombin-Sperling, Paul Vernon, and two anonymous reviewers to help me prepare this paper.
Territorial Education through Urban Agriculture: Contributing to Building Sustainable Cities in Times of a Pandemic

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The multi-dimensional damages caused by the Covid-19 pandemic have highlighted the fragility of our economic systems and their lack of resilience. People are starting to question globalisation, and debates on alternative modes of development are back and alive. If economic paradigms need reforming, we also need educational systems that will equip people to build more sustainable societies. With this in mind, this article focuses on two crucial components in ‘current issues in comparative education’. One relates to the emergence of a so-far under-explored area of research in education, that of Territorial Education (TE), and places it in the context of both the 1990s educational reforms, intended to create a standardised ‘world class education’, and of ‘education for sustainability’. The second one focuses on the experiential nature that skill-orientated Territorial Education can provide, in contrast to other types of ‘education for sustainability’ approaches that are more conceptual. Using Urban Agriculture initiatives in Lisbon as illustrative examples, the article shows that such practical approaches might help to make cities sustainable and resilient in the future.

Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic we are experiencing has encouraged people to question globalisation not only from an economic perspective but also with regards to how it has affected our education systems. Authors such as Teodoro (2020), Santos (2006), and Sahlberg (1996) have explained the mechanisms by which the calls for a standardised ‘world class education’ global reform in the 1990s were mainly targeted at adapting educational institutions to new configuration systems in world organisations. The OECD assumed a central role in this global reform, directly motivated by achievements in the economic sphere, and encouraged competition and standardisation mechanisms. This ‘educational reform’ was very different from the humanistic approach to ‘Global Citizenship Education’ put forward by UNESCO (2014) which “referred to a sense of belonging to a common humanity, and emphasised socio-political, economic and cultural inter-dependency, and interconnectedness between the local, the national and the global” (UNESCO, 2014: 14). The 1990s educational reforms also contrasted with efforts to develop educational approaches that would help communities to ‘put sustainability into practice’. This paper focuses on the types of knowledge and learning processes needed to understand what urban sustainable communities would look like if cities were to reduce their dependency on food produced outside, in a less globalised world. The article focuses on the so-far little explored area of research in Territorial Education (TE).
Part One presents the emergence of TE, first as a reaction against the 1990s educational reforms and then in the context of research on education for sustainability. Part Two uses Urban Agriculture (UA) and project-based educational approaches related to UA in Lisbon as a practical illustration of how TE could be used to make the city more sustainable. It first explores the contribution of UA to the sustainability of a city and its links to food security and food systems. By showing the evolution of policies focused on the greening of Lisbon, Part Two also highlights the development of participatory processes in urban planning that contribute to making TE usable at different levels and with various stakeholders, extending education for sustainability not only to more practical urgent topics (such as feeding a city) but also beyond the educational institution.

The emergence of Territorial Education
As Champollion explained, “while the different contexts having influence on education—spatial, political, institutional contexts for instance—have been analysed for a long time, territoriality has only really been tackled for fifteen years” (Boix et al., 2015, p. 12). Other authors focused on related issues - such as learning with local communities (Gargiulo Labrida, 2016), territorial governance (Jahnke, 2019), sustainable development and territories (Barthes & Champollion, 2012), territorial development (Courlet & Pecqueur, 2013), educational territories (Leite & Carvalho, 2016) – but ‘territorial education’ per se is relatively unexplored and ill-defined. Explaining the context in which it developed and the needs it meets will help to grasp better what it means.

TE and the global educational reforms of the 1990s: why does the - local - territory matters?
The main characteristic of TE is its focus on the local level in the context of a global pandemic that has triggered concerns and critical reflexions on globalisation. Some of the most obvious of these have explored how the reduction of transportation costs derived from globalisation has brought infectious diseases everywhere. Harrold James (2020), international historian, reflected on whether the coronavirus pandemic could bring about the waning of globalisation. Fujita and Hamaguchi (2020) discussed possible impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic through “a first scenario in which the fear of acute supply shocks of essential goods motivates rich countries to hoard domestically produced goods – a setback for globalisation – and a second scenario, in which the global economy adjusts to living with the coronavirus, creating opportunities to innovatively ‘re-orientating globalisation’ through cooperation”. In parallel, as Vidal points out, “a number of researchers today think that it is actually humanity’s destruction of biodiversity that creates the conditions for new viruses and diseases like COVID-19 to arise—with health and economic impacts in rich and poor countries alike”. As David Quammen explained, “we cut trees; we kill animals or cage them and send them to markets. We disrupt ecosystems, and we shake viruses loose from their natural hosts. When that happens, they need a new host. Often, we are it” (2020).

One way or another, the current pandemic has encouraged us to question economic globalisation. It has also highlighted the unsustainability in our ways of living. This realisation reveals a failure not only with policy-making processes but also with the way in which citizens behave. Education has an important role to play in equipping
people to make the world more sustainable, but it seems to have had difficulties in doing so.

As we will see in the next section, the various reforms focused on generating approaches to education for sustainability have recently led to approaches that are more territory centred. However, before exploring this evolution, it is worth explaining how, during the 1990s, educational reforms also focused on globalised dimensions and how this affected people’s attitudes.

The major global educational reforms undertaken in the 1990s aimed to create a ‘world class education’ everywhere through the Global Education Reform Movement (GERM), which generated a process of comparison between educational systems’ performances and was reinforced by the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), carried out periodically by the OECD. With such objectives in mind, these reforms did not leave room for the broader aims of schooling, except insofar as they can be of economic benefit. For example, “issues of citizenship and socialization are not considered as concerned with how humans interact, but immiserated, as merely providing stable, economic conditions favourable to economic growth” (Gillies as cited in Colucci-Gray & Gray, 2014, p. 80).

As Teodoro deplores, “the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s-90s produced a fundamental change (…): the traditional professional university culture, based on the freedom of enquiry and open debate, has been progressively replaced by the rationale of performance and has created a paradigm of ‘entrepreneur education’ “(2020:84). The GERM has been mainly criticised (Teodoro, 2020; Cowen & Kazamias, 2009) for the technical fragility related to making international comparisons but also for generalising societal values based on Western economic principles, enhancing competition in the learning environment, and homogenising pedagogical approaches to entirely different communities. Besides, an underlying belief in the neo-classical approach to economic issues was translated into the ways in which development and environmental problems were being tackled, which resulted in a detachment of our communities from nature. The socio-economy-environment interactions advocated by ecological economists (Martinez-Alier, 1987) as being core to the notion of development were never integrated in educational reforms, which consequently did not help to modify attitudes, beliefs systems and all that had contributed to creating environmental crises in the first place.

The relatively new focus on the territory accompanies what Courlet and Pecqueur (2013) described as a crisis in the notion of ‘Nation State’, in a somehow ‘post-normal paradigm’ within which liberalism, globalisation and growth models are being questioned (p.7). Focusing on the notion of ‘territorial economy’, these researchers describe it as a ‘new grammar of economics’ which seeks to contest the dogma of the ‘homogeneous space’ and encourage the emergence of ‘local and territorial development’ within which the territory, as a complex system, is aligned with the deepest challenges of current societies. The original interest in ‘the territory’ was closely linked to the ‘theories of localisation’, which suggest that the diminution of transportation costs amplifies the polarisation of activities (Courlet & Pecqueur, 2013). All challenges of recycling, energy saving, and reclaim encourage territorial innovation and ‘new proximities.’
The territory we are focusing on is the Lisbon Metropolitan Area (LMA), which hosts a third of the population of Portugal. The LMA has grown dependent on the rural areas and on food imports, despite its dense network of agricultural activities - the second most expressed land-use pattern (Oliveira and Morgado, 2014). With efforts focused on making Lisbon the Green Capital of Europe in 2020, combined with concerns about food security raised by the current pandemic, this paper explores how the sustainability of this territory could be enhanced through educational programmes focused on the various benefits brought by UA.

**TE in the context of sustainability-focused educational approaches**

With the rise of environmentalism in the 1970s, efforts to raise environmental awareness grew, partly through the creation of NGOs such as the World Wildlife Fund, but also through education. The term ‘Environmental Education’ (EE) was first mentioned at the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, during which the establishment of the International Environmental Education Programme (IEEP) was recommended. Initial EE focused on helping students to understand better the natural environment from a scientific perspective. Although the socio-economic and political dimensions of ‘un-sustainable’ practices had been discussed, “the multi-disciplinary approach to EE was left to small bands of enthusiasts in each country” (Fien, 2020, p. 4). This situation remained throughout the 1970s and 1980s and it is only at the end of the 1980s that a broader understanding of the issues at stake helped reform EE.

Formerly known as the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), the Brundtland Commission helped in formulating the concept of ‘sustainable development’ in 1987, providing the definition for it that is now most referred to: “a type of development that meets the needs of the present generation without putting at risk the capacity of generations to come in meeting their own requirements” (WCED, 1987, p. 43). For UNESCO, Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) involved integrating key sustainable development issues into teaching and learning. The UN Decade of ESD (DESD: 2005-2014) mobilized the educational resources of the world to help create a more sustainable future. Various ways to do so were described in Agenda 21, the official document of the 1992 Earth Summit. UNESCO coordinated DESD initiatives and published their findings (Buckler & Creech, 2014). Were these initiatives successful? As Fien (2020, p. 1), who explored the history of EE over the past 30 years, showed: “student levels of awareness of key concepts for sustainability are low, with few able to correctly define essential concepts – e.g. precautionary principle and sustainable development”. With this disappointing conclusion in mind, researchers explored further the shortcomings of the ‘greening’ of the educational system.

Much energy was put into reflecting on the type of effective changes that were needed. Some focus was put on the overall content of the teaching. Thus, for instance, in Coriddi (2008), Ros Wade introduced the notion of Education for Sustainability (EfS) into the debate, preferring the term EfS to ESD and discussed how EfS aims to overcome the separation of development and environmental education that is frequent in the global North. Besides, a plethora of individual initiatives, project-centred educational programmes were put in place around the
world. Some networks of initiatives also helped to identify common features, characteristics of education for sustainability, and skills for ‘sustainability learners’. Thus, for instance, Howard et al. (2019) presented the Living School concept. As they explain, “in keeping with the ethos of ecological thinking and the interdependence of communities, the values of local relevance, and cultural appropriateness, an approach to scalable educational change through sustainable community economic development (CED) is offered” (p. 2). The main message of Living Schools is that the learning outcomes of education for sustainability have to be meaningful in practice for communities, who therefore need to get a sense of ownership of the concept through acquiring the skills and the ethos that will lead to its operationalisation. “The curriculum of the Living School is founded on understanding the vitality of one’s place within the larger landscape as being inextricable from human well-being”, (O’Brien & Howard, 2016, p. 123).

Living Schools have built on reflections of skills and competencies that are needed to prepare young generations for the 21st century. With sustainability at the core of preoccupations and new technologies and contexts specific to the 21st century, these competencies include critical thinking, communication, collaboration, creative problem solving, character education, and citizenship but also innovation, creativity, computer-enhanced learning and entrepreneurial mindsets (Fullan & Langworthy, 2013). The focus on well-being ensures that Living Schools support outdoor learning (Williams & Brown, 2012), positive education, as well as social-emotional learning (CASEL, 2019) and health (Morrison & Peterson, 2013). These competencies together with the principles of Community Economic Development (CED), call for holistic and interdependent approaches to creating sustainable communities. CED, defined as “action by people at the local level to create sustainable economic opportunities and to improve social conditions contributing to well-being for all’ (http://www.cf-sn.ca/community_economic_development/definition.php) occurs when people in a community take action and, as a result, local leadership and initiative are then seen as the resources for change (Schaffer et al. 2006).

Work on Living Schools and CED helped re-localise and contextualise work on sustainability. Although, historically, economic development and community development were viewed as separate concepts, researchers were encouraged to progressively integrate them, highlighting the benefits of partnership-building within communities (Beauregard, 1993; Reese & Fastenfest, 1996).

Identifying what needs to be learnt to transform our societies into sustainable ones still needs improving. As Ison, et al. (2007) suggested, ‘sustainability science’ needs to create new understanding by a coupling of multiple knowledge systems into ‘learning systems’ based on social networks. Research has demonstrated that sustainability-oriented programmes could not be successful unless concerned parties were also involved in their design and running (Healy, et al. 2013). This implies an appropriate size of activities, at a manageable scale, but also a move away from a teacher-student model and more active participation.

As we will see in the next part, food production in a city constitutes a relevant case study and platform for the application of TE, since UA both facilitates a practical understanding of what greening a city, contributing to food security and linking food
production to other activities in a ‘circular – zero waste - economy’ mean. The evolution of policy responses by the municipality of Lisbon and local stakeholders demonstrate that learning platforms are also developing outside the educational system, extending to its subject of study itself: the city as a sustainable territory.

**UA as a practical example of TE in Lisbon**

There are numerous definitions of UA, all of which converge into describing UA as the growing of plants and the raising of animals for food and other uses within and around cities (Van Veenhuizen, 2006). UA also includes concepts such as aquaponics, indoor agriculture, vertical farming, rooftops production, edible walls, edible landscapes, school and community gardens, and many other forms of integrated agriculture (Skar et al, 2020). The wish to concentrate our research on UA initiatives in Lisbon stem from the realisation that: (a) according to the World Food programme, the Covid-19 pandemic could force more than a quarter of a billion people into acute hunger by the end of the year unless swift action is taken to ensure that food supply chains keep running; and (b) while cities cover 3% of all land areas on the planet, they consume 75% of the world’s energy, generate 80% of CO2 emissions, use large quantities of water, and create an enormous amount of waste and pollution (UN, 2018). UA could both contribute to improving a city’s food security as well as making them greener and healthier environments.

In this part, we will first link UA to food security, food systems, and environmental protection; we will present how Lisbon’s local institutions recently addressed them. Then, a second section will explore how the policy achievements and new governance approaches, together with insights from practical skills for sustainability developed through project-based UA initiatives, could contribute to putting into place a model of TE to create EfS that leads to tangible results.

**UA as a core ingredient to making cities more sustainable**

The dimensions of sustainability that we are most interested in here focus on food security and sustainable food systems as key ingredients to transforming the city into a resilient, no-waste and environmentally friendly environment.

The FAO (2002) defined food insecurity as a socioeconomic situation that leads to limited or uncertain access to the nutritious food necessary to maintain a healthy life. Various studies have focused on food security in Portugal (Alvares & Amaral, 2014; Gregorio et al., 2018; Maia, et al., 2019), which concluded that the prevalence of food insecurity was 17% on average (2014-2019). We are now experiencing a world pandemic during which many households are losing their means of living, and food supply and circulation is changing. In Portugal, at the end of April 2020, articles in the Correio da Manha indicated that calls for help in the form of charitable food donations had increased by 50% since the 1st of March. In total, 600 000 people had then been reported as not being able anymore to meet their own needs and earn a living because of the COVID crisis. Learning how to feed the city and strengthen food autonomy is both useful in the short term and in designing strategies for the post-Covid uncertain transition. Portugal, which turned its back on agriculture after its entry in the EU, now needs to import food to meet its own needs (FAO, 2017). Related to food security, a food system includes various stages in the food chain. A sustainable food system is “one in which the food production chain (production, processing, distribution, trade to final consumption, and waste management) ensures
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food and nutrition security in terms of quantity and quality, accessing food for all, while promoting a healthy environment, economic dynamism, social cohesion and public health” (Oliveira & Morgado, 2014, p. 5).

During the last 20 years, much research has been carried out to demonstrate that UA could contribute to improving both food security and cities’ environmental improvement. It has shown that UA can contribute to minimising the effects of climate change and to improving the quality of life in urban areas, addressing the UN Habitat’s concerns (2012). McDougall, et al. (2019) showed that small-scale UA results in high yields. Altieri and Nicholis (2018) focused on the potential to increase UA yields through agro-ecology and suggested ways to re-design UA to explore whether UA, which can currently provide 15% to 20% of global food, could help cities reach food self-sufficiency. Saavedra, et al. (2017) showed that 20% to 30% of total anthropogenic environmental pressures derived from private consumption are caused by the global food system and investigated potential food system transformation and changes of diet. Most studies demonstrate that UA can contribute to sustain a regular supply of food for low-income urbanites ignored by long food chains (Sonnino, 2009).

In terms of territory, the city could grow as a more autonomous entity, part of a group of interconnected local production units, with UA at the core of the overall food system. For this to happen, the ‘territory’ on which food systems are being considered needs changing. As Oliveira and Morgado (2014) explain, “strategies for food security in cities have highlighted the need to re-localize production-consumption systems and to find innovative approaches in urban planning” (p. 1). The fact that, in the LMA, 37% of the land is used for agricultural purposes, which justifies in itself the need to adopt a strategic vision for the LMA’s food system planning.

As Delgado (2017) stressed, “so far, UA in Lisbon is not approached from a city food system perspective that connects producers, distributors, processors, retailers, formal and informal markets, restaurants, institutional food service and waste management” (p.141). However, examples of ‘connected’ food systems exist. Thus, the cooperatives Fruta Feia and ADREPES collect fruits and vegetables that are rejected by the corporate sector and distribute them through a large network of producers (Fruta Feia CRL, 2017). Other programmes, such as Programa PROVE, have established short distribution chains between small-scale producers and consumers. In the context of ‘social economy and entrepreneurship’ (still relatively new in Portugal with its first ‘social economy law’ appearing in 2013 -law N. 30/2013), they can help us to understand how improved food systems could contribute to making economic activities of the city more circular.

Various studies have documented today’s revival of UA in Lisbon. Mougeot (2015) focused on hortas urbanas and short food chains. Branco (2016) explored the 2011 ‘Parques Hortícolas Municipais’ programme. Delgado (2017) mapped 29 UA initiatives in Portugal and highlighted their focus on food production for self-consumption among formal or informal frameworks. Besides, the Portuguese National report to Habitat III (2013) listed allotment gardens initiatives, covering 27 hectares. The European programmes Cost Urban Allotments Gardens in European
Cities (2012-2016) and Cost Urban Agriculture Europe (2012-2016) strengthened the connections between Portugal and Europe. These programmes generated networks of researchers from more than 29 countries who investigated how UA can provide solutions in Europe and contribute to innovative cities” (Sanye-Mengual, 2015). In addition, Portugal and 136 other countries joined the Milan Urban Food Policy Act, aimed at engaging cities around the world in the development of sustainable urban food systems (MUFPP, 2015).

Integrating the food system into urban planning implies that some urban land must be devoted to food production, taking advantage of all the eco-services that this component of the system could provide (Oliveira & Morgado, 2014, p. 4). Although the complexity of an urban food system brings to bare a substantial pressure on existing planning public policy tools (for instance, an urban food system does not geographically comply with administrative boundaries), debates on how to design adequate spatial planning and governance instruments are needed. In 2009, Castro Henriques carried out a piece of research focused on the planning of UA. At the time, “the existing legal framework did not provide any protection to those practicing UA and much of the land farmed (legally or illegally) belong[ed] to the municipality” (p.49). A major change occurred when Lisbon Municipal Assembly ruled that its Plano Director Municipal had to incorporate a Green Plan - designed Portuguese landscape architect Gonçalo Ribeiro Telles - (Plano Verde de Lisboa, 2012). This decision opened up new possibilities for the development of UA in the city. The idea was to form “green corridors” linking various land uses, such as hortas urbanas urban parks, gardens, bicycle lanes and footpaths. Subsequent work included the development of an UA Strategy by the Commission for UA, which “stressed the utility of UA sites, namely because of the city’s dependence on imported fresh vegetables, the rising prices in the international food markets, the added income UA provides for families and the importance of UA in dealing with food shortages” (Castro Henriques, 2009, p. 50).

Since then, work has been done in the area of land use planning which, in Portugal, is divided between the regional level (where the Regional Coordination and Development Committee for Lisbon and Tagus Valley, CCDR-LVT, is responsible for creating the Regional Land use plan for the Metropolitan area of Lisbon (PROT-AML) and the city level (where Lisbon Municipality develops the Master Development Plan (PDM), which establishes territorial development strategies) (Santos, et al., 2015). The Lisbon municipality established the Lisbon Strategy (2010-2024), whose objectives focus on city regeneration, climate change adaptation, and connectivity of green spaces. The municipality also put great efforts into developing participatory governance by providing information platforms and developing participatory instruments (such as Lisbon Participatory Budget (OP-L) [i]). Together with the Biodiversity 2020 Strategy, Lisbon’s Master development plan (2014) and the Green Plan (2008) promoted UA, stressing that it can enhance sustainable urbanisation, restore (i.e., repair) ecosystems, contribute to climate change mitigation and adaptation, and improve risk management.

Recently, a research report came out highlighting that Lisbon still needs a comprehensive strategy to integrate the Food System into urban planning and spatial management. The European project conducted semi-structured interviews with 31
types of stakeholders strategically identified [ii] to select preferences for food strategy priorities (Serra, 2021). These priorities were ranked out of 21; those with the highest scores were short food supply chain, food security, food waste, and food literacy. From this, four main clusters (boosting agricultural production, stimulating sustainable food distribution, developing food education and valuing waste) emerged. Participants explained how they understood a food strategy could improve elements belonging to these clusters. Thus, a global food strategy could stimulate sustainable food distribution by improving transport logistics to create short supply chains. It could also put into place food education programs, farmers training on sustainability and innovation, and help to incentivise people to separate bio-waste from other waste. About half of the people being interviewed identified a ‘food platform’ as a preferred governance platform for the development of a food strategy and the majority of respondents favoured autonomy through a food strategy that would develop its own initiatives (Serra, 2021, pp. 21-22). This research highlighted the importance of the governance process that helps linking urban planning with food production, contributing to advances in social urbanism and TE.

TE learning approaches through UA

Research carried out on EfS in Portugal has highlighted a general lack of integration of national strategies in HEIs with regards to the goals of the UN DESD 2005-2014 (Farinha, 2018), as well as a lack of long-term objectives (Teixeira and Koryakina, 2016), and of an underpinning framework (Dlouhá et al., 2016) in what seems to mainly be top-down efforts. One important conclusion is that, in order to grasp the practical dimensions of what makes a territory sustainable, one has to embrace practical projects and acquire skills. As Kolb explained (1984), learners need experiential components to really understand concepts. Many researchers have also highlighted the importance of adopting a systems perspective like Bawden (1991) to appreciate the multiple dimensions (economic, social, political, environmental) of a ‘sustainable city’.

In the examples of TE applied to UA projects, systemic learning is fundamental because agriculture is a human-natural system. In the transdisciplinary agro-ecology educational projects presented by Francis et al. (2011), work on sustainable farming and food systems created an effective learning landscapes “for students to deal with complexity, uncertainty and a range of biological and social dimensions, life-cycle analysis and long-term impacts” (Francis et al., 2011, p. 226). In those, students develop new governance and management systems in order to better manage interconnections between agriculture and overarching resource systems of food, energy, water and land-use, using a whole set of skills - such as negotiating, open-mindedness, and appreciation of different perspectives. In Landscape Architecture, Keeler (2011), for instance, documented the benefits derived from the ‘Urban Farm educational Program’ (University of Oregon). He concluded that “place-based education implies a process of re-storying, whereby students are asked to becoming part of the community, rather than a passive observer of it” (Laurie Lane-Zucker, in Keeler, 2011: p.11).

In Lisbon, about a third of the UA projects (including the LIPOR programme, Lisbon Allotments Parks, and Cascais allotments) focus on mandatory training, education or capacity building programmes (Abreu, 2012). As Cancela (2009) showed, some UA initiatives created small-scale pedagogic kitchen-gardens in schools, or “pedagogical
allotments”, where the public can visit and learn farming techniques, or even farm their own plot. “Olivais Pedagogical Farm” is one of the first examples, with the “Alta de Lisboa” where, thanks to the organization of local residents, an “urban agricultural park” of three hectares was born in a bottom-up approach (Cancela, 2009, p. 7). Practically all the UA initiatives (22/29 selected by Delgado in 2017) include educational activities in parallel with food production. The way in which the learning is enhanced is both conceptual and skill orientated. TE based on UA projects could also include debates on health and immunity – debates that are much needed during the Covid-19 pandemic. Focusing on this could constitute one of the motivations for learning about sustainability.

For citizens, institutions, small businesses, and urban planners, working together at linking activities that could make the city greener could help them to appreciate what a sustainable city might be. Away from top-down approaches to education and training, TE through UA “focuses on the collective influence and responsibility in creating inclusive and responsive public spaces” (Smaniotto et al., 2017, p. 53). Through this, the territory both becomes an educational agent and content (Villar-Caballo, 2001). Such an approach to TE could build on the participatory platforms that have recently been put into place in the context the Lisbon’s Food Strategy.

**Conclusion**

The current pandemic is motivating us not only to think about how to make our societies more sustainable but also how to ensure that educational activities can contribute to doing so. Here we have explored the potential contribution of ‘Territorial Education’ through the example of Urban Agricultural initiatives in Lisbon. Nominated as the Green Capital of Europe in 2020, Lisbon hosted a number of UA initiatives throughout time, especially in times of crisis.

After exploring the historical context from which TE emerged (in reaction against the 1990s GERM and in continuity with efforts to improve education for sustainability), this article explored the various characteristics of this type of educational approach ‘in the making’. From integrating initiatives focused on UA into it, we can conclude that TE deals with local, practical problems in view of developing skills to address them and also develops solutions to the problem in view of improving the sustainability of the place. This approach enhances the formulation of solutions through long-term communication and collaboration amongst a variety of stakeholders whilst respecting the needs, perspectives and skills of various stakeholders through a dialogical iterative social learning process that enables the ‘co-creation of spaces’ (Estrela and Smaniotto, 2019). TE encourages networking and exchanges of ideas and know-how locally and globally, in order to improve learning about sustainability in line with Global Citizenship principles. It also integrates activities such as UA within the broader creation of the city’s resilience and circularity and therefore, puts action at the core of learning.

Building on the recent participatory processes carried out in the LMA to initiate the formulation of a comprehensive Food Strategy will help in understanding the centrality of food within the overall urban sustainability and constructing learning platforms and networks that will facilitate the collaboration of various stakeholders to build a circular, no-waste and resilient city.
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**1**The OP-L had a budget of 2.5 million euros in 2015 and, in 2012, more than 200 projects were improved, voted upon by almost 30,000 citizens. 30% of these projects involved green space enhancement (Santos et al. 2015, p. 7; also see Allegretti and Antunes, 2014).

**2**6 producers, 6 distributors, 7 institutions, 6 local administrations, 4 organisations and 2 universities.
Geographies of Participation in Learning Abroad Mobility Among European Youth: A Comparison of Student and Non-Student Groups in the EU Member States

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In recent decades, learning abroad mobility has become a popular movement and has often been considered among students in higher education. However, in the European Union (EU) context, opportunities to learn abroad are also provided for non-student groups of youth. Accordingly, this study aims to examine the role of certain socio-economic factors concerning participation in learning abroad mobility and to compare their contribution between students and non-student groups of youth in six country groups in the EU. In so doing, a quantitative method was followed by using the data of Flash Eurobarometer 478. Findings of the multinomial logistic regression analyses show that although there is no significant difference between the EU15 and NMS (new member states) regarding young people’s participation in learning abroad mobility, such difference occurs within the NMS. Students are more likely than non-students to participate in general. The age of students, being female and living in rural areas among non-students can also hinder participation.

Introduction
The mobility of young people is often regarded as an essential instrument for European integration, and of sustainable and inclusive growth of the European Union (EU) (European Commission [EC], 2010). Consequently, cross-border mobility throughout Europe emerges as an important way to increase young people’s commitment to EU citizenship (Mazzoni, et al., 2017).

In this regard, starting by focusing on student mobility, different mechanisms have been established to improve young people’s mobility across Europe with different exchange programs abroad. The ERASMUS Program (European Region Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students) is a well-known example of these programs among others such as the European Solidarity Corps, European Voluntary Service, or other Youth in Action Projects. Beginning with eleven European countries in 1987, the ERASMUS Program is now implemented in thirty-four program countries including non-EU member countries. In addition, after the implementation of Erasmus+ in 2014, the program also started to cover various activities for youth, such as voluntary activities, apprenticeships and internship programs, professional training and youth worker programs, as well as academic/study-related opportunities, once only provided for students.

Numerous researchers focus on participation in learning abroad mobility activities among students in a European context. They research the role of various macro-level, institutional-level, and individual-level factors of participating in international student mobility or study abroad programs. A number of these factors cover EU space, including all member countries, and others focus on single country contexts (Beech, 2015; Dabasi-Halász et al., 2019; Finn and Darmody, 2017; Souto-Otero et al., 2013; Van Mol and Timmerman, 2014). However, studies examining non-student groups’ participation in learning abroad mobility are often scarce. Most of the studies focused on non-student youth mobility take this topic as part of migratory research, not
primarily focused on educational experiences abroad (Cairns, 2018; Hemming et al., 2019; King, 2018; Krzaklewska, 2019; Mazzoni et al., 2017; van Geel and Mazzucato, 2018).

Focusing on the role of certain socio-demographic factors of participating in learning abroad mobility, this study aims to compare how the contribution of these factors change between student and non-student groups in different EU member countries. By doing this, the current study uses cross-sectional data gathered by Flash Eurobarometer 478 survey implemented across EU member countries. The comparison between student and non-student groups is also made within six geographies (Northern Old, Western Old, Southern Old, Northern New, Southern New, and Eastern New member countries) by following a quantitative approach and making multinomial logistic regression analyses.

The very reason of making such a comparison between geographical zones is to investigate the role of contextual differences between EU member countries. Because such differences could also be effective on young people’s participation in learning abroad mobility. Despite the EU representing a regional, political and economic integrity, it is an organization that has grown between 1973 and 2013. Such a gradual enlargement also automatically caused the late integration of some member states and resultingly new members have lately gained more opportunities than previous ones.

Within this context, EU member countries could be grouped as EU15 and the NMS (new member states). The EU15 states were members of the EU before 1996, and the NMS became members of the EU after 2003. Most of the NMS is composed of the former Warsaw Pact or USSR-aligned countries (excluding Cyprus and Malta). So, as Favell (2009) stated, although the Western Europeans have a "free movement" by right for four decades, “the socially and spatially dynamic mobile populations of new Eastern and Central Europe” only lately grabbed this opportunity, after enlargements in 2004, 2007 and 2013. Such a late coming of the free movement opportunity for the people of NMS is also reflected in the participation of youth in learning abroad mobility in the NMS (Dabasi-Halász, et al., 2019). In the context of Erasmus exchanges, NMS started to join the program later than the EU15 countries, some of them even eleven years later. Various studies show that EU15 countries are at the center of the students' mobility while the NMS is at the periphery, and generally speaking, student exchanges are denser among/within EU15 countries (Dabasi-Halász et al., 2019; González, Mesanza and Mariel, 2011; Shields, 2016).

Although the above-mentioned studies represent a rich source of information regarding participation in intra-European student mobility, they neglect two points in general. One is the mobility of non-student youth for learning abroad activities, and the other one is the impact of contextual (geographical) differences in the participation in abroad learning mobility. Focusing on this gap in the literature, the current study tries to answer the below questions:

1. How does the contribution of socio-demographic factors to participation in learning abroad mobility differ within the geographies?
2. And how does such a contribution differ by student and non-student groups of youth in different geographies?

**Literature Review**

**Learning Abroad Mobility**

Learning abroad mobility is similar to students’ international mobility, but it also covers non-formal and informal learning activities rather than focusing only on formal learning, academic or study-related activities (Berg, Milmeister & Weis, 2013; Devlin et al., 2017). So, it includes both students and non-student groups such as staff, trainees, apprentices, youth workers, and young people (Learning Mobility of
Individuals, n.d.). Covering all such types of mobility, it is commonly used in the context of EU member countries and is often elaborated on in the EU policy documents (Berg, Milmeister & Weis, 2013; EC, 2010; Kettunen, 2017; Learning Mobility of Individuals, n.d.). However, for non-student groups, the duration of mobility is relatively shorter than in the students’ mobility, often ranging from two weeks to two months, except for some of the voluntary youth activities (Devlin et al., 2017; Learning Mobility of Individuals, n.d.).

Factors Leading to Participation in Learning Abroad Mobility
Considering that learning abroad mobility is a more inclusive term covering both student and non-student groups, it is possible to argue that participation in learning abroad mobility could also be regarded as a change of behavior affected by various push/pull factors. Participation in both long-term (often regarded as acquiring a B.A., M.A or Ph.D. degree) and short-term learning abroad mobility activities (non-degree, credit, study-related, or event mobility) is shaped by the various factors and their effects could be diverse in different contexts.

In this part of the paper, however, I only dealt with some certain factors. Because such factors are also investigated in the literature and some of them are represented in the Flash Eurobarometer 478 too. These variables are often used in the studies related to students’ participation in learning abroad mobility, but since the current study also focuses on the mobility of non-students, they were also used for the analyses of the non-student groups. These factors are grouped as demographic, economic, academic, cultural and social, geographic factors and characteristics of learning abroad mobility programs. They are explained in detail in the coming paragraphs.

Starting with the demographic factors, age, gender, type of community, and occupation (work status) constitute the demographic factors of the current study (Finn and Darmody, 2017; Van Mol & Timmerman, 2014; Chen, 2007). Younger people (Hercog & Van de Laar, 2013), living in large towns or cities, are often considered to be mobile, and female students (Finn & Darmody, 2017; Whatley, 2018) and those working (full-time or part-time) (Goldstein & Kim, 2006) are generally more likely to participate in learning abroad mobility.

Considering the economic factors, a lack of financial resources or the cost of studying are often found to be constraints to studying abroad (Dabasi-Halász et al., 2019; Souto-Otero et al., 2013). Also, most students who participate in study abroad programs often belong to higher social strata in society (Van Mol & Timmerman, 2014).

Academic factors could vary according to study type (B.A, M.A., or Ph.D.), major to seniority, recognition of credits taken abroad, or interruption of studies in the home country institution. Furthermore, concerns related to the quality of the program or institution abroad could prevent people from participating (Berghoff, Obdulia, & Brandenburg, 2014; Böhm et al., 2013; González, Mesanza & Mariel, 2011; Tran, 2016;). Most of the time, senior or post-graduate students are more likely to participate in learning abroad mobility (Hercog & Van de Laar, 2013).

Cultural and social factors also vary, and they can play both an enabling or a hindering role for learning abroad mobility. Most of the time, family or personal reasons and work-related or study-related issues could challenge participation in mobility (Tran, 2016; Berghoff, Obdulia, & Brandenburg, 2014; Böhm et al., 2013; González, Mesanza & Mariel, 2011). Besides, living in a different country may not be comfortable for some people or some may simply not be interested in learning or studying abroad (Chen, 2007; Mazzarol & Soutar 2002). However, social networks (significant others) in the host country or institution could be a pull factor for participation in mobility (Beech, 2015; Chen, 2007). Lastly, foreign language knowledge may enhance participation (Dessoff, 2006; Goldstein and Kim, 2006; Souto-Otero et al. 2013).
The characteristics of learning abroad mobility programs may hinder participation. For example, a lack of program information or a long/short program duration may prevent participation (Berghoff, Obdulia, & Brandenburg, 2014; Böhm et al., 2013).

Geographic factors are often related to the proximity of the home country to the host country (Chen, 2007; Mazzarol & Soutar 2002). The mobility of people across countries could be easier for those who have short distances to travel or shared borders. Additionally, the cost of mobility or staying abroad could be cheaper than staying in a distant host country. However, in the current study, geographic differences are utilized to see the role of contextual differences in the participation of youth in learning abroad mobility. Because different characteristics of the EU member countries, especially the contextual differences between EU15 and the NMS, this may cause the rise of different learning abroad mobility patterns within these country groups (Dabasi-Halász et al., 2019; González, Mesanza & Mariel, 2011; Shields, 2016).

Method
Data Source & Sample
The study uses data gathered by the Flash Eurobarometer 478 (EC, 2019), which was administered in twenty-eight EU member countries among the population aged between 15-30, at the request of the EC Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture. The survey covers the population of the respective nationalities, residents in each member state. Accordingly, 10,786 respondents were selected as samples, using a multi-stage random sampling design. They are interviewed by telephone through the Kantar e-Call center (CATI system). In the analyses, the data of 10,669 respondents was used because of the missing cases in the ‘mobility’ variable (dependent variable).

Variables
Dependent Variable (Participation in Learning Abroad Mobility). This variable was derived by merging two questions; D7 (‘Excluding travel for tourism or living with one’s family abroad, have you ever stayed abroad for at least two weeks? For example, for study purposes, training, work, exchanges or volunteering’), and Q2 (‘You said earlier that you had never stayed abroad for the purpose of study, work, exchanges, and so on. Have you considered taking part in any learning experience abroad?’). The merged item was represented in the dataset by a composite variable (q2b). Accordingly, there are three groups of youth when mobility is questioned. Those who ‘had participated’, ‘had considered, but couldn’t participate’, and ‘had never considered participating’. As a result, respondents who had ‘never considered’ participating were selected as the reference category.

Independent Variables. Independent variables are composed of gender, age, occupation, type of community, and geographical zones.

Regarding this, gender was simply composed of female and male, with the male selected as the reference category. Age ranged between 15 and 30. It was taken as a categorical variable, consisting of three categories; 15-19 years, 20-24 years, and 25-30 years. The age range of 25-30 years was selected as the reference category. Occupation is derived from the answers to Questions D5a, D5b, D5c, D5d, and D5e. In the dataset, there is a composite variable (D5r) merging and representing all twenty-two occupation types, ranging from self-employed to manual workers, from managers to civil servants, from retired to full-time students, and refusals. Accordingly, D5r was re-coded into ‘Full-time students’ and ‘Others (respondents having a part- or full-time job)’. The category of ‘Others’ was selected as the reference category. Type of Community was derived from Question D13: ‘Would you say you live in a…?’; the possible answers being ‘Rural area or village,’ ‘Small or mid-sized town,’ ‘Large
town/city’ and ‘DK’. Accordingly, ‘Rural area or village’ was selected as the reference category and the DK is recoded as missing.

Lastly, geographical zones (country groups) are identified based on the UNSD-M49 Standard, and the countries’ dates of joining the EU. Considering the date of joining the EU, member countries may be grouped into two: the EU15 and NMS. In this regard, twenty-eight member countries are grouped as follows: ‘Northern Old-NO’ (Ireland, the ‘UK’, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden); ‘Western Old-WO’ (France, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria); ‘Southern Old-SO’ (Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal); ‘Northern New-NN’ (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania); ‘Southern New-SN’ (Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia, Croatia); and ‘Eastern New-EN’ (Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania).

**Analytical Strategy**

Multinomial logistic regression analyses are chosen because of the categorical nature of the dependent variable. Participation in learning abroad mobility is categorized into three: those who participated; those who did not participate but considered it; and lastly, those who never considered it. These three types are taken as ‘participated,’ ‘considered,’ and ‘neither’ to express them in short. Considering the analyses, there is no multicollinearity problem due to the VIF values being no higher than 1.467, and Tolerance values being not close to 0.00, with the lowest being 0.682. According to Hair et al. (2014) VIF value lies between 1.00-10.00 and it should be closer to 1.00, and the Tolerance value lies between 0.10-1.00 and it should be closer to 1.00.

**Findings**

Before moving to the findings of multinomial logistic regression analyses, cross-tabulations were made to provide information on the general association of socio-demographic factors and participation in learning abroad mobility. As shown in Table 1, $\chi^2$ statistics show significant differences for all of the independent variables.

**Table 1. Cross-tabulations between Mobility Types and Independent Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Participated</th>
<th>Considered</th>
<th>Neither</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>10753</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>29.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4875</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>30.1</td>
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<td>Male</td>
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<td>19.2</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age***</td>
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<td>33.6</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19 years</td>
<td>1596</td>
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<td>39.2</td>
<td>26.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>20-24 years</td>
<td>3311</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>31.8</td>
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<td>25-30 years</td>
<td>5846</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>24.6</td>
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<td>30.5</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>37.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>47.6</td>
<td>21.5</td>
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<td>Rural area or village</td>
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<td>34.6</td>
<td>30.7</td>
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<td>Others (working full or part-time)</td>
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<td>32.0</td>
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<td>25.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country Groups***</td>
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<td>25.9</td>
<td>29.4</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>39.8</td>
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</tr>
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<td>WO</td>
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<td>20.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>SO</td>
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<td>34.6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN</td>
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<td>35.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>EN</td>
<td>2400</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*$p \leq 0.05; **p \leq 0.01; ***p \leq 0.001$
Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses

Multinomial logistic regression analyses were made to examine the contributions of geography (contextual differences) and other socio-economic factors to the odds of participation in international mobility, by using all-data, within-country group data. As shown in Table 2, findings are also similar to the significant differences in the cross-tabulations. Considering the all-data analysis (Model 1), respondents who are older, living in middle and large towns are more likely to participate in learning abroad mobility than younger respondents, and living in rural areas, respectively. Being a student increases the likelihood of participation 1.85 times higher than being non-student (part-time and full-time working respondents). Additionally, respondents from NN countries are 1.19 times more likely to participate than the respondents from the EN countries. These differences remain the same for considering participation, but the contribution of being a student is higher this time, and subsequently, respondents from the WO, SO and SN countries are more likely to consider participation than respondents from the EN countries.

Table 2. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses for Mobility Types by Geographies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
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</thead>
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<td>SO</td>
<td>NN</td>
<td>SN</td>
<td>EN</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(n=1975)</td>
<td>(n=2221)</td>
<td>(n=1592)</td>
<td>(n=1192)</td>
<td>(n=1302)</td>
<td>(n=2387)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Male)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.37**</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.74*</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.73**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (25-30 years)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19 years</td>
<td>0.37***</td>
<td>0.36***</td>
<td>0.33***</td>
<td>0.40***</td>
<td>0.46*</td>
<td>0.31***</td>
<td>0.47***</td>
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<tr>
<td>20-24 years</td>
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<tr>
<td>Large town</td>
<td>1.86***</td>
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<td>1.94***</td>
<td>1.47*</td>
<td>1.81***</td>
<td>1.63***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small or mid-size town</td>
<td>1.30**</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.56**</td>
<td>1.69**</td>
<td>0.94</td>
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<td>1.09</td>
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<td>Occupation (Non-students)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Students</td>
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<td>1.76***</td>
<td>2.14***</td>
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<td>1.55**</td>
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<td>Considered vs. Neither</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Male)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (25-30 years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19 years</td>
<td>1.26**</td>
<td>1.42*</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24 years</td>
<td>1.30***</td>
<td>1.48**</td>
<td>1.67***</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Type of Community (Rural area or village)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large town</td>
<td>1.77***</td>
<td>1.68***</td>
<td>2.10***</td>
<td>1.39*</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.66**</td>
<td>1.98***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small or mid-size town</td>
<td>1.37***</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.67***</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.54**</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation Students</td>
<td>2.18***</td>
<td>1.77***</td>
<td>2.04***</td>
<td>2.23***</td>
<td>2.98***</td>
<td>2.99***</td>
<td>2.20***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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When the analyses were made within country groups, it is possible to detect more differences regarding participation in learning abroad mobility. Gender becomes a significant contributor to participation, but it loses its significant role in consideration. In the NO countries, females are 37% more likely to participate, whereas, in the NN and EN country groups, they are 26% and 27% less likely to participate in learning abroad mobility, respectively. Younger respondents (15-19 years) from all of the nation groups are less likely to participate in learning abroad mobility than those older (25-30 years), but for consideration, they are more likely to consider participation than those older only in the NO and WO countries. Living in large towns makes significantly more of a contribution to participation in all of the country groups than living in rural areas, and this is almost the same for consideration, except in the NN countries. Students are significantly more likely to participate in all of the country groups except the SO countries, and they are more likely to consider participation than others in all of the country groups.

Furthermore, it is possible to reach detailed findings regarding the role of gender, age, and type of community when the analyses are made by students and non-students within country groups. In Table 3, it can be seen that gender differences are mainly valid for non-student respondents. There is no significant difference by gender among students regarding participation, except for students in the WO countries. Among students, females are 1.77 times more likely to participate in learning abroad mobility than those older (25-30 years), but for consideration, they are more likely to consider participation than those older only in the NO and WO countries. Living in large towns makes significantly more of a contribution to participation in all of the country groups than living in rural areas, and this is almost the same for consideration, except in the NN countries. Students are significantly more likely to participate in all of the country groups except the SO countries, and they are more likely to consider participation than others in all of the country groups.

On the other hand, age differences are mainly valid for student respondents. Younger students (15-19 years) from all of the country groups are less likely to participate in learning abroad mobility than the older respondents (25-30 years). Younger students are most disadvantaged in the SN countries. However, age differences do not remain the same for consideration in most of the countries, except for the NO and WO countries. In these two country groups, younger non-student respondents are more eager to participate.

Similar to the gender differences, differences in the type of community are mainly valid among non-students for both participation and consideration. Students in the NN countries are an exception to this matter. In the NN countries, students living in mid-size towns are 3.61 times more likely to participate in learning abroad mobility than students living in rural areas, and students living in large and mid-size towns are also more likely to consider participating than students living in rural areas. In the WO and SO countries, non-student respondents living in large and mid-size towns are the most advantaged for participation.
Table 3. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses for Mobility Types by Students and Others within Geographies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>SO</th>
<th>NN</th>
<th>SN</th>
<th>EN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1 Student (n=667)</td>
<td>Model 2 Non-students (n=1308)</td>
<td>Model 3 Students (n=783)</td>
<td>Model 4 Non-students (n=1438)</td>
<td>Model 5 Students (n=561)</td>
<td>Model 6 Non-students (n=1031)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Participated vs. Neither</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Male)</td>
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<td>1.77**</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (25-30 years)</td>
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<td>0.48**</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td>0.49*</td>
<td>0.35**</td>
<td>0.57</td>
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<td>15-19 years</td>
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<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24 years</td>
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<td>2.04***</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>2.46***</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>2.26***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Community (Rural area or village)</td>
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<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>1.44*</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>2.09***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.86***</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>2.69***</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>1.76**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small or mid-size town</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1.89***</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Considered vs. Neither</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Male)</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1.52**</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (25-30 years)</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>2.15***</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19 years</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1.66***</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.78***</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24 years</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.86***</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>2.69***</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>1.76**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Community (Rural area or village)</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1.89***</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large town</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.86***</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>2.69***</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>1.76**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small or mid-size town</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1.89***</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negalkarke R²</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model χ² (df)</td>
<td>59.74 (10)**</td>
<td>76.44 (10)**</td>
<td>61.21 (10)**</td>
<td>83.63 (10)**</td>
<td>30.35 (10)**</td>
<td>29.52 (10)**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Discussion
Youth have experienced learning abroad mobility for a long time across Europe. However, a proportion of youth who are from recent member countries of the EU has lately been exposed to this opportunity than the youth from older member countries. Therefore, participation in learning abroad mobility is naturally expected to be different between the EU15 and NMS. However, the findings of the current study show that such a difference is only significant between the NN and EN country groups. This means that participation differences between Old and New member states converge or maybe no longer exist, but such difference continues within the NMS. Yet, it is also possible to argue that such a difference continues in the consideration of participation in mobility since the participants from WO, SO, SN countries are more willing to participate than their counterparts in EN.

Moreover, whole-dataset analyses within country groups reveal that students are more likely to participate than non-students in all of the country groups. Considering that students have been benefitting from the learning abroad experience for a long time, such a finding is quite reasonable for the mobility of youth in an EU context. However, dividing the old (EU15) and the new (NMS) member states of the EU by geography led to several differences in the role of socio-demographic factors.

The first issue is related to gender equality in participation. Among students, there is no significant difference between males and females in almost all of the country groups, and females are significantly more advantaged in the WO countries. Several other studies also indicate that females are more mobile than males among students (Finn & Darmody, 2017; Whatley 2018). However, among non-students, females are significantly disadvantaged in the NN and EN country groups, whereas they are more likely to participate in the NO countries. Therefore, it is possible to say that gender equality may not constitute a problem in the EU15 countries among students, but it could still be a problem among non-students, especially in the NMS.

Dissimilarly, age does not play a hindering role in the NMS or among non-students in most of the country groups. However, among students, the young (15-19 years) are significantly disadvantaged than older people (25-30 years) in all of the country groups. Such a hindering role of age among younger students is quite reasonable since most of the learning abroad opportunities are concentrated at the higher education level. Even among university students, there is evidence that seniors, and graduate students are more likely to participate than freshman and undergraduate students (Hercog & Van de Laar, 2013).

Differences among students and non-students are evident for participation in whether they live in large towns or rural areas. But the type of community is an underestimated factor in studies focusing on learning abroad mobility (Di Pietro, 2020). According to findings of the current study, type of community does not make a significant contribution among students, whereas, among non-students, respondents living in large towns are more likely to participate in learning abroad mobility than those living in rural areas.

Limitations
The findings of the current study are limited because of the question representing the dependent variable (participation in learning abroad mobility) in the questionnaire. This question was asked generally, not separating respondents whether they participated in learning abroad mobility when they were students or after they graduated. Student (full-time students) and non-student groups (respondents having a part- or full-time job) were separated by the researcher based on the Occupation item (D5r). So, there could be some non-student respondents participating in learning abroad mobility when they are students. At the same time, they could also participate in learning abroad mobility after they graduated once more. But there isn’t any item
for the identification of such responses in the survey. However, the findings showed that the older the respondent, the more participation in mobility. Accordingly, the actual number of non-student respondents who participated in learning abroad mobility could be less. So, the contribution of the socio-demographic factors to participation in abroad learning mobility of non-students may have been underestimated.

**Concluding Remarks**

Factors contributing to students’ participation in learning abroad mobility have long been studied by various scholars. The current study explores the role of certain socio-demographic factors (gender, age, type of community) in participation, not only among students but also among non-students within six different EU member country groups. Although some current findings were consistent with the findings of other studies, they also show interesting clues regarding the role of contextual differences (geographies).

Accordingly, despite the late integration of NMS into the EU, participation in learning abroad mobility gap between EU15 and the NMS has minimized recently, despite the ongoing differences in consideration (willingness to participate). Besides, participation differences are continuing within the NMS. So, policies and financial resources allocated for youth mobility should be organized by focusing on the conditions of youth in the NMS in the next seven years (2021-27 term), especially those residing in the EN countries.

A similar focus should be concentrated on non-students because non-students are less likely to participate in learning abroad mobility than students. Implementing Erasmus+ to cover these groups was a good start to cover non-formal learning abroad activities more systematically. However, there is still a lack of studies broadly focusing on the challenges/conditions of participation among non-student groups of youth in the EU context. Further research should also examine non-students abroad learning mobility. Some specific EU-wide surveys such as some of the Flash Eurobarometers could also be conducted by EC officials to investigate the learning mobility of the non-student group of youth, rather than making population-based surveys.

Among non-students within nation group analyses showed that individuals living in rural areas in almost all country groups and females in some NMS countries are disadvantaged in participation. Therefore, specific policies encouraging or supporting these groups in the 2021-27 fiscal term could be a priority for the EC officials and the national agencies of these countries.

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**References**


A Policy Shift from State to Non-state in Education Aid: A Critical Discourse Analysis of the UK’s Development Policies

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Due to the historically outsized influence of the United Kingdom’s development assistance office on international aid, a better understanding of the underlying ideologies and political priorities guiding this agency would help the larger aid community more clearly understand the power dynamics and structural context of the development industry. However, these ideologies and dynamics are often left implicit and are not always easily understood. The purpose of this article is to use critical discourse analysis to unpack the ideologies, political priorities and power dynamics present in DfID’s official education policy documents. In so doing, we make the implicit explicit, and begin to unpack the implicit meanings and assumptions that are present in these written texts, particularly regarding the deprioritized role of the state in providing a high-quality education. We argue that this analysis reveals an underlying perception within DfID that the private sector is more effective at providing public education in developing countries than the public sector.

The Department for International Development (DfID) was a department under the United Kingdom (UK) Government responsible for administering UK official development assistance (ODA). The UK stood in third place after the United States and Germany among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee list of donor countries, contributing 12.7% of total global ODA in 2019 (FCDO, 2020). The UK contributes its ODA as both bilateral aid (i.e. aid earmarked for particular aid-receiving countries) and multilateral aid (i.e. as a part of an unearmarked pooled global fund). In 2019, the UK’s bilateral development aid accounted for 67.5% of its total ODA, and it saw an overall upward trend from 63.2% in 2015 (FCDO, 2020). Bilateral ODA allows the donor country (in this case, the UK) to choose the priority areas they will support in aid-receiving countries, reflecting more directly the priorities of their citizens and taxpayers, while multilateral ODA is generally considered politically neutral (Kilmister, 2016). In 2019, Africa received the largest share (50.6%) of the UK’s bilateral ODA, followed by Asia (41.8%), Americas (4.1%), Europe (3.2%), and the Pacific (0.3%). Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan were the top 3 countries receiving the UK’s country-specific bilateral ODA (FCDO, 2020).

Since DfID is among the largest donors listed by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, its underlying ideologies and political priorities have the potential to exert
enormous influence on education policy in aid-receiving developing countries. However, while understanding these underlying ideologies and priorities would help aid-receiving countries, scholars and lay observers to better understand the larger aid policy environment, they are typically not stated explicitly so as to be easily understood. In response, the purpose of this article is to unpack these ideologies and priorities using DfID official policy documents, with the goal of making the implicit explicit. To do this, we use critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1995) to analyze DfID’s four primary education policy documents issued between 2010 and 2018, with the purpose of examining and unpacking the implicit meanings and assumptions that are present in these written texts.

To reach this aim, we will first ground this work in the established literature, reviewing the growing role the private sector has played in educational provision in developing countries, as well as the use of critical discourse analysis to examine the relationships between developing countries’ education policies and international aid organizations. We will then describe our methodology based in critical discourse analysis, before delving into our findings. As we will argue here, DfID’s educational policy documents contain powerful rhetoric on the role of the state in providing education, implying a strong ideological stance regarding the relative efficacy of state versus non-state actors in providing a high-quality education. More specifically, we argue that the rhetoric used in these DfID documents demonstrates the perception that public education in developing countries has failed, while the private sector provides a degree of quality and outreach the public sector lacks.

**Private Sector in Education of Developing Countries**

Private schools for the wealthy have not been unusual in developing countries. However, starting in the 1990s, a large number of low-cost private schools have emerged in the poorest parts of the developing world, particularly in slums and rural areas (Heyneman & Stern, 2014; Lewin, 2007; Tooley, 2004; Tooley et al., 2011). There is a wide spectrum of relative government support and regulation regarding those low-cost private schools, from non-existent to official government sponsorship through voucher programs, which buy seats in private schools for needy students, or contract out private firms to run public schools (Heyneman & Stern, 2014).

In their research in six African and South Asian countries, Tooley et al. (2011) categorized low-cost private schools into three categories: government-aided, government-recognized, and government-unrecognized. The government-recognized status allows a school to organize state examinations and to issue official graduation paperwork, meaning students who attend these schools can continue to a higher level of schooling and have better employment opportunities (Tooley et al., 2011). Parents’ motivation to send their children to low-cost private schools often relates to the perceived better quality of those private schools or the inability of public education systems to reach the poorest areas, especially the fastest growing city slums (Heyneman & Stern, 2014; Tooley et. al, 2011). The proliferation of low-cost private schools in developing countries related to the pressure of the Education for All policy agenda on those countries whose public education systems could not respond to a dramatic increase of enrollment in basic education within the Educational for All timeframe (Lewin, 2007; Rose, 2005).
The Impact of Low-Cost Private Schools

There has been a debate around whether or not low-cost private schools have a positive impact on the education systems of developing countries (Heyneman & Stern, 2014; Lewin, 2007; Tooley, 2004; Tooley et. al, 2011). Professor James Tooley from the United Kingdom is an ardent advocate of low-cost private schools, and he advocates for governments to relinquish their role as education providers (Wilby, 2013). Tooley (2004) boldly asserted that “government schools cannot provide quality education for all,” referring to the Probe Team’s 1999 Public Report on Education in India and the 2000 Oxfam Education Report by Watkins as examples of how low-cost private schools are better than their public counterparts (p. 4). Tooley (2004) has claimed that public schools in many developing countries lack accountability, have chronic teacher absenteeism, and little time on task for students. Watkins (2004), who wrote the Oxfam Education Report that Tooley draws upon, argued in response that Tooley “selectively interprets and then misinterprets” the findings from the Oxfam report and the Probe Team report to advocate for low-cost private schools (p. 8). Watkins has argued that state education systems in developing countries can deliver quality education if there are "participative and accountable structures" in politics, whereas "wholesale privatization" of the basic education delivery will deepen inequality (Watkins, 2004, p.11).

On a similar note, Lewin (2007) has concluded that low-cost private schools have only "a limited impact" in achieving universal access to education in South-Saharan Africa (p.18). While recognizing that private schools have expanded access to education, Lewin pointed out that they do not reach children from the poorest 20% at the primary level and more children at the secondary level (Lewin, 2007). Based on their multi-country case studies of low-cost non-government schools in Jamaica, Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, Indonesia, and Pakistan, Heyneman and Stern (2014) have recommended that non-government schools must be regulated and included in governmental education management systems. As can be seen in this review of the literature there is still debate on whether the expansion of low-cost private schools in developing countries ameliorates educational inequality or exacerbates it.

Another crucial question is whether low-cost private schools do better than public schools in promoting student academic achievement. Several studies have demonstrated evidence that low-cost private schools do promote higher student achievement, at least as measured by standardized tests. Tooley et al. (2011) randomly selected low-cost private schools and public schools in Lagos, Nigeria, and in Delhi and Hyderabad, India to compare the performance of students from unrecognized private schools, state-recognized schools, and zero-tuition, state-run schools. Their results show that students from both government-recognized and government-unrecognized private schools outperformed their counterparts from state-run schools (Tooley et al., 2011). In a similar study of low-cost private schools in Brazil, students from two Brazilian high schools with a co-management model based in public-private partnerships outperformed their public-school counterparts in state examinations (Chattopadhay & Nogueira, 2014).

However, while these two studies (Chattopadhay & Nogueira, 2014; Tooley et al., 2011) found private schools to outperform their public counterparts in student achievement,
Heyneman and Stern’s (2014) found only mixed results in comparing low-cost private schools and public schools in Jamaica, Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, Indonesia, and Pakistan. Another rigorous review of 59 studies by Ashley et al. (2014) showed that private school students outperformed compared with their public-school counterparts, but “there is ambiguity about the size of the true private school effect,” and “many children may not be achieving basic competencies even in private schools” (p. 1). Since findings pointed to some critical gaps in evidence, Ashley et al. (2014) concluded: “What is clear… is the need for more targeted research to fill the gaps in our understanding of the role and impact of private schools in developing countries” (p. 3). While this study does not provide the type of quantitative evidence for or against low-cost private schools outlined in this literature review, it does document how, despite the lack of consensus in the academic literature regarding the impact of low-cost private schools, staffers and report writers at institutions like DfID already hold opinions and beliefs regarding the relative strength of public and private schools in developing countries, and those opinions are revealed through their rhetoric and word choice. Before examining that rhetoric and word choice with our own critical discourse analysis, we will now explore the literature on previous studies that have engaged in similar forms of critical discourse analysis on governmental policy documents.

**Policy Relationships Between Developing Countries and International Organizations: Insights from Critical Discourse Analysis**


In the existing literature, scholars have conducted critical discourse analysis of education policies and public policy documents from developing countries like the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Cambodia, and Ghana, revealing that influence from international organizations has led to the emergence of hybrid discourses of ‘global’ education ideologies in developing world contexts (see McCormick, 2012; Nuzdor, 2013). Nuzdor (2013) analyzed selected documents on Ghana’s Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (fCUBE) policy and revealed that in these documents there was a discursive shift from rights-based social democratic ideals to a neoliberal discourse focused on economic concerns. Specifically, Nuzdor (2013) found a link between this neoliberal discursive shift and when Ghana began to implement World Bank-supported policy strategies.

In the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) and Cambodia, McCormick (2012) found similar neoliberal, individual-centric globalization discourses from international organizations, though in those cases that outside rhetoric mixed more strongly with existing centralized bureaucratic discourses within the existing policy structures of these two countries. McCormick (2012) noticed that in both Lao PDR and Cambodia, there were intertextual links between both countries’ national constitutions and Education for All (EFA) documents that, when analyzed, revealed a power struggle for dominance in the policy discourse between local governments and international organizations. For
instance, the Laotian constitution carried traces of both socialist ideas of nation-building alongside neoliberal tenets of privatization with regard to education. McCormick’s analysis of education policy documents in Lao PDR and Cambodia led him to conclude that “access to formal, primary education is promoted in the service of growth, and private provision to the benefit of the few, at the expense of improving quality in education for the marginalized or even the poor majority” (McCormick, p. 39). While these documents contained competing discourses of socialism and neoliberalism, in the end the neoliberal trend won out and held the greater way over policy (for similar results in Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, see McCormick, 2011, 2014, 2016).

At times, the literature has shown instances when imported “modern” ideas result in unintended negative consequences when implemented. Through a critical discourse analysis of the Ethiopian education reform policy for broadcasting secondary school lessons from the capital city Addis Ababa to outlying rural areas, Birbirso (2013) found the policy had come about due to external pressures from funding agencies, resulting in what he referred to as a form of technological determinism, in which local teachers only need to serve as the “gatekeepers of the screen teacher” (p. 196). According to Birbirso’s (2013) argument, this remote education policy represented the type of failure that comes from (over)technologizing education, replacing local classroom teachers’ expertise with pre-recorded broadcasted lessons that need only be “facilitated” on the ground locally.

Another portion of the literature that utilizes critical discourse analysis to examine the relationship between international aid organizations and policy in developing countries is focused on higher education policy, and comes to similar conclusions to the studies cited above. In terms of more theoretical contributions, Shajahan (2012) studied the role of four international organizations (UNESCO, the World Bank, the OECD, and the European Union) in globalizing higher education policy, arguing that these international organizations serve as “discursive forces” (p. 380) which shape the way policymakers think about learning, education policy, and education in general. Shajahan (2012) contended that these organizations have such force due to developing countries’ dependence on their technical and/or financial support.

A number of scholars made similar arguments with country-specific studies. For example, Baxter’s (2010) comparative textual analysis of the World Bank’s 2002 higher education policy and the 2008 higher education policy of the Rwandan Ministry of Education reveal that discourses based in human capital theory and a general market-oriented view towards the education sector which are prevalent in the World Bank documents are also interestingly replicated and reflected in Rwanda’s educational policies. Baxter also found that such discourses were present in the vision and mission statement of public institutions of higher education in Rwanda. Similarly, Julia Preece (2013) analyzed policies related to lifelong learning in Lesotho and Tanzania, arguing that international aid organizations’ neoliberal influence on both countries had been negative, marginalizing the discourses of indigenous African worldviews. Koch and Weingart (2016) argued that the silencing of alternative discourses perpetuated long-standing inequalities, with government policy agendas being “hijacked” (p. 179) by foreign experts from international organizations when aid dependency in developing countries is high. Koch
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and Weingart (2016) concluded that “the prevailing sentiment of being at the mercy of donors has paralysed leadership and administration which fails to set or refrains from articulating an agenda of its own” (p. 208).

Critique of international organizations’ development policies has also come from feminist perspectives (see Roberts, 2015). Notably, Monkman and Hoffman (2013) used feminist critical discourse analysis to analyze three hundred policy documents published by 14 organizations between 1995 and 2008. They found that across these documents, education policy was effectively narrowed in three different ways: first, the logic of the arguments is left unexplained; second, policies are not grounded by theories; and third, superficial accountability notions are used (such as comparative headcounts of male and female students). Notably, many documents they analyzed revealed the policy agenda of girls’ education focused on improving their "performance in traditional female roles" (p. 79), a move that paradoxically perpetuates the very gender disparities that international organizations claim to challenge.

Overall, the existing literature has shown that policy documents created by international funding organizations, such as (in our case) DfID, are a rich data source to be mined using critical discourse analysis, as the language used in such documents reveals a great deal about the motivating ideologies and political priorities of the people in these organizations. Furthermore, this review of the literature has shown why this type of analysis is urgently needed, as these prior studies have revealed the extent to which these policy documents have influenced national policies in aid-receiving countries. In the following sections, we will build upon this literature with our study of the implicit ideologies and political priorities revealed in DfID’s policy literature.

Methods

Our primary means of data analysis in this study is critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1995, 2001). The primary use of critical discourse analysis is to unpack the implicit meanings and assumptions inherent in texts, and by so doing reveal the larger ideologies and social structures that inform those texts (Fairclough, 1995, 2001). More specifically, we operationalize critical discourse analysis as the act of taking a piece of writing or a speech act (in other words, a form of discourse) and trying to understand not only the explicit, surface-level meaning of what is being written or said, but also trying to identify and understand any underlying messages that are being communicated to the listening or reading audience.

In this article, the pieces of writing in question are the four primary policy position documents created within DfID from the period between 2010 and 2018. We have included these documents because they represent the clearest distillation of DfID’s position on the current global state of education, as each of the four documents were prepared as position documents which represented the UK governmental position on international education policy at the time of preparation (namely, in 2010, 2013, 2015, and 2018). The first document chronologically (2010) was produced through the UK National Audit Office by DfID officers, and the following three (2013, 2015 and 2018) were produced internally within DfID.
In this article, we are particularly interested in the implicit meanings communicated within DfID’s educational policy documents regarding the role of the state in providing education, and the efficacy of state versus non-state actors in providing an education of high quality. In the following section, we explore our findings from that analysis in greater depth.

Findings
In our analysis of the DfID policy documents identified above, we found that all four documents followed a common narrative: namely, they began by creating a sense of urgency around the need for global educational reform, followed by arguments that such reform was urgently needed due to the incompetence of current public educational systems, ending with a focus on how educational policy should focus more on the intended recipients of reformed systems (namely, the poor and the marginalized) rather than the means of delivery of those systems (i.e. private versus public). Each of these narrative steps will be explored in turn. As the reader will see, this rhetoric becomes more and more explicit as these documents progress chronologically, with the 2018 document containing the most explicit examples. As a result, the reader will also see more examples cited from the 2018 document than from its predecessors.

Creating a Sense of Urgency
DfID’s education policy documents assert that there is a learning crisis in developing countries. This assertion is supported by using shocking figures: for example, “Over 90 percent of primary-age children in low-income countries and 75 percent of children in lower-middle income countries—more than 330 million children—are not expected to read or do basic maths by the end of primary school” (DfID, 2018, p. 3). In the 2018 DfID policy statement, it is argued then that developing countries’ curricular priority should be basic literacy and numeracy. For example:

> Education systems in many developing and conflict-affected countries do not incentivise progress on basic literacy and numeracy….DFID’s response will focus on tackling the learning crisis at its root by supporting children to learn the basics of literacy and numeracy (DfID, 2018, p. 3).

DFID’s mandate to end extreme poverty means that our main objective will be ensuring children learn the basics of literacy and numeracy…tackling the learning crisis at its root. (DfID, 2018, p. 9)

Although it is true that basic literacy and numeracy are important foundational skills for education, and the statistics that precede these policy statements do display there is a lot of work to reach these goals, it is notable that urgency is given to these positions when they have effectively been the subject of global, multilateral efforts for decades, first through the Millennium Development Goals (James, 2006) and later the Sustainable Development Goals (Nazar et al., 2018). This reflects a long-standing trend in developed country policy in both domestic and international affairs (see, for example, the way the Reagan administration utilized the report *A Nation At Risk*), in which rhetoric implying urgency is used to promote the government’s policy agenda (McIntush, 2000).
Framing Public Education Systems as Incompetent
Across all four DFID policy documents we analyzed, public education systems in developing countries are portrayed across the board as being incompetent. More specifically, they are often described as not providing marginalized children and girls with access to education. These comments are common enough across all four documents that we organized them in Table 1 below. As can be seen, this rhetoric grows in degree chronologically across the four reports, with the 2018 report containing the largest and most explicit number of examples.

Table 1. Framings of Public Systems as Incompetent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Document</th>
<th>Pertinent Quotes</th>
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| *Bilateral Support to Public Education* (2010) | Data on costs and progress in countries is generally weak and incomplete (p. 5).  
[Enrollment] is not a sufficient measure of access to education because pupil dropout in developing countries is high, and the amount of education delivered and received is low (p. 6).  
Pupil attainment has been poorly measured…. High enrollment increases the proportion of children from uneducated families, increasing the difficulty of improved attainment (p. 6).  
On teacher performance, we found growing awareness of problems but as yet little success in securing improvement (p. 7).  
School inspection arrangements exist in each country we visited, but are not fully functional or resourced (p. 7).  
… available evidence indicates that aided education systems remain inefficient, consuming scarce existing financial and human resources (p. 9).  
Student completion and attainment, however, remain low (p. 18).  
Gender parity remains a major challenge in countries where culture and religion influence girls’ enrollment and retention (p. 18).  
Countries find it difficult to enrol the last 5 to 10 per cent of children, comprising 2.6 the most excluded and poorest, often found in rural areas (p. 19).  
Course completion is off-track to achieve the Millennium Goal, reflecting high numbers of children who enrol but subsequently drop out of school (p. 19).  
…available data show low standards and little or no progress (p. 21).  
DFID education teams acknowledge that low attainment may also indicate poor quality education and teaching in large classes (p. 23). |
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| Improving Learning, Expanding Opportunities (2013) | Teachers are not delivering the volumes of teaching required (p. 27).  
...clearly more needs to be done, and done differently, to ensure all girls and boys can access a quality education and learn (p. 3).  
Rural girls from the poorest families are locked out of education in 10 countries, and at least half of poor, rural girls have never been to school (p. 6).  
DfID's bilateral programme is well aligned to fragile states and countries furthest from meeting the education MDGs (p. 7).  
In some fragile and conflict-affected states, where it may be more difficult to work through government... (p. 11).  
DfID works with the private sector in situations where the public sector is not sufficiently present (the slums of Nairobi for example) or where state provision is so weak that the private sector has stepped in to fill the gap (p. 13). |
| Government Policy: Education in Developing Countries (2015) | More than 57 million children around the world do not go to primary school. At least 250 million children cannot read or count, even if they have spent four years in school (p. 3).  
Every child should have the chance to go to school. But it’s not just about getting them into the classroom. It’s also about making sure they are well taught and that what they learn actually improves their opportunities in life (p. 3).  
[By 2015, we will] spend half of our direct education aid on unstable or war-torn countries where more than two-fifths of the world’s out-of-school children are found, and where a lack of education can directly contribute to conflict (p. 3).  
...large proportions of children in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia [are] still not making it into the classroom (p. 3).  
... evidence shows girls are disproportionately excluded from education and that educating girls helps lift whole communities out of poverty (p. 4).  
The Girls’ Education Challenge (GEC) will help up to a million of the world’s poorest girls have an opportunity to improve their lives through education (p. 4). |
| Get Children Learning (2018)               | Business as usual will not achieve the transformative change that is needed (p. 1).  
Yet many teachers lack the knowledge and skills to do their jobs well. Too often, they are absent from the classroom, meaning that precious resources go to waste and the potential of their students is unfulfilled (p. 1).  
We will support national leaders ready to take a fresh look at how their workforces are recruited, trained and motivated, so that they can make the bold changes that are needed (p. 1). |
we will support ambitious reform to make education systems—across public and non-state sectors—more accountable, effective and inclusive of poor and marginalised children (p. 1). I know that many of the challenges which hold back progress on learning are highly entrenched in education systems and that achieving change will be difficult (p. 2).

Education systems in developing countries have expanded schooling at an impressive rate in recent decades, but there is now an urgent need to drive up quality and learning (p. 3). This is a tragic waste of human potential, holds back development and poses risks to stability. It is also an enormous waste of public resources... (p. 3).

Education systems in many developing and conflict-affected countries do not incentivise progress on basic literacy and numeracy (p. 3).

We call on all countries facing a shortfall here to take urgent action, ensuring that poor and marginalised children—who face the greatest challenges—are not left behind (p. 3).

Yet education systems in developing and conflict-affected countries are not consistently delivering quality education, leading to a learning crisis (p. 5).

Learning levels are low (p. 5).

There are huge inequalities in learning....There is often little support once children fall behind (p. 5).

Barrier to access persist (p. 5).

Vulnerable education systems will come under enormous strain to boost quality while accommodating growing numbers of students (p. 7).

Waste is high....unproductive spending...can lead to further waste higher up the system (p. 7).

We call on all countries where children are not learning these foundation and transferable skills to take urgent action (p. 9).

Teachers lack the basic knowledge they need to do their jobs (p. 14).

Teachers also lack good teaching skills (p. 14).

There are too few teachers (p. 14).

Teachers are not present where they are needed most (p. 14).

Teacher training is critical to ensuring teachers teach well, particularly in countries with weak education systems where many candidates start with a deficit in foundation skills. However, much teacher training in developing and conflict-affected countries remains ineffective (p. 16).
Many education systems remain focused on getting more children into school, rather than improving quality and learning (p. 19). System incentives to ensure poor and marginalized children are learning the basics are weak (p. 19). Many education systems lack coherence (p. 19). We will help national decision-makers to establish a clear picture of how their education system is working through good diagnosis. We will also support more effective spending, through cutting waste (p. 20).

In most developing countries, overall levels of learning are low, but poor and marginalised children usually learn the least (p. 23).

In most developing and conflict-affected countries, there is an enormous gap between policy and delivery on supporting children with disabilities and little evidence on successful interventions which can be delivered affordably at scale (p. 26).

The reader may note that in these quotes, nearly all areas of the public education sector are seen as lacking—student enrollment, student attainment, student content mastery, teaching students with disabilities, gender parity, education in fragile contexts, teacher training, and teacher retention. Some quotes, particularly from the 2018 document, implicate entire public school systems, stating that they “lack coherence” (DfID, 2018, p. 19), are “not consistently delivering quality education” (DfID, 2018, p. 5) and are not sufficiently “accountable, effective and inclusive” (DfID, 2018, p. 1) for their “unproductive spending” (DfID, 2018, p. 7).

Across the board, unlike previous DfID documents, DfID (2018) used particularly strong language to describe developing country education systems:

“precious resources go to waste” (p. 1)
“tragic waste…risks to stability…enormous waste” (p. 3)
“vulnerable education system” (p. 3)
“stagnant public sector” (p. 4)
“learning crisis” (p. 5)
“Waste is high…unproductive spending” (p. 7)
“fundamental challenge” (p. 13)
“products of a failing system…caught in a vicious cycle” (p. 14)
“outdated models of teacher training” (p. 16)

This change to the use of very negative language seems to reflect a shift in DfID’s organizational orientation towards public education systems in developing countries, moving from labeling them as from being “weak” (DfID, 2010, p. 5) to being emblems of government “waste” (DfID, 2018, p. 1, 3, 7). In the following section, we will explore rhetoric that may help to explain this shift, as we argue that DfID’s policy language (as
well as their material forms of policy support) overall has shifted over time to prioritize non-state over state actors.

**Justifying the Policy Shift**

Particularly in their 2018 document, DfID’s language choices in how they describe the work of state and non-state educational institutions make their policy preferences very clear. For example, compare how state public educational institutions are described in the following quote:

> System incentives to ensure poor and marginalised children are learning the basics are weak…. To deliver on quality and learning, these incentives will need to change (DfID, 2018, p. 19).

This language corresponds with the descriptions we have explored above. In this section, we want to extend that argument by comparing this consistent negative description of state public educational institutions with the following descriptions of non-state or private schools and public-private partnerships (DfID, 2018):

> ... public-private partnerships which improve access to education for poor and marginalised children (p. 21).
> Through a voucher scheme, new schools programme and subsidies to existing low fee private schools, over 2.5 million students are accessing free of charge primary and secondary schools (p. 21).
> Non-state providers, including low-cost private schools, play an important—and growing—role in delivering education in low- and middle-income countries…. Many pupils attending private schools come from low-income families (p. 22).
> It is essential that where DfID supports non-state providers and public private partnerships, they work for poor and marginalised children (p. 22).
> ...private sector partnerships to support more children with disabilities in special and mainstream schools (p. 26).

Compare these positive descriptions of private initiatives to the previous descriptions of public state ones—private education is described as improving access for the poor and vulnerable, while state initiatives are labeled as forms of waste and failure. Such descriptions have clear implications: not only is private education implied to be more effective, but the more socially just option over public education. A contrast is subtly made between the public education systems as being pro-rich (as the rich benefit from “government waste”) and private education (which is ironically structured for-profit) as being pro-poor. It is implied that public education systems do not reach marginalized and poor children, and low-cost private schools fill this gap. The way these documents frame this contrast is used to justify DfID’s policy shift from primarily supporting public education systems to diverting supports to private entities and public-private partnerships, a trend which corresponds to the same time period represented by these documents (2010-2018).
Discussion and Conclusion
In its funding, DfID is increasingly diverting more development aid from public education systems in developing countries to non-state entities. As we have shown in our findings here, we argue that to justify this aid policy shift, DfID documents use negative language which portrays public education systems in developing countries in its policy documents as inefficient, failing manifestations of government waste. In so doing, the authors of these reports create a sense of urgency for reform, and then portray non-state education actors (including low-cost private schools) as the solution to this crisis. Private initiatives and public-private partnerships are described as serving the disadvantaged groups left unattended by current public systems.

Through this kind of writing, the authors of these reports provide ideological justification for DfID’s increasing support of non-state education aid. As we have noted previously, this kind of rhetoric becomes more explicit and common in these reports as the reports progress chronologically, with the 2018 report containing the largest number of examples. Over this same time frame, DfID’s investment in non-state education providers has increased. We do not see this correlation as occurring by coincidence.

Interestingly, DfID has funded reviews of research on private education (Ashley et al., 2014) whose findings do not support their unambiguously pro-private policy stance. Specifically, Ashley et al. (2014) found that the evidence on the relative effectiveness of private DfID-funded educational initiatives is inconclusive and varied, as we explored at length earlier in the literature review.

DfID has already faced criticism for its pro-private education policy stance in developing countries. An alternative report presented to the UN’s Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) submitted by 18 non-government organizations argued that policies prioritizing private education have a negative impact on the right to education in developing countries and may create social stratification in those countries, as not all children have access to non-state institutions (Right to Education, 2015). Referring to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the report asserts that the UK “could be violating its extra-territorial obligations” in the policy stances taken by DfID (Right to Education, 2015, p. 3). Through the arguments we make in this article, we agree with the Right to Education (2015) coalition that the unquestioned pro-private policy stance represented by DfID’s policy documents merits further questioning, particularly in the face of compelling evidence to the contrary (Ahsley et al., 2014).

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1 In July 2020, DFID was merged with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to become the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO).

2 The UK’s ODA saw an overall upward trend from 1999—when it was about US$ 4.05 billion—to 13.4 billion in 2016 if inflation is adjusted at the 2016 price (DFID, 2017; Full Fact, 2018). In terms of ODA as a proportion of Gross National Income (GNI), the UK met the United Nation’s target set in 1970 for all developed countries (0.7% of GNI) by 2013 and has maintained it at 0.7%, a significant increase from 0.36% in 1970 (DFID, 2017; Donor Tracker, n.d.; Full Fact, 2018). The UK stood in fifth place after Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark among the DCAs in terms of the ODA to GNI ratio in 2019 (FCDO, 2020).
Suggestions for Critical Awareness, Accountability, and Transformation in Human Rights Education

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Human Rights Education exists as an implementing entity of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Scholars such as Andre Keet and others have criticized the dissemination of universal rights through education because it covets Western ideology over local ethical and epistemological constructs. Using Tibbitts’ revised typologies of Human Rights Education, this paper offers suggestions for critical pedagogy for the teaching of, for, and through Human Rights. These suggestions are drawn from examples of critical practice from throughout the world.

Introduction
Human Rights Education (HRE) is a powerful, if nascent, institution that is spreading throughout the world as a crucial piece of the Human Rights framework (Russell & Suárez, 2017). This rapid dissemination across education requires that practitioners and researchers critically evaluate the purpose, pedagogy, and power that creates HRE. Curriculum is often guided by the legal standards of the state that is implementing education, this formulates the basis of many national curricula. HRE differs from other curricula in that it is set by law to instruct people on the multinational parameters from which other laws should stem. Entrenched in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), HRE propels itself and the document it derives from as a normalizing function. The teaching of human rights is a legal mandate that ensures compliance with the standards outlined by international law.

The legal presuppositions of the UDHR offer the risk that its prescriptions are not suitable for every context. Indeed, it is arguable that the UDHR is a tool for Western political and (especially through HRE) epistemic hegemony (Keet, 2014). Thus, HRE may purport learner-agency through the dissemination of the Rights enshrined by law, while actually enhancing the control of Western ideologies over local beliefs (Keet, 2014). The risk for HRE to promote hegemony has sparked an interest in disruptive and critical HRE pedagogies that seek to redress power structures through activism and teaching.

A critical evaluation of HRE may begin by analyzing why HRE is taught. Tibbitts and Fernekes (2011) point out that HRE is specifically to promote the UDHR. The uniqueness of HRE is that it does not find its origins the nation-state. The ideology that UDHR represents is not exclusive to one place, but sprawling method for asserting what Keet (2015) recognizes as very specific interests. Those interest are spelled out in the UDHR (1948) which states: “every individual and every organ of society (…) shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and the freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance” (page). This preamble clearly articulates that signatories to the Declaration are charged with education for the sake of the legal rights that are so enshrined. The UDHR (1948) admits that there is a need to teach
about Human Rights making it a demand for a specific curricular focus. It seems assumed that the protection of the rights as enumerated rests on the ability of people to know what they are and to know that they can want to demand them. These interests have very real mechanisms that use HRE to promote the UDHR. While schooling is often a tool wielded through power to assert commonalities across the nation state, the UDHR had many levers through which HRE flow. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Amnesty International, the Organization or Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and others, have all committed themselves to HRE (OSCE/ODHIR, 2012). The diversity of these speak to Keet’s (2015) recognition that Human Rights intertwine power, legal authority, and knowledge through many different bodies.

In the purpose of HRE lies the problem. If the concept that is Human Rights is indeed universal, then why do people need to be educated on it? It is hard to argue that the UDHR finds it itself in a singularly agreed-upon moral compass. At the time of the creation of the UDHR, the American Anthropological Association wrote it was a “statement of rights conceived only in terms of the values prevalent in Western Europe and America” (American Anthropological Association as cited by Nickel, 2019). An original draft for the Arab Charter on Human Rights was first published in 1994, and later adopted by member states in 2004, out of a desire for a framework more rooted in Islam that is incompatible with the UDHR. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights was brought to bear in the 1980s. This Charter’s emphasis on “peoples” in the plural form is a sharp difference with the UDHR. The UN’s own website remarks on the reservation that delegates from China had when discussing the idea of universal and individual rights (United Nations, 2021). Since the UDHR there have been additional documents required to extend rights to people who have not been afforded them. The specific rights and protections necessary for disabled people, Indigenous communities, and children were not initially included in the Universal Declaration. Not all other modifications have been welcomed. During the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna several states moved for a more culturally relevant UDHR which was met with a statement reinforcing the supremacy of the original document. The consensus that the UDHR portends is not truly universal. Instead, Human Rights was set forth as something that the World as a political body is meant to gather around in legal and philosophical consensus. The universality lies only in the accord between nations and between a nation and the document. For there to be human rights, they needed to be written, agreed upon, and adopted. The need for declarative consensus-driven statements on Human Rights make it impossible for them to be truly a priori.

This paper begins by recognizing that since Human Rights are not a priori they cannot really be universal. Human Rights are just as much a construct as gender binaries and state borders. Tibbitts’ (2017) analysis for different HRE modalities provide a structure by which the critiques of Keet (2017) and others can be furnished in critical educational contexts. Along with Tibbitts’ modalities this paper also uses Bloom’s taxonomy to leverage commonplace pedagogical training to extend access to practitioners seeking to implement Critical Human Rights Education (CHRE). This paper offers some ideas for how HRE can deconstruct Universal Human Rights while still promoting human dignity and outlines the potential for best practices across various contexts.
Literature Review
Tibbitts (2017) suggests three typologies of Human Rights Education that practitioners implement in the field. These typologies are the typical practices for instructing about, through, and for human rights. They can also be useful for articulating how HRE may or may not be critical. Tibbitts first suggests an Awareness Model that usually presents Human Rights in formal education as a content centered mode sponsored by governments. This type usually targets schools and the students in these schools, seeking to provide direct instruction about what Human Rights are, and towards the history of the UDHR (Tibbitts, 2017). The second model in Tibbitts’ typology is the Accountability or Professional model. Usually offered by both governments and civil society actors and aimed at developing the skills of professionals to ensure the protection of Human Rights within their fields. A typical, but not exclusive example, is the idea of training law enforcement in the protections afforded to all people under the UDHR. Many other professions such as teachers, doctors, and civil servants - amongst others - all demonstrate the ability to increase their application of Human Rights with such training (Tibbitts, 2017, p. 87). The final model presented is the Transformation Model; this model is aligned with Freirean Critical Praxis and aims to empower learners to recreate social change that is more aligned with the legal prescriptions of the UDHR (Tibbitts, 2017, p. 91).

Each of these typologies is a method for instructing learners on some aspect of the UDHR. Theses typologies indicate how HRE is more than just the teaching of the meaning, parameters, and potential for the UDHR. This is especially true of the Awareness Model which is typically situated in formal educational settings (Tibbitts, 2017). The Awareness Model teaches about Human Rights and seeks to disseminate information about the UDHR. Keet (2014) argues that Human Rights act as a tool to replace local notions of right and wrong with globally dominant ones; proposing that “if hegemony is taken to mean the manufacturing of consent, which is constructed around floating signifiers, human rights discourse can then certainly be regarded as hegemonic” (Keet, 2014, p. 48). HRE, along with any education that is intended to disseminate and promote attention to a particular cannon, would share in the interests of the same bodies from which that cannon derives. Simply put, if the national curriculum tends to promote the affairs of the nation and is implemented by national actors; than international curriculum would promote and be enabled by interests of powerful inter- and multinational actors. The hegemony that HRE proposes is not bound by any kind of border nor even ideology. Both Capitalist and Communist nations alike are signatories to the UDHR. This adulation of the UDHR as a global force for good sets it as a virtue that bears political capital that HRE constructs through its curricular presentation as an unquestionable fund of knowledge (Keet, 2014).

The Accountability Model as posited by Tibbitts can be used loosely to teach through Human Rights because the Accountability Model is usually intended for professionals that are obligated to secure individuals’ rights, (Tibbitts, 2017). Thus, this model might be seen as teaching through Human Rights because it defines how learners are intended to meet their professional obligations and serve their clients. Keet and Zembylas (2011) both emphasizes how human rights can reconstruct harmful power relations and agree on the need for new models (Zembylas, 2011). This interpretation is usefully juxtaposed against with the Accountability Model because this model localizes Human Rights as a significant professional standard. As Zembylas (2017b) points out this kind of standard
rarifies how Human Rights embodies and fulfills a Western framework to act as a colonizing mechanism. In the author’s words, “(t)he human rights regime is embedded within a specific cultural and historical framework involving the foregrounding of Western colonial knowledges” (Zembylas, 2017b, p. 488). Human rights are an entity that self-promotes Western ideology through setting standards such as those for professionals. In part, the argument against the UDHR as a global standard is in the hegemony of centralizing decisions over right and wrong, but Zembylas (2017a) also offers several logical arguments against globalizing HRE as a set of standards. First, that the colonial knowledges were often responsible for harm being caused in the first place and are thus not fit to be the standard bearer for good (Zembylas, 2017a). Moreover, Zembylas (2017a) argues that concepts of human dignity are entirely contrived from the individual and social fabric of peoples, not in axiomatic statements. A singular professional or ethical standard is simply not enough for the world over because we all describe the world in different realities. In structuring a decolonial HRE, Zembylas (2017) inserts several dimensions drawn from the seminal work of Tuck and Wang (2012). Zembylas describes that decolonial HRE must be critical of the current historical, political, and material situation of learners, it must implement tangible decolonial processes, and center the human rights ethic on individual and collective emotions (Zembylas, 2017b). Additionally, a decolonial HRE would also make note of the particular social relations in a context (Zembylas, 2017b).

Tibbitts final model is the Transformation or Activism Model, the latter name was added later to better specify what this type intends (Tibbitts, 2017). This model teaches for Human Rights because it seeks to transform society using the UDHR as a standard for justice (Tibbitts, 2017). The Transformation Model is arguably the most critical as Tibbitts (2017) aligns it with Freirean Praxis. Nonetheless, in using Human Rights discourse as the standard for transformation the aforementioned power structures are re-implemented. Ahmed (2017) argues that HRE does not have to reproduce hegemony and that transformation can occur outside of legal parameters. Defining a disruptive HRE that does not fit into previous categories, Ahmed (2017) argues that HRE can be used to systematically transform power relations though this must often be done outside of legal norms. In this view transformation may not be reliant on the standards of the UDHR. Bajaj (2008) highlights some notions of critical peace education where “the transformation of educational content, structure, and pedagogy is to address direct and structural forms of violence at all levels” (p. 135). Structural violence is physical as well as epistemic and symbolic harm that can be implemented by oppressive curriculum. Because formal education settings are typically the province of the state and elite actors, Bajaj (2008) argues that peace education should likely happen outside of school. Likewise, CHRE would also benefit from separation from formal structures embedded with power, or at least within formal settings that provide space for the open critique of power. Critical peace education shares some similarities with Ahmed’s (2017) Chilean example, discussed above, in that it is entirely participatory. Both examples also require some measure of learning to happen outside or even against power structures.
Repositioning HRE

Tibbitts’ (2017) typologies are a useful lens by which to consider reforming HRE. Since these typologies are drawn from the field, they outline the typical modes by which HRE is currently happening. Instead of attempting to rebuild HRE from the ground up, it is possible to use Tibbitts’ (2017) typologies as an inroad into critique and critical praxis. Additionally, these models are simultaneously congruent with Bloom’s (1956) taxonomy which helps to make them more approachable for educators. Awareness is structured at the bottom of Bloom’s (1956) taxonomy, the most basic form of learning: remembering and understanding, specifically for the UDHR. Accountability exists in the middle phases: apply and analyze, used in HRE to specify how the Human Rights are applicable to specific situations such as careers. The final stages are to evaluate and to create, which share similarities with the traditional Transformation model wherein learners are empowered to critique and re-create their specific contexts to better implement Human Rights. These typologies provide a possible blueprint for theorizing and implementing CHRE. Using these typologies to teach about, through, and for Human Rights may be amended for criticality into: 1) impart an understanding of the current political, economic, social, and historic reality of learners’ context, 2) enfranchise learners to hold state structures and power-holders accountable to the Human Rights model so as to ensure a minimal legal framework to exist peacefully and analyze current power structures, and 3) enable learners to transform societies they live in from the current human rights model to a locally constructed model. Below are possible methods for these renewed objectives

The Awareness Model

The first learner objective could be situated within the Awareness Model. Traditionally this model is used to teach about human rights as legality and theory often in a formal setting that relies solely in the UDHR as the bulwark of the curriculum. This typology might include utilizing curriculum from UNESCO or UNICEF that operate within the HRE guidelines proposed by the United Nations. Other international NGOs and scholars have also proffered an array of curricula aimed at teaching about the UDHR and human rights theory. This is largely not critical because the traditional Awareness Model reinforces the prominence of the UDHR by making it the purpose of a learning unit. Treatment of Human Rights through curriculum presents it as an immutable truth that is being handed to students for them to remember. Keet (2014) argues that to be critical HRE must not make declarative statements about what is or is not a right. When integrating Human Rights into standardized curriculum it becomes such a statement. Treating the UDHR as canonical reifies it as an iconoclast standard that must be adhered (Keet, 2014), akin to math or science.

Gibson and Grant (2017) offer Brayboy (2011)'s concept of genesis amnesia as an entryway into critical instruction. Genesis amnesia describes the presentation of opinion through curricula by the powerful as to present those opinions as fact (Solyom & Brayboy, 2011). Oftentimes, students may suggest that the world simply “is the way it is,” without having the tools to recognize that contexts do not exist in a vacuum. Gibson and Grant (2017) point out that the language of HRE can be intentionally used alongside history to promote justice. As Gibson and Grant (2017) suggest, “one of our primary challenges as social justice and human rights educators is to get our students to see the water in which they swim” (p. 225). Here, learners are meant to learn the history of their oppression and how it circumscribes the present. Historicizing HRE –
or infusing the curriculum with the historical conditions that have led up to the present – unmoors learners’ material conditions away from determined truth and repackages them as situational realities. This kind of criticality is nested within the application of knowledge. Instead of teaching history in an abstract way, linking history to the lived experiences of the learners connects them with the past. These links are important learning tools that integrate lessons into our individual schema.

Some examples emerge as critical methods for the Awareness Model. The Zinn Education Project (2019) is a collaborative effort between two NGOs rooted in the work of the Historian Howard Zinn who authored the alternative “Peoples’ History of the United States.” The Zinn Project (2019) seeks to engage students in “the empowering potential of studying U.S. history [that] is often lost in a textbook-driven trivial pursuit of names and dates. People’s history materials and pedagogy emphasize the role of working people, women, people of color, and organized social movements in shaping history”. Teaching Tolerance (TT) is a project of the Southern Poverty Law Clinic in the United States. TT crowd sources materials from journalists, authors, and educators aimed at “social justice and anti-bias. The anti-bias approach encourages children and young people to challenge prejudice and learn how to be agents of change in their own lives”, which is done through four area standards of social justice (Teaching Tolerance, 2019). Facing History is another example which utilizes alternative modes for history instruction to present critical pedagogy in the classroom (Facing History, 2019). Their model relates history to students’ lives to promote diversity and teach towards “about racism, antisemitism and prejudice” (Facing History, 2019). Each of these examples come from the United States (US) and are grounded in promoting democratic citizenship specific to the US context.

Curriculum sets are not the only means by which to approach critical instruction around history, social conditions, and rights. A school in the United States also provides an example of utilizing critical pedagogy to raise awareness of oppression. El Puente academy uses a critical curriculum that merges traditionally disparate disciplines to link historic constructs to modern consequences (De Jesus, 2003). Their ideology is based on the principle of Sankofa (De Jesus, 2003), an Akan tribe word that loosely translates into a study of history as to not lose the past (Berea College, 2019). Students at El Puente did not learn historical facts in a vacuum. Project Based Learned (PBL) incorporates facets of the local community into the classroom such as trip to local factories that are now abandoned alongside studies of economic policies that were implemented and led to the decline of manufacturing in the region. Student concepts self-drove some of the inquiry. One student reported learning the difference between being Hispanic versus Latino; and how it was empowering to understand their cultural community better (De Jesus, 2003). These are also relevant historical and political distinctions that complicate oppression and class distinctions in concert with racial constructs. Consequently, Students reported learning about more than just history, but also about their own identities (De Jesus, 2003). These examples are not universally applicable, though they are still samples of critical pedagogy specifically centered around teaching students about the history of oppression. Each of these bring to the center the voices of oppressed communities while providing space for students and teachers.
The Accountability Model
The Accountability Model typically consists of older professionals and learners holding trainings that are sponsored by civil society or governments (or both) to leverage their professional duties in upholding human rights (Tibbitts, 2017). Tibbitts does not explicitly deny students and classrooms this model but observes that it is more commonly found among adult professionals. Already the Accountability Model offers some vision of criticality. CHRE might even evolve the Accountability Model by folding the other traditional typologies into it and expanding the model to young learners. A Critical Accountability Model could bring awareness of the entitlements promised by the UDHR while empowering learners to hold power structures to those standards. The accountability is shifted from the learners’ self-accountability. In this Accountability Model the UDHR is utilized specifically for the protection of the learner. This model still recognizes that the UDHR (and perhaps other rights models stated within the local context) may be a problematic standard, but a nonetheless useful one. This model is situated at the intermediate levels of Bloom’s (1956) taxonomy: analyze and apply. The legal tenants of the UDHR are analyzed against the learner’s context and applied for their fulfilment.

Tibbitts (2015) argues that HRE can have significant influence over the lives of adult learners and Critical Accountability can leverage this influence. In studying HRE trainers in Turkey, Tibbitts (2015) notes that women were able to teach their children about the oppressive nature of certain gender roles. The same participants were also more likely to engage in the Women’s movement in Turkey (Tibbitts, 2015). Learners were able to use the standards learned as part of their work to better their entire lives including their interpersonal relations with men and boys. The power structures that existed at all different levels of society were challenged by learners who had the agency to do the challenging. This example demonstrates how the Critical Accountability Model can actively support learners in oppressive contexts by giving them knowledge of the existing legal framework that can afford specific protections. However, this example also limits the Accountability model to adults that are likely already interested in Human Rights Work. Critical accountability is not limited to Human Rights workers or adjacent professionals. All people, including young learners, should be given the tools to hold power accountability in many situations.

Extending the Accountability Model to youth would entail participatory methods that promoted their abilities to question authority. The Freedom Schools of the Southern United States are one method for enhancing student autonomy and activism. During the 1968 Summer of Freedom, Black activists formulated a plan to provide genuine learning opportunities for members of their communities during the summer months when formal school was not in session. Activities worked together with educators to plan, develop, and implement curriculum that taught general academics, focused on civics, and intentionally taught equality (Perlstein, 1990). These schools trained young learners to be activists by guiding them through anti-racist work such as canvassing, protesting segregation, and singing freedom songs (Hale, 2011). The Freedom School model carries on in the United States today. One community freedom school in Washington, DC notes in their mission a specifically dual focus on academic excellence and community service through the same philosophy of nonviolence that the Civil Rights Movement was founded on (EW Stokes PCS, n.d.). The Children’s Defense Fund also utilizes the Freedom School summer model for remedial education (Jackson
& Howard, 2014). These continue to be sites for Black student liberation in a country where segregation and disparity are still commonplace. In the Children’s Defense Model educators are servant/leaders. The camps’ teachers utilize a pedagogy that empower learners to be active participants in the entire camp experience (Howard, 2016). The curriculum continues to center Civil Rights which has produced among students an increased desire to engage in their community, in civil society, and to have greater interest in their academics (Howard, 2016).

Both the Freedom Schools as well as the HRE trainers in Turkey are examples of how educational settings can be used to hold power structures accountable. They also relate Ahmed’s (2017) uses the Chilean Student Movement of 2017 to indicate how educative experiences grounded in rights can disrupt power structures. Ahmed’s example is certainly educative, but less grounded in the UDHR – students were protesting initially against increased transit costs. Though outside the legal concept of the UDHR increased fares that would have made attending school difficult decreased Chilean students’ access to their right to and education. Similarly, the above examples may not seek to educate towards the UDHR specifically, but they do note how the educating towards rights and equality can secure Human Rights if there are also demands made of authority. These examples discuss how a human rights model can be used to help learners become agents of accountability. Freedom Schools were a demonstration of the right to an education. They also encouraged students to be activist for their other US civil rights many of which are comparable to the UDHR. Educating trainers and learners in their rights enabled them to hold their families, societies, and more accountable.

The Transformation Model
The Transformation Model could be considered linked to social justice as critical pedagogy is integral to this model’s stated outcome which is activism. Typically, learners work alongside instructors to critique power structures to advocate for justice. In some ways the traditional Transformation model is like the Critical Accountability model. The servant leadership/educator role of the Freedom Schools is usual in the Transformation Model. Learners and educators are voluntary participants that are engaged in Human Rights work that challenges the status quo. In some ways the Transformation Model is the enactment of the call for Human Rights to be globalized through the various facets of society (Tibbitts, 2017). Evidence from the field suggests that the intent of this model is to “incorporate a critical stance towards features of one’s own society, the nature of power/authority, and even the human rights system itself” (Tibbitts, 2017 p. 91). Here, it is suggested that the separate areas of critique are delineated across typologies. Critique of power structures and authority is reserved for the Critical Accountability Model where learners hold authority responsible. In the Critical Transformation Model, critique of the human rights system becomes the nexus of programming. In so doing the Transformation model links to the final stages of Bloom’s Taxonomy. Learners are encouraged to evaluate Human Rights for their local applicability. After, they are charged with creating – or reinvigorating - a localized system.

This Transformation Model diverges from its previous format in its rejection of the UDHR. Critical Transformation logically follows the Accountability Model which relies on the UDHR as a minimum standard. This evolution from accountability to
transformation is necessary because “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house. They may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about genuine change” (Lorde, 2007, p. 112). Lorde (2007) argues that a hegemonic foundation is not capable of truly challenging oppression. A different ethos is required to facilitate liberation. Even meeting the basic standards of the UDHR is likely improbable if they are strictly defined by one positionality. Stavenhagen (2008) notes how countries that have promised to meet the standards of the UDHR for all their citizens are often still unable to do so. In part, systems meant to enable rights are assimilative and not liberative. That is if the bedrock of the benefit [in Stavenhagen’s (2008) perspective this benefit is the right to education] is hegemonic then any attempts to grow that benefit will also be hegemonic. Many Indigenous students, for example, attend compulsory schools that technically afford them the Right to Education while actually disenfranchising them. As an alternative, Stavenhagen (2008) points to Canada where “the First Nations and the Inuit have the option of establishing their own education programmes and exercise control over primary and secondary schools, (p 127). In these environments what constitutes a right to education is challenged. These schools offer programming that respects Indigeneity, including multi-lingual instruction that opens the potential for competing epistemological views (Stavenhagen, 2008). They create environments where the normative right to an education is challenged with alternative systems. The right to education is no longer strictly defined as equal opportunity for success within the formal systems parameters.

New York City, United States, provides an example of critical transformation. New York City is one of the most diverse cities in the world and reflects the broader US migrant identity. In the US the Right to Education is often stylized as teacher-led schooling that embraces hierarchical features such as principals, policies, and a particular student/teacher relationship. In New York, this often means that minoritized, immigrant, and other students are subject to authorities that do not come from or represent their communities. Humanities Preparatory Academy (HPA) serves students that have failed in other schools and is largely Latinx population of students that are migrant or the descendants of migrants, as well as other students who in the US would be identified as people of color and are thus marginalized (Hantzopoulos, 2011). The academy has instituted a number of practices that create heterarchical systems for all community members. One physical implementation is the removal of the commonplace teacher workroom which is a space that permits teachers to separate themselves from students for privacy and work. This separation epitomizes the hierarchical relationship between teachers as representative of sanctioned knowledge and student as object that requires teaching. At HPA there is one space where both professionals and learners come together (Hantzopoulos, 2011). In the “hub” both learners and educators share space and resources to meet their common goal of working for the community (Hantzopoulos, 2011). These contrasts typical schooling in the United States which features hierarchy and curriculum implementation. Significantly, the space functions as the metaphoric heart of the institution. That is, the most radical space – where the hierarchy is leveled – is where all the community members must themselves work. The critical transformation model could leverage spaces like this. In such spaces, ideas are also able to be equalized alongside bodies.
Critical transformation implies creation, and that creativity needs space. These spaces need to be able to recognize alternative concepts of right, wrong, and reality. De Sousa Santos (2012) argues that the Pluriversity challenges dominant schemas with subaltern epistemologies. Pluriversities recognize that the sources of the UDHR are not in a moral position to teach the world because of their history of domination. One feature of the Pluriversity is the elevation of marginalized epistemologies with a focus on how they contrast and oppose dominant paradigms (Martinez-Vargas, 2020). The “plural” is quite literal. Viewpoints meet in conversation and do not seek to converge or aspire to acquiesce. In these settings Martinez-Vargas (2020) argues that participatory research is integral to maintain a plurality of positions. In participatory research the agenda is derived from the community. Instead of researcher and object, the members who engage research are also the studied. Localizing human rights is an analogous project. The creation of community standards for right and wrong need to be determined by the members of the community that those rules govern. The creation process is equally participatory in this concept. Beginning with the deconstruction of the UDHR by participants, the community can then move forward with analyzing the value of the UDHR’s tenants in their own context. Following evaluation, the community can create their own standards for the preservation of human dignity. This may require some convergence, but the many voices of the Pluriversity represent various communities who can independently create their concepts. The Pluriversity through its participatory nature offers space to legitimize questioning the Human Rights system much as Tibbitts indicated the traditional Transformation Model could.

Conclusion
The traditional teleology of Human Rights Education perpetuates a hegemonic brand that stems from a certain positionality’s concept of justice. The UDHR is grounded in Western ontology with little credence to the world at large. This paper has presented numerous critiques of the traditional Human Rights system as well as HRE. Using Tibbitts’ (2017) typologies this paper was able to identify possible methodological shifts within standing HRE practice. Bloom’s (1956) taxonomy is infused as a scaffold for educators trained in Western pedagogy to understand the typologies as shifting towards a vertical process of liberation. These suggestions are not definitive, nor do they seek to be prescriptive. Such intent would ultimately recreate the same ethos of certitude of one value statement over another. These examples highlight the possibility of a course correction. Human Rights educators, as with most teachers, center their work on the care for justice that the UDHR has always intended. Beginning with that cause, these educators can push the boundaries of HRE. Locating our work within the traditional and critical typologies is a place for educators to begin. From there, using the critiques above educators can evaluate their own programming for its liberative potential. Ultimately, the work of pushing HRE forward will only be partially done through theorizing. Educators and learners will bear the burden of challenging traditional HRE in their domains. This paper hoped to have offer some ways for those challenges to happen.

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Suggestions for Critical Awareness, Accountability, and Transformation in HRE

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Higher Education Finance Between Ghana and the United States

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Over the years, there has been a tremendous increase in enrollment in higher education as well as the cost of attendance. This article comparatively analyzes the higher education finance between the United States of America (U.S.A.) and Ghana, taking into consideration the goals of higher education, enrollment and expenditure, and the various sources of finance available to students in both countries. The source of education finance between both countries is examined through the lens of neoliberalism, which prioritizes capitalism, free trade, and market in public institutions, specifically higher education. While there are disparities in the financing of higher education in both countries, there is a similarity in the limited access to higher education and funding by students from low socioeconomic backgrounds.

Introduction
The escalating cost of higher education in recent years has been felt by many countries around the world and has attracted a lot of attention, with some studies attributing the high cost to inadequate public funding, growing pressure on public funding, and in some cases, economic recession (Acheampong, 2010; Klein, 2015; Liu, 2018; Tulip, 2007). According to the World Bank, higher education refers to all post-secondary education, including private and public universities, colleges, technical and vocational institutions. Also, higher education is seen as an instrument and key in providing solutions to intricate problems. It is also perceived as an economic engine that frees people from poverty by providing them with high-paying jobs (Morton, 2018). Higher education, which used to be a service for the elite, is now a service for the mass due to higher demand by all classes of people. In recent times, higher education has seen a massive expansion. For example, the worldwide Gross Tertiary Enrollment Ratio (GTER) increased to 32 % in 2012 compared to 10% in 1972 (Marginson, 2016). There are about 200 million students enrolled in higher education in the world compared to 89 million in 1998 (The World Bank, 2017). As enrollment increases in higher education, the cost of attendance also increases. The increase in enrollment and high cost of higher education is seen as a result of the increased emphases on knowledge-based economy and neoliberal practices, the former measuring how knowledge or information contribute to the economy and the latter prioritizing competition, free market, and government budget cut (St. George, 2006; Gyamera & Burke, 2018). Knowledge-based economy has been described as one of the “three powerful economic narratives” in the past 30 to 40 years and has influenced educational reforms in public discourse. (Sum, & Bob, 2013, p. 24). It has become more influential lately because it is championed by three world superstructures: The Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), the World Bank, and the European
Union (Sum, & Bob, 2013). Through knowledge-based economy, education is now considered an economic industry that is evaluated based on its contributions to the economy. Thus, educational services are increasingly being privatized, open to global competition, and managed by non-academic personnel. Although the emphasis on knowledge-based economy has contributed to increased enrollment in higher education, it has also positioned education in a neoliberal perspective accounting for the high cost of higher education. Besides, the limited access to higher education, funding, and the complications that accompany the securing of student loans deny students from low socioeconomic backgrounds from enrolling in higher education (Klein, 2015; Okrah & Adabor, 2010).

The purpose of this paper is to examine the sources of higher education finance available in Ghana and the U.S. and understanding how practices of neoliberalism have impacted them. The paper compares the higher education finance of Ghana and the U.S. due to their historical connection in education. It analyzes the goals of education, higher education enrollment, and expenditure in both countries. This paper aims to contribute to the literature on comparative higher education between Ghana (a “developing” country) and the U.S. (a developed country) who is more advanced in higher education and serves as a measure of a standard to other countries.

Background information
According to the United Nations, the U.S. is the third most populous nation in the world with a population of 329,064,917 in 2019, while Ghana has a population of 28,833,629 and serves as the forty-eighth most populous nation in the world. In 2019, there were about 19.73 million and 496,148 students enrolled in U.S. and Ghana higher education, respectively (Duffin, 2020; Sasu, 2020). According to a statistical report released by the National Accreditation Board, Ghana, there are about 230 institutions of higher education in Ghana. In comparison, the USA has about 4,360 (as of 2016/2017) degree-granting institutions of higher education (National Center for Education Statistics [NCES], 2017). Enrollment into higher education in both countries is optional and not compulsory as compared to basic education.

Over the years, the cost of higher education in Ghana and the U.S., and other countries have risen due to a reduction in federal government funding (Acheampong, 2010; Tulip, 2007). This reduction in funds, as a result, puts more higher education cost burden on students and parents, contributing to an increase in student loans. On average, 68% of students in the U.S. higher education graduate with about $30,000 in loans (Morton, 2018). According to a report by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES, 2019), the annual average cost of higher education in the U.S. was $24,300 for public four-year institutions and $50,300 for private four-year institutions for the 2017/2018 academic year. This applied to students who lived on campus. Students who lived with the family spent $14,400 and $39,900 in public and private schools, respectively. Those who lived off-campus without family spent $24,200 and $50,200 in public and private schools, respectively (NCES, 2019).
According to Enterversity (2021), a free university search engine for students in Africa, the average cost of higher education in Ghana for public institutions is between GH¢1400 ($243.45) to GH¢2100 (365.17). The cost of higher education in private institutions is between GH¢5,000 ($869.46) to GH¢9,000 ($1,565.03) (Enterversity, 2021). This amount is a little more expensive for the average Ghanaian. In order for students to become aware of these increments and the cost of higher education, it is vital that students are as well exposed to the different sources of funding available to them. Oseni et al. (2018) propose that one of the important aspects of education finance is the source of funding available to students. They argue that sources of funding should be explicitly stated in order to be able to synthesize with other sources of funding (Oseni et al., 2018).

Although Ghana was colonized by the British, the U.S. has a greater educational transfer role, a core ground for comparative education research, on Ghana. For example, an American concept of education, the Hampton-Tuskegee model of industrial education, was first borrowed by the Achimota College (now Achimota School) situated in Accra, Ghana, before it spread to other British colonies in Africa. (Steiner-Khamsi & Quist, 2000). During the 1920s, Phelps-Stokes Fund, a New York-based philanthropic agency, saw the spreading of the American education model (industrial education), which was mainly designed for African Americans in the Southern U.S., to the African continent. Ghana, then Gold Coast, became the first country to adjust to the education model of the U.S. (Steiner-Khamsi & Quist, 2000).

This educational transfer was spearheaded by America’s Booker T. Washington and Ghana’s James E. K. Aggrey, a co-founder of Achimota College (Newkirk, 2012). The historical connection between Ghana and the U.S. may have contributed to the increasing similarity in both countries’ education systems. Also, the U.S. has, over the years, become the number one study abroad destination for most international students from Ghana. For example, the U.S. recorded 4,221 international students in the 2019/2020 academic year, indicating a 15.3 percent increase from the previous year (Institute of International Education, 2021). The adaptation of the American education model by Ghana and the flow of international students shows the historical connection between the two countries. Yet, there is a dearth of literature comparing certain key aspect such as higher education finance between these two countries. This paper aims to address this gap in the literature. Hence the comparison.

**Literature Review**
This section reviews the literature on higher education funding, including performance-based funding, which has gained prominence in recent years. I summarize the findings of prior studies on the consequences of low public funding on students and families.

Public universities all over the world are affected by budget cuts from the increasingly inadequate government funding resulting in increased tuition and fees in countries where they exist and more so imposing them where until now did not exist (St. George 2006; Klein, 2015; Newman & Duwiejua, 2015; Salmi, 2003; Schugurensky, 2013). For example, tuition and fees are now enforced in places like Latin America and Europe, previously tuition-free. As a result of the steep rise in the cost of higher education, loan plans have
been introduced by several higher education institutions and countries over the years (Salmi, 2003). Examples of such loan schemes include the Stafford Loan and the Student Loan Trust Fund (SLTF) of the U.S. and Ghana, respectively (Darvas et al., 2017; Federal Students Aid, n.d.; Library of Congress, 2005). These loans are repaid by students after graduation (Salmi, 2003). As government funding for higher education continues to shrink, many OECD countries, including Ghana and the U.S., have implemented the performance-based type of funding.

Funding for higher education is being increasingly based on institutions’ performance, known as performance-based funding, which shifts higher education funding, normally based on factors such as enrollment and expenditure, to one based on results and outcomes. That is, state or public funds are linked directly to institution outcomes (Doh & Doh, 2013; Dougherty et al., 2014; Dougherty & Natow, 2015). In a new proposal for higher education funding in Ghana, performance-based funding was enacted as one strategy to distribute public funds to higher education institutions (Newman & Duwiejua, 2015). This means that one of the criteria for allocating public funds to any institution would be based on the output or contribution to the economy. The proposal referenced the performance-based funding used by the Tennessee Higher Education Council as a model (Newman & Duwiejua, 2015). The performance-based model, which began in the Tennessee U.S. in 1979, was in the form of bonus money aside from the base funding from the state. In the U.S., about 38 States had enacted performance-based funding in 2014 (Dougherty et al., 2014; Dougherty & Natow, 2015; Dougherty & Natow, 2019).

In a study to explore performance-based funding’s impact on state appropriation, Hagood (2019) found that performance-based funding was favorable to some schools over others. The results from the study indicated that this type of funding mostly benefits higher education institutions that are research-oriented, highly resourced, and highly selective but posed burdens to the low-resourced institution of higher education. The study found that performance-based funding may promote a winner-loser situation among schools by rewarding highly resourced institutions and punishing those with fewer resources. The author advised that a more equitable distribution of public funds that takes an institution’s resources into consideration be implemented in higher education.

Also, in a study on performance funding in the U.S. states of Ohio and Pennsylvania, Zumeta and Li (2016) found that there were differences in institutional strength to respond to the demands of performance-based funding adequately. Using purposeful sampling, the authors recruited and interviewed 42 administrators, faculty, and advisors. The authors found that performance-based funding has the likelihood of worsening the gap between the highly-resourced institutions and the least-resourced institutions (Zumeta & Li, 2016). The highly resourced institutions have all well-qualified faculty and staff and access to varied resources for meeting the requirements of performance-based funding. In contrast, institutions with fewer resources are not well-equipped to meet the requirements, creating winners and losers (Zumeta & Li, 2016). These studies suggest that performance-based funding is more favorable to higher education institutions that are well resourced, placing them in an advantageous position over those with fewer resources. This brings
about competition among institutions and creates a winner-loser dichotomy among schools.

Other studies in higher education funding have shown the challenges students and families face relative to the inadequate public funding (Asamoah, 2017; Goode, 2017). The cost of higher education and the reduction in government subsidies has become a barrier to accessing higher education. In a study to explore how the components of the U.S. 2-year community college model might be adapted by Ghana to address the limited access, limited facilities, inadequate programs, and high cost in higher education, Goode (2017) found that most participants attributed the barrier to higher education in Ghana to the high tuition cost especially to low-income students. Participants from the study noted that although loans and grants were available to students, the system of distribution was unfair to students from working-class and middle-class families. Similarly, Asamoah (2017) found that the high cost of tuition fees was a major challenge to students in Ghana. The findings indicated that, low-income students who make up the majority of the undergraduate student population could not afford the cost of their education. Participants also lamented the high cost in private institutions because they were excluded from receiving a share of the public fund.

The findings from this body of research suggest that the rising cost of higher education is a key concern to students and families, especially those from low socioeconomic backgrounds. Also, students from low-income backgrounds may not have the means to access available funding due to inequitable funding distribution mechanics.

**Theoretical Lens**

This paper utilizes the framework of neoliberalism in understanding higher education financing in Ghana and the United States. Neoliberalism refers to political and economic practices that minimize public interventions but prioritize free-market, free trade, and competition as the means through which institutions and people can achieve favorable and greater outcomes (Harvey, 2007; Stromquist & Sanyal, 2013). Neoliberalism emphasizes capitalism, privatization, and free market in public spaces (e.g., public institutions of higher education), increasing the influence of ones’ socioeconomic background in their educational trajectory (Weis et al., 2020). This system results in meritocracy, competition, and decentralization in higher education. It even contributes to the reduction in government funds for schools forcing higher education institutions to modify their curriculum to meet the demands of the international economy (Gyamera & Burke, 2018). Besides, guidelines of participation are now created through international organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which are now inevitable in almost every nation-state and "instantiates neoliberalism as a global set of rules" (Harvey, 2007, p. 23). Usually, countries affiliated with these superstructures are directed or mandated to adjust to the policies, such as reducing government funds to higher education institutions. This puts pressure on schools to increase tuition and fees, adjust their curriculum to reflect the international standards, and start to operate as a for-profit organization turning the university into a private good where students have to pay huge sums of money to purchase as any other good in the market. The pressure is mostly felt more by developing countries like Ghana, which have limited resources and receive
support from donors (Altbach, 2015; Harvey, 2007). In order to generate more income, institutions concentrate more on attracting international students into their programs, which raises their status on the international rankings of schools Lee, 2010). For example, international students contributed 41 million to the U.S. economy in 2018/2019 (National Association for Foreign Student Affairs [NAFSA], 2020). Previously, Ghana reserved five percent of admission slots to international students but is now proposed to increase to 15 percent, paying the full cost of their tuition (Badoo, 2013; Newman & Duwiejua, 2015). Also, the U.S. receives the highest number of international students, with about 1,075,496 international students. (Becker & Kolster, 2012; Institute of International Education, 2021). Neoliberalism also has the aim of just providing the skills that are needed by students in securing jobs in the global economy. In the introduction of their article “Neoliberalism and curriculum in higher education: a post-colonial analysis,” Gyamera and Burke (2018) talk about the adverse effect of neoliberalism to include the strong emphasis on the private sector as the foundation for a country’s development. As such, public institutions are pushed to generate income independently, which means cutting down the flow of government funding to schools (Gyamera & Burke, 2018). They also emphasized how neoliberalism favors some groups (elite) over others (low-income families) relative to access to higher education (Gyamera & Burke, 2018).

Data and Methods
The research was conducted using previous studies and documents. I searched for peer-reviewed articles on online libraries and journals as well as search engines like Google Scholar. I also obtained information on higher education finance from government institution websites for data on goals of higher education, college enrollment, sources of funding, and expenditure. In addition, I obtained information on higher education finance from books on comparative and international education. Lastly, I retrieved information that is hard to find in the literature from funding from higher education institution websites. Key-search terms used in this review included higher education finance in Ghana, higher education finance in the U.S., sources of funding for higher education in Ghana, sources of financial aid in the U.S., neoliberalism, knowledge-based economy, globalization of higher education, and Historical connection between Ghana and the U.S. These search terms helped in finding relevant information which informed this paper.

Goals of Higher Education in Ghana and the U.S.
In Ghana, the National Accreditation Board (NAB), which is under the Ministry of Education, is one of the agencies responsible for the regulation, supervision, and accreditation of tertiary education institutions. There is also the National Council for Tertiary Education (NCTE) and the National Board for Professional and Technician Examinations (NABPTEX). Recently, the NAB and the NCTE have been merged to form the Ghana Tertiary Education Commission (GTEC), which is mandated to regulate higher education. Although the GTEC had no specific mission or goal stated on its website at the time of this article, there were pieces of information in its strategic plan that focused on the creating a vigorous, world-class higher education capable of competing globally. Besides, there was an emphasis on the need to standardize government programs in all disciplines and utilize technology in its operations (GTEC, 2021). Also, the Ministry of
Education’s vision is to provide education relevant to students at all levels (Ministry of Education, Ghana, n.d.).

On the GES website, there is a mission statement that pertains to only the technical and vocational education division. The mission is “to create an enabling environment for the youth to acquire quality demand-driven Technical and Vocational Education Training (TVET) employable skills and general education to enable them fulfill the country’s TVET human resource requirements” (Ghana Education Service [GES], n.d., TVET section).

The goal of higher education in the U.S. is to "promote student achievement and preparation for global competitiveness by fostering educational excellence” (U.S. Department of Education, n.d.). Higher education goals in the United States vary due to their regulation by different private institutions. According to a report released by the U.S. Secretary of Education on March 21, 2019, the then president's executive order on higher education was "improving free inquiry, transparency, and accountability at colleges and universities" (U.S. Department of Education, 2019).

**Enrollment and Expenditure on Higher Education in Ghana and the U.S.**

In Ghana, investment in education as a percentage of GDP was 6-8% between 2011 and 2015, representing 22-27% of the Government’s annual expenditure. In recent years, this has declined to 3.9% of the GDP in 2018 for education in general and 1.2% in tertiary education in 2013, as last recorded by the World Bank (The World Bank, 2021). Also, 19.1% of the government budget for education is apportioned to higher education (Newman & Duwiejua, 2015). According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute of Statistics, Ghana had a total higher education enrollment of 15.7% in 2018, compared to 11.8% in 2011, with the former representing about 2,879,063 of the population aged 19 to 23. The total enrollment of female students increased from 8.9% in 2011 to 13.6% in 2018. On the other hand, enrollment for males increased from 14.5% in 2011 to 17.7% in 2018 (UNESCO Institute of Statistics, 2021).

The total gross enrollment ratio in higher education in the U.S. was 88.3% in 2018, with 102.4% and 74.9% gross enrollment for females and males, respectively (UNESCO Institute of Statistics, 2021). In the U.S., the overall college enrollment rate for young adults (18 to 24 years old) increased from 35 percent in the year 2000 to 40 percent in 2017. Enrollment for females increased from 38% in 2000 to 44% in 2018, while men's enrollment rose from 33% in 2000 to 38% in 2018 (NCES, 2020). Higher education outcomes vary from country to country depending on the investment made towards education. This can be measured in the number of students who complete higher education. Also, there is a higher percentage of women who have completed at least some college, according to the 2015 census. 60% of women had some college or more education as compared to 58% of men. Also, 32% of men and 33% of women had completed at least a bachelor’s degree. There were 12% of both men and women who had completed an advanced degree (Ryan & Bauman, 2016).

Furthermore, the U.S. federal government invests about $149 billion in higher education, representing 3.6% of the federal government's expenditure. The amount increases to
$1.068 trillion with funding from non-federal funding agencies (Data Lab, n.d.). In 2016, the total government and private expenditure on all institutions was 6% as a percentage of the GDP and 2.5% on higher education (NCES 2019). The U.S. government expenditure was 4.1% and 0.9% on all institutions and higher education, respectively (NCES, 2019). In other sectors like defense, health, and government pensions, the federal spend 5%, 8%, and 7% of the GDP, respectively (U.S. Spending, 2020).

Sources of Higher Education Funding in Ghana and the U.S.
Higher education in Ghana used to be free, just like basic education. However, in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the government could not increase and continue funds for supporting higher educational institutions due to low expenditure for higher education, and as a result, institutions of higher education had no choice but to charge high tuition fees (Dadzie, 2009). This was influenced by donor-backed policies and the World Bank’s initiative of supplementing public income with income by shifting higher education costs from the government to students, parents, and people who purchase higher education services. They also emphasized high spending for primary and high school education to create high demand for higher education (Asamoah, 2017; Britwum & Martins, 2008; World Bank, 1994). Since then, the government’s aid for supporting higher education now comes in the form of government grants that are often shown in the national budget for developing higher education institutions (tertiary education). This fund is not the kind of aid that is disbursed to a student to complete or pay for tuition but is distributed to the various public institutions of higher education by the government through the Ghana Education Trust Fund (GETFund) as opposed to the U.S. Pell grant that contributes directly in paying students tuition fees. Other sources of funds for higher education institutions emanate from local authorities, internally generated funds by the institutions, tuition, and international organizations such as the World Bank (Pius, 2014).

The GETFund is an initiative enacted by the Ghanaian government to support all levels of education in the country. The fund was established by law in the year 2000 through the nation’s parliament (Atuahene, 2006; Emeka, 2020). From the GETFund’s online homepage, the trust fund is mandated to providing “funding to supplement government effort for the provision of educational infrastructure and facilities within the public sector from the pre-tertiary to the tertiary level” (GETFund, 2021, par. 1; Atuahene, 2015; Newman & Duvie, 2015). This includes providing support to higher education institutions to acquire educational supplies and contribute to staff and research development. The trust provides aid in the form of scholarships and grants to needy but brilliant students. It also subsidizes academic facility user fees for higher education students. The GETFund, also a source of student loans, allocates money from its funds to support the student loan scheme’s running to offer loans to students in accredited higher education institutions (Atuahene, 2015; GETFund, 2021). According to Atuahene (2015), the GETFund, despite all difficulties, is “making significant contributions towards higher education development in Ghana in infrastructure, student development, faculty research, and staff support” (p. 21).

Another source of government aid to students in higher educations in Ghana is the Students Loan Trust Fund (SLTF). The SLTF is a source of government funding in the
form of loans for students in an accredited institution of higher education in Ghana. This trust fund was established in December 2005 under Act 820 of Ghana’s parliament to support higher education institutions and students who are needy (Atuahene, 2008; Students Loan Trust Fund, 2020). The main sources of funds for the trust include but are not limited to; money from the GETFund, voluntary contributions and contributions from the private, and loans from the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT). To qualify for SLTF, the applicant must first be a Ghanaian citizen and in need who is admitted to a nationally accredited institution of higher education for an academic program that is accredited by the National Accreditation Board. Besides, the student applicant must have a guarantor in order to be considered (Atuahene, 2008; Students Loan Trust Fund, 2020).

In addition to this, there are other forms of financial aids offered by the various higher education institutions in Ghana. An example is the Students Financial Aid offered by the University of Ghana as a measure to combat the increasing financial needs of their student applicants. This fund is awarded to brilliant but needy students. The fund pays for their academic fees and other expenses but contingent on the availability of funds. This could be in the form of a full or partial scholarship, on-campus work-study for students (University of Ghana, 2018).

The United States
In the U.S., federal student financial aid programs aim to assist students with or without low socioeconomic background. The federal student aid is categorized into three main types: (1) the federal aid, which consists of PELL grant, Stafford Loans, and Direct Plus Loan; (2) State Aid (merit and need-based scholarships); and (3) Institutional Aid. Firstly, the PELL grant, which is categorized under federal aid, is a subsidy provided by the federal government to students in need to pay for college. This aid is given mostly to undergraduate students but also some graduate students in certain post-baccalaureate programs. Students receive this aid by applying the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) and demonstrating need. Unlike loans, students who receive PELL grants do not have to repay. According to Federal Students Aid, the maximum PELL grant award for the 2020/2021 academic year is $6,345. In order for students to be eligible for this kind of aid, they need to be enrolled in a degree or certificate program at an accredited higher education institution to receive the aid. In addition to the aforementioned eligibility requirement, the students have to demonstrate financial need, maintain satisfactory academic progress (mostly a GPA of 3.0 or higher), and be registered with the selective service (Federal Students Aid, n.d.).

Secondly, the Stafford loans are low-interest rate loans that are awarded to undergraduate or graduate students. Stafford Loans can be subsidized or unsubsidized. Subsidized Stafford loans are awarded to students with financial needs with an interest rate of 4.53% that is usually paid by the federal government as they accrue. On the other hand, the unsubsidized Stafford loans are available to both undergraduate and graduate students and professional students (financial need is not required) with an interest rate of 6.08%, with the exception of undergraduates who pay 4.53%. Unlike the subsidized Stafford loan, borrowers of the unsubsidized Stafford loan are responsible for paying the accrued
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interest. Stafford loan borrowers are required to repay with a grace period of six months after school. However, there are extended repayment plans (Library of Congress, 2005; Federal Students Aid, n.d.). Also, there is the Parent Loan for Undergraduate Students (PLUS), which is available to parents in order to pay for their ward's college expenses with an interest rate of 7.08%. The federal loans are awarded through the U.S. Department of Education (Federal Students Aid, n.d.).

Aside from the federal aid discussed above, the United States also has State Aid awarded to students. The State Aid is in the form of grants or scholarships awarded to students as merit-based or need-based. Merit-based state aid is awarded based on academic performance, and receivers are not required to repay. On the other hand, need-based state aid is awarded to students who demonstrate financial need through the application (College Planning Center of Rhode Island, 2020; Federal Students Aid, n.d.). Lastly, there is also institutional aid in the form of grants to help recruit students into various programs in institutions of higher education.

According to the NCES (2019), 85% of first-time students in a four-year institution of higher education received financial aid in the form of Pell grants and loans in the 2016/2017 academic year. However, the percentage was 75 in the 2000/2001 academic year. These include all aids that went directly to the students but excluded loans paid directly to parents. These percentages include students in both public and private schools. This shows about a 10% increase in the number of students who depend on some form of financial aid to enroll in higher education.

Findings
This section of the paper outlines and discusses the findings from the analysis of the goals, enrollment, expenditure, and sources of funding in Ghana and the U.S. The first part analyzes the similarities between the two countries’ higher education relating to the limited access to education and the goals established for their higher education institutions. The second part analyzes the difference between the two countries.

According to Ghana's 1992 constitution, access to education at all levels in Ghana is supposed to be free to all irrespective of financial background, but this is not the case due to inadequate government funds to support higher education. Given that there is limited financial aid, especially for students from low socioeconomic backgrounds who may not have a personal guarantor to secure a loan from the SLTF, they would have to pay from pocket or forget about enrolling in higher education. The limited access to higher education and the complications of securing a student loan gives students with high socioeconomic background more access to higher education than those with low socioeconomic background (Okrah & Adabor, 2010). Also, the government is more committed to ensuring free secondary education for all and, as a result, allocates more funds to the secondary education sector. Similarly, education in the U.S. is intended to be accessible to all. However, not all students can enroll or graduate due to increased tuition, a decrease in government funding for schools, and the continuing financial barriers that limit the low-income family's access to higher education compared to their high-income
family counterparts (Tulip, 2007). This idea suggests that higher education is still not accessible to all citizens, whether in a super-power nation-state or a developing country.

The goals for higher education emphasize accountability and competition in both countries. A careful analysis of the established goals of higher education in Ghana and the U.S. seem to be geared towards competing in the global education sphere. It also reveals the demand for standardization and accountability across all higher education institutions. As a developing country, Ghana’s goal relative to education is focused on establishing a solid foundation for improving the quality of education, which seems like an indisputable vision for every developing country. However, there seem to be evidence of using neoliberal practices such as standardizing disciplines and creating competition among schools. Also, the goal of achieving a demand-driven form of higher education reveals the influence of knowledge-based economy (Sum & Bob, 2013). As a developed country and a super-power, the U.S. obviously has achieved a greater foundation and now seeks excellence in higher education through accountability. That is, the higher education goals in both countries seem to be influenced by neoliberalism, which prioritizes competition and commodifies higher education institutions (Harvey, 2010). Performance-based funding, a product of neoliberalism, has been enacted to enforce standardization, accountability, and competition among schools in the U.S. and lately in Ghana (Dougherty & Natow, 2019; Hagood, 2019; Zumeta & Li (2016).

The U.S. has more sources of funding than Ghana. In the U.S., there are more sources of financial aid available to students to pay tuition. These aids, such as the Pell grants and the Stafford loans, go directly to individual student accounts to pay their fees. In Ghana, there are limited financial aids to support students, especially those from underprivileged families. The government’s subsidy distributed to the various universities helps subsidize the fees for all regular students. This suggests that all regular students pay the same fee, which is subsidized by the government (Dadzie, 2009). This, however, does not apply to the fee-paying students who pay full fees without any subsidy from the government. Also, international institutions like the World Bank and the IMF contributed to cutting down funding for higher education in Ghana (Britwum & Martins, 2008; Dadzie, 2009). Ghana’s partnership with the World Bank and the IMF in the 1980s resulted in theStructural Adjustment Program (SAP) managed by these organizations. The World Bank and the IMF directed the government to reduce funding for higher education and rather increase expenditure for basic education (Britwum & Martins, 2008; Dadzie, 2009). The adaptation of the SAP ensured that demands of higher education did not divert the demands of the World Bank and the IMF (Britwum & Martins, 2008).

Female enrollment is less in Ghanaian higher education. In terms of gender, there are more males who enroll in higher education in Ghana than females. For example, Ghana had a 13.6% gross enrollment ratio for females enrolled in 2018, against a 17.7% gross enrollment ratio for males in the same year (UNESCO Institute of Statistics, 2021). On the contrary, the U.S. has more female enrollment than males in higher education. For instance, there was 102.4% gross enrollment for females in 2017, while males had a gross enrollment of 74.9% (UNESCO Institute of Statistics, 2021). Also, in 2018, Ghana had a
gross graduation ratio of 8.79% and 12.51% for females and males, respectively (UNESCO Institute of Statistics, 2021).

On the other hand, the OECD (2021) reports that females’ 2017 graduation rate in the U.S. was 66.9%, while males had 46.0%. This data shows the disparities in enrollment and graduation between genders in the two countries. It shows that the United States has more females enrolling in higher/tertiary education than males. However, this is not the case for Ghana, where more males enroll and graduate from higher education institutions than their female counterparts. This suggests that women in Ghana may not have attained equal access to higher education as men. Studies have found that access to higher education in Ghana favors males and those from high socioeconomic backgrounds than females and students from low-income families (Atuahene & Owusu-Ansah, 2013). In a doctoral dissertation written by Dadzie (2009), he commented on how families would rather send their boys to school other than girls due to the patriarchal nature of most Ghanaian societies where men are seen as the dominant or heads of families. The author also indicated how the colonizers sent boys to Europe to further their education, leaving behind girls (Dadzie, 2009).

The U.S. has a higher enrollment and graduation rate than Ghana. From the data, there seems to be a low enrollment and graduation rate in general in the case of Ghana compared to the U.S. This could be a result of the inability of the various institutions to increase their intake due to lack of infrastructural development and expansion of facilities. The limited facilities such as lecture halls, limited space libraries, and resources prevent institutions from admitting more students (Asamoah, 2017). Also, Acheampong (2010) found that the loans available to the students in Ghana are insufficient and that support from relatives was more reliable to the students who participated in the study. The available public funding for students is not enough to pay the high cost of higher education, especially the private sector, making enrollment and graduation favorable to students from high socioeconomic backgrounds (Asamoah, 2017; Atuahene & Owusu-Ansah, 2013; Yusif, Ishak, & Zulkifly, 2013). This shows a major characteristic of neoliberalism: favoring the elite over those from low-income families regarding higher education access (Gyamera & Burke, 2018).

**Conclusion**
This paper explored the higher education finance between Ghana and the U.S. as countries with a historical connection in education which continues to some extent in today’s higher education. The goals of both countries were outlined and discussed. The paper also explored the enrollment trend in each country and the extent to which each of the countries invests in their institutions of higher education. As a world “super-power,” the U.S. invests much more in education than Ghana, a developing country. This is manifested through the number of higher institutions established in the various countries and the sources of financial aid available to university students in both countries. Also, the gross enrollment rate in higher education, especially for females in the U.S., is much higher than that of Ghana. This could mean how well the United States is established in terms of gender policies to ensure equitable access to higher education by all genders.
Nonetheless, in all these disparities in Higher education between the two countries, there is a common ground for them all, and that is the diminishing government support in terms of funding to the schools and the students as well as the limited access to students from low socioeconomic backgrounds. This is seen as an adverse effect of neoliberalism, which considers privatization as the basis for every nation-state’s development. As a global rule, neoliberalism is enforced by superstructures such as the World Bank and the IMF, who see to it that countries make adjustments to their structures and policies, giving more power to free-market, private property rights, and capitalism. The pressure from these international organizations is usually felt by the developing countries more than the developed countries.

To understand the impact of the sources of funding in both countries, there should be more future research on the percentage of cost covered by these aids. Also, there should be future research on the awareness of these sources of financing available to students in both countries.

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Book Review

Qualitative data collection tools: Design, development, and applications by Felice D. Billups

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Where Do We Even Begin?

Research is not easy. Learning how to navigate qualitative research can be particularly murky. The three reviewers of Billups (2020) book, Qualitative data collection tools: Design, development, and applications, used the text during an introduction to qualitative research methods and analysis class within their Ph.D. program and strongly recommend it to other PhD students and early scholars. After completing foundational courses and learning about some of the belief systems that drive educational research, such as epistemology and ontology, it was time to tackle a research project. So what now? The three reviewers, all first year PhD students at the time, came to their qualitative course excited to work through pilot studies in their own focus areas. They had all spent time reading research studies, writing about potential research they would conduct, and discussing theoreticals, but this was the opportunity to design and conduct their own research. The reviewers found the following three sections particularly helpful when managing the logistics of their pilot studies to provide the “thick description” (Geertz, 1973) that is vital to qualitative research: (1) Researcher Role, Access, Trustworthiness, and Ethical Concerns, (2) Interview Protocol, and (3) Observation Tools. While these sections are not novel to the Billups text, the authors had read this type of guiding text in similar texts such as Cohen et al. (2007) and Creswell and Guetterman (2018), Billups’s writing is in digestible chunks that provide salient points to support getting out and conduct research. Furthermore, each chapter contains various templates that suggest ways to collect data for a research study. These templates were pivotal in the reviewers’ development of their pilot studies and three salient examples are provided below.

Researcher Role, Access, Trustworthiness, and Ethical Concerns (Chapter 3)

No matter which epistemological camp qualitative researchers situated themselves within, the vitally and conversation of their role as the researcher must be addressed.
Methodologists often state that the researcher is the tool, but actual application of that phrase is one that novice researchers can struggle to embrace. Billups addresses this struggle with a practical conversation of each facet and tools for implementation.

First, through the discussion of bias and positionality, Billups outlines how researchers need to provide transparency of who they are, what formed their experiences and beliefs, and how these components bring potential bias to their research practice. Through this, Billups suggests the inputs of building a quality transparent relationship through interviewing, transcribing, and addressing findings with participants. Struloeff found these strategies to be extremely helpful during her communication, interviews, follow-up, and presentation of findings with participants. Interviewing up, that is interviewing participants who hold a higher rank institutionally and socially than the researcher, Struloeff was able to offer transparency and authenticity allowing participants to feel heard, offer additional insights, and ultimately critically engage in their own reflections.

Billups created a table that provides the commonalities of rigor between quantitative and qualitative research with a space for the bridge between the two forms of research and the essential questions. This simple representation assisted Struloeff in understanding the terminology, approach, and parallels between the often dichotomous and contentious forms of research. Perhaps more importantly, it provided a starting point, language for discussion, and tactics for how to ensure credibility, dependability, transferability, confirmability, and authenticity. As qualitative research continues to gain recognition and traction, researchers must continue to strive for excellence, especially in the areas addressed in this chapter.

**Interview Protocols (Chapter 4)**

Interviews are often the crux of qualitative data collection. Billups first describes the strengths and limitations of an interview, the requisite characteristics needed for a skilled interviewer, and the various formats and types of interviews. What sets the Billups text apart from other books on qualitative research is that she then provides eight interview protocol templates for the researcher to use as models for their particular research study.

The first two templates are for unstructured and semi-structured interviews, respectively. Sterin found that having a visual example of what the interview protocol could look like extremely helpful. Billups includes placeholders for logistical information such as the date, time, and place at the top of the template as well as reminders about interview information and procedures to relate to the interviewee. When conducting multiple interviews over long periods of time this information may be helpful for accurate record keeping and consistency of depth of information given to the interviewee about the research study. Next, Billups includes an outline for the sequence of questions that includes bolded sections and a layout for the interview questions. As a novice researcher, Sterin found this guidance to be particularly useful both when designing her interview protocol and when justifying the question sequence in her description of the research design. Billups advises to begin with broad, introductory questions, then move to content questions with potential probing questions, and finally, to conclude with a summary question and an invitation to the interviewee to add anything else they would like to share.
Qualitative data collection tools: Design, development, and applications

on the topic. Sterin’s application of this last open-ended question proved to be notably fruitful when conducting her interviews. The templates conclude with a note to thank the interviewee and reminders about any follow-ups the researcher may want to engage in. After using this template, Sterin can attest to the value of including these final reminders within the interview protocol itself. During the course of an interview, it is easy for the researcher to become so engrossed with the content that they may benefit from having pre-written reminders for logistical next steps.

The third template is a note-taking recording sheet designed to capture non-verbal cues and templates 4 through 8 are specific to certain research designs including phenomenological, ethnographic, and narrative. Researchers looking to utilize these designs would benefit from these interview templates.

Observation Tools (Chapter 7)
Observations seem to be a straightforward process at first. Document what was said, by who, and the group dynamic. However, Billups sets the stage with the researcher needing to consider how they are coming to the observation. She uses Gold’s (1958) categories of a complete participant, observer as quasi-participant, researcher as participant, and complete observer as a consideration for how the researcher is approaching their observation and their level of involvement.

The concept of observing an established group as an outsider was challenging for Fornaro to approach. Additionally, due to COVID-19, the observation would take place on a web-based video conferencing platform. This meant that the field of view was contained to what was visible in each participant’s camera. Fornaro leaned heavily on two of the three templates provided by Billups that focused on creating a chart for the observation. Billups suggestion to observe “not just what is happening but what is not happening” (Billups, 2020, p. 133) is evident through her inclusion of “group interaction and behaviors, tone/mood” in Template 7.2. By including a similar topic for observation in the pilot studies observational chart, Fornaro was able to take note of how talking time and tone shifted between employees of an organization depending on their experience at the organization. As an outsider to an organization, having the templates from this text allowed Fornaro to stay focused throughout the observation and look for key interactions between participants that may have otherwise been missed.

Adding to Your Qualitative Toolbox
The sections above are just three of the chapters that contained templates that the authors directly related to their own process. Billups included templates and guidance for conducting discourse analysis, moderating focus groups, document analysis, reflecting on research, and synthesizing data sources in qualitative research. While each section is not exhaustive on these topics, they equip new or early qualitative scholars with the main ideas and tools to design, collect, and analyze quality data for their research projects which was what Billups set out to do with this text. The templates should be utilized as a living document for early scholars to build from and adjusted to their own contexts. Qualitative data collection tools: Design, development, and applications is a text that should be
included in early scholars’ libraries as they look to develop their first qualitative research projects.

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